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ABSTRACT 
The chronically ill participants in this study are vulnerable experts in life’s 
uncertainties, and have become aware over time of multiple medical and social 
needs and practices. But, unlike the hypo-aware respondents documented in 
some studies of diabetes mellitus Type 1, these research participants are also 
conscious of their inability to recognise when their own fluctuating blood glucose 
levels are rising or falling to extremes, a loss of hyper- or hypo-awareness that 
puts their lives constantly at risk. Particular sources of better life management, 
increased self-esteem and means of social (re-)integration are trained medical 
alert assistance dogs who share the human home, and through keen olfactory 
sensitivity, are able to give advance warning when their partners’ blood sugar 
levels enter ‘danger’ zones. Research studies in anthrozoology and 
anthropology provide extensive literature on historic and contemporary human 
bonds with domestic and/or wild nonhuman animals. Equally, the sociology of 
health and illness continues to extend research into care practices performed to 
assist people with chronic illness. This study draws from these disciplines in 
order to add to multispecies ethnographic literature by exploring human-canine 
engagement, contribution and narrative, detailing the impact each member of 
the dyad has on the other, and by observing the 'doing' of the partnerships' daily 
routines to ward off hypo-glycaemia and hospitalisation. In addition, the project 
investigates the place, role and 'otherness' of a medical alert dog in a 
chronically ill person's understanding of 'the-body-they-do'. The perspective of 
symbolic interactionism assists in disentangling individual and shared meanings 
inherent in the interspecies collaboration by examining the mutualistic practices 
of care performed. The often-flexible moral boundaries that humans construct to 
differentiate between acceptable use and unacceptable exploitation of 
nonhuman animals are questioned within ethics-of-care theory, based on the 
concept of dogs as animate instruments and biomedical resources.  
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Tina (her voice drops as she speaks): I just thought they’re going 
to come and find me dead.  
I: That must be frightening? 
Tina: Well, you’d go to bed of a night and sleep straight out so if 
they come, they haven’t got much to do...(she demonstrates as if 
lying on her back, legs together, arms close to her body,  
resembling an alabaster effigy of a medieval knight on a church 
tomb chest). 
I: So you were preparing? 
Tina: Yes, have I got everything clean and I’d get into my new 
pyjamas... 
1 Introduction 
 Complacency, likely created by ignorance, laziness or disinterest, allows 
all manner of negligence, unkindness and condescension to occur in everyday 
life. For example, an overheard coffee-shop conversation might reveal: ‘Oh, 
Jenny told me she’s got diabetes...’ Response: ‘Poor thing, no more cream teas 
for her. Did you see that film on ...?’  Instantly the unfortunate Jenny is 
disenfranchised, boxed into the category of invisibly-unwell individuals who 
could probably do something to improve their health if they made an effort. 
There is no endeavour by her friends to discover which type of diabetes was 
diagnosed, whether she might need to increase rather than decrease 
carbohydrate ingestion; it is as if Jenny has ‘a bit of a headache’. Complacency 
enables disparaging sympathy, even vague condemnation, and an avoidance of 
the need to care, to ‘do something about it’ or to question the significance of 
such a diagnosis. 
 When Tina, a participant in this research who has Type 1 diabetes, 
describes her long-term fight to live on her own and ‘survive’ frequent and 
lengthy hypoglycaemic collapses, any trace of complacency in my attitude to 
this illness is given a trenchant shake-up. Her consideration of the feelings of 
others, such as care-workers and undertakers, in the situation above is mind-
blowing and in total contrast to the attitude of my imagined café 
conversationalists. She adds: 'You get to the point in your life where you think, 
am I going to wake up? Or you spend all night up...' 
Tina could remain unconscious for four to five hours after a 
hypoglycaemic collapse at home. If she collapsed in the street, she recalls: 
People would just walk past. They’d think ‘you’re drunk’, and really 
it’s no different to what I’d do, but I was in desperate need, you 
know, for someone to know that I’m not right... 
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 Mentally ripped out of their comfort zone by the unexpected tearing of 
their corporeal mantle, people are often forced to discover alternative modes of 
social existence and other resources that enable coping with newly-shaped 
ways of being. One method of locating these is to talk of upsetting events and 
experiences with psychologists and physicians, and with those who have had 
similar disruptions in their lives.  Gradually and often uneasily, the altered 
selves are enabled to release stories of their embodied corruption and its 
forceful entourage of side effects. Sarah Nettleton exemplifies the significance 
of personal narrative: ‘When people have the opportunity to give voice to their 
experiences of illness, it becomes evident that their accounts are woven into 
their biographies’ (2013: 73).  
The voluntary participants in this study, who are accustomed through 
necessity to communicate personal illness and wellbeing issues to their family, 
work colleagues and members of healthcare professions, are therefore enabled 
to narrate tales of medical and social upheaval in their own lives as a result of a 
Type 1 diabetes diagnosis. They relate personal stories of internal and external 
bodily damage and repair; they laugh when they might weep over the obstacles 
that beset them in society and at home, and are grave when contemplating the 
life-changing experiences of others faced with unpredictable hurdles in similar 
minority groupings.  
They are expert but vulnerable witnesses to the inconsistencies and 
uncertainties of their lives and are conscious of the need for ongoing medical 
and social practices. They recognise when things are ‘out of synch’ within their 
embodied worlds and often, how to get the external world to intervene so they 
may adapt and achieve safe passage onwards. They are explorers and 
adventurers, consultants and chemists, who traverse the world of chronic illness 
and in so doing, reveal to others their best practices of self- and other-care.  
But they are also conscious of their inability to recognise when their own 
fluctuating blood glucose levels are rising or falling to extremes. This loss of 
hyper-(too high) or hypo-(too low) glycaemic awareness constantly endangers 
their lives. 
Particular sources of increased self-confidence and of companionship in 
social (re-)integration are the diabetes alert assistance dogs who share the 
human home and give advance warning when blood sugar levels enter ‘danger’ 
zones. Their keen sense of smell, combined with training by the charity, Medical 
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Detection Dogs, to perform active alarm signals, ensures the dogs retain a 
much-vaunted significance in the lives of their human partners. These are dogs 
(Canis familiaris) of diverse breeds and backgrounds whom those with Type 1 
diabetes credit with being life-savers and confidence-boosters, as having full 
membership both of their families and of the society in which their close 
interspecies relationships are situated. Adrian Franklin (2006: 142) relates this 
new concept, of companion animals being seen as ‘belonging’ to and becoming 
family, to a ‘hybridization of the family’ and not to imagined anthropomorphism 
whereby a dog’s qualities and characteristics are observed as ‘human-like’ (see 
also Milton, 2005). Importantly, the diabetes alert dogs are further considered to 
be fully deserving of respect, recognition and gratitude for their incomparable 
prowess in scent detection for human benefit. And the good-natured dogs 
seemingly acknowledge praise and reward as their wont, and accept the need 
to collaborate and tolerate, and to enact the requisite behaviours, as worthwhile 
and customary practices.  
As Franklin contends: 
Unproblematic similarities might include co-residence, enduring 
ties, emotional inter-dependence, friendship, company and shared 
activities. When this happens, it is important to realize that it is not 
a one-way, human-orchestrated attribution, but one built of close 
feelings and emotions self-evidently expressed also by the 
animals themselves (2006: 142). 
‘Shared activities’ and hybridized practices are prominent in the daily 
routines of the species under focus here. These interactive human and 
nonhuman animal partners are the central figures performing on the 
ethnographic stage of this research into trans-species co-existences and the 
practices of normalising lives unsettled by chronic illness; lives in bodies that fail 
to function as expected and desired in a human, but also lives that enable 
bodily adaptation, alteration, survival and the creation of new identities, through 
the exceptional sensory perception of a nonhuman animal. These closely united 
companions are actors whose ‘lines’, spoken and unspoken, and vivid images 
of life in chronic illness, animate and illuminate their interconnecting 
biographies. Following Irvine (2013: 5), their narrations become ‘resources, 
helping us understand and share what we find meaningful and what gives us 
purpose’.  
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To examine the symbiotic practices of care referred to in the project’s 
title, I use the perspective of symbolic interactionism (Irvine, for example, 2004, 
2007, 2012) to disentangle the shared meanings inherent in the co-existing 
partnerships who work together within the bounds of chronic illness. The 
ecofeminist-derived ethics of care theory (Hamington, 2008; Adams and Gruen, 
2014) supports exploration of interdependency and what it might be like to care 
and be cared-for (Taylor, 2014: 109) in a symbiotic human-nonhuman co-
existence.  
Ethics of care theory also enables questioning of the elastic moral 
boundaries that humans construct to differentiate between the use and the 
exploitation of others. A firm moral stance needs to be considered and activated 
to avoid abuse and cruelty in human-nonhuman animal interactions. Symbiosis 
enables the pairing of unlike couples so that at least one member of the 
partnership gains benefit, be it improved self-worth, nutrition or increased ability 
to achieve reward. Under the symbiosis umbrella huddle parasitism, 
commensalism and mutualism (refer Leung and Poulin, 2008) and it is 
mutualism in this canine-human coexistence that motivates and leads towards 
acceptance of certain morally justifiable interspecies usages.  A mutualistic and 
therefore moral form of usage can impel development of credible and ethical 
multispecies collaboration, even unification, when compared to the unethical 
exploitation of commodified nonhuman animal masses. 
The project investigates the importance of animal 'mattering' (Irvine, 
2013; Law, 2004; Rollin, 2011) in exploring the question: 'how do chronically ill 
people engage with medical alert assistance dogs in their self- and other- care 
behaviours and in their lives?' The responses offered by clients of the charity, 
Medical Detection Dogs (MDD), record and explore action and performance, the 
doings and re-shapings of life with chronic illness, by themselves and their 
MDD-trained working canine companions as they together effect and 
experience best practices that maintain lives worth living, lives that matter to 
more than one lone being. 
The complexities examined and resolved by these multispecies 
practitioners in their everyday lives enables a visible becoming of an emotional, 
familiar, self- and other-respecting amalgamation; a dyad identifiable as 'one-
self'. Gazing into, and reflecting on these harmonising coexistences enables an 
ethnographic contribution to the social sciences, drawing attention to innovative 
  
10 
 
multispecies health care practices and raising awareness of the multi-
disciplinary science of anthrozoology. Anthrozoology is a recent but significant 
addition to the social sciences, as John Bradshaw (2017) affirms in the title of 
his most recent volume: The animals among us: the new science of 
anthrozoology. It emphasises a present and future need for an ethics that is 
involved in, allows for and advocates multispecies' dependencies and 
interdependencies. 
Students in this fast-developing field explore the relationships and 
interactions - whether collaborating or conflicting, whether bringing risk or gain 
to either or both - that are shared by human and nonhuman animals. An attempt 
is made to avoid, as far as possible, an anthropocentric bent and an ontological 
assumption that the 'other' is an already fully-known and understood being, and 
further there is effort to engage in self-reflection to encourage challenges to 
human interpretations and analyses of nonhuman animals. 
Embedded in and emanating from this 'new science', this project studies 
domesticated healthy members of the canine species, who are educated to 
make use of their olfactory sensitivity in working for unwell members of the 
human species, and examines their situatedness, attempting also to 
comprehend their perspectives. Unlike anthropology, which investigates 
humans and their cultures, for the most part ignoring nonhuman animal 
participants' impact in such cultures, and sociology, which has refused 
acknowledgement of the nonhuman animal's position in our society until very 
recently (Irvine, 2012), anthrozoology borrows evidence from many disciplines 
including the aforementioned, and for example, from those of philosophy, 
geography, biology and psychology in order to accentuate the significance of 
'other' animal species in our evolutionary coexistences.  
Research literature already published in regard to multispecies 
entanglements within the field of health and illness is examined to provide a 
broad backdrop to the innovative influence that working scent-detecting dogs 
are having on chronic illness. This project is based on the anthropological and 
sociological intentions to make the familiar, strange, and the strange, familiar. In 
the words of Raymond Madden (2014: 281). 'we all know that a close and 
knowing experience with some "other" (regardless of their relative strangeness 
or familiarity) can be a transforming experience'. So this study aims to make a 
space for anthrozoological research on the shelves of social science by 
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sourcing meanings and extending knowledge of the efforts by both dogs and 
humans to do daily life better together; indeed to do a life of vibrancy that leads 
to an improved method of survival in chronic illness, and engenders increased 
enthusiasm for the possibilities of ethical transformation in those multispecies 
lives. 
1.1 Humans and other animals: the familiar and the foreign  
Humans and other animals, or human and nonhuman animals, are newly 
talked of as a single collective, one that enables us to imagine we are of the 
same ilk and of similar classification, one that enables us anthropocentrically to 
feel more comfortable about be(com)ing with (Maurstad, Davis and Cowles, 
2013) or being alongside (Latimer, 2013) those whose discourse and gait are 
mostly at variance with human modes of communication and mobility.  
However, there remains a pronounced divide between human and 
nonhuman animals encouraged by the frequent use of ‘non’; such wording 
segregates one species from the other just as effectively as more-than-human 
or other-than-human equally succeed in distancing those with whom we might 
want to live more closely. Hurn (2012) notes the terms nonhuman or other-than-
human animal may be used to show that humans are also animals, but the 
good intention also highlights an opportunity to emphasise human 
anthropocentricity.  Talking about human exceptionalism, Hurn reminds that 'the 
humanist approach has been guilty of taking humans out of context and putting 
them on a pedestal' (2012: 205). However, to mitigate for such human error, 
she draws attention to the greater opportunity for choice and 'liking' among 
friends than our already-selected family members; thus 'when humans choose 
to take responsibility for the welfare of another animal, one of the reasons for 
doing so is because of some spark of mutual attraction, or a recognition of 
personhood across the species barrier' (Hurn, 2012: 109).  
Would we therefore perhaps be better off by talking of humans and 
animals as (potential) allies, colleagues and friends, and retreating from what 
may sometimes seem an overly-fastidious attempt to make ourselves into a 
more-than-similar species when we anyway majorly belong to the taxonomic 
‘kingdom’ of Animalia? 
The use of ‘other’ can also distance humans from those creatures with 
whom we wish to communicate, collaborate and co-exist. ‘Othering’ produces 
disenfranchisement, no matter how it is induced; it highlights mental and 
  
12 
 
physical differences that can lead to alienation, isolation and a discrediting of 
that other’s identity. It is an encouragement or stimulus of alterity that 
intentionally conjures more than difference – it may create distance, provoke 
ageism, racism, sexism or speciesism, inviting objectification of nonhuman 
animals to the 'status of lesser beings' (Hurn, 2012: 25) and the oppression of 
minority groupings (also Nibert, 2002). But, in the perhaps comforting words of 
Rosa Braidotti (2009: 526), ‘a bioegalitarian turn is encouraging us to relate to 
animals as animals ourselves’. Such movement denounces ‘modes of 
embodiment, in the sense of both dialectical otherness (nonwhite, 
nonmasculine, nonnormal, nonyoung, nonhealthy) and categorical otherness 
(zoomorphic, disabled, or malformed)’ and enables ‘rich new alliances’ (2009: 
529). 
As people concerned with the integration of multiple species, we may 
therefore hope these ‘others’  become accustomed to accepting our more 
considered ways of being with and behaving towards them, so they may 
eventually recognise, enjoy and seek out harm-free inter-species inclusivity, 
compatibility and friendship. We may hope too that, through improved 
knowledge of a symbiotic ethics of care and better human ‘management’ of wild 
and feral other species, there will be a reduced exhortation for the extinction of 
their free-roaming natural lives through culling or sterilisation. 
Involving images of the domesticated animal ‘other’, rather than the still-
wild nonhuman animal, this project intends to highlight a microcosm of society 
in which both human and nonhuman animals succeed in cooperating and 
communicating to achieve a ‘rich new alliance’, an interspecies mutualistic co-
existence – a form of functioning, mostly stable homeostasis that is not only 
physiologically, but also socially successful. This co-embodied way of living 
negates the anthropocentric historical drive for dominance and control over 
domesticated companion animals explored by Ingold (2000) and Palmer (1977) 
and further contemplated by Tuan (2007: 148): 
Power over another being is demonstrably firm and perversely 
delicious when it is exercised for no particular purpose and when 
submission to it goes against the victim’s own strong desires and 
nature  
Instead, the shared way of life and the inter-subjective appreciation of 
each other’s capabilities under discussion in these pages, also frame inter-
dependency – a need by each for the other – and mutuality – an avoidance of 
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intentional harm by one to the other. A trans-species co-existence is activated in 
which interconnectedness is paramount and alterity takes a more positive turn 
in reducing the significance of differences in appearance, linguistic skill and 
degrees of sentience and in illuminating the similarities and capacities for 
mutual understanding. The alien ‘other’ animal visage that has been expected 
and accepted by society instead becomes a familiar one and no longer 
accentuates Cartesian distinctions between human and nonhuman animals.  
As postscript to this section, I draw attention to Kendra Coulter’s (2016b: 
201) consideration of her readers and of the nonhuman animals of whom she 
speaks: ‘For linguistic efficiency, [...] and to avoid continuously identifying others 
in relation to but one of the species they are not, I use terms like people, 
humans, women, men, and so forth for homo sapiens, and refer to nonhuman 
animals as animals, or by their species or common name’. However, in this 
writing, as will become obvious, I have intentionally maintained the use of 
’human’ and ‘nonhuman’, or ‘more-than-human’, ‘other-than-human’, animals as 
terms to illustrate how language does differentiate categories, and to 
emphasise, irritatingly drawn-out as these identifiers may be to the reader, how 
such differentiation may further divide rather than meld multispecies existences. 
One method of ensuring that trans-species communication is consistently 
shared between, for example, a horse, acting as a nonhuman animal, and an 
equestrienne, as a human rider, is the co-embodiment of mobility and emotion 
in their working recognition of ‘feel’. 
1.2 Becoming 'one-self' 
Global scrutiny and knowledge of other-than-human animals becomes 
meaningful only when there is human recognition and engagement with these 
‘animate objects’ (Czerny, 2012: 8) in inter-personal relationships. Such 
engagement and performance, acted out between the medical alert assistance 
dog and the human with Type 1 diabetes, endow significance that affects both 
species beyond the visible partnership. Identity becomes a shared image not 
only in the eyes of the human partner but also under the searching gaze of 
society.  
This study involves dogs and humans 'doing' diabetes (Mol and Law, 
2004; Mol, 2008) and reflects Ingold's (2013) research in which he encourages 
demolition of Agamben's (2004: 33-38) 'anthropological machine' that separates 
humans from 'the continuum of organic life' (Ingold, 2013: 8). He suggests 
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action begins by thinking of humans and all other beings 'in terms not of what 
they are, but of what they do' (Ingold, 2013: 8, italics in text). And further, 'to 
think of ourselves not as beings but as becomings - that is, not as discrete and 
pre-formed entities but as trajectories of movement and growth' (Ingold, 2013: 
8): becomings who work to 'forge' ways forward and 'guide the ways of 
consociates' (2013: 8). 
In the world of assistance dogs too, there are those who 'forge ways 
forward and guide the ways of consociates' (Ingold, 2013: 8),  be they diabetes 
alert dogs or the service dogs who 'guide' their sight-impaired human partners. 
There is a becoming of a unique entity, a becoming of ‘one-self’ that involves a 
mutual understanding gained through effort and practice, discovered by Rod 
Michalko (1999) in the always-developing symbiotic relationship conducted 
between himself and his assistance dog, Smokie. Perhaps this is more a ‘co-
becoming’ concept that is also gaining prominence in natural horsemanship 
where ‘embodied collaboration’ is felt within some, although not all, human-
equine partnerships (Birke and Hockenhull, 2015: 82). The co-embodiment of 
‘feel’ provides an important human means of gauging equine temperament and 
movement, the horse’s most apposite ‘way of going’. ‘Feel’ allows the 
nonhuman to respond to questions asked of him or her, and the human to 
comprehend that response so that a communication channel becomes open to 
an unspoken two-way flow of information. 
‘Feel’ may be considered instinctive and derived through emotion, but it 
is also sourced through vision, from seeing and reading ‘a different look in a 
horse’s eyes, ear positioning and tail swishing’ (Coulter, 2016a: 35) as well as 
from the physically tactile, minute muscle movements continuously 
communicated between horse and rider, or between horse and human-
guardian. as perceived in the tale of Clever Hans (Despret, 2004). Despret 
remarks Pfungst’s (1988) claim that horses are good at reading muscle-
movement and that they ‘read the mind of their rider through the pressure of the 
bit’ (2004: 114). Good riders today might better have the horse read their minds 
through the ‘minute muscle movements’ learned from intuition and feeling than 
from the controlling influence effected by a human’s sometimes severe pressure 
on the metal bit in the horse’s mouth. A thinking rider produces a co-embodied 
‘feel’ that enables the horse to ‘reproduce’ (Despret, 2004: 115) the rider’s 
thoughts in actively performing a wanted movement. 
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Lynda Birke (2008: 113) highlights an increasing recognition of equine 
signs of comfort and discomfort in horse-human partnerships.  ‘Touch‘, a more 
obviously tactile version of the co-embodied ‘feel’, may elicit an unspoken, 
comfortable and comforting comprehension of the equine partner; although not 
of course when produced by Ingold’s (2000: 307) ‘tools of coercion’, the whip or 
spur, that touch a horse’s flanks as ‘aids’ to encourage performance.  
However, touch may fittingly contribute to interspecies communication 
and so succeed in explicating the need for, and the production of, empathy and 
compassion and the importance of these emotional attributes in the lives of 
intermingling species. A clear example appears in Donna Haraway’s ‘touching 
comfort’ (2008: 202-204) where an interspecies tactile closeness between dog 
and human results in the assuaging of reciprocal need. A similar ‘touching 
comfort’ was observed at a country hospital where a cat lay draped over the lap 
of an elderly bedridden woman who never appeared to have contact with 
human visitors beyond the nursing staff. Repetitively she stroked the cat, the cat 
purred soothingly and settled closer to her; both gave and received mutual care, 
increasing each other’s levels of oxytocin, known variously as the ‘love’ or ‘hug’ 
hormone. Odendaal and Meintjes (2003) found that oxytocin levels almost 
doubled in 18 participants and in their dogs when the humans touched and 
stroked their nonhuman companions. Fine and Beck (2010: 11) suggest that 
their study ‘highlights the enormous physiological impact that animals have or 
could have on our lives’, impact that is slowly being recognised in human-
animal studies and animal-assisted interventions. 
1.3 Facilitators of human-human relationships 
A stranger’s conversational gambit may be addressed to the canine as 
often as to the human when the interspecies dyad walk down a street or 
through a public park – and an ensuing presumptive dialogue may be 
expressed by the human/s on behalf of the dog. Hurn (2012: 102) suggests that 
dogs can be ‘effective “ice-breakers”’ when it comes to forming new social 
relationships; although some unruly1 companion canines may inevitably ruin 
potential human partnership formation.  
                                                          
1
 Having considered ‘unruly’ to describe over-excited or bouncy behaviour,  perhaps it more 
correctly signifies ‘unable to be ruled’, or controlled, inevitably by human pressures, and 
becomes an example of anthropocentrism in dominance and objectification – which was not the 
original intention. 
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Participant Terry achieves mobility with the aid of a wheelchair but says 
he is ‘below most people’s eyeline’. However, he continues: 
It’s a case that people see the wheelchair and they don’t want to 
know; people see the dog and they come and talk to you, so the 
dog is a bit of an ice-breaker, they talk to disabled people because 
they’ve got a dog; they want to know what he does and about the 
charity. 
Sanders (1990: 662-668) claims that in general ‘companion animals act 
as facilitators of human-to-human interactions’, and goes on to suggest that 
human animal-companion animal social exchanges acknowledge ‘co-
participation in the encounter, mutual definition of the perspective of the other, 
imaginative estimation of the other’s intentional definition of the situation, and 
mutual adjustment of behaviour’.  
How guide dogs impact the identity of people with visual impairments is 
the focus of Sanders’ research (1990) and his words retrieve memories of a 
conversation held with a bereaved elderly resident of a bustling city who had 
previously walked her now-deceased dog in the camaraderie of other dog-
walkers in a neighbourhood park (Eason, 2011). She sadly remarked: 
I went to the park alone after she died.  People with their dogs 
came up to ask where my little dog was – they’re well-meaning but 
it’s too painful.  I won’t go back to the park anymore. I’m too old to 
have another dog, my sight’s failing and I can’t risk falling down 
again.   But I do miss the companionship... 
Those few words exhibit the loss of social friendships, both human and 
non-human, the loss of exercise, emerging signs of physical frailty and 
emotional isolation, and the destructive loss of reason to care. 
 Lynette Hart (1995: 166) and Leslie Irvine (2013) are among researchers 
citing a study by Adell-Bath et. al. (1979) in which 83% of 259 Swedish dog-
owners agreed that ‘my dog gives me the opportunity of talking with other 
people’ and 79% also agreed with the statement ‘the dog makes friends for me’. 
Hart avers that ‘dogs seem to display an inexhaustible willingness to form and 
sustain partnerships with humans’ (1995:167), illustrating this with an example 
of the partnership between service dogs and people in wheelchairs ‘who come 
to be seen by other people as a team, more predictably together than any 
mother and child, marital couple or pair of siblings’ (Hart, 1995: 167).  Such 
shared identity, exemplified above by participants Terry and his curly-coated 
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assistant, Jim, and the always-present but unnamed wheelchair, will be 
returned to later. 
Similarly viewed as teams are the other interspecies dyads also 
participating in this study who occupy the time and space of their everyday 
existences weighed down by the dominative burden of chronic illness. Good 
management of this largely invisible load is intrinsic to the human’s survival, and 
in certain respects to the dog’s health and welfare, too. There is reciprocal 
responsibility in catering for effective mutual care. These canine-human 
partnerships are compelled to take ownership of the chronic illness that is Type 
1 diabetes, to care for it, enact its routines, carry it from room to room, from 
home to work, to shopping mall or medical institution, to draw out blood and 
replenish insulin to assuage its needs and stresses; to be conscious of its 
fluctuating symptoms and pay homage in the form of insulin donation and 
calorific balance. Inept lifestyle management is not to blame for a Type 1 
diabetes diagnosis, a lifetime Sword of Damocles which requires consistent 
care and attention to preclude its fatal downward trajectory. 
Essences, ethics and practices of care guide or direct much of the social 
interactions in life, whether in school, home, institution or workplace: who and 
what we care about, for and of (Haraway, 2008; Mol, 2008; Mol, Moser and 
Pols, 2010; Pols, 2012; Van Dooren, 2014; Taylor, 2014; Coulter, 2016b). 
Material goods and ethereal yearnings, the animate and inanimate causes of 
pleasure and pain, variations on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943) 
motivating survival...the power in ecologies and in governments.  
If we fail to care about or for our fellow human and nonhuman animals – 
and there are of course those who pathologically find regard or respect for 
others impossible to express within acceptable social norms – there would be 
little point in continuing to journey through our seemingly brief spell of existence. 
So care is a prominent feature when traversing our own lifescape, providing 
opportunity to investigate other lives, to excavate and interpret illness and its 
attendant biopsychosocial requirements and practices. Ethics guiding moral 
care practices, and mutual performances of care activity performed in symbiotic 
relationships, are investigated more fully in a later chapter, much of it integrating 
the research of Adams and Gruen (2014); Coulter (2016); Taylor (2014) and 
Zamir (2006). 
1.4 Multispecies cooperation 
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‘To succeed in life, you need to work together – pursuing the struggle for 
existence, if you like – just as much as you strive to win the struggle for 
existence’, stresses Nowak (2011: xvii) in urging global cooperation. And it is to 
encourage multispecies cooperation, and human understanding of such 
collaboration in this struggle for existence and success in life, that is the 
endeavour of the following pages. 
Hamilton and Taylor (2013: x) research ‘the “hows” of daily life spent 
working with animals - in relation, among other contexts, to experiences of 
farming and slaughter, safe places for the unwanted, veterinarians who care for 
the welfare of small animals - by examining the ‘complex steps, interactions and 
negotiations’ necessary for a better perspective and understanding of how 
animals matter in diverse places of work. In similar vein, Coulter (2016: 146) 
draws attention to the way in which nonhuman animals can become ‘partners 
and friends’ and/or ‘useful commodities or tools’ when they are perceived as 
workers. Their lives may improve or may not, dependent on ‘context’ (2016: 
146) and on the ways in which they ‘matter’, are recognised and integrated into 
multispecies society, or are rejected.  
Prepared separately for a meeting that may join them almost literally ‘by 
the hip’ for their future co-existences, once ‘matched’, and only from that 
moment of onward bonding, the interspecies dyads become what Higgin (2012: 
74) terms ‘works-in-progress’ and members of Haraway’s ‘lively knottings’ 
(2008: vii). Although conventional medical technologies and laboratory-derived 
medications have position and purpose in these species’ managements of daily 
life, it is the warm-blooded intertwined care of and by each being - framed by 
innovative biomedical technology and structured within the values and 
guidelines of a code of symbiotic ethics of care - that is analysed under the 
ethnographic microscope.  
Assistive inanimate technologies, for example, the test strip, insulin pump 
or glucose monitor, or the white stick aiding visually-impaired individuals with 
Type 1 diabetes, all facilitate life compromised by chronic illness. However, 
when examined alongside the dog’s exceptional olfactory abilities and 
companionable behaviours which do more than merely facilitate the diabetic 
person’s continuing aliveness, it becomes evident that this animated resource 
leads to far greater enhancement and enrichment of the human’s hold on life 
and being-well. 
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When beginning this project, I imagined that the human participants 
would fall under the ‘disabled’ label, a classification freely and stereotypically 
bandied about in ‘Western’ society. I prepared readings from ‘disability studies’ 
relating to minority groups of those disenfranchised and ignored because of 
bodily malfunction (refer Tom Shakespeare, 2014: 101-106, who expands 
research on challenges to disability identity), or because they were born 
nonhuman, sentient but suffering from condemnation under human social 
norms and constraints. Further readings related to animal rights to have 
personhood, and advocacy for the freedom of domesticated species to enter 
public places, shops and libraries, schools and hospitals, whether as assistance 
animals or not. 
But, when I met those who volunteered to participate as human-canine 
partnerships in this research, my imaginings became clouded, and anticipated 
images seemed unworthy of association with respondents of either species.  
Instead I learned that, as one human participant succinctly put it, ‘this is normal 
for me, this is my normal way of life’. Shakespeare (2014: 102) cites Linton 
(1998: 12): ‘The question of who “qualifies” as disabled is as answerable or as 
confounding as questions about any identity status. One simple response might 
be that you are disabled if you say you are’. Despite difficulty with aspects of 
mobility, this participant is by no means un-able and has altered and ordered his 
environment to suit his abilities and preferred lifestyle, at the same time doing 
best practices to satisfy the needs of the human and canine companions 
sharing his home.  Similarly, the blind lawyer cited by Rod Michalko (1999: 118) 
describes his condition:  
I don’t think of myself as disabled. I’m like everyone else. I just 
happen to be blind. Blindness is no big deal. All it is is a nuisance 
and an inconvenience. Like any other nuisance, it can be 
overcome. There’s lots of technology around, especially 
nowadays. 
 For Michalko, the technology is his guide dog, Smokie; for others, it may 
consist of a white stick or walking frame, and for participant Terry, technology 
involves both a wheelchair and a medical alert assistance dog, Jim. The two 
pieces of 'equipment' enable him  
to go on my own to the football because I don’t need anyone – I 
mean it’s nice to take a carer and have somebody else to talk to, 
but it’s also nice to just go out on your own, to have the freedom to 
go out on your own, which I had lost. 
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Although Terry is lauding Jim's companionship and the scenting abilities 
that give him 'freedom' on the one hand, he also seems to appreciate going out 
'on his own' as if Jim is a useful instrument or an invisible chaperone rather than 
'someone', albeit that this someone lacks vocal speech comprehensible to a 
human ear. The concept of companion animals as tools or technologies is 
discussed in a later chapter. 
As Charmaz (1995: 657) explicates, adaptation to living with impairment 
calls for changing ‘life and self to accommodate to physical losses and to 
reunify body and self accordingly’. Life and self adaptation enable a becoming-
normal that concurs with Schillmeier’s (2014: 1) suggestion that the 
cosmopolitics of illness make us conscious not only of the normativity of 
embodied social relations, but also the practices and procedures shaping 
‘normal bodies’.  
The experiences of illness trouble the practices and relations of 
our embodied life, the more so if these illnesses are life 
threatening, infectious, and/or resist to be [sic] curable.  
So opines Schillmeier (2014: 1) in the introduction to Eventful bodies: the 
cosmopolitics of illness. These cosmopolitical events lead to conscious 
visualisation of ‘the unsettlement of embodied human life’, and provide insight 
into ‘the complex and powerful practices of normalizing embodied human 
relations’ (italics in text). 
Other members of society might observe disablement or impaired ability 
as reasonable causes of anger or frustration but, to the ‘owners’ of a chronic 
illness, difficult circumstances are the norm, not the extraordinary, and issues of 
risk or hazard inherent in their illness, tend to provide challenge, but do not 
necessarily provoke continual rage or depression. A sense of purpose and an 
ongoing mindful determination accompany participants in this research who live 
life differently after a ‘hypo-unaware’ Type 1 diabetes label is affixed to their 
medical records.  
Sara was diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes when in her thirties. 
Describing her chronic illness, she shrugs her shoulders as if attempting to 
shake it off: 
Well, you have to learn to cope, don’t you? You can’t not; you 
can’t take it off and put it in the bin and say I’m finished now. It 
doesn’t work like that... 
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Similarly, Janet, a long-term possessor of a variety of severe health 
difficulties including Type 1 diabetes, has become resigned to the vicissitudes 
that upset routine and best practice: 
A lot of it was (done) on autopilot. The one thing with having a 
long-term condition is that you get used to having lots of 
knockbacks and you just think, right, I’ll get myself through it...find 
a way. 
Despite the many ‘knockbacks’, participants speak openly and candidly 
about their efforts to navigate the complexities of life with Type 1 diabetes, their 
endeavours to swim through riptides of institutional bureaucracy and to surf 
waves of internal discomfort.  The pitch of their voices rises and falls, the pace 
of their speech quickens, dawdles, halts and speeds up again as they recollect 
good days and bad times. They re-live experiences with gesture, facial and 
vocal expression, and the companion dogs sit and listen, watch and wait, tip 
their heads to one side or other, raise a questioning eyebrow, or occasionally 
sniff and nudge to remind the human partner to test their blood sugar levels. 
Often exhausted by the daily physical and mental battering that is generally 
concomitant with chronic illness, the human participants appear resolutely 
determined to perform to the best of their abilities so as to attain goals and 
standards of life that realistically may only become achievable through the 
assistance of their medical alert dogs. 
1.5 Aims and objectives 
The study’s general aim is to contribute to anthrozoological research that 
examines human-nonhuman animal interactions and experiences within 
medical and social contexts, at the same time increasing public knowledge of a 
potentially fatal, rarely visible, chronic illness. The sometimes tempestuous 
odorous symptoms of illness are consistently revealed to canine olfaction, but 
fail to present many Type 1 diabetic people, or their human companions, with 
recognisable signs warning of an approaching hypoglycaemic episode that may 
result in emergency hospitalisation. 
A more particular objective is to draw on aspects of the conceptual 
approach developed by Mol and Law (2004: 16) who examine hypoglycaemia in 
terms of ‘the body we do’. Their approach points to self-practices which are 
enacted by the chronically ill in order to evade an unwanted early demise: 'one 
does not hang together as a matter of course', they remind (2004: 1). Such 
necessarily active self-practices are conducted to prevent the body collapsing, 
  
22 
 
to keep the individual’s unpredictable world whole and any errant corporeal 
pieces glued together to avoid ‘leaky' boundaries (Mol and Law, 2004: 11). If 
the required self-practices and behaviours fail to be performed effectively, death 
may result. 
In addition, this project intends to contribute to the practices of 
multispecies data collection and ethnographic analysis, exemplified by Kirksey 
and Helmreich (2010), through a lens magnifying now familiar domestic 
coexistences: the lives of dogs and their companions in human-structured 
homes. An objective being to reveal the choreography balancing and 
unbalancing human-nonhuman performances within chronic illness;  a 
choreography of practices chiefly directed by canine olfactory sensitivity. In this 
are dances embellished with attendant artefacts - the blood test kit, the insulin 
pen, the packet of jelly-babies, the dog treats and the illness-identifying jacket; 
and the music of the beep-chirp monitor, the whine or bark of the alerting dog, 
the thump-hiss of the fridge door and the pop of an opening sample-jar lid used 
in training, or the human sigh of relief or annoyance at the monitor reading of 
blood glucose levels. All these are familiar environmental factors surrounding 
the human-canine partners as they weave their essential patterns for life. 
A further intention is to discover the active efforts made by nonhuman 
animals to communicate with their human companions, and to examine the 
discourses contributed by the human element to communicate with members of 
these partnerships who do not share a common language.  
James Clifford (1986:108) writes of the different ‘voices’ that emerge 
from an ethnographic discourse; voices that agree with or counter others’ 
dialogical pathways, providing concurring or contrasting commentary. In this 
research, such voices belong to Medical Detection Dogs’ clients who live with 
Type 1 diabetes and are knowledgeable through past and present experiences; 
individuals whose existence is embodied in discourse, in lifestyle management 
and in the reactions of human and nonhuman others. Their narratives recount 
the chiefly positive influences gained by living with an assistance dog in terms 
of medical support and companionship, and relate the value of publically-
recognised social integration when contrasted with former social 
disenfranchisement. 
Voices also emerge from the active communications presented by the 
diabetes alert dogs whose co-embodied presences and performances highlight 
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chronic illness to a less knowledgeable human public. As Irvine (2013: 165) 
explains, in her examination of the ‘hidden’ population among the homeless, 
she studied ‘pet owners in order to introduce another set of voices’; voices who 
‘in speaking for’ their animals, ‘help to establish the identity of the animal’ (2013: 
15).  In listening to and questioning the human participants of this project, who 
are used to the invisibility of their diabetes, there emerge other relational 
interspecies voices narrating stories of their lives and situations, while 
simultaneously opening paths that give space to self-reflection, to my thinking 
and experiencing of their symbiotic relationships and complex existences. 
My interest in the ability of dogs to detect human illness through their 
acute sense of smell was stirred by news media commentary on a proof-of-
principle study as to whether dogs could be trained to scent the odour of 
malignant cells in bladder cancer from urine samples. This study, researched by 
Willis and colleagues, was published in the British Medical Journal (2004), and 
attracted worldwide attention.  
Prior to the bladder cancer study, an organisation, ‘Cancer and Bio-
Detection Dogs’, had been formed by Claire Guest with scientists and medical 
practitioners in the United Kingdom to research multispecies collaborative 
exploration into illness odour detection and to discover whether anecdotal data 
could have scientific foundation. The organisation gained charitable status in 
2008, and in 2011, the name was changed to ‘Medical Detection Dogs’ (MDD) 
as the range of illness conditions that the dogs were learning to detect from 
human breath and odour samples, was expanding. Not only in the United 
Kingdom, but internationally dogs are now being trained to discriminate among 
the odours of serious illness: for example, Gadbois and Reeve (2014) working 
with dogs in Nova Scotia, Sonoda et. al. (2011) publishing studies from Japan, 
and Cornu et. al. (2011), who have conducted canine odour detection research 
in France.  
Cornu and colleagues (2011) indicated the possibility that dogs might 
become useful instruments in future screening for prostate cancer, a possibility 
which is becoming a reality as the MDD charity and the Milton Keynes NHS 
Hospital Foundation Trust are currently, according to information on the 
charity’s web pages (www.medicaldetectiondogs.org.uk), conducting an ‘NHS 
ethically-approved study’ with the help of trained cancer detection dogs, ’to find 
an early, accurate, non-invasive method to test for prostate and other urological 
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cancers’, thereby avoiding biopsies which could become interventions ‘of last 
resort in many diagnoses’.  
Research into canine detection of cancer odour is ongoing and a paper 
by Elliker et. al. (2014) accentuates the need for robust double-blind testing to 
ensure confusion does not arise in regard to the dogs’ abilities to discriminate 
particular odours. In their research, an investigator was isolated in one room, 
and the dog and handler were isolated in another, both observed by an 
independent referee. The investigator placed urine samples in an array and was 
then isolated, after which the dog and handler approached the array where the 
dog would sniff and select a sample containing cancer odour. The researchers 
concluded that trained dogs might be able to remember individual scents in 
large quantities of training samples rather than generalise on a common odour; 
their results suggested that dogs could be trained to detect prostate cancer, 
which is the focus of Medical Detection Dogs’ current research. Dogs are being 
trained to work on the detection of urological cancer using samples of human 
urine in double-blind trials. Importantly, the charity also plans to conduct 
molecular biomarker analyses to attempt to identify and isolate the volatile 
organic compounds detected by the dogs. 
Sonoda et. al. (2011) researched the scenting abilities of trained dogs 
who were employed in the olfactory detection of colorectal cancer by means of 
breath and faecal samples, and their findings revealed, as is also noted by 
Guest (2013: 290),  that ‘canine scent detection was not confounded by current 
smoking, benign colorectal polyps, inflammation or infection’ (2011: 117) nor 
was there any ‘correlation between canine scent judgement and human 
haemoglobin or transferrin’ (2011: 118), the latter being a serum protein 
carrying iron to bone marrow for red blood cell production. 
Sonoda et. al. (2011) further contended that cancer has a specific odour 
as do other illnesses such as the apparent acetone or pear-drop smell of 
diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA), a serious complication mentioned by participants in 
this research and explained in chapter 6. Terry agrees with the pear-drop smell 
but says there can also be a strong smell of almonds and he recalls Jim’s acute 
interest in Christmas cake (‘he goes bananas’) because of the almonds making 
up marzipan: 
The only thing he’s ever gone to eat is Christmas cake and I’m 
convinced it was the marzipan because he didn’t bother with 
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anything else. You can even leave ham on the table and he won’t 
take it. He’ll put his nose up and he’ll look, but he won’t take it.  He 
was trying to pick up the Christmas cake and bring it to me: ‘this 
should be yours. The smell is yours so why is it over here?’ 
Terry’s explanation may be based on an egomorphic (Milton, 2005) 
perception of knowledge gained from personal experience and understanding, 
rather than from the more distancing concept of anthropomorphism, and this 
allows him to make sense of Jim’s unusual behaviour and the reason behind 
the dog’s effort to communicate. Terry can thus tell me the content of Jim’s 
actively-produced, silently-transmitted, information without leaving his chair, in 
vocal speech that I can understand. An action performed in the past by Jim, the 
dog, is recognised, comprehended and passed on by Terry, the human, in 
intelligible terms through time and space to me who, knowing the smell of 
almonds and marzipan from Christmas experience and seeing both dog and 
human before me, can perfectly imagine.  
As a result of Jim’s attempt on the Christmas cake and their reasoning of 
it, Terry and Nick try never to have anything ‘almondy’ in the house so that Jim 
won’t be distracted from detecting Terry’s changing blood sugar levels.  Nick 
comments that the smell of almonds is also associated with semtex which 
bomb-detection dogs work on through scenting, and adds ‘dogs don’t just work 
with human beings, but with inanimate objects as well’. 
1.6 Additional research purpose 
Researching the symbiotic lives of humans and dogs involved in 
revealing the canine olfactory sensitivity that benefits people with persistent and 
sometimes terminal illnesses, has allowed the opening of a channel for a more 
positive form of grieving over the death of my elder son from colorectal cancer. 
Similarly, it has enabled remembrance of my closest childhood friend who was 
compelled to leave our boarding school to be cared for at her distant home after 
developing Type 1 diabetes – she too died young.  
So the writing style of this project will incorporate auto-ethnographical 
musings and reflections that surface because of the activities and behaviours of 
the interspecies research participants who sometimes mirror aspects of life that 
are wholly familiar and not always comfortable to recognise. Leslie Irvine’s 
definition of participant observation, as requiring ‘full immersion’, has enabled 
lapses from ‘academic’ writing to more personal interjections when deeper, 
more emotional reflections are allowed to bubble up. Again borrowing from 
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Irvine (2004: 3-21), ‘although some of my arguments might well apply to other 
animals, I have studied only dogs...’ for the purpose of this project, although 
keen-scenting or macrosmatic olfactory ability applies to the majority of animals 
on this planet, with the exception of humans and most primates. 
Like Keri Brandt (2004: 303), ‘my recent biography and personal history’ 
have become meaningful in terms of how and where this project is situated. 
Childhood life was spent among ponies and pigs, chickens and dogs – there 
was a division between the ‘named’ and ‘unnamed’ members of the so-called 
domesticated nonhuman animal species. Mary Phillips (1994: 123) draws 
attention to ‘proper’ names being given to laboratory animals as signifying ‘the 
social emergence of personality’, thus acknowledging their ‘unique 
characteristics’ (1994: 121). Similarly, Sanders (2003: 411) remarks that the 
designation of human names for dogs signifies their establishment as 'virtual' 
persons, and Irvine (2012: 129) posits the influence of 'individual characteristics 
or behavioral tendencies' on the choice of human name for a particular dog.  An 
example of this became visible when I cared for 'holiday' dogs - at one stage, 
over a dozen Staffordshire bull terriers from a variety of homes were in 
residence: all looked 'tough' and were named Rambo, Tyson, Brutus and 
similar, but I cannot agree that their behaviour complemented their names. 
Rather like 'Ferdinand' (Leaf, 1936), the Spanish bull who wished to sit in the 
sun and not fight in the bullring, they appeared much happier playing and 
'smelling the flowers' than in planning assault.  
Sincere mourning was felt on the farm at the death of the named of any 
species who were identifiable from their ‘unique characteristics’, and a more 
opaque sadness fell among us when the unnamed went out of the farm gates. It 
was a sheltered childhood in which words such as ‘suicide’ or ‘cancer’ were 
enunciated letter-by-letter by adults, and funerals were not attended by children. 
And of course this encouraged much poring over dictionaries and feeling scared 
and slightly guilty at unexpected glimpses of oddly menacing, behatted, all-in-
black figures silently walking up the church path.  
Poppet, a little coal-black pony, came from the era of ‘docked’ tails, 
ponies-and-traps, and the often-given, kindly-intended, present of Black Beauty 
(Sewell, 1877), the harrowing tale of animal abuse and cruelty to horses that 
anecdotally, has elicited graphic nightmares from myriad children since its 
original publication. I spent hours spraying ‘grow-more-hair’ or something similar 
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on the few wispy strands of her tail in the hope that she could whisk it more 
effectively against flies, or swish it more dramatically, if asked to go along a 
path she had no wish to travel. She was a gentle horse living up to her name; 
piglets played uninjured around her legs and she once carried a hen’s new-laid 
egg across the fields to show us – her lips were so soft, there was not a crack in 
the shell. She had a stroke after which her left ear and lower lip drooped but she 
maintained her kind nature until the day I found her lying breath-less in the 
grass. Her unspoken lessons on multispecies cooperation and the need to care 
and show concern for the lives of others remain with me. 
More recently, health, illness and the unethical treatment of multiple 
nonhuman animal species again became central to my ‘being-in-the-world’. The 
global abuse of animals by children:  live hamsters cooked in microwaves or 
guinea-pigs thrown out of upstairs windows, tin-cans or fireworks tied to cats’ 
tails, dogs peppered with lead pellets or shut in crates and poked with burning 
sticks, the list of cruelty is endless and the above-mentioned violent 
maltreatment of companion animals excludes the wild nonhuman species also 
used as target practice or trapped to be taunted and tortured. These activities 
have a variety of potential causes (Kellert and Felthous, 1985), and results 
sometimes lead to increasingly abusive behaviour towards human and 
nonhuman animals as the child becomes adult (Ascione, 2005).  
There is difference between curiosity and malice when nonhuman 
animals fall victim to young human predation. I studied psychology in an attempt 
to discover why childhood abuse of animals might lead to domestic violence 
and animal cruelty in adulthood, and then turned to studies of canine 
psychology and ethology, and to the importance of dogs in triadic animal-
assisted activities. 
Research into the lives of domestic animals fired interest in the deaths of 
companion animals and to methods of remembering them so as to reduce the 
social isolation felt by bereaved humans; those whose sole affection had been 
directed at someone who never judged, never argued, who always willingly 
offered an apparently caring affection in return for human hospitality. ‘It’s only a 
dog’ is one of the most harsh sentences that can be addressed to an individual 
bereft of a close companion animal, a friend who might also have been the last 
living link to a loved and previously-deceased human companion.  
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Interest in the discrimination and stigma that afflict multispecies minority 
groups, alongside living life ‘on a different plane’ during my son’s terminal 
illness, guided research into early stage diagnosis of illness and the arrogant 
invasiveness of the serpentine cancers. This in turn led to knowledge of the lack 
of privacy and the possibility of pain during investigation preceding their 
discovery, especially for adolescents and young adults. 
Finding innovative, non-invasive and less expensive methods of 
diagnosing serious human illness in its early stages is the ongoing endeavour of 
Claire Guest, CEO of the charity, Medical Detection Dogs, and herself, a former 
possessor of a deep-seated breast tumour which might not have been 
discovered until too late were it not for the behavioural changes in her dog, 
Daisy. Such was the intensity of her dog’s unusually anxious behaviour, not 
wanting to leave her and jumping up against her, that Claire went for health 
checks leading to the eventual discovery of an early stage, but deeply-
embedded tumour.  After this was medically treated, Daisy’s attitude relaxed 
and she returned to her former joyful way of being. 
But Claire learned of others whose dogs had changed behaviour towards 
them, dogs who incessantly tried to lick moles, barked or whined and became 
distressed when they never had been so before, or who nudged at particular 
areas on their companions’ bodies where carcinogenic material was later found. 
Certain that Daisy had sensed the malformation in herself, Claire gathered 
anecdotal data and spoke to members of medical professions, including John 
Church (1996, 1999, 2013), a surgeon with interest in biotherapy, and what 
began with a few individuals working in a small building without running water 
has become a recognised well-established charity, now patronised by the 
Duchess of Cornwall and invited to share its medical discoveries in Parliament. 
When I first visited the charity, there were three offices, fewer than 10 
staff members and a room where Daisy and one or two other dogs were trained 
to scent urine samples on a carousel and to sit pointedly in front of the one 
containing an affected sample.  I met other dogs learning to recognise, through 
sniffing, rapid changes in volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the breath of 
people with Type 1 diabetes. The client waiting list for a diabetes alert 
assistance dog is around three years despite the increasing number of MDD 
staff now involved in training the dogs and matching them to appropriate human 
companions. However, public enthusiasm for canine scent detection of illness 
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symptoms has increased to the extent that the charity has been enabled to gain 
planning approval for extensive new buildings to be constructed from donations 
which will provide, according to the charity’s website (December 2016):  
two new Bio Detection areas, a client area for the Medical Alert 
Assistance Dogs, space for our specialist dogs to relax, dog 
washing facilities, a lecture theatre for our visitors, private rooms 
for client interviews and additional parking spaces...these new 
buildings will give us the space to increase the annual number of 
Medical Alert Assistance Dogs placements to up to 50 by 2019/20. 
We will also be able to expand on our existing urological (including 
prostate) cancer and malaria studies to include new projects such 
as colorectal cancer and Parkinson’s disease. 
A forthcoming research study entitled 'using medical detection dogs to 
identify people with malaria parasites', incorporates an innovative use of canine 
olfactory sensitivity and involves Durham University, Medical Detection Dogs, 
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and the Medical 
Research Council Unit The Gambia. A statement on the MDD website identifies 
the project's purpose as finding a way to 'detect malaria that is non-invasive and 
can be used to test a large number of samples at a time.  Current tests require 
finger-prick blood collection and laboratory screening. In contrast, the dogs are 
portable and rapid'. If successful, the investigation could lead to an eventual 
reduction in death from this illness and significant benefit to the health of global 
populations. 
Starting with the bladder cancer proof-of-principle study, the charity now 
works with dogs in the detection of other cancers and is continuing to develop 
the adjacent branch in which staff members train dogs to use their scenting 
abilities in the detection of early signs of hypo- or hyper-glycaemia in clients 
who have Type 1 diabetes, Addison’s disease or are allergic to the smell and/or 
taste of nuts. This area of canine olfactory sensitivity has become the focus of 
my research.  
This canine olfactory capability provides early non-invasive detection of 
extreme fluctuations in the blood glucose levels of people with chronic Type 1 
diabetes so that medical care practices can be performed to evade 
hypoglycaemia and collapse leading to coma, and thus prevent urgent and 
frequent calls for an ambulance. An extensive list of symptom of hypoglycaemia 
reported by hypo-aware respondents appears in a study by Wells, Lawson and 
Siriwardena (2008: 1238).  
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The fifth chapter of this study is devoted to the sense of smell in diverse 
species and to the canine olfactory system which is pronounced macrosmatic 
when compared to the feeble-scenting (microsmatic) sensibility of the human 
nasal structure (Bradshaw, 2012; Craven, Patterson and Settles, 2010; Helton, 
2009; Horowitz, 2016; Smith et al., 2004). 
Also under examination are the care practices performed by human-
canine partnerships to improve ‘personal’ health, welfare, domestic and social 
life within the limitations of Type 1 diabetes. How the interspecies dyad adopts 
or adapts the practicalities necessary to effect safe and mutualistic 
coexistences is revealed within inter-subjective and essential strategic activities 
that maintain wellbeing and coherent management of lives under constant 
threat. As Schillmeier (2014: 3) suggests, experience of serious illness that 
‘breaches the general norms of health and related practices, introduces novel 
norms of illness...that have to be accounted for in a pragmatic sense’ (italics in 
text). Certainly new norms are introduced and practiced when dogs undertake 
care-work that assists in hypo-prevention and involves altered or altering 
procedures emerging from the effects of coincidental illnesses. 
1.7 Care practices and problems 
The overall aim of a multi-voiced form of investigative story-telling 
need not necessarily be to come to a conclusion. Its strength 
might very well be in the way it opens questions up (Mol and Law, 
2004: 17). 
There are occasions when corporeal ‘leaks’ undermine composure. 
Participant Paul has lived with chronic illness since childhood and his discomfort 
with a malfunctioning body becomes apparent: 
My whole body just doesn’t feel right, you don’t feel like you’re in 
the right skin; nothing wants to settle. It’s like nothing’s moving but 
it feels like everything’s going; it’s all vibrating; all your nerve-
endings are firing off but it doesn’t settle... 
  He adds that the cause of his bodily ‘unsettlement’ might not only arise 
from Type 1 diabetes but could originate from one of the attenuating ‘tightly 
intertwined’ complex issues by which his health is perpetually hampered. 
Autoimmune diseases are numerous and as yet cannot be prevented or cured; 
and the causes of the immune system’s malfunction, according to information 
available on the Diabetes.co.uk website, may include ‘bacteria or virus, drugs, 
chemical or environmental irritants’. Because autoimmune disorders can affect 
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different parts of the body simultaneously, for example, joints, red blood cells, 
muscles or skin, it is possible for someone who has Type 1 diabetes, also to 
have additional problems from rheumatoid arthritis, Addison’s disease, coeliac 
disease, multiple sclerosis or issues of hyper- or hypo-thyroidism 
(Diabetes.co.uk, 2016).  
In taking an ‘inter-species’ approach to Mol and Law’s ethnographic view 
of people dealing with hypoglycaemia and the misbehaving body, this project 
investigates the place, role and ‘otherness’ of a medical alert assistance dog 
becoming co-embodied in a chronically ill person’s understanding and 
enactment of  the body they do. Mol and Law (2004: 16) reflect that ‘keeping 
ourselves together is one of the tasks of life’, a necessary occupation to 
maintain survival. However, in this instance, the multispecies co-embodied 
entity works as a ‘two-in-one-self’ to achieve this – the dog, who alerts the 
human partner to take external steps to prevent the internal lack of insulin 
becoming a hazard to life, is in turn multiply rewarded by the human for vital 
assistance in their continued survival. As Adrian Franklin (2006) writes, in the 
context of what happens and what is done in ‘almost every home in the western 
world and beyond’, homes become ‘home to humans living very closely and 
purposefully with other species, particularly with cats and dogs (2006: 138). 
Avoiding the threatening complications that commonly adhere to life with 
Type 1 diabetes calls for significant care methods and practices by the 
individual, under instruction from what may be a very distant (in terms of 
mileage and travel time) team of diabetes health care professionals. None of 
the participants in this study lives within walking distance of a hospital, and as 
the majority are no longer, if they ever were, licensed to drive, they and their 
medical assistance dogs become reliant on others to reach medical 
appointments or consultations.   
When talking of institutional caring, Mol suggests that ‘care is not 
attractive...even good care is not attractive’ (2008: 28); it may be painful, 
invasive, boringly essential and time-consuming, an unwanted addition to the 
‘daily grind’ of managing life’s progression through illness. And there is need for 
the human and canine partnership, coexisting within the boundaries of chronic 
illness whether at home or in social environs, to work hard - separately, 
together, as a team, as a dyad actively striving for health within a community of 
similar practitioners – in order to maintain a daily routine of mutual caring, 
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however dull, however stressful, painful and time-consuming, however 
sometimes unattractive to the self and others, that will attain optimum standards 
of care and demonstrate a body being well ‘done’ in both public and private 
settings. And the settings themselves need ordering and organising so as to 
facilitate best practices of care. 
Kendra Coulter (2016b: 199) explicates the concept of care work, 
including that done by nonhuman animals, as being ‘tasks, interactions, labour 
processes, and occupations involved in taking care of others, physically, 
psychologically, and emotionally’. The work necessary for the sometimes 
challenging and complex delivery of care, calls for ‘skill and multifaceted 
communication’ (2016b: 204) at a time when distraction must be ignored no 
matter its attraction. 
1.8 Blood, hygiene and biotherapy 
In this interspecies skilled delivery and ‘doing’ of care in chronic illness, 
blood activities become silently prominent. ‘Taking your bloods’, giving blood, 
blood testing, blood glucose levels, blood transfusions. Into this constant 
manipulation of blood cells swerves Mary Douglas’s anthropological thinking on 
sullied contexts, dirt as ‘matter out of place’ (2002: 44) and the dangers of 
pollutants, bringing contrast to medical enthusiasm for cleanliness in care and 
treatment practices.  
Thoughts of zoönotic disease, health risk and lack of hygiene at times 
when blood testing and insulin injection require ‘purity’ in the environment, may 
inspire caution before preparing to care for, and be cared for by, a nonhuman 
animal living in close proximity day and night. Education in canine welfare and 
the use of efficient hygiene methods to control disease transmission between 
species can reduce health risk (Hart, 1995; Gorczyca et al. 2010) as well as 
diminishing fear at the prospect of an unknown or complex infection or illness.  
However, looking at hygiene and disease from a different perspective, 
Elliott and Weinstock (2012: 551) find growing evidence that ‘highly hygienic 
living conditions create risk for developing immune-mediated disease such as 
inflammatory bowel disease’ (IBD). Parasitic worms (helminths), for example, 
human hookworm and porcine whipworm, living in a symbiotic relationship with 
their hosts, become enabled to ‘activate cells of innate and adaptive immunity 
that suppress inflammation’ (2012: 551). It seems the more industrialised and 
socio-economically advanced a country becomes, the more likely are its 
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inhabitants to develop IBD, and so, they conclude, exposure to helminths may 
offer new ways to treat IBD.  
Elliott, Pritchard and Weinstock (2013: 186) suggest that ‘over the next 
few years, T. suis (porcine whipworm) will be tested for efficacy in many of the 
major autoimmune and immune-mediated inflammatory diseases like psoriasis 
and Type 1 diabetes’. 
Other creatures re-considered beneficial to human health in recent 
decades, are leeches, whose application in hirudotherapy to draw blood for 
‘curative purposes’ is thought to have been effective since the Stone Age 
(Gileva and Mumcuoglu, 2013: 31). The researchers suggest that the 
usefulness of the leech in ‘reconstructive and plastic surgery, and traumatology’ 
and in other contemporary medicinal fields, might assist in the creatures’ 
protection and conservation in ‘nature’ (2013: 69), resulting in another form of 
symbiotic existence. 
Biotherapy is defined as ‘the use of living organisms for the treatment of 
human and animal illness’ (Grassberger, Sherman, Kim, Gileva and 
Mumcuoglu, 2013: v) and the increasing number of multidisciplinary 
practitioners and researchers in this field indicates growing acceptance of 
maggots (Bowling et al., 2007), the 'most commonly employed larvae have 
been those of the green bottle fly (Lucilia sericata)' (Sherman, Mumcuoglu, 
Grassberger and Tantawi (2013), bees (Apis mellifera) (Molan and Betts, 2008), 
and leeches (Hirudo medicinalis) (Gileva and Mumcuoglu, 2013). Fish or 
ichthyotherapy involves, for example, the reddish suction barbel (Garra rufa) in 
therapeutic treatments (Grassberger and Sherman, 2013) while, more widely 
acknowledged, is the ability of larger domesticated mammals, for example, 
dogs (Canis familiaris) and horses (Equus ferus caballus) to aid mental and 
physical human corporeal complications (Levinson, 1969; Chandler, 2005; Fine, 
2010). Church (2013: 4) suggests that instead of attempting to discover 
stronger antibiotics at a time when superbugs are showing firm resistance to 
current antibiotics, a burgeoning search for ‘probiotics’ should be encouraged 
so that natural mechanisms can be ‘harnessed’ towards preventing and 
managing disease, alongside care for the welfare of our environment. 
As he claims (2013: 4), biotherapy is ‘challenging and demanding, but it 
is efficacious, relatively safe, low tech, low cost, and eco-friendly’ and the 
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human-nonhuman animal collaboration involved in the diagnostic achievements 
of Medical Detection Dogs exemplifies his contention. 
1.9 Commodification and the ethics of care 
Discussion of the ethical issues involved in the human use of other-than-
human animals occurs in chapter 9 since the entwined strands of the human-
dog symbiotic co-existence are also subject to issues of morality. Malamud’s 
(2013: 34) forceful statement - ‘service animals (those who are employed by 
and for humans who require assistance); serve us animals (the boar’s head 
degraded further by the apple forcing open its lifeless jaws, or the emplattered 
motionless silver salmon); serve us, animals (the superior human command to 
the inferior nonhuman recipient, for example, the timber- or tourist-laden 
elephant or the milk-producing cow)’ (my words in italics) - sadly reflects our 
generally anthropocentric attitude to those sentient providers who are 
compelled to donate their lives to the supply of human foodstuffs, and to the 
burdened, scrutinised and experimented-on subservient ‘other’ bodies we make 
use of for ourselves.  
Josephine Donovan (2006: 305) elucidates the thinking behind the 
feminist animal care theory which stresses the need to listen to animals, to pay 
them ‘emotional attention’, to care about the content of their communications. 
Her approach counters the utilitarian argument of ‘mathematical balance’, killing 
one to save the rest, as seen in the UK during the foot-and-mouth epidemic in 
which herds of cattle were destroyed on some farms to save others on 
neighbouring farms. John Law’s (2004: 57) ‘care and killing’ chapter on the 
2001 slaughter, results of which made distressing public viewing on television 
news channels, brought the pain of those carefully arranging the deaths into a 
world view. Farmers and veterinarians, who could be disparaged unseen via 
social media as cruel administrators of this destruction of a trusting species, 
sometimes became known as unexpectedly caring and feeling enforcers of 
death for the betterment of others (in line with government injunction), and they 
themselves were perceived to suffer to the extent that some ignited their own 
manner of death.  
Hamington (2008:177) proposes that we can learn ethics from 
meaningful relationships with animals by realising that quality interactions with 
other-than-human animals ‘can stimulate the imaginative basis for the care and 
empathy that are crucial for social morality’: through the use of the ‘moral 
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imagination’, care can be universalised from one unfortunate creature, human 
or nonhuman, to the many. His research on embodied care is significant in 
relation to mutualism and the co-practices of care performed within chronic 
illness.  
The ecofeminist theory of care, discussed in articles collected and edited 
by Carol J. Adams and Lori Gruen (2014), has become a viable approach to 
aspects of this research with its emphasis on ‘the importance of care as well as 
justice’ (2014: 1).  Contributing to their collection, and discussed more fully in 
future pages, is a paper written by Sunaura Taylor (2014), whose incisive 
approach to the interdependency of animal species brings the ethic-of-care 
theory to life when facing her own and others’ dis- or in-abilities and society’s 
reaction to them. 
Accepting that compassion and empathy are crucial qualities for social 
morality in respect of the human-canine relationships under focus here, permits 
belief in a cross-species embodiment of moral interdependence that also 
succeeds in extending the biomedical armamentarium.  
Prominent among researchers of multiple species’ interactions are Frans 
de Waal (2006; 2010) who is visibly proactive in encouraging empathy to 
express and foster multispecies tolerance and understanding, and in similar 
vein, Lori Gruen (2015) whose writing concurs with the need for empathy to 
reduce or resolve human-human and human-nonhuman animal conflict in ways 
that can be considered moral.  
 The following chapter elucidates the qualitative methodology directing 
this multispecies project and the context in which it is situated. Symbolic 
interactionism is among perspectives taken in order to understand the 
significance of a human-nonhuman animal collaboration that enhances the 
quality of life for individuals who may be rendered physically and/or socially 
isolated by chronic illness. Symbiotic relationships are examined in terms of 
commensalism, mutualism and parasitism, with mutualism being identified as 
best suiting the human-canine partnerships under observation. 
 Backgrounding this research is the sense of smell and the outstanding 
olfactory ability of dogs and most other species of nonhuman animal, with the 
exception of humans and the majority of primates. Chapter 5 is devoted to 
olfactory perception and canine nasal architecture and to the role of the dog’s 
nose in scenting odours from human illness. 
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 In Chapter 6, focus is centred on studies relating to the way people 
manage long-term corporeal dysfunction, highlighting Type 1 diabetes and its 
needs and complexities (Diabetes UK, 2014; Juvenile Diabetes Research 
Foundation, 2013). The practical assistance given by the diabetes alert dogs at 
home and in public is made prominent, and their human partners provide 
narrative illustrations of the complexities involved in ‘doing Type 1 diabetes’. 
 The controversial use of domesticated nonhuman animals as devices 
manipulated for human benefit, in this instance, dogs as biomedical resources, 
is the topic of Chapter 7 in which such animal commodification may be seen as 
tenable or exploitative. Chapter 8 examines animals as health technologies and 
their performances as tools and devices of assistance. 
Mutualism in care practices, the symbiotic ethics of care and moral 
behaviours, and the use of animal models for human treatments, are topics 
discussed in Chapter 9. The concluding chapter ‘endings’ investigates ‘what 
happens next’ to the no longer working diabetes alert dog and to the unwell 
human when their biomedical partnership dissolves, and what it means from  
their perspectives to collaborate and co-exist. More broadly, what cooperation in 
biotherapy and biomedicine will bring to illness detection through the sniffing 
prowess of nonhuman animals for the benefit of multiple other species. 
At the centre of this anthrozoological research is the charity, Medical 
Detection Dogs, whose cross-species work in olfaction and biotherapy has been 
made available to enquiry and analysis. The methods I employed to uncover 
and sometimes disentangle the meaningful dances of the coexisting species' 
daily lives are explained in the following chapter. 
2 Methodology 
Wide-ranging roles are opening up to dogs trained in olfactory pursuits 
beyond the already-known ability to sniff out drugs, bombs and buried human 
remains. Wishing to explore the phenomena surrounding canine olfaction in 
human health more extensively in terms of theory and practice, the Medical 
Detection Dogs charity was approached and provided with information 
regarding prospective ‘ethnographic’ research. Acting as gatekeeper, the 
charity’s CEO invited clients to participate in the study and those, who were 
interested in volunteering their experiences of living within interspecies 
partnerships, gave permission for their email addresses to be sent to the 
researcher. On receipt, the charity’s clients were sent information sheets 
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detailing the proposed research, together with informed consent forms which 
they were asked to sign and return.   
These information sheets and consent forms followed Association of 
Social Anthropologists (ASA) (2011) and British Sociological Association (BSA) 
(March 2002) ethical codes of practice and guidelines relating to confidentiality, 
privacy and anonymity, and had received prior approval by the University of 
Exeter’s research ethics committee when the project was first put before its 
members.  
Informing participants of confidentiality and privacy during primary 
interviews, I offered to change their names (both dog and human) when writing 
the text and to avoid mention of the regions in the UK where they reside. And 
these changes have been effected. They were also asked if there were other 
alterations to their identities that I could incorporate. No matter how great the 
attempts to disguise identity, the charity’s human-alert dog partnerships are not 
yet numerous so participants may recognise one another from narratives 
transcribed, and many of them give talks in public places or take part in media 
interviews, which give them local and national prominence. They are therefore 
aware that excerpts from their interviews may reveal their identities because of 
events or experiences they mention that others may have witnessed. 
Sampling was limited firstly by the number of volunteer respondents as 
the charity is in its infancy and at that stage, there were fewer than 30 clients 
already matched and living with medical alert assistant dogs, although this 
number has more than doubled over the research period. Illness and 
unexpected changes in personal circumstance hampered interviewing in some 
cases, forcing abandonment of the planned discourses, but seven participants 
with chronic illness maintained contact with the researcher and interviews were 
held when convenient to their health practices and life events. 
The first interviews took place in 2014 and were conducted over one to 
two hour periods in participants' homes, holiday residences or in the homes of 
their family members.  Participant Tina, and staff members Gill, Jenny and Liz, 
gave information and comment in conversations held at the MDD training centre 
where they work, and where, over the two-year period, opportunity was given to 
observe multispecies' education, play activities and the rapport gained with one 
another: human-human, human-dog, and dog-dog interactions. Val's advice 
relating to MDD client application forms, human and dog training, and matching 
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procedures, was given in personal correspondence (2017) in addition to the 
information detailed on the charity's website. 
Further unstructured interviews were conducted in 2015 and concluded 
in 2016 and, perhaps becoming a more known quantity, the researcher was 
invited to spend extended periods observing daily routines and practices, and to 
walk or travel with participants, their family members and friends, so as to see 
how the dogs worked in social situations and interacted with multispecies 
individuals away from their home environments. Partners, family members and 
friends entered conversations as they and the consenting individual wished, and 
this expanded knowledge of the embedded illness and the working assistance 
dog's status in household hierarchy, as well as demonstrating the close-knit 
bond that develops between dog and human. 
Participants were questioned as to ‘what it is like’ to have Type 1 
diabetes, how they cope and what they do in everyday living; what are the 
particular complexities they have to face and what do they do to resolve 
difficulties brought about by living with a working assistance dog and with their 
illness. The semi-structured interviews allowed human participants to narrate 
their interspecies activities, the positives and negatives emerging from a close 
social and biomedical relationship with a canine companion, the routines that 
they successfully perform and the obstacles that prevent care practice 
fulfilment.  
Recorded interviews were transcribed by the researcher and examined 
to find links, comparisons and interpretations for further discussion and 
analysis. The narratives were studied individually to identify and clarify each 
client’s personal feelings, emotions and behaviours in relation to their illness, 
the canine partner and the 24-hour assistance enacted by the dog. 
Participants have been magnanimous in explaining the mutual care 
practices performed, and with their responses to questions. Time and again, I 
am astonished by the open and frank comments and explanations that are 
afforded me during data collection and recall Sarah Nettleton’s words: ‘When 
people have the opportunity to give voice to their experiences of illness, it 
becomes evident that their accounts are woven into their biographies’ (2013: 
73). ‘My’ research participants, human and canine, enable me to take pride in 
shared-ownership of the narratives they offer, the roller-coaster stories of their 
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obstacle-fraught existences, and the truths of life changes when sharing home 
and illness management with working dogs and Type 1 diabetes. 
Field notes provided context, emotion and atmospheric conditions. For 
example, heightened noise levels during interviews, unexpected visitors 
curtailing significant conversations, or distress overwhelming participants, are 
among causes sometimes adversely affecting narratives. Equally, contented 
animals and tranquil human partners may produce apparently stress-free 
interviews belied by the pattern and tenor of the words spoken during their 
narrations. 
Type 1 diabetes is the invisible and weighty ‘elephant in the room’ who 
constantly tramples and reshapes the other lives also embedded there. Sara 
was diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes at the age of 31 and was matched with 
Apple, a trained diabetes alert dog, by Medical Detection Dogs. She has 
become very aware of the invisibility of her chronic illness and appreciates how 
Apple helps to draw much needed attention to its existence: 
The number of people that come and speak to you about the 
diabetes alert dog accompanying you in shops, saying ‘oh, I’ve 
never seen that before’, or ‘I’m diabetic’ or ‘my husband’s diabetic’ 
and you wouldn’t know, you don’t know that those people are 
diabetic, just walking around...it’s a very hidden disability, isn’t it? 
You get lots of disabilities that are very visual...but you can’t see 
diabetes in people... 
Information was gathered that specifically related to Type 1 diabetes but 
canine medical alert assistance also benefits humans with severe allergic 
reactions to the taste or smell of nuts, those who suffer extreme pain seizures, 
who are narcoleptic or are affected by Addison’s crises or postural tachycardia 
syndrome (PoTS) whose symptoms are shown by an abnormal increase in 
heart rate after sitting up or standing. The first dog trained to assist a client with 
PoTs has had a very high alerting success rate, according to Gill, an MDD 
instructor who added that the client has hypo-mobility so can lift very little: 
She’s hardly got any strength so she wears a belt, like a jogging 
belt, (to which the dog’s leash is attached) to leave her hands free 
because she uses a stick as well. The dog’s a big boy and she’s 
only slight, so it’s all on verbal communication because she’s not 
hands-on with him at all. Upstairs, downstairs, he stays very, very 
close.  
2.1 Qualitative mixed methods 
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 In this empirical study, the intention is to give a rich and deep insight into, 
and a detailed description of, a small group of human-dog dyads, whose 
interspecies life practices involve them in a broader socio-medical community of 
health practitioners. Qualitative mixed methods, including fieldwork based on 
multispecies participant observation and personal reflection, informal 
conversation and open-ended interviews leading to ethnographic analysis, are 
employed here to examine interspecies collaboration and cooperation in the 
field of chronic illness, and further, to reveal the significance of such 
cooperation in adding to biomedical epidemiology and the improvement of 
trans-species integration in society.  
Ethnographic research is appropriate to the study of community, enabling 
fieldwork to take place in locations that are familiar to participants: home 
environments, supermarkets, while walking in urban or rural settings, visiting 
town halls or city restaurants. Because of the flexibility made available to the 
researcher by participants, this method allows the establishment of rapport and 
trust among human and nonhuman respondents. Such research evolves as it 
progresses through studying the social behaviours and lifestyle patterns of an 
‘identifiable group of people’ (Creswell, 2013: 92).  The common denominator of 
the identifiable group in this study is chronic illness, and membership invites a 
private and public coexistence between an unwell human and a medical alert 
assistance dog. 
Much has appeared in the media over recent decades that relates to 
assistant animals and their human carers and in particular to the dogs who 
guide humans with visual impairments through life. Contemporary sociology 
frames research and writing - by Krieger (2005; 2010) and Michalko (1999) and 
others whose vision is partially or wholly impaired - which draws attention to the 
ways their assistant dogs have made significant, positive differences to their 
lives. However, there is sparse research, beyond media investigative reporting, 
that examines the day-to-day lived experiences of scent-detecting dogs and the 
significant impact they have on humans with malfunctioning internal organs. 
New arrivals to the society of assistance animals are these canine 
medical ‘detectives’; dogs of diverse breeds who not only share a ‘nose’ for 
discovery but have also become expert interspecies collaborators in the early 
diagnosis of certain illnesses or are able to act as alarmists of unwanted 
medical happenings through their willing attitude and reward-based training. 
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By asking questions of participants over a two-year period (2014-2016) 
and in observing the environmental strictures surrounding these human-canine 
pairings, answers are found which then encourage more extensive and deeper 
questioning; and this provokes a rich narrative involving phenomenological 
interpretation and recognition of the sometimes-hidden interactive medical and 
social worlds of the dog and human as they ‘do’ their daily symbiotic stuff to 
survive together in chronic illness. 
As the partnership practices self-care, so it takes up membership of a 
practicing  community; that which Wenger (1998) and O’Reilly (2012) suggest is 
a group of individuals coming together to act out social life, giving structure and 
significance to what they all ‘do’ together and separately in an evolving, 
revolving set of circumstances. So self-practice in Type 1 diabetes becomes 
situated within a community of practice. And such progressive, fluid practices 
are extensively activated and enabled by the agency of the canine partners. 
‘We shifted terminology and used words like perform, or do, or enact’ 
(Mol, March 2014), ‘what is the reality that takes shape and that various people 
come to live with?’ She contributes ‘to theorizing medicine’s ontological politics: 
a politics that has to do with the way in which problems are framed, bodies are 
shaped, and lives are pushed and pulled into one shape or another’ (Mol, 2002: 
viii). Her theories, and those of Lori Gruen (2015), Donna Haraway (2003, 2008) 
and John Law (2004), relating to multiple realities and their entangled versions - 
realities routinely enacted by the multispecies performers involved in doing 
Type 1 diabetes care practices - have enabled questioning, listening and 
reflection during participants’ everyday living. 
Ethnography is both flexible and permeable, allowing the researcher’s 
writing to be influenced by interdisciplinary theories and perspectives developed 
in sociology, anthropology, philosophy and psychology and by the increasing 
number of studies relating to human-animal interactions. I have followed Karen 
O’Reilly's (2012) suggested use of an iterative-inductive research approach, in 
which data collection, analysis and writing are inextricably linked, one in which 
an open mind admits preconceptions, studies previous theories on the topic, 
and allows theory to develop from the collected data. O’Reilly’s approach is also 
cited by Sarah Pink in her 2014 volume, Doing sensory ethnography, which 
examines, inter alia, sensory embodied knowing; knowledge and how it is 
transmitted between researchers and participants.  
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At the forefront of understanding health in the context of chronic illness 
are studies by Charmaz, Schillmeier and Bury. Particularly relevant to this 
project is Rod Michalko’s (1999) phenomenological expression of ‘being at 
home’ with blindness and as ‘one’ with a guide dog. Phenomenology is an 
appropriate approach to perceiving and drawing out tales of beings in a social 
and unsociable world, and to reflecting the co-embodied experiences of humans 
and dogs doing diabetes day after day after day. However, I have not extracted 
and coded themes in the phenomenological tradition, nor used a formal analysis 
system to interpret findings. Instead I have allowed open questioning and 
participant narration to guide and make prominent what is significant in the 
events and routines of their daily lives, refraining from restricting their voluntary 
thoughts and comments by erecting specific theoretical boundaries. 
Leslie Irvine (2012: s125) sees symbolic interactionism as an approach 
that centres on both ‘the creation and negotiation of meaning’, where humans 
actively engage in creating the social world so that ‘full immersion’ into situated 
interactions is required to understand sensitively the actions and creations 
performed. Drawing on the multiple studies by Arluke and Sanders between 
1987 and 2010 as examples of significant insight into human-nonhuman animal 
interactions, Irvine (2012: s132) highlights the need for ‘careful listening and 
observation, without imposing prefabricated definitions’ in order to comprehend 
how meaning may be reached within multispecies relationships. She lets ‘tellers 
have their say’ (2013: 4-7), to relate authentic stories without insisting on 
verifiability, and recollects her earlier narrative concept of the self as ‘not so 
much a matter of people making up stories as it is of stories making up people’ 
(1999: 2). 
A researcher, intent on discovering the significance and symbolism that 
chronically ill people attach to a medical alert assistance dog moving into their 
social spaces, necessarily embodies personal expectation and opportunity, 
values, boundaries and biases, all of which may have impact on, and 
implication for the daily lives of the two species under examination.  
So inward reflection is contingent on outward data collection and such 
reflexivity should, as far as is humanly possible, ensure questions are not 
skewed to gain participant responses that may be pointedly advantageous to 
the research. Candea writes of a researcher’s ‘active skepticism’ and ‘the 
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difference between moments of engaged commitment and moments of 
detached non-commitment’ (2013: 431).  
Reflection over the duration of this project has brought my way of living 
into sharper perspective: enabling recognition that interspecies beings do their 
lives in ways that are highly similar and entirely different to my own; that a level 
external surface may shield an inner dishevelment that can blow apart a 
harmonious existence both individually and collectively. In examining my field-
notes and attempting to avoid all forms of prejudice or judgemental thinking that 
might inaccurately influence the research findings, it was necessary to bear in 
mind Haraway’s caution (1989: 245) regarding ‘interference’ of the observer 
with the ‘natural character of the object of knowledge that will be so important to 
the epistemological status of the resulting report’. 
As an illustration of possible interference, the researcher was invited by 
participant Mel to accompany the family, including her son, Mark, and diabetes 
alert dog, Gemma, on a shopping trip. Thinking this to be an ideal opportunity to 
observe how the dog, wearing a jacket proclaiming her profession, works in a 
social arena, and further how members of the public view the interspecies 
partnership, acceptance was given immediately. 
The ‘team’ meandered through the shopping mall, the child eyeing sports 
equipment and the dog eyeing the child. Wherever the pair moved, shoppers 
turned to look at the child and the red-coated dog, and I was surprised to find 
myself feeling proud to be sharing ‘ownership’ of their visible combined 
achievement and wondered what it might be like to be the mother who worked 
so hard to produce and preserve this ‘normal’ way of life while under public 
scrutiny. 
To keep a safe distance from bias and to avoid the chance of loaded 
questioning favouring personal judgement, it was necessary to remain silent 
and merely observe and listen, until once more in the family’s home 
environment where the topic could be introduced in a more balanced context 
and with more thoughtful questioning. Without influencing Mel’s comments 
because of personal interpretation, interview questions could then become less 
contrived and less prejudicial to the outcome. 
Within the context of the alerting dog’s relationship with the human 
companion, the concepts of attachment, attunement and empathy become 
primary means of performing their close communications. Challenging 
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questions need to be asked regarding the human emotions, thoughts and 
feelings when the dog acts in a particular way.  There is a fine line between 
gentle probing beyond accepted social norms and an impolite questioning that 
may squander any achieved value from discourse between participants and 
researcher.  Lack of forethought may ruin an honest, informative interview that 
might have provided a wealth of detail on canine-human symbiotic coexistence. 
Despite receiving and signing informed consent documents prior to the 
researcher’s arrival on their doorstep for an interview, inviting a stranger over 
the threshold must inevitably create internal, if not external barriers for the 
participants. Therefore, if everyday mixed-species living behind the front-door is 
to be revealed fully and accurately, in descriptions and analyses that convey 
reliable and honest human and nonhuman perspectives, findings should also be 
interpreted and reflected on in ways that are sensitive to the vulnerability of the 
multispecies storytellers. 
2.2 Interspecies participants 
The paragraphs below give insight into the lives of the interspecies 
working partnerships central to this study. The dyads comprise canine actors 
who perform learned reactions to the particular volatile organic compounds they 
smell in their human companions, and provide advance warning of likely 
‘hypos’.  
As mentioned above, the names of the participating dogs and humans 
have been changed to protect identity.  
2.2.1 Sara and Apple 
Sara lost her hypo-awareness after being ill with shingles and found 
herself frequently falling indoors and outside at the school where she taught. 
She was close to losing employment as a teacher because of her frequent 
collapses during school classes and the resultant need for ‘time-off’ to make 
hurried visits to hospital Accident and Emergency departments. Such serious 
issues were the norm before medical detection dogs became health 
interventions for those humans who embody chronic illness, and who are also 
hypo-unaware. 
 After discussion with her family and with members of medical and 
educational institutions, she is now able to continue teaching classes with her 
Cockerpoo companion, Apple, in close attendance.  ‘He takes it all in his stride; 
he’s used to 2000 pupils – kids and noise and that sort of environment doesn’t 
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faze him at all’. Apple was the family's first dog because Sara and her husband 
both work and had agreed that leaving a dog at home all day was 'not fair'; now 
Apple is her fulltime medical alert associate and is never left behind. Sara has 
learned that Apple is 'better off his lead' when other dogs have to be faced or 
passed on a walk: 'he'll just deal with it in his own way, he can read the dogs far 
better than I can, he knows when he wants to approach a dog and when he 
doesn't'.  
2.2.2 Terry and Jim 
On arrival, I am offered coffee and sit in the sunshine that streams 
through the window taking up most of one wall in the sitting-room where Terry is 
describing the attributes of the new home into which he, Nick and Jim have 
recently moved. Terry has the brittle form of diabetes in which fluctuating blood 
sugar levels are more sudden and extreme, but he is helped constantly by Jim, 
his quick-witted and multi-skilled working dog. I observe his manifold abilities:  
several times Jim displays his olfactory alerting sensitivity to Terry; he also 
collects and returns items such as the pen that fell unnoticed onto the carpet 
and which he carefully picks up and drops into my hand; he demonstrates how 
he attracts the attention of someone else to his human companion’s health 
issues by jumping up and putting his front paws on their back (the only time he 
may jump up), and he fetches medical equipment when needed. ‘We have a job 
to stop him working’, claims Terry: ‘we’ve had the devil of a problem when I’ve 
dropped a glass because you don’t want him picking up glass’, and Nick adds 
that if Jim hears something hit the floor, ‘he’s there – quite difficult, if you’ve 
dropped a sharp knife, to tell him not to pick it up. He’s watching and waiting all 
the time’. 
Nick emphasizes their appreciation of Jim’s additional competencies: 
It’s not just the dog doing a job, the dog is a companion. You can 
say things to a dog that perhaps you couldn’t say to another 
person, not even to me, even though we’ve been together for 20-
odd years. A dog keeps you on your toes, keeps you thinking, 
keeps your mind active. 
 The 'working' dogs of these pages condense the ‘piece of equipment’ 
and ‘close companion’ into one identity, one which might successfully fall into 
the category incorporating moral virtue as envisaged by Goode (2007: 110-114) 
and accepted by Michalko (1999: 73-74) (see also section 9.8). 
2.2.3 Richard and Higgins 
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 When I first meet Richard, who lives and works in an urban environment, 
he tells me that he has never shared home-life with a canine companion either 
when a child or as an adult, and he is awaiting the arrival of Higgins, his future 
diabetes alert dog, with some excitement and slight trepidation. He tells me that 
Higgins stayed with him for several days as a form of ‘practice run’ to see how 
they interacted and to find out whether Higgins would settle comfortably into 
Richard’s way of life.  
He fitted in very well, was much liked by everyone and wasn’t a 
problem in any way. I took him to a jazz restaurant and we sat at 
the front and he was absolutely fine. 
Eighteen months later, we meet again, this time in the company of 
Higgins, who is small and who now lives permanently with Richard, who is tall. 
Their difference in height seems not to have prevented the formation of a close 
interspecies bond and Higgins' alerts have already prevented Richard having to 
call out emergency services on several occasions.  
We walk through a city park active with children, dogs and bicycles 
where Higgins runs free from leash restriction, sniffing tree roots and other 
items that call for investigation. He dashes back and forth, ears flapping and tail 
seeming to rotate and propel with undisguised joyfulness. Richard is relieved 
that he is ‘very responsive to the Recall’ and he uses a whistle to gain Higgins’ 
attention if he has gone out of ‘earshot’ or is distracted by the park’s plentiful 
squirrel population. 
In the park he sometimes alerts Richard by taking ‘a running jump at my 
legs’ but ‘normally he will stare at me or scrabble at my legs’. The latter method 
would not be appreciated or accepted as good behaviour by the majority of 
trainers or human partners of assistance dogs, but the 'scrabbling' appears not 
to be painful or irritating to Richard and seems to be an appropriate alert for 
them both. While we talk, Higgins performs an alert in that exact manner and 
Richard checks his blood sugar levels. ‘Yes, I’m 6.5 and he knows that it’s 
coming down as it was 16.5 mmol/l, a lot higher, at breakfast a couple of hours 
ago. It’s going down but not to the level where I need to have a jelly-babies 
boost’. 
 Arriving at a people-packed café – it is raining hard outside – Higgins 
again performs as Richard described earlier. He paws at the trousered knee 
and stares fixedly at his face so Richard checks his blood glucose levels again, 
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expecting a lowered figure as breakfast carbohydrates will have been burned off 
during the ambulatory interview. Higgins receives praise, a treat and a gently-
ruffled coat. ‘If his alert is incorrect, I shake my head and he understands that’. 
 Adam Miklósi (2009: 186) reports that barking is ‘often observed as a 
means for communicating with humans, and according to Boitani and Ciucci 
(1995, in Miklósi, 2009: 186), ‘is relatively rare in stray and feral dogs’2. How 
humans respond to the wide range of dogs’ high- and low-pitched, short and 
long, single and repetitive, yelps, growls, barks and howls, can demonstrate 
simple vocal communication between species. In alert-signalling barks, the 
sound must be decisive and dissimilar to the one emitted to announce visitors, 
to frighten intruders or to demonstrate the dog’s own fear of someone or 
something. 
Although an alert has to be a sound or movement that is natural to the 
dog and easy to perform, Richard was given opportunity, during initial training at 
the centre, to choose whether he would like his future partner to alert vocally. ‘I 
said, from a practical point of view, I would rather he didn’t bark, particularly if 
he needed to alert in the middle of the night’.  
And, as mentioned by Bradshaw (2012), timing of the reward for 
accurate alerting is essential in maintaining or improving quality and quantity of 
correct warning signals. 
 Richard had previously collapsed at work on more than one occasion. He 
recounted having hypos at least three times at work and, while attending a 
friend’s party, an ambulance and paramedics being called ‘because no-one 
there knew what to do to help me’. 
When I’m occupied at work, I won’t think of testing and sometimes 
the pressure of what you’re doing, particularly if you’re involved 
with a lot of other people; you’re distracted by responding to them. 
But Higgins warns me all the time, and the environment doesn’t 
matter; he just picks up. 
 
At the beginning, there was a transition from my breath in the 
sample pots used for scenting training to recognising the real 
thing.  It was a learning curve for him and I did wonder if he was 
able to alert correctly because on several occasions he missed, 
and I would still do a routine check. 
                                                          
2
Tangentially, Franklin (2006: 142) draws attention to ‘vocal expressions between cats and 
humans’. Cats do not meow to each other, he contends, and are ‘largely mute in their dealing 
with each other in the wild, but they seem to have learned of the significance of vocalization 
between humans, and the fact that humans vocalize to them’. 
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However, he seems to have sharpened up in the last year or so. It 
probably took him three or four months to settle in and make the 
transition from scent pots to scenting the change in blood sugar 
levels in me. 
Flying to a wedding abroad may not usually be considered work, but for 
Higgins, flying has become an essential element of his working practice. After a 
trial flight to Scotland with his trainer and Richard, during which he slept 
unperturbed, he then flew to Ireland for the wedding, attending the church 
service at Richard’s side:  
The sound of the plane’s engines and the air pressure seemed to 
deaden other sounds and his ears weren’t affected, nor did he 
seem uncomfortable. Higgins has his own passport now and, after 
going by car for a summer holiday in south-west England, we then 
flew to France for three weeks. We also took the train to Wales. 
2.2.4 Paul and Nero 
I am completing the primary interview with Paul, who is on holiday not far 
from where I live and who has invited me to spend time with Labrador Nero and 
his human family. As we discuss the quotient of successful canine alerts 
predictive of dropping blood sugar levels, I wonder aloud if he is happy just 
having Nero as a companion, regardless of his alerting prowess. Paul blows out 
his cheeks ‘well, 90% of the time’ and laughs. ‘There are days..., but having him 
gets me out, it gets me walking. I used to love walking and I still do’, so they 
generally leave home, linked by a leash, and walk for about an hour every 
morning, and 30 minutes to an hour in the evening. 
On a later occasion, one of the Medical Detection Dogs’ trainers is 
visiting Nero and his companions, Paul and Natasha, at their home and I listen 
to their discussion. Paul relates that Nero is not at all ‘forceful’ and his alerts are 
very subtle, but that as soon as ‘we’ve done the bloods, he goes mad for it, but 
prior to that he’s very subtle’.  Asked what form the alerts take, Paul responds: 
paw, that’s his main one, although he does nudge occasionally, 
but as I say, I’ve got hardly any feeling and the rest of it, so I can’t 
really notice the nudge – then it’s mostly Natasha saying ’oh, he’s 
alerting’. 
During my initial visit, Natasha drew my attention to Nero’s subtle ways 
of alerting: 
Wait, see what he’s just done, he’s come here and he’s got 
something in his mouth; he’s laid down and he’s gone (she 
demonstrates Nero’s inward breath; he draws in air very slightly 
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more obvious than in a normal inspiration of air). Quite often, 
that’s his way of alerting, but if you didn’t know that, you wouldn’t 
clock it. He doesn’t just come in and go oo, oo, ooh (and she 
illustrates pawing), which is what a lot of the other dogs do, but he 
gets really waggy. 
2.2.5 Janet and Alfie 
Janet was diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes at the age of four and when 
attending primary school, had a ‘hypo’ that was observed by her classmates, 
who cruelly mocked her as ‘a diabetic spastic’. Many years later after 
completing her education and following employment, Janet explains the 
excitement and scepticism felt by herself and her mother when attending their 
first three-day training session with diabetes alert Labrador, Alfie. 
He actually did his first alert when we were having coffee in a 
supermarket; he was lying under the table, settled really well, 
when I started to feel pawing on my foot  and I said to the trainer, 
do you think he wants to go out for a wee or something? She said 
why don’t you do a blood test and I was like okay – and I was 
hypo. So you want to believe it but you think does he really pick it 
up that quickly or was it just fluke?  It was a real sort of mix of 
emotions because you really want to believe that he was doing it 
so quickly but at the same time, you’re thinking maybe he just 
wanted to go out. 
Janet explains that once she was shortlisted for a dog, she sent scent 
samples to the centre ‘so they had about 50 of my pots taken when my blood 
sugars were low so he had been trained a bit on what my scent was like, but it’s 
obviously a lot stronger in person than in the samples’. 
That first alert occurred on training day two, with the second on the 
following night when they reached home and the young Labrador had gone 
‘exploring’ while Janet told her family about the training.  
All of a sudden he picked up my blood test kit and gave it to 
me...’are you telling me to do it?’ And he was right again, and it 
was like okay (she laughs, with the sense of recognition and relief 
still evident in her voice) considering it was his first night in a new 
home with new people and everything...and it just went from there. 
 Janet recalls Alfie’s first night alert after about four months of living 
with her: 
He was whining by my bed so I took him outside but he came 
straight back in...as soon as I switched off my light, he was crying 
again and jumped up on the bed and this doesn’t normally happen 
- ‘yes, we’re talking about you, Alfie’ (the dog appears to hide his 
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head under the sofa cushions) – and the penny sort of dropped, 
like maybe I should do a blood test...and I was 3.something. 
Janet talks, as do others with chronic illness diagnoses, of suffering 
severe bouts of depression and relates how she feels she might not have got 
through ‘those really hard times, if he wasn’t there’: 
You get home in the evening and have a cuddle ... and it really 
brought home to me just...how I depend on him on so many 
levels. 
So I ask whether she feels the charity is correct in wanting to spend time 
matching dogs and humans: 
Yeah, whenever I’ve spoken to people who’ve been on the (MDD) 
waiting list and have got frustrated because it’s taking so long, I’ve 
said ‘you don’t want to be put with just any dog because the dog’s 
got to want to help you.  
It’s not like a Guide Dog who has visual prompts, you know, the 
dog sees a kerb and knows to sit and wait. These dogs don’t have 
that so they’ve got to want to do it (alert) for you and that’s where 
the bond is so important – because if that’s not there, then they’re 
not going to want to do what you need them to do. 
Michalko (1999: 149) also writes of the human-assistance dog bond's 
significance: 
...the bond binds not only dog and person, it also binds the 
species, breed, training, and personality necessary for success 
into the 'team'. The idea of the bond is an essential feature of dog 
guide training as well. In fact, the presupposed ability of dogs to 
bond to people and vice versa is one reason why dogs are used 
for guiding. Dog guide trainers also work with the assumption that 
a dog guide will only work well with a blind person if the two are 
bonded. 
As well as her human relatives, Janet shares the family home with Alfie 
and two cats: ‘the tabby is best mates with Alfie, and as soon as they see each 
other, they rub noses. In the evening when I take Alfie for a walk, the tabby 
follows us’. 
After several successful years of fulltime employment in the health 
professions, Janet became hypo-unaware and was no longer able to fulfil her 
work commitments. She has recently given birth to her first child in hospital, and 
with the support of her health care team, Alfie was permitted to stay in the ward 
for the days preceding the baby’s arrival so as to maintain pre-hypo alerting and 
to ensure neither member of the partnership suffered additional anxiety or 
stress in the absence of the other. 
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2.2.6 Tina and Harley 
 Tina was diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes nearly 30 years ago at a time 
when she was moving into her own home. To pay the mortgage she had fulltime 
employment and two casual jobs but her parents would often ‘find me in comas 
and I’d have been there for three or four hours at a time’. After their deaths, 
Tina and her four-month-old black Labrador puppy, Harley, were taken into 
sheltered housing – ‘when you’re in your late forties, it’s the last thing you want’.  
 In desperation, she searched online, found and applied to Medical 
Detection Dogs. Her consultant and doctor were supportive because every 
other option was ‘dead’. She had been offered a transplant where a living cell is 
placed in the pancreas; ‘because my pancreas is dead, it would mean after two 
years, I’d come back to being a diabetic again’ ostensibly with hypo-awareness. 
However, because Tina had had side effects from long-acting drugs for a 
previous illness, the planned transplant failed. Harley then received training in 
hypo-detection at the Medical Detection Dogs charity so that he could become 
Tina’s fulltime alert assistant: 
He alerts me to my highs, he alerts me to my lows, he also alerts 
me if I’m dropping quickly which I tend to do. I can be in the 20s 
and then drop to nothing.  
Now I can catch a bus, come to work, go shopping, go on holiday, 
go into hotels, go out for meals, do anything. 
2.2.7 Mel and Gemma 
They call the dogs who work with the children ‘Team Dogs’ 
because they work as part of the group with the adult who cares 
for the child. So the dog forms part of that team; the dog and the 
child don’t work on their own like an adult partnership would. They 
call them ‘Team Dogs’ because the families are very much 
involved. 
 Mel’s son, Mark, was diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes at the age of three, 
and has benefitted from the assistance given by Gemma, the family’s canine 
companion, now trained in hypo-alerting by MDD instructors. Mel describes 
Gemma’s alerting practices: 
She’s amazing at night. She sleeps on the bed with him and if 
there’s a problem, she comes from his bedroom doorway to mine. 
If I’m only sleeping lightly, then I’ll hear her claws coming across 
the floorboards and she’ll greet me with the meter in her mouth. 
But if I don’t wake up when she does that, she goes back into his 
room, comes back through our doorway, goes back into his room, 
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comes out again and goes back – and then she barks. That 
seems to be the pattern. 
 Terry and Nick believe the charity focus on youth is directed towards: 
children with Type 1 when having a dog is fun, rather than on 
teenagers who want to be part of their own group and don’t want 
anything to do with adults because we don’t know anything. Most 
diabetic teenagers don’t want to be different, don’t want to be 
diabetic so if you tell them something is for their diabetes, they 
don’t want to know. Rather let them find out for themselves. We 
suggest adults give them the MDD website and let teenagers do 
the research. Let them find out a bit more for themselves; don’t 
ram the idea down their throats. 
Multiple articles relating to Type 1 diabetes and adolescents, for example 
Lewandowski and Drotar (2007), detail the difficulties faced by teenagers in 
keeping to routines of diet and insulin when frolicking hormones unsettle all 
efforts at stability. 
Enthusiasm and gratitude for the dogs’ efforts pervade every 
conversation held with participants. It appears understandable that the dogs are 
creatures, like humans, who cannot be perfect all the time, but any missed alert 
or failure to return immediately when called, does not call for criticism of the 
dog; it is considered more likely to be a failure to act swiftly or accurately on the 
part of the human partner. Quite refreshing when so often nonhuman animals 
are 'blamed' (see Ritvo, 1987; Irvine, 2003) for human error. 
 Conversing with MDD instructor, Gill, en route to a shopping mall where, 
on behalf of MDD, she will observe Paul and Nero working together in public, I 
learn how necessary it is for the MDD staff to explain clearly how the charity’s 
partnerships evolve so that members of the public can comprehend the variety 
and amount of training and encouragement that goes into ‘producing’ an 
accredited diabetes alert dog: 
We try to say to people that it’s a partnership, that it’s a two-way 
thing, so there’s a lot of work on both sides. It’s not easy, 
especially for people who have never lived in close proximity to a 
dog - the dog is with you 24/7, going everywhere with you, and 
you have to plan. You can’t just pop to the shops any more, you 
have to think what you need for yourself and for the dog, and 
obviously public attention is going to be centred on the dog when 
you’re out.  
People want to talk to you about the dog so we try to say to clients 
that everything will take much longer [than they would expect]; 
and the biggest thing that we’re trying to put across at the moment 
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is that there’s a lot of work still to be done. Things go on in 
people’s lives, things that don’t always go according to plan.  
She believes that people have high expectations of the dogs’ capabilities 
because of the increased media coverage of the charity and the work of the 
detection dogs, but are unaware of the amount of work going on behind the 
scenes ‘even down to keeping records of every blood test the clients do’. 
We realise it’s a lot of work but it’s vital for us to be able to see 
anything going on. The computer program we’ve got is fantastic; 
to be able to input the client-recorded details and see the 
percentage of successful alerts given by the dogs. But we can 
also see if there are problems occurring and there’s a lot we can 
do on there to try and find out if there are any trends, if there’s a 
reason for the problem, if it’s a particular time in the day – it’s 
things like that that are so helpful. 
 The year is 2015 and the charity has 60 working partnerships and a 
further 20 dogs in training. When the dogs are placed with a diabetic client, 
there will be a weekly visit from the trainers in the early months to ensure the 
smooth-running of the care practices and the comfort of both individuals when 
living in such close proximity. Thereafter, contact between home assessment 
sessions is maintained by telephone or email, or visits to the centre are 
arranged either as individual partnerships or to meet other clients at social 
events or refresher courses. 
A young dog still undergoing training accompanies the instructor and we 
join Paul, Natasha and Nero in the shopping complex. Despite his impaired 
vision, Paul is able to navigate stairs, lifts and crowded shops by following 
Nero’s lead. We move through a pet accessories and nutrition shop to see if the 
dogs become distracted by toys, bags of food and any possibly diverting smells. 
The younger dog occasionally turns her head to see what lies on the shelves 
but keeps walking. Nero walks slightly ahead of Paul and is never distracted, 
despite swinging shopping bags, children shouting and open displays of dog 
chews and treats. He lies down under a restaurant table and appears to relax, 
but his eyes are constantly trained on Paul’s legs; I am told that, although calm, 
he won’t really settle and sleep until they return home because of the need to 
alert either when items on restaurant menus are eaten without carb-counting, or 
when environmental stresses rapidly change Paul’s blood glucose levels.  
 The diabetic alert dogs are fully appreciated by the individuals with health 
issues whom they assist, but whether the people they meet socially are able to 
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recognise and comprehend the degree of assistance available from and given 
by another species, is less certain, since so much of their sensory work is 
invisible to public observation. The similarity is striking in terms of the invisibility 
of the two minority groups here: there is rare public recognition of the immensity 
of the dogs' sensory assistance nor, in general, is there social awareness of the 
human partners' chronic illness and inabilities. Sara's earlier comment (page 
37) on the invisibility of diabetes comes to mind: 'it's a very hidden disability, 
isn't it'. 
2.3 Social sensitivity and self-reflexivity 
Before reviewing published literature relating to chronic illness and 
canine history and domestication, further discussion of methodology follows 
regarding the need for social sensitivity and self-reflexivity when attempting to 
understand interspecies respondents' behaviours and communications. 
Existential anthropologist Michael Jackson (2012: 179) encourages 
researchers to employ ‘social sensitivity’ to the people who accept them ‘into 
their households and everyday lives’. This is an essential element of fieldwork 
interview procedure, particularly when conversing with people affected by 
chronic illness who share their households with medical alert assistance dogs. 
These inter-species partnerships are vulnerable to the complexities of the focal 
illness but also to society’s views and judgements on their lives as co-existing 
members of a cooperative team. 
Their relationships with a researcher are dependent on their own 
personalities, experiences, tolerance of pain, or frustration-with-life-as-it-is; they 
are also reliant on the researcher’s efforts to question with empathy, to listen 
actively and passively, to act and react with appropriate language, mannerisms 
and consideration.  Madden (2014: 279-280) refers to Haraway (2008: 27, 63) in 
contending that ‘animals are co-constituting, co-evolving, active, and reactive 
agents in the formation of social relationships with humans’ and seem fully 
deserving of a researcher’s mindful efforts to understand their ways of 
behaving, to perceive their emotion, their reasoning, their actions and reactions 
to mutual coexistence with a chronically-unwell human. 
Human and canine perceptions are liable to vary according to genetics 
and environment, so conducting fieldwork among partnerships of more than one 
species involved in health and illness performances, requires sense and 
sensitivity. Humans and nonhuman animals considered to be in good health are 
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still subject to changes in mood and behaviour, so those plagued by the 
complications of chronic illness or by enforced placement in a human 
household, may not always live in an imagined harmony.  
‘Ideally’, Jackson contends, ‘one’s writing shows how understandings 
emerge from the space between people – a space of conversation, negotiation 
and encounter, that switches unpredictably between accord and discord, 
attunement and disharmony’ (2012: 174).  So this study endeavours to write of 
everyday encounters and attempts to reveal the shifting understandings that 
emerge from spaces between the researcher and the human-canine dyads 
immured within the boundaries of chronic illness.  
It is hoped that the physical, and sometimes emotional, mutualistic 
practices of care, supported or negated by the diverse theories referenced 
throughout the text, will embody the concept of symbiotic ethics itself – theory 
informing practice as practice informs theory – and assist in further developing 
the role to be played by empirical research in bioethics as delineated in Lucy 
Frith’s ‘practical research methodology for the inclusion of data from social 
science studies into ethical deliberation’ (2012: 198). Ethical theory, she 
suggests, ‘is useful for criticizing practices and guarding against any serious 
contraventions of particular principles, for example, liberty or equality’ (2012: 
205). Not insisting that her approach and methodology should replace others, 
she assigns it to a bioethicist’s expanding tool kit as additional equipment; 
perhaps an instrument that can add value, lying in useful proximity to the ranks 
of health tools and animate instruments contained in the biomedical cabinet. 
Reflexivity enables retention and explication of emotional contact 
between researcher and participants in the study.  Participants have shown 
willing acceptance of this investigation into their interspecies ‘families’ so close 
observation can provide objective and subjective considerations of the 
advantages and disadvantages created and enacted by the nonhuman 
assistant who establishes/is given an identifiable place/space in the home. 
2.4 Trans-species communication 
Those who have a trained alert dog to assist in the performing of their 
care treatments, in the ‘doing’ of their medical practices, may consider what the 
dog’s active, agentic body needs to do to survive within their human 
environment, how their own agency might act to enrich and improve canine 
options in their mutual life-sharing, and, being co-embodied in this 
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biopsychosocial context, what these interspecies performers can achieve in 
symbiotic partnership.  
Examples of human insight into close human-canine relationships are to 
be found in David Goode’s Playing with my dog Katie (2007), an 
ethnomethodological portrayal of the importance of play in enhancing 
interspecies communication. 'What I wanted to do was show the observable, 
intrinsic events of play as they appeared to and were done by Katie and me', 
Goode (2007: 156) concludes, describing his endeavours to study and analyse 
their everyday events - Garfinkel's (2002) 'lived orders' - which occurred at 
specific times and places. Ken Shapiro (1990: 186) sources his insights and 
reflections from watching and interacting in play with his dog, Sabaka. 
According to Goode (2007: 137), Shapiro's intention is to understand 'the 
subjective experience of the other', whereas Goode's objective is to obtain data 
and demonstrate 'detailed practices'. 
People talk of ‘my friend’, ‘my child’, ‘my love’, when addressing their 
assistant nonhuman companions, and the personal pronoun triggers a sense of 
ownership and possession, but not of an alien object or being. Rather the ‘my’ 
appears to signify trust and concern, a ‘belonging together’ by the human and 
an effort to gain and demonstrate insight into a shared identity. As Czerny 
(2012: 10) claims, a ‘sense of responsibility’ seems necessary for pro-active 
assistance in the dog’s negotiation of a human umwelt (Von Uexküll, 2010), the 
subjective environment that is continually experienced by an organism.  
But Deleuze and Guattari (2007: 40) look at the other side of the coin 
and consider that ‘individuated animals, family pets, sentimental, Oedipal 
animals each with its own petty history, “my” cat, “my dog”...invite us to regress, 
draw us into a narcissistic contemplation, and they are the only kind of animal 
psychoanalysis understands, the better to discover a daddy, a mommy, a little 
brother behind them’. Whether ‘motherese’, narcissism, or simple pronouns of 
affection, the result is interspecies communication of a positive, if imagined, 
kind. 
Cassidy (2002: 135-136) ponders the ‘consistent personalisation of ties 
between humans and particular horses that blurred the category distinction 
made between humans and horses’ on the stud where she conducted fieldwork. 
‘The use of categories usually restricted to humans, such as ‘maiden’, ‘mummy’, 
‘baby’... reflects the propensity of those who work on studs to imagine their lives 
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through horses and horses’ lives. Leslie Irvine (2004: 175-176), talking of 
selfhood, suggests that  
people who work with and care for others who cannot speak will 
readily acknowledge the selfhood within. Friends and caregivers 
will ‘speak for’ the mute, the autistic, the brain-injured, the 
Alzheimer’s patient, and the severely retarded. The same takes 
place, albeit with a few differences, between people and animals. 
If we look for selfhood in interaction, we will see it even without 
language. 
Similar category blurring occurs within the human-dog teams where 
participants, for example, Natasha and Mel, speak of the dogs as family without 
hesitation, and Tina believes her co-existence with Harley provides the two of 
them with a single shared identity. Their inter-species dialogues may on 
occasion become more familiar, more intimate, than those held among human 
family members, and imagined responses are vocalised by the human partner 
in order to activate and progress the interspecies conversation.  
Cassidy’s ‘consistent personalisation of ties between humans and 
particular horses’ is further reflected in social media where companion dogs are 
given their personal ‘Facebook’ identities and converse on their ‘pages’ in the 
words and phrases thought appropriate to them by their human guardians. They 
may comment on their human companion’s dialogue in humorous or ironic 
terms, send photographs or describe events in their daily lives. In this way, 
dialogical species boundaries fade as communication crosses barriers between 
individuals and their social networks, nationally and often, internationally, when 
‘friends’ of the dog post messages to him or her which may be read aloud by 
human voices, and replies concocted with appeal to the dog for imagined 
comment. 
But challenges face ethnographers who wish to take animals ‘seriously 
as social beings and ethnographic subjects’. Raymond Madden (2014: 285), 
like Jackson, considers researchers should act with sensitivity to participants’ 
ways of being in society and in the world so as to achieve and communicate 
inter-subjective trust, ‘the paragon quality one wants in ethnographic social 
exchange’. Despite our willing determination to become embroiled and 
entangled in the so-called ‘messiness’ of life, Madden contends that it is also 
‘the most ill-defined and difficult’ (2014: 285) quality to achieve in ethnographic 
communication. 
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Allowing a subjective absorption of emotion, as well as objective 
observation and necessary detachment, has been fruitful in providing greater 
comprehension of Type 1 diabetes and the multiple side-effects and 
complications that also require performances of care. These complexities can 
lead to severe dysfunction in mobility and sensory perception, and to 
physiological alteration in those encumbered by chronic illness.  
Doing the daily routines of assessment, measure and control necessary 
to balance blood glucose levels and carbohydrate absorption, and performing 
the external behaviours (doing tests and recording what, why and when they 
have done, are doing and will do) requires physical and mental work, intense 
concentration and a need for internal and external self-knowledge. Observing 
the length of time which respondent, Paul, spent enacting these routines, the 
question arose ‘how much of the day do you spend thinking about the illness?’ 
The answer was thoughtful: 
It’s probably on your mind 24 hours a day or all the time you’re 
awake. If you think about dinner, you’d just put something on; but I 
first have to think about what I’m going to eat, how much I’m going 
to inject. It may only take 15 minutes but when you sit down to eat, 
you think I’ve got to eat all of this, and then if you don’t, you think 
I’ve missed that out so that’s left me short on eggs, so then you’ve 
got to get something else to fill the gap. 
And this calmly-spoken statement fails to encompass the depth and 
breadth of the causes and effects of life with Type 1 diabetes and its conjoined 
emotional upheaval. Extracts from Paul’s narrative, given during fieldwork 
observation, reveal many of Type 1 diabetes’ complex, and sometimes 
confusing, requirements, and detail the necessary ‘juggling’ of carbohydrate to 
suit the moment. ‘Carbs and cals’ interactions when consumed, can be highly 
effective or completely ineffective, depending on the rate of absorption, the 
speed of blood glucose levels’ rise or fall, the items being consumed, current 
‘mood’ and the variety of contextual settings. 
Each person with chronic illness is unique within and without so a diet 
suiting one diabetic, for example, may lead to an increase in hypoglycaemic 
episodes in another; one type of energy drink may increase blood sugar levels 
almost instantly for some, but make no difference whatsoever for others. 
Discovering similarities and differences in such care practices may afford 
assistance to ‘newcomers’ with Type 1 diabetes who are likely overwhelmed by 
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the enormity of their diagnosis, and to parents shocked to learn of their infant’s 
seeming lifetime medical ‘sentence’. 
Throughout the project, participant narratives expand detail and 
exemplify their shared lives, giving commentary on the advantages and 
disadvantages of mutualistic practices of care. With emotion and knowledge 
relating to chronic illness being embodied in both participants and researcher, 
the narrative gains from insight into the body as subject and as object, into the 
interconnectedness and engagement of the two species, and as Mol and Law 
(2004: 4) have suggested, into 'the body we do’ to avoid a hypo. 
Despite apparent general scepticism at the outset, or lack of knowledge 
about the possibility of nonhuman animals detecting symptoms of cancer and 
forewarning of hypoglycaemia in people with Type 1 diabetes, the charity at the 
centre of this study has persisted in extending research into innovative canine 
medical detection of human illness through reward-based training methods and 
bio-techno-scientific investigation.  
The possibility of ethical bias or other implication accruing from alignment 
with the charity 'helping' these research participants agitated my thinking as, in 
my first year of research, I spent several months acting as a regional volunteer 
explaining the charity's work to members of the public. However, living far from 
the MDD training centre, I was unable to observe the close interaction taking 
place there among trainers, dogs, and clients who fulfilled the criteria making 
them eligible for a medical alert assistance dog. 
During 2015, I was offered the opportunity to join the organisation to 
provide occasional home checks and received training from an instructor in how 
to assess prospective clients' homes and home-life so as to ensure the future 
comfort and welfare of an alert dog.  Such visits require observation not only of 
family members, all of whom are invited to join in conversations with their own 
questions and comments, but also of the amount of space indoors and out for 
the dog to move around safely, the number of nonhuman family member with 
whom the dog would have social interaction, whether a dog could easily 
navigate stairs or outside steps, whether garden fencing/hedging would keep a 
large or small dog within the garden and other dogs, out, where the alerting dog 
would sleep and eat, the home's neighbourhood, amount of traffic and parking 
facilities, safe places for a dog to run free, and the proximity of a veterinary 
surgery. 
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The introductory home visit I undertook with an MDD instructor and her 
dog-in-training did not involve the consenting participants of this project, so the 
school-going child who has Type 1 diabetes and who enjoys the close 
companionship of several nonhuman animals, including a dog, chickens, fish, 
rabbits and a budgerigar, is not identified here and was not interviewed.  
However, in listening and observing, the visit opened my eyes to the 
amount of detailed information needed in order to match a trained diabetes alert 
assistance dog to a human partner so that both enjoy a safe and supportive 
home environment.  Although it has not yet been necessary to undertake a 
home assessment visit in the region where I live, I have been offered access to 
further education directed at MDD staff and volunteers which includes 
instruction in aspects of health and safety, methods of transporting humans and 
dogs safely and legally, and means to ensure the safety and protection of 
myself and others, all of which have increased my awareness of the need for 
high levels of care knowledge and interpretation when working with adults, 
children and dogs, beyond the categories of illness, linguistic ability, age or 
species. 
As a result of participation in and observation of procedures, 
conversations and interactions among the charity's staff, clients and working 
dogs, and the lack of pressure to bend my research to any specified norms or 
conventions held by MDD, it has been possible to maintain a consciousness of 
my 'self' in the world of 'other selves', to become aware of the possibilities and 
benefits of a mutually-directed empathy, and to take an inter-subjective view of 
the diabetes alert dog's 'doing' of practices in response to the trainer's 
recommendations, and later, to the client's health behaviours.       
Broadening the scope of the study to include relevant already-published 
research brings focus onto the necessary interdisciplinarity of studies involving 
the health and welfare of multispecies populations. Academic research into the 
advantages of multispecies interactions improving human health and wellbeing 
has surged in recent years both quantitatively and qualitatively. Literature 
sources reviewed for this study are derived principally from the disciplines of 
anthrozoology, anthropology and the sociology of health and illness, but those 
of philosophy, psychology and other disciplines related to human and 
nonhuman animal welfare, play contributory roles that support or explain 
narrative content communicated by participants.  
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3 Review of historical and contemporary literature 
In the recent past, anthrozoology has ‘prioritized’ (Hurn, 2010: 27) the 
human-observed aspects of trans-species interactions, objectifying the 
nonhuman animals under focus. But today’s researchers are more likely to 
observe and accept nonhuman animals as ‘social actors in their own right’ and, 
like us, as do-ers of their own thing. Further, compassion and empathy may 
now be incorporated in human endeavour to take up, as far as possible, the 
nonhuman’s sensory perspectives so as to see, hear, smell, taste, touch, 
aspects of their worlds in order to better comprehend them and those who 
inhabit them, what they do and how they re-act, how they impact their 
environments and experience their surroundings.  
Participant observation and shared experience, conducted through 
empathic spoken or unspoken communication, enable research to take place in 
homes and habitats, both wild and domestic. Living-with, even ‘becoming-with’, 
companion animals as friends and assistants, invites new perceptions of what it 
might mean to be ‘an animal’, with reference to Ingold’s (1994 [1988]) question: 
‘What is an animal?’ 
 Turning to the sociology of health and illness, quality of life has 
previously appeared dependent on how long a passive patient would live before 
death occurred; a decision being based on observed and diagnosed symptoms 
of illness. This was a highly objective approach that failed to acknowledge any 
psychological effects that such an illness might have - nor the social 
consequences that it might produce - on the patient, their families, friends and 
colleagues and certainly not on any resident family cat or dog. A seemingly 
simple inability to provide meals for family members, including cats or dogs, 
could cause physical hunger in the home, fatigue, changes in mood and result 
in possible antisocial behaviour. However, a contemporary perspective 
pinpoints a more active and thinking patient, one who requires knowledge and 
skills to improve their own physical, psychological and social way of being, 
alongside proffered medical treatments. In this instance, a diabetic individual 
may gain beneficial information from the sensory assistance afforded by trained 
medical alert dogs. 
Schillmeier’s (2014) research into the cosmopolitics of illness highlights 
contemporary societal diseases such as dementia that cause overwhelming and 
damaging costs to personal and social lives and to the economy. Obesity is 
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currently a problem affecting human adults and infants alike, and has become 
so severe an issue that many, in particular ‘Western’, countries now require 
government interventions to reduce its effect on the health and welfare of their 
societies. Similarly, obesity and its close companion, diabetes, have affected 
domestic animals living in human homes so that both species may require 
medical intervention and insulin donation. Rock and Degeling (2013) explicate 
the impact of companion animals on human health in the light of personhood, 
property, and municipal or council by-laws. They suggest that investigation into 
'socio-ecological ethics in public health' (2013: 494) and multispecies 
interactions might encourage quality of life improvement for both companion 
animals and their human counterparts living in urban societies.   
Prevalence figures for 2015 state that more than 3.5 million people in the 
UK are known to have been diagnosed with diabetes (Diabetes UK, November 
2015) and more than half-a-million adults and children are estimated to have 
undiagnosed symptoms of this life-changing illness. 
Type 2 diabetes can be partially attributed to obesity and lifestyle 
behaviours and allows ‘room for improvement’ in health by the individuals 
themselves. Type 2 diabetes is the condition generally understood as ‘diabetes’ 
by society, whereas juvenile-onset or insulin-dependent Type 1 diabetes is a 
‘silent’, lesser known chronic illness, and occurs when the immune system 
views its own cells as alien, resulting in destruction of the body’s insulin-
producing beta cells in the pancreas.  
From the onset of a Type 1 diabetes diagnosis, care practices and 
practitioners infiltrate the life of the ‘patient’; whether nurse or physician, parent 
or pharmacist, nutritionist or neurologist, weighing and measuring, pricking 
fingers and testing blood, teacher, work colleague, friend or paramedic – care is 
given of necessity by individuals and communities to improve ways of doing life 
with this form of diabetes. 
Research by Annemarie Mol (2008) has influenced this study insofar as 
her intentions of writing to 'articulate the specificities of good care' within the 
parameters of diabetes ‘so that we may talk about it’ (2008: 2), will hopefully 
resonate effectively in this examination of care practices conducted within the 
mutual co-existences of medical alert assistance dogs and their human 
companions with Type 1 diabetes. And in resonating, will inform members of 
society who may currently lack knowledge of symptoms, side effects and 
  
63 
 
treatments for this complex illness, and may be unaware of the efficient 
interspecies collaboration that can prevent the unpleasant effects of 
hypoglycaemia. 
The illness condition, Type 1 diabetes, has as yet no cure or clinical 
treatment to prevent its development, so innovative procedures to improve self-
care practices and strategies, augmenting lifestyle management, are crucial 
requirements for day-to-day living and for the social integration of individuals 
with this illness who may have to endure a lifetime of specialised behaviours. 
How these care strategies are embodied in individual and collective health 
practices and routines is learned from observing the daily activities and 
behaviours of people with Type 1 diabetes who share their lives with medical 
alert assistance dogs, and by listening to their significant personal narratives. 
This canine-human symbiotic relationship stems from a recently 
developed, non-invasive procedure to benefit people with Type 1 diabetes. The 
collaborative multispecies process incorporates the dog’s acute sense of smell 
in detecting extreme fluctuations in blood glucose levels, symptoms which may 
fail to be recognised as needing urgent attention by the individual with Type 1 
diabetes, but which may result in serious and severe reactions.  
Unlike the participants with Type 1 diabetes in Mol and Law’s 2004 study,  
respondents active in this research have, over their life-times, lost awareness of 
symptoms and the embodied ability to sense an approaching hypoglycaemic 
crisis. When all educational attempts and medical encouragements to continue 
feeling or sensing symptoms of an imminent hypo fail, the chronically ill person 
may, on frequent occasions, become dizzy, lose environmental awareness and 
sense of location or situation, may collapse, and without human assistance to 
call an ambulance, fall into a potentially-fatal coma. 
However, the humans with Type 1 diabetes participating in this study are 
able to rely on a canine ‘stand-in’ for an embodied sensation. Canine olfactory 
acuity perceives what the human fails to recognise, and inter-corporeal 
sensitivity maintains an advance warning system to prevent a hypoglycaemic 
episode or ‘hypo’. Dogs are trained to act on their olfactory detection of changes 
in the diabetic’s odour signature in order to alert the individual so that blood 
sugar levels can be tested, insulin dosages can be adjusted and medical 
treatment measures enacted appropriately.  This forewarning by the dog can 
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avoid the previously-frequent need to call for emergency medical services and 
prevent collapse into unconsciousness and hospitalisation. 
Canine olfaction and nasal architecture, accuracy in naso-sensory 
detection and differentiation, the co-embodied care practices performed by the 
dog-human partnership and the doing of interactive behaviours that impact on 
better management and resultant extension of life, are topics for further 
discussion. The concept of dogs as animate instruments, as biomedical 
resources in the Type 1 diabetes medical kitbag, is also examined and 
interpreted while incorporating the views expressed in the narratives spoken by 
human participants in this research. 
3.1 Examining research 
Literature investigating the advantages of animal-human interactions in 
the context of health and wellness has increased nationally and internationally 
over the past 50 years. Levinson (1969), Fine (2010), Friedmann, Son and Tsai 
(2010), and Wilson and Turner (1998), are among inter-disciplinary researchers 
whose work is prominent among well-cited studies. Lynette Hart draws attention 
to the value of ‘pet’ animals in enhancing human quality of life ‘that can stem an 
unravelling decline into disability or disease’, but adds the significant rider: ‘they 
only rarely offer a pathway to curing disease’ (2010: 63).  
While trained medical alert assistance dogs are regarded both as 
working dogs and as companion animals, there is no pretence that they can 
provide a cure for diabetes. However, their exceptional olfactory prescience can 
dramatically enhance quality of life, and enable the provision of an acceptable 
and more secure standard of living it, when viewed from both medical and 
societal standpoints. Disenfranchisement because of disability frequently 
isolates the chronically ill, so the company of a dog bolsters safety in public 
venues while aiding social integration, and shores up self-confidence in knowing 
the dog can act promptly in bringing medical assistance and equipment when 
required.  
Many disciplines now remark both the value of animal models for human 
behaviours and reaction to illness (Blackburn-Monro, 2004; Shanks, Greek and 
Greek, 2007), as well as the improvement in health to be gained from animal-
assisted activities and therapy (Fine, 2010). Riding for the Disabled (RDA) is 
one well established and widely recognised association which helps riders of all 
ages to improve balance and muscle strength. Admittedly, this is an 
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anthropocentric perspective which sees the sociability of human-equine 
interaction within a group also facilitating integration into communities, 
particularly if the riders have medically-recognised difficulties that might include 
ADHD (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder), or impaired coordination, vision 
or hearing.  
The regular movement of the horse beneath the rider, and the safety 
offered by the human companions walking on either side of the interspecies 
partnership, allow at least a short-term mutual coexistence. A union bounded by 
care and empathy from the volunteers towards the horse and the rider, and 
perhaps from the horse silently communicating with the (usually) young rider in 
the saddle. I once observed children of the RDA carefully balancing beanbags 
on their heads as they sang 'twinkle, twinkle, little star' to the blue skies of Africa 
while 'racing' their ponies as fast as the helpers could walk. Certainly they gave 
an impression of enjoyment that seemed mirrored in the human and nonhuman 
animal assistants, despite the bridle perhaps evidencing one of Ingold's 'tools of 
coercion' (2000: 307). Horses and ponies retired from competition work are 
likely candidates for donation to animal-assisted activities (Chandler, 2005: 31) 
just as many human retirees volunteer to assist in charity work after completing 
their working careers. Both may be indirectly coerced into 'helping'; the human 
helpers finding purpose and satisfaction in being among communities of like-
minded individuals and the horses are not seen to 'kick against the traces', nor 
to dislike the mixed-species companionship. Horses live naturally in herds, and 
humans, for the most part, dislike social isolation. 
Another 'use' of therapy animals has benefitted individuals who are 
affected by autism spectrum disorders (Grandin, Fine and Bowers, 2010). And 
the global employment of assistance dogs to support people with physical and 
mental impairments has increased substantially in recent years, for example, 
the non-profit UK organisation, Dogs for Good, which changed its name from 
Dogs for the Disabled in October 2015, provides accredited assistance dogs to 
people with impaired physical mobility. 
Reviewing research sourced principally from the disciplines of 
anthrozoology and the sociology of health and illness, it appears that human-
nonhuman animal cooperation can offer significant multispecies welfare benefit.  
Rock and Babinec (2008) offer an example supporting this collaboration, in 
relation to diabetes in people and in their domesticated companion animals. The 
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fact that diabetes is also a condition affecting dogs and cats, who therefore 
require medical treatment similar to that needed by humans, produces what 
Rock and Babinec (2008: 325) term 'intricate' multispecies 'interconnections'.   
There is an essential closeness in such complex and intimate practices. 
During the years spent running boarding kennels, a small, wavy-coated elderly 
dog came to stay regularly, bringing her case of syringes and needles, insulin 
vials and specific food items, and her agenda for treatment was exacting. Meals 
were served to her three times a day allowing a precise number of hours 
between each, and an injection into the loose skin on the back of her neck 
would be given before she could eat, according to written instruction. Seemingly 
simple, it proved not to be so when other domesticated species also required 
caring attention: so she travelled with me to collect prescribed food from the 
veterinarians, to deliver dogs to their family homes, and on other similar 
journeys in order that any delay on the road would not disrupt her diabetes 
management. Her medical bag and weighed food came too and we sat in car 
parks, driveways and roadside lay-bys following the rules of time and insulin 
donation. As a result of our intricate and, to my mind, mutually empathic 
interconnection - her patience with my tapping of the syringe to remove any air 
bubbles and fiddling to find space on the back of her neck that was not 
thickened by years of injection - my appreciation of her stoicism and tolerance 
grew into attachment. She became a friend because of the ‘intricacies’ of her 
illness. 
3.2 Morals and minority groups 
Underpinned by studies into human-animal interactions written by an 
eclectic group of multidisciplinary researchers such as Adams, Arluke, Birke, 
Coulter, Despret, Fine, Gruen, Haraway, Hurn, Ingold, Irvine, Michalko, Sanders 
and Serpell,  and including quotations from eminent authors of classic literary 
fiction to illustrate salient points more graphically in the academic text - for 
example, excerpts taken from the novels of  Margaret Atwood (2013), J.M. 
Coetzee (1999) and Virginia Woolf (1933 [2016]) - this anthrozoological study 
endeavours to project the moral values to be learned and social lifestyle 
benefits to be gained by two minority groups as a result of interspecies 
collaboration and coexistence, actively applied to good effect with the 
biomedical knowledge and canine training skills of Medical Detection Dogs.  
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Whether such symbiotic coexistence might fail to benefit either species 
on occasion, or cause unanticipated difficulty in terms of health and welfare, is 
also for discussion since there is no avoiding the ethical whirlpool where the 
human use of nonhuman others is directed towards human health benefit and 
such usage may be condemned as morally wrong by more than animal rights 
advocates alone. This is not the issue of bovine tuberculosis or the culling of 
badger populations, nor the fight for survival of foxes in town and country. It is 
not related to the grave matters of puppy-milling, abandoned ‘Christmas present 
pets’ or underground illegal dog-fighting, all of which require continuing in-depth 
research and urgently applied solutions. As mentioned later in the context of 
animal exploitation, this research is not about intentional cruelty to domestic 
nonhuman animals, nor about laboratory experimentation on caged other 
species but it does investigate the moral dilemma of using animal ‘others’, 
however kindly, as commodities for bettered human lives. 
Disability brought about by chronic illness can enforce a bounded way of 
life - an occasionally oppressive need for the security of routine and control 
contrasting with the frustration of needing to need - onto individuals requiring 
assistance to perform essential daily practices. This produces a social minority 
group entitled to, although sometimes disenfranchised from, what are termed 
'human rights'.  
Qualified medical alert assistance dogs, as is the case for other 
accredited assistance dogs, have been granted legal rights to access shops 
and institutions, public transport, theatres and cinemas, hotels and university 
lecture halls. Their animal ‘rights’ are reflected in human disability rights’ 
imperatives – in other words, members of both species are constrained under 
the minority group banner of individuals requiring ‘rights’ – a label which 
continues to invite condescension, prejudice and de-valuation despite improved 
social awareness, advocacy and activism. Nocella, Bentley and Duncan (2012: 
xvi) strive for eco-ability, a meshing of ecology and ability among human and 
nonhuman animals and nature, that 'argues for the respect of difference and 
diversity, challenging social constructions of what is considered normal and 
equal'.  
In their volume, Arrigoni (2012: 153) writes that in her opinion, 'respect 
for animals and respect for people with disabilities are not separate issues'. 
However, she recalls an elderly man looking for information about 'disabilities 
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and social welfare during retirement. He had lost a leg due to diabetes, and he 
was also worried about the hunting license he could lose because of the 
amputation, which happened a few years ago. He was still hunting. I am still 
bewildered' (2012: 153).   
Wolfe (2013: 8) has drawn attention to Esposito’s (2011) statement 
which is significant in the lives of the two minority groups under discussion. 
Esposito (2011: 209) contends that 'the category of those who enjoy a certain 
right is defined only by contrast with those who, not falling within it, are excluded 
from it'. 
‘Animal rights’ is a phrase synonymous with the names of Peter Singer 
(1975 [1995]; 2006) and Tom Regan (1983 [2004]).  Their writings, on animal 
liberation and the rights of animals, have had decades-long influence on active 
protest against the use of animals in laboratory experiments, factory-farming, 
culling, hunting, circuses and zoos, and on the components of the sometimes 
vegan, increasingly vegetarian, but principally flesh-based ‘Western’ diet.  
The multispecies search for 'rights' to freedom of access, for example, 
becomes an entanglement such as that described in the writings of David Nibert 
(2002: xiii), who claims that   
In myriad ways the oppression of other animals has been 
devastating for the cultural, spiritual and economic well-being of 
the vast majority of humans...the oppression of devalued groups 
of humans has been, and remains, disastrous for other animals. 
Nibert presents challenges to the customary definition of two terms 
‘minority group’ and ‘speciesism’, both of which have significance for the 
human-nonhuman partnerships central to this study. Nibert contends that 
‘minority group’ was a term used to define groups which ‘differed from the one 
that controlled society’ (2002: 6) and that it became commonplace for 
sociologists to consider minority group members as different or ‘special’. As a 
result, he finds ‘oppressed’ group to be more accurate than ‘minority’ group in 
that the term avoids ‘the human-centred concept of minority groups and helps 
challenge the prevailing view that human use and mistreatment of other animals 
lies in the realm of “natural affairs”’(2002: 7).  
Agreed; however, ‘minority’ rather than ‘oppressed’ will be the preferred 
term used here to best describe the two collaborating groupings of humans with 
Type 1 diabetes and the dogs who provide care, since it is the aspects of 
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quantity, i.e. fewer than others, and status in society, rather than emphasis on 
human or animal oppression or mistreatment, that feature most prominently.  
‘When we began to think of animals as ‘others’, we also made them 
inferior...a belief known as speciesism’ (Irvine, 2008: 1957), a concept 
introduced by Richard Ryder in the following excerpt from his pamphlet, Victims 
of Science, delivered in Oxford in 1975. He claims to have characterised the 
‘conventional prejudice against nonhumans as “speciesism” - drawing the 
parallel with similar forms of ‘irrational discrimination such as racism, sexism, 
and ageism’ (2006: 89). Ryder’s terminology has been associated with the anti-
prejudice themes found in the writings on speciesism by Singer and Regan, and 
Nibert (2002: 7) cites Singer’s definition (1990: 6) 
Speciesism ... is a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the 
interests of members of one’s own species and against those of 
members of other species.  
But Nibert is concerned that there is a tendency to diminish the social 
structural basis of oppression of other animals, by the emphasis on overcoming 
prejudice and immoral reasoning in order to secure their freedom. He considers 
speciesism to be an ideology, a socially shared belief system that ‘results from 
and supports oppressive social arrangements’ (2002: 10).  
Cohen, as a self-proclaimed ‘speciesist’, wades into the morality 
argument, allowing that animals should not be made to suffer needlessly but 
highlighting the errors arising from critical inference that biomedical research 
causing animal distress ‘is largely (or wholly) wrong’ (1986: 867). The 
assumption that all animals have equal moral standing is unacceptable since, 
contends Cohen, ‘humans engage in moral reflection; humans are morally 
autonomous; humans are members of moral communities...human beings do 
have rights; theirs is a moral status very different from that of cats or rats’ (1986: 
867). Furthermore, he suggests that those who base their objection to the use 
of animals in biomedical research on pain and the loss of animal ‘rights’, ignore 
the benefits emerging from such research, for example, a reduction in diseases, 
saving of lives and better quality of multispecies lives.  
 Instead of reducing the use of animals in biomedical research, Cohen 
advocates increasing their use so as to avoid issues of risk when using humans 
as participants in experimental medical investigations. While disagreeing with 
much of Cohen’s contention, which seems to fuel further ‘rights’ argument, his 
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suggestion that animal use in biomedical research should be increased while 
avoiding any form of pain, harm or hardship to human or nonhuman (my italics) 
holds attention; the olfactory detection of human disease by canine ‘technicians’ 
featured in this study, appears to enable the use of animals in biomedical 
research without apparent pain, detectable harm or obvious hardship.  
3.3 Marks’ amoral animal ethics 
Whether their ‘moral rights’ are infringed depends on human personal 
decision and belief, and Joel Marks sets out a challenging consideration that 
would dispense with moral argument and sever the complex ‘Gordian Knot of 
animal ethics with a meta-ethical sword’ (2013: 445). He provides an example 
of animal use in biomedical research that is ‘typically defended by an appeal to 
a utilitarian theory’ legitimising harm to some for the good of others, or by other 
arguments that, he contends, fail to resolve the problem of which moral theory 
would be most appropriate to ‘our moral intuitions’ (2013: 446).   
Having planned to cite more of Marks’ contention in a later chapter, I 
rather bring his words into the frame now so that his concept of amoral animal 
ethics can be assimilated, considered and contrasted throughout the 
paragraphs of this study into the use of nonhuman animals in biomedical, but 
non-injurious, research. He proposes the following argument (2013: 452): 
Premise 1: Eating meat in the modern world typically involves 
complicity in the cruel treatment of animals. 
Premise 2:   For most people in the modern world, it is 
unnecessary (for health and even for gustatory pleasure), and in 
many ways (health, environment, etc.) desirable, not to eat meat. 
Premise 3:    Unnecessary complicity in cruelty is wrong. 
Conclusion:   Most people in the modern world are morally 
obligated to become vegetarian. 
Marks finds premise 3 to have an obscure meaning and suggests his 
tendered conclusion ‘lands with a thud of futility’. Thus he proposes removing 
the moral premise 3 and all thoughts of any argument so that what remains are 
the first two propositions only. Although his statements refer particularly to 
animal cruelty and meat-eating, the significance is that action could take place 
to resolve the issues, instead of ‘superfluous’ and often insoluble moral 
argument (2013: 453).  
Concluding that ‘morality does not exist, and advocacy on behalf of 
morality is, as a rule, ineffective and even counterproductive’, Marks allows the 
possibility of a ‘robust ethics in the form of applied amorality, which replaces 
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ingenious dialectic about a fictitious realm of prescriptions with heartfelt 
dialogue about a factual realm of preferences’ (2013: 454). I plan to write about 
moral values and symbiotic ethics, and about the ethics of care in symbiotic 
relationships, but Marks has muddied the pool of contemplation a little by 
dropping in the notion of ‘motivation’ in place of ‘justification’. At all events, 
ethical issues relating to animal use are later discussed in relation to research 
by Gruen, Taylor and others, particularly those who follow ecofeminist 
perspectives on morals and ethics.                                                                                                             
3.4  Moral principles and dilemmas 
Positive reward methods and the formation of genuine interspecies 
bonds are flagged up as being of high significance in the human-canine 
partnerships studied here, and enable support for pain-free ‘use’ of animals in 
the sensory field of olfaction in biomedical research. However, looking at urgent 
medical treatment involving, for example, the human use of porcine heart 
valves, the majority of humans, vegan or not, would likely lower their principles 
in order to bring relief and save human lives if there were no alternative options. 
Karen Emmerman (2014: 163) flags up the moral inter-species dilemma she 
faced in needing vegan-sourced breast milk for her premature baby when none 
was available. Noting the importance of attending to context in such decision-
making, she did find a soy formula but the source of vitamin D3 in it was 
obtained from sheep lanolin via a process that caused stress and suffering to 
the sheep and resultant distress in herself: 
I cannot reduce the conflict to my son having more moral 
significance than the sheep used to make his formula. My son is 
more significant to me than the sheep because he is my son and I 
am his mother and this clearly influences my choices. He is not 
more morally significant that the sheep, however, simply because 
he is human. 
Alternatively, Hamington’s (2008) proposal that we could learn ethics 
from meaningful relationships with particular animals suggests such 
relationships assist in developing moral faculties necessary for ethical 
behaviour, additionally stimulating a ‘moral imagination’ that improves with use.  
Examining these arguments brings attention back to the utilitarian legitimisation 
of ‘harm to some for the good of others’ (Marks, 2013: 445) and to the concept 
of trans-biopolitics, which researchers Blue and Rock (2011: 354) contend is 
‘the classification and evaluation of life as it unfolds in complex, technologically-
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mediated networks within global reach’ (italics in text), enabling academic 
exploration of power mobilities and transformations among both human and 
nonhuman animals. Who is sacrificed for whom in interspecies relationships? 
Richard Twine (2015: 4) comments that ‘in quite obvious ways human 
social lives include a wide range of relations with living (and dead) agential 
nonhuman animals’ which relationships can impact and transform personal and 
social identities, and influence the ways in which nonhuman animals are 
affected in consequence. Referring to animal studies’ ‘assault on human-animal 
dualism’, and suggesting that this dualism is ‘similarly pertinent to the operation 
of, for example, gendered, classed and racialised relations’, Twine notes that it 
then may become possible to view animal studies as encouraging improved 
comprehension of intersectionality, ‘a social science concept that posits shared 
features and interaction between what have traditionally been seen as 
categories of oppression’ (2015: 9). 
Nibert’s chapter, examining ‘the social construction of speciesist reality’, 
takes issue with ‘invidious ideologies’ such as racism and speciesism that 
require anthropocentrism for legitimacy. If, he suggests, the general populace is 
educated to disparage the oppressed as “foreign,” “alien,” “uncivilised,” 
“unclean,” “stupid,” “inferior,” and so on, they become ‘socially distanced from 
the devalued others’ (2002: 197), and lose any opportunity to feel or utter 
empathic responses. 
And compassion and empathy are essential qualities for non-injurious 
human-animal coexistence. While sympathy is separated from these significant 
qualities for this study, the writing of Deane Curtin (2014) has provided a further 
division – compassion being seen as beyond the empathic ‘putting one’s self 
into another’s shoes’. Curtin considers compassion to be less about pity and 
more about a developed and ‘cultivated feeling about emotion’ (2014: 45), a 
‘practice in which one engages deliberately and reflectively, through which one 
becomes skilful in identifying the true causes of suffering in others and in 
ourselves’ (2014: 48). Compassion, claims Curtin (2014: 55), is ‘a form of 
practical therapy. The model for an ethic of compassion is health, not cognitive 
correctness’.  By merging reason and feeling, Curtin suggests that compassion 
becomes more resilient than empathy and is neither altruistic nor reciprocal in 
nature. For example, participant Tina’s compassion for those who might 
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discover her body no longer animated due to ‘dead-in-bed’ syndrome does not 
expect reciprocity. 
However, compassion contains elements of sympathy for the sufferer and 
for the causes of that suffering, whereas empathy – the symbolic wearing of 
someone else’s gumboots while the subject, already in them, is wading through 
a mire of emotional experiences - can enable sharing of both emotion and 
experience whether concocted from sadness or from joy and delight. It is 
possible to empathise with human or nonhuman senses of happiness or relief 
as well as those of betrayal or anguish. And in thinking of happiness, Deborah 
Slicer’s (2014) chapter entitled ‘Joy’ has an uplifting anecdote about a horse 
chomping human-written instructions for his Parelli training, while staring at the 
instructor. Slicer, like Irvine (2013), stresses the significance of stories ‘because 
they help us see and feel that and how animals are subjects’ (2014: 60). Mark 
Bekoff’s foreword to Irvine’s (2004) ‘If you tame me...’ suggests that ‘anecdotes 
are basic to most, if not all, of the sciences, for it is usually stories that motivate 
further empirical or experimental research.  Moreover, it is important to 
remember the plural of anecdote is data’ (Irvine, 2004: viii). 
3.5 Interspecies empathy 
The writings of Barbara Smuts, who gained ‘a feeling for what it means to 
be a baboon’ (2001: 294) and Frans de Waal's (2010) widely-cited research into 
nonhuman animal empathy, provide evidence in support of the significance of, 
and need for, interspecies empathy. De Waal suggests that yawn contagion 
reflects the power of ‘unconscious synchrony’, a synchrony 'ingrained' in 
species that adds to means of survival, exemplified by him as the instantaneous 
‘lift-off’ of a whole flock of birds when ‘one bird suddenly takes off’ (2010: 49). 
Jaak and Jules Panksepp (2013) draw attention to an emotional contagion felt 
among neighbouring laboratory rats and mice as a neuro-evolutionary strategy 
for understanding human empathy. And Lori Gruen (2015: 38) recalls Theodor 
Lipps’ (1903) suggestion that empathy signified a ‘specific perceptual way of 
understanding the world and others in it’.  De Waal also cites Lipps’ 
interpretation of empathy as a feeling of being inside a high-wire walker 
traversing a thin piece of steel wire far above him; he was no longer just an 
observer, he was the walker.  
Sitting before the televised annual Badminton cross-country event, many 
former and current equestrians may feel muscles twitch involuntarily as ‘they’ 
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ride towards the complex fences. For those minutes, they will ‘become with’ 
those on-screen equine-human partnerships, will smell the churned-up turf, 
hear the pounding hooves and feel the shared rush of adrenalin, the sense of 
flying through space over timber and water. Maurstad, Davis and Cowles (2013) 
use multispecies ethnography to give insight into co-being and intra-action in 
horse-human relationships; an interspecies relationship that Birke, Bryld and 
Lykke (2004: 167) explore in terms of performativity, emphasizing animality as 
‘a doing or becoming, not an essence’ and enabling thinking ‘about the 
complexity of human/animal interrelating...as a co-creation of behaviour’. 
Vinciane Despret (2004) continues the human-equine theme in the 
example of Clever Hans, the horse mentioned earlier who could allegedly use 
his hooves to stamp out solutions to simple human-set mathematical problems, 
until research by Oskar Pfungst (1998) suggested the body language of his 
human questioner gave Hans clues to the correct answers.  According to 
Despret (2004: 114), Pfungst (1998: 203) discovered that Hans could ‘play the 
role of a device that induced new articulations between consciousness, affects, 
muscles, will, events “at the fringe” of consciousness’.   
Despret employs the history of Clever Hans to explore issues of 
articulation and communication under the overarching title of anthropo-zoo-
genetic development. She proposes (2004: 114) the notion that the horse 
‘embodied the chance to explore other ways by which human and non-human 
bodies become more sensitive to each other’ (italics in text). Questioning mutual 
influence between a horse and a human rider, Despret suggests that ‘both...are 
cause and effect of each other’s movements. Both induce and are induced, 
affect and are affected’ (2004: 115).  
This shared ability to perform as expected and preferred by each other, to 
embody at least a part of the other’s mind and movement, is seen in the active 
rapport between a human with Type 1 diabetes and their accompanying 
diabetes alert dog. It allows adjustment in agency and produces the mutual 
influence of give-and-take in a powerful bonding, in fine attunement that 
enables the ‘liking’ of each other and therefore beneficially affects the care 
practices of each. There is a balance of inter-dependent cooperation between 
these two species, not the one-sided over-emotional, psychological reliance of 
the needy dependent personality (DSM-IV-TR®, 2000: 725) who may have a 
‘pervasive and excessive need to be taken care of, that leads to submissive and 
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clinging behavior and fears of separation...’, a personality that forces a 
potentially agreeable but unbalanced drive for dependency on the support of the 
other. 
It is perhaps questionable whether some zealous carers of ‘pet’ animals 
inadvertently fulfil one or two of the criteria for this dependency need in their use 
of nonhuman rather than human animals for comfort and support. It seems 
possible that companion animals can offer, if not always empathy, at least 
tolerance, and, being long domesticated, they do require the offices of good 
care, whereas a human other may attempt to ward off, sometimes unkindly, the 
fawning3, ‘clinging’ approaches of someone with traits of a dependent 
personality.  
3.6 Animal personhood in a shared identity 
Talking about her thoughts on the intensity of the human-canine bond 
central to this ethnography, Tina, a long-term possessor of Type 1 diabetes, 
reveals deep feelings of shared identity with her diabetes alert assistant, Harley. 
Harley is a seemingly warm-hearted and attentive companion who rarely fails to 
alert appropriately - despite demonstrating an impressive snore, although his 
nostrils may have been briefly compressed against a chair leg - and who never 
leaves her side during our interview sessions:  
And what I like, the thing I love about him is that we’re no longer a 
number, we’re actually an individual person, an individual being, 
and that’s what fascinates me. 
Significantly, Tina makes use of the inclusive first person plural, ‘we’, in 
her dialogue and it seemed unnecessary to question whether frequent 
encounters with medical personnel who incline towards the use of ‘we’ when 
talking with or on behalf of children or patients, could have embedded this 
plurality of speech into her natural way of speaking. Her delight in their shared 
personhood and avoidance of life as a mere inanimate statistic seemed 
genuine; she was inviting acceptance of both dog and human as the single 
embodiment of a shared identity; two well-matched animal beings contained in 
the extravaganza of one life.  
                                                          
3 I use the word ‘fawning’ with regret that an animal should once again be exemplified in a term 
that disparages a sentient and young nonhuman creature in order to deride the focal human, 
and refer to the pertinent writing of Edmund Leach (1989) concerning animal categories and 
verbal abuse. 
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Shared identity and entangled personhood are prominent in the work of 
Donna Haraway (for example, 1989, 1991, 2003, 2008, 2016) whose literary 
contributions, highlighting entwined interspecies relationships - the ‘lively 
knottings that tie together the world I inhabit’ (2008: vii) - have influenced 
thinking in many academic disciplines as well as in the human-canine world of 
sports agility competition, and have impact in these pages. 
Throughout the fieldwork experience and the attempted disentangling of 
the human-nonhuman interactions and the effect of researcher presence, bias, 
and interview method, one item has continuously rung muffled bells in my 
conscience. This is the easy generalisation of grouping human and nonhuman 
animals into the so-called category of ‘people’. Personalities, personhood, traits 
and characteristics in nonhuman animals that remind of human beings, seem 
acceptable; but deeming nonhuman animals, people, I find a harder concept to 
absorb, particularly when there is increasing desire and encouragement for an 
all-animal collective. 
The right to be respected, to be treated with fairness and justice, 
regardless of species, has to be honoured for all creatures. Understanding, for 
example, elephant populations or communities in sub-Saharan Africa seem 
feasible, but elephant people would more likely be attributed to humans who 
live/work among elephant congregations. Miklósi (2009: 47) opens a chapter 
with the words: 'It is only recently that people have begun to think about dogs in 
terms of populations', allowing dogs to have populations but people to be the 
human species. Terming domesticated nonhumans, ’people’, seems to drop an 
anthropomorphic, anthropocentric veil over those we so want to admire and 
treat as equals; they become once more caught in the brambles of our 
verbiage. If not resident in a laboratory cage, many are over-cuddled and petted 
‘fur babies’, similar to Haraway's 'cuddly, furry, childlike dependents' (2003: 36), 
and may run the risk of being routinely oppressed or smothered into states of 
anxiety. 
However, despite such misgivings about terming nonhuman animals, 
‘people’, because of the sometimes disparaging, sometimes disrespectful, 
anthropocentric connotations involved,  animal personhood seems a more fitting 
concept and, in this research, gains further credibility when made prominent by 
the behaviour of trained canine olfactory ‘detectives’. These detection dogs sniff 
chemicals in human body odours to detect extreme fluctuations in blood sugar 
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levels. They are viewed as medical assistants, as agentic ‘animal selves’ 
(Irvine, 2007), who work in the homes of humans with chronic illness and 
illustrate the fact that recognition of animal personhood is no longer considered 
disquieting to ‘Western’ society.  
 The loud, shrill warning notes sounded by a blackbird at the sight of 
human, cat or fox in an English garden may have become a learned pattern of 
behaviour, but the alarm calls have cause and effect, signifying some form of 
cognitive ability. Irvine’s ‘behavioural flexibility’ (2007: 7) can be seen in the 
adaptive posturing of a horse’s body, the angling of the mobile ears, and the 
variety of ‘snorts’ that might indicate matter ‘out of place’ in the field – a human 
stranger, a snake to be feared, a familiar dog or flock of guinea-fowl to be 
played with, or a sometimes-airborne plastic bag filled with invisible predators. 
From watching and listening, by attending to what attracts the horse’s focus, I 
become informed by the horse’s communicative performance whether to watch 
and enjoy the display or to investigate immediately.  
Kohn (2007: 4) relates that Runa individuals living in Ávila, Ecuador, 
believe it is possible to know the ‘dreams, intentions and motivations of dogs‘ 
because they consider that ‘all beings, and not just humans, engage with the 
world and with each other as selves – that is, beings that have a point of view’. 
This multispecies engagement and recognition of animal personhood/selfhood 
may also be inferred both from the newly-recognised notion of a dog becoming 
an autonomous medical support worker in a family home and from the growing 
number of relevant studies, for example, those contained in John Knight’s 
(2005) Animals in Person, in which Kay Milton’s proposal of egomorphism, as 
an alternative to the ‘distancing concept’ (Alger and Alger, 1999: 203) of 
metaphorical anthropomorphism, is a significant contribution to human-animal 
interaction studies. 
Milton suggests that an individual’s repeated experiences of, and 
engagement with, another’s way of doing and being in certain contexts, can 
lead to an improved understanding of members of different species. As she 
suggests (2005: 268), ‘perceptions emerge, not only out of what we do with and 
towards objects in our environment but also out of what they do to us’.  
Without apparent supervision, Newfoundland 'Nana' is able to provide 
health care for the Darling children in J.M. Barrie’s Peter Pan (1911). This 
seems less of a fantastical concept when trained medical alert assistance dogs 
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are now able, of their own volition, to bring urgently-needed medication or 
medical equipment to their human companions, or to rouse them physically to 
perform blood tests.  
The ‘Norland Nanny’, seen pushing a pram through Hyde Park or 
Kensington Gardens, has undertaken and successfully completed a prestigious 
and intensive training course, initiated in 1892, before taking responsibility for 
her employer's youthful ‘charges’. Similarly necessitating complex training, the 
diabetes alert dogs learn accurate olfactory detection of a specific human’s 
chemical odours, occurring when blood sugar levels rise or fall into zones of 
risk, before undertaking independent alerting decisions that benefit the welfare 
and care of their diabetic human companions. 
To achieve a balanced and broad-based view of the literature underlying 
this study, multidisciplinary research into trans-species co-operations, in terms 
of human health management and lifestyle improvement, is now examined. 
Studies include investigations by Haraway (1991, 2016), Hurn (2012), Irvine 
(2012), Miklósi (2009) and Serpell (2010). The second section examines 
chronic illness and disability studies, specifically the investigations undertaken 
by Bury (1991, 2001), Charmaz (1983, 1995, 2006), Charmaz and Rosenfeld 
(2006), Nettleton (2013), Shakespeare (2014) and Taylor (2014, 2017).  
The medical condition, Type 1 diabetes, is the chronic illness under focus 
and its symptoms, diagnoses and treatments are principally explored through 
information detailed by Diabetes UK (2015) and the Juvenile Diabetes 
Research Foundation (2013). Deeper and more personal knowledge of this 
illness is gained from the narratives verbalised by participants who volunteer 
their own insights into life regulated by treatment routines, practices of care and 
inevitable illness-related hazards. The dogs cannot give vocal contributions in 
language decipherable by human cognitive ability, nor can they sign informed 
consent documents, but their contributions to human welfare are ably performed 
and perceived and therefore present different-to-human versions of their 
insights and experiences in situations of chronic illness. 
4 Anthrozoological and sociological perspectives 
 The dogs themselves were the ‘other’ species who made me question 
their cognitive abilities, their sensory perceptions and their ways of being in our 
shared world. They show no artifice and scarce deception in the actions they 
perform with and towards their human caretakers. The communications ‘flowing’ 
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between each species allow for external physical intermingling and internal 
mental porosity, and appear to result in caring engagements. The dogs act as 
beings who help and are worthy of help. Symbiotic relationships flourish, and 
good companionship and mutual understanding are offered and accepted 
without much use of spoken language. 
 The medical alert assistance dog is a working animal companion, treated 
for the most part as a family member who has a keen olfactory talent for helping 
human health to improve.  Rarely do the human partners label their canine 
companions ‘pets’ unless in answer to an enquiry asking for clarification of the 
dog’s identity in their minds as ‘piece of equipment’ and/or ‘pet’? In recent 
decades, since the interspecies initiatives taken by Arluke and Sanders (1996), 
Bryant (1979) and Levinson (1969), ‘pet’ has taken on problematic connotations 
of dominance and hierarchy in human-human and nonhuman-human animal 
social engagement.  
 Belk (1996: 139) suggests that 'it is their metaphoric status as loved ones 
that keeps pets from being regarded as mindless machines, programmed 
computer games, or even livestock'. Considered to be 'more than machines' but 
'less than humans', Belk contends that it is this incomplete human status that 
'places pets in presumed need of our care' at the same time granting us 
'impunity in treating them as subhuman' (1996: 139). Earlier, Belk (1988: 139) 
examined the relationship between 'possessions and the sense of self', a 
concept appropriate to UK legislation which considers domestic animals to be 
property of their 'owners' (refer Animal Welfare Act 2006).   
Nobis (2016), for example, pinpoints the use of the word ‘pet’ as 
signifying ownership - and thus property which can, for the most part, be 
manipulated or destroyed without criminal liability, an aspect of law that requires 
amendment particularly in the context of domestic abuse where animals may be 
injured or killed to wreak malevolent damage on a human partner who has no 
recourse to law when the abuser resides on the property and the abused 
nonhuman animal is ‘owned’ by the abuser. If an animal is considered to be an 
‘owned’ pet, rather than a nonhuman animal companion, the consequence may 
be a worrying avoidance of the need to consider or care well for the owned 
creature, and invites recollection of Descartes’ mechanistic animals which, 
rather than who in this context, have no conscious awareness and can thus be 
treated as insentient objects. But Coppinger and Coppinger suggest, with 
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reference to domesticated companion animals, ‘we do not think of owning them 
any more than we would think of owning a child, even though we pay all the 
bills’ (2016: 129).   
A ‘pet’ or ‘to pet’ may, furthermore, not only lead to contexts of 
objectification and thoughts of superiority and control, but can also enable 
issues of bestiality and zoophilia. Heidi Nast (2006: 301) recollects the research 
of Marc Shell (1986: 122) in which he explored the sexual, familial, and social 
role that the ‘institution of pethood plays in contemporary politics and ideology’. 
She continues: 
As an anthropologist, he (Shell) wanted to explore the limits of that 
familial relationship, both ideologically and in practice: can one 
love or marry a pet (leading to a discussion of petting, puppy love, 
Playboy bunnies, and so on); and would physical love with a pet 
(especially dogs) be akin to bestiality? Incest? Or neither? (2006: 
301) 
Reminiscent of the Haraway (1991) and Mullin (1999) notions of animal 
mirrors mentioned earlier, but bearing in mind Haraway’s (2003: 11-12) claim 
that dogs ‘are not a projection, nor the realization of an intention, nor the telos of 
anything. They are dogs; i.e., a species in obligatory, constitutive, historical, 
protean relationship with human beings’, Heidi Nast (2006: 325) explicates 
contemporary inferences relative to ‘pets’:  
Pet animals have become variably positioned screens onto which 
all kinds of needs and desires are projected; they co-habit with 
humans; their production and investment is tied to globalized pet 
industries and genetic engineering; and the ethics of pet-human 
encounters is riven with complexities and specificities that few 
have explored.  
Similarly, Hurn (2012: 110), noting that pets can be 'companion animals, 
working animals and friends, mascots, accessories, mediators and victims of 
human control', also remarks the 'fluidity' of the 'membership criteria for the 
category "pet"'. Thus is my concern at using the word ‘pet’, despite its still-
common usage in conversation.  However, exchanging ‘pet’ for the term 
‘companion animal’, preferably 'friend' (Hurn, 2012: 110), allows opportunity for 
a greater interspecies equality and at least a human recognition of another 
species’ socio-emotional worth; and perhaps removes one thin layer from the 
onion of domesticated animal commodification. 
Companion animals can be horses, dogs, cats, or a range of other 
beings willing to make the leap to the biosociality of service dogs, 
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family members, or team members in cross-species sports. 
Generally speaking, one does not eat one’s companion animals 
(nor get eaten by them); 
         (Haraway, 2003:14) 
4.1 Symbiotic relationships 
Fuentes (2010: 600) reflected on the entwined lives of humans and 
monkeys in Bali to demonstrate that ‘both species are simultaneously actors 
and participants in sharing and shaping mutual ecologies’. They may be 
partners in complex relationships, sharing histories and social behaviours and 
co-creating their practices and environments. Similarly co-acting and co-
creating care practices and domestic environments around their already-
domesticated selves are the medical alert assistance dogs and chronically-ill 
humans who spin and weave their interlacing existences around Type 1 
diabetes.  
Coppinger and Coppinger (2016) disentangle the imbricating layers of 
commensalism, mutualism and parasitism involved in symbiotic relationships. 
They talk of ‘overlapping’ and ‘changing’ niches which require species 
adaptation, and the advantages, or lack of, to be gained by ‘living in proximity’ 
(2016: 130). Reliance on and responsibility for the self and other are essential 
elements of companionable relationships, so inter-species trust becomes 
implicit to conducting symbiotic partnerships and to demonstrating successful 
ways of living together in chronic illness. 
An Acarine tick of the genera Rhipicephalus or Amblyomma, has long 
been considered to have a parasitic symbiotic relationship with, for example, the 
buffalo (Syncerus caffer)  or rhinoceros (Rhinocerotidae) on which it feeds since 
the burdened animal gains nothing but skin irritation and possible disease. On 
the other hand, the red-billed oxpecker (Buphagus erythrorhynchus), perched 
on the buffalo and removing the blood-sucking ticks, does have a mutualistic 
relationship with the host animal – the latter is cleansed of disease-donating 
ticks and the bird gains nutrition – neither harms the other. However, research 
by McElligott, Maggini, Hunziker and König (2004) suggests that this bird, in 
searching for parasites and larvae, frequently opens old scars and creates new 
wounds on the host animal causing increased bleeding and irritation; so the 
oxpecker then becomes a less than equal partner, one whose behaviour verges 
on parasitism and not mutualism – and the buffalo or rhinoceros remains host 
sometimes to a mutualistic symbiont, sometimes to a parasitic one.   
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There are flexible shades of meaning overhanging these symbiotic 
relationships. ‘Even though the different organisms are not in constant physical 
contact, the parties involved rely upon the association to fulfil a major part of 
their life cycles’, suggest Leung and Poulin (2008: 107). They propose that 
where the host and symbiont reciprocally benefit from the relationship, the 
association represents mutualism, whereas if the symbiont utilises the host 
without benefitting or harming it, it is considered as a commensal.  If, however, 
the symbiont (for example, the oxpecker) is using the host (for example, the 
rhinoceros) as a resource and causing harm as a result, then it qualifies as a 
parasite.  
There are further intricacies within mutualistic relationships involving 
obligatory and facultative dependencies: obligatory organisms cannot survive in 
the absence of the other partner whereas facultative organisms are able to exist 
independently. Coppinger and Coppinger (2016: 131) flag up the hummingbird-
flower image of obligatory mutualism whereby the hummingbird (Trochilidae) 
cannot survive without the flower because its ‘designer bill’ has evolved to 
enable the bird to reach needed nectar from that plant, but conversely, the 
flower cannot survive if pollen is not transferred to others via the bird’s bill.  
A complex example of a multispecies mutualistic relationship in sub-
Saharan Africa, is that of the greater honeyguide (Indicator indicator), who is 
known to give a loud and distinctive call to ‘solicit the assistance of a symbiont’, 
human or honey badger (Mellivora capensis), in opening wild bees’ (Apis 
mellifera scutellata) nests (Hurn, 2012: 115). When the human recognises the 
call and follows the honeyguide, the bird will lead the way to the nest; the 
human honey-hunter retrieves the honeycomb required and the bird is rewarded 
with a safely-opened nest and the remaining honey-less waxy combs – 
collaborative foraging highlighting mutualism on a grand scale. Budiansky 
(1997: 47-49) similarly draws attention to the Boran people of northern Kenya 
who 'still collect wild honey following the practices of their ancestors'. The Boran 
honey collectors watch the flight patterns and listen to the vocalizations of the 
honeyguide which informs them of the 'direction and distance to a nest, guides 
them to it, and alerts them when the nest is reached' (1999: 47). 
Spottiswoode, Begg and Begg (2016) ascertained further that the 
honeyguide recruitment and foraging collaboration could also be initiated by the 
human. They report that Yao honey-hunters in northern Mozambique use a loud 
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trilling and a particular grunting sound, learned from their fathers, to attract the 
honeyguide’s attention and so increase the probability of finding a bee’s nest. 
Spottiswoode et. al. (2016) suggest these results provide experimental 
evidence that a wild animal in a natural setting responds adaptively to a human 
signal of cooperation.  
As these researchers contend, humans use many species, for example, 
hounds or cormorants, to find food, and these co-opted 'companions' are 
trained to collaborate in the hunt for prey. Alternatively, Miklósi and Topál (2013: 
5) suggest the rat (Rattus norvegicus) exemplifies a 'competitive inter-specific 
relationship' wherein the human may 'actively act against the intruding species'. 
While, over millennia, a human home may have become the natural setting for 
dogs as companion species, and an adaptive, well motivated and domesticated 
canine may find the lived-in accommodation to be worthy of interspecies co-
existence (and even that mutual cooperation with a human symbiont might be 
sufficiently rewarding), it cannot be said that a human home is a natural ‘wild’ 
location or situation for a dog vis à vis that of the 'village' dogs of the world 
(Coppinger and Coppinger (2016).  
Miklósi and Topál (2013: 5) illustrate the three different forms of dog-
human symbiotic interaction: 
During their evolution, dogs (wolves) shared all these forms of 
symbiotic relationships with humans. The final stage of 
domestication was characterised by the emergence of a 
mutualistic relationship between humans and dogs, but, 
depending on the ecological and cultural situation, present-day 
dogs share all three forms of relationship with humans (Figure 1). 
Continuing the theme of divisions in symbiotic relationships, Coppinger 
and Coppinger disparage the 'stories full of euphoria' about useful and helpful 
working dogs, and the assumption that 'dogs and people live together for each 
species' mutual benefit' (2016: 224). They give an example of the connection 
between 'guide dog and blind person [that] is not exactly mutualism because it 
doesn't have much if any benefit for the sterilized and constantly controlled dog' 
(2016: 224).  However, from the small sample of assistance dog-chronically ill 
human partnerships I have observed in this research, in guide dog-vision 
impaired human relationships viewed previously, and from personal research 
conducted by Michalko (1999) and others, it appears that a mutualistic co-
existence can offer benefit to both. The domestic dog, living alongside the 
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human animal species for thousands of years, has perhaps become 
accustomed to working for human-given reward and even to be living 'the life of 
Riley' (Dictionary.com) in some human homes.  It may be a very different 
lifestyle to that of their village-residing kindred but the human partner of an 
assistance dog is willing to pay and provide optimum welfare, care and attention 
that includes daily off-leash 'free-running', in return for an attentive sniff or safe 
guidance around unseen hazards. 
Coppinger and Coppinger consider the dog-human symbiotic relationship 
in terms of 'obligatory' commensalism (2016: 134) and reach interesting 
conclusions: if dogs were removed from the relationship, people would survive, 
but, they assert, if humans left the equation, dogs would not. ‘Wilderness 
niches’ adapted to the lives of ‘wolves, coyotes, jackals and foxes’, would be 
unavailable to dogs suddenly forced to hunt for food, they suggest (2016: 133). 
However, their very adaptability to experiences and environments, their capacity 
for social learning 'by observing conspecifics' (Miklósi, 2009: 191; Pongrácz et. 
al., 2003) might ensure they would create new niches and increasingly large 
communities (safety in numbers and wider choice of hunting dogs) within very 
brief moments of time. 
Leung and Poulin’s (2008) exploration of the symbiosis continuum, along 
which parasitism, commensalism and mutualism shift and ‘overlap’, reviewed 
investigations in which symbiotic interactions are argued to be ‘highly plastic 
across circumstances and timescales’ (2008: 107). Their study details ‘how 
easily symbiotic associations can switch between mutualism and parasitism in 
response to even the slightest environmental change’ (2008: 107). While the 
subjects of the studies they review are chiefly marine organisms, plants and 
insects, and symbiosis is generally used within biological and ecological 
research, this umbrella term covering parasitism, mutualism and commensalism 
can also be opened to include multispecies human-nonhuman plastic 
interactions that make up the ever-changing co-existences of diabetic alert dogs 
and humans with Type 1 diabetes. 
Commensalism is an association between two organisms in which one 
benefits and the other does not, but neither is the latter harmed (Leung and 
Poulin (2008); Miklósi and Topál (2013: 5); Coppinger and Coppinger (2016: 
133-135). So that fails to describe the inter-species relationships referred to 
here – after all, both species gain some benefit from their partnership and 
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neither of them harm nor is intentionally harmed by the other, if the human 
domus is considered natural habitat to the long-domesticated canine 
companion.  
Chimpanzees (Hare et. al., 2006, 2001, 2000; de Waal, 2010) and 
corvids (Emery and Clayton, 2001) are among species now considered to 
possess aspects of a 'theory of mind', and are able to recognise the mental 
states of other beings. The dog in this context is considered to have the 
capacity for intention, even 'a precursory theory of mind' (Reid, 2009); there 
may not be ‘thinking or planning’ as those concepts are understood 
linguistically, but dogs do organise their living in multiple ways so as to obtain 
the food, shelter, mates and playmates that they require beyond the present. 
It is this notion of interwoven, flexible, mutualistic coexistences that 
supports research into the shared lives of the agentic medical alert assistance 
dog and a person with chronic Type 1 diabetes. The canine-human partnerships 
involved in this study restructure their former ways of being and living into 
synchronised performances of mutual care; roles similar to those co-embodied 
inter- and intra-active roles played in the human-horse relationships described 
earlier by Maurstad, Davis and Cowles (2013).  
4.2 The working dog 
The following examination of the recent history of the working dog is 
supported by a review of canine domestication (Clutton-Brock, 1995), and 
Helton’s research into canine ergonomics (2009). Also discussed here are 
methods of training ‘working’ dogs (Savalois, Lescureux and Brunois, 2013; 
Miklösi, 2009), the charity Medical Detection Dog’s concept of acceptable dog 
training and discussion of the criteria enabling eligible chronically ill individuals 
to invest in assistive relationships with diabetes alert dogs and to develop 
mutualistic biomedical partnerships that evolve from particular interspecies 
companionable bondings in the field of illness and care.  
4.2.1  Domestication and history of the working dog 
Man (sic) is far from the only species to practice 
domestication...The state of dependence of one species upon 
another...is a finely honed evolutionary strategy for survival. In a 
world made up so much of competition for survival, nature has 
with surprising frequency cast upon the solution of cooperation. 
             Budiansky (1997: 17) 
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Opening the anthrozoological subsection relating to working dogs and 
canine domestication is a brief history of the close relationship that has 
developed between humans and dogs over millennia, and examination of the 
speculation or imagination involved in inferred conclusions as to how these very 
different species of animal have learned to co-exist companionably.  
Clutton-Brock (1995 [2008]) observes that Canis familiaris, the 
omnivorous but chiefly carnivorous animal who is globally recognised and 
identified as a dog, is considered to be the only fully domesticated member of 
the canine family, Canidae. Listing 38 species within this family, she 
acknowledges earlier studies that indicate the wolf, Canis lupus, to be the 
principal ancestor of our current most favoured companion animal, 
notwithstanding the feral Australian dingo who is related to the pariah dogs of 
south-east Asia as well as to the wolf.  
Exactly when the ‘domestic’ dog split from its lupine relation is 
inconclusive and currently ranges between 150 000 years ago and 15 000 
years ago. Both Helton (2009) and Miklósi (2009) highlight the contentions of 
Csányi (2005), and Vila et. al. (1997) who argue that if the divergence of dogs 
from wolves occurred 150 000 years ago, this was similar to the date ascribed 
to the Homo sapiens sapiens’ divergence from other Homo sapiens, such as 
Homo sapiens Neanderthals, and therefore ‘could be a pivotal point in both 
human and dog evolution’ (Helton, 2009: 2). Adding to the evolutionary 
quandary is the Coppinger and Coppinger (2016) enquiry as to which wolf 
ancestor became the antecedent of today’s domestic dog since wolves, 
coyotes, jackals and dingoes all fall under the Linnaeus-classified genus Canis 
and are ‘interfertile’ (2016: 9). 
Accepted as the first animal species to be domesticated, seemingly by 
hunter-gatherers at the end of the last Ice Age, dogs were thought to have 
assisted humans in tracking, guarding and hunting (Brewer et. al. (2001), 
Clutton-Brock (1995), Coppinger and Coppinger (2016), Miklósi (2009) and 
Serpell (1995). Miklósi (2009: 96-97) provides five theories of domestication 
that, if combined, offer a comprehensive view of dogs' evolutionary process, 
and goes on (2009: 103-109) to explain the sequence of events over millennia 
in which bones of working dogs have been uncovered during archaeological 
research. Research which suggests that dogs have accompanied humans for 
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many thousands of years; accompanied in terms of interspecies companionship 
as well as for hunting, protection and the retrieval of fallen prey.  
Contemporary media sources have been excited by news relating to the 
discovery - at the Blick Mead archaeological site near Stonehenge in Wiltshire – 
of a ‘domestic dog’ tooth carbon-dated to more than 7000 years ago – 2000 
years before the sarsen stones of Stonehenge were erected. The attention 
arises in particular from results of the scientific testing of the tooth. When 
young, it seems the dog drank water from the York area, the same region of 
England in which Clutton-Brock (1995: 13) notes that the skull of a five-month-
old puppy was found (at Star Carr) dating from the Mesolithic period. The Blick 
Mead dog is later believed to have travelled 250 miles southwards in human 
company to where the tooth was discovered; evidence of what is thought to be 
‘the earliest journey in British history’ (BBC News, October, 2016).  That is 
sufficiently newsworthy but what made me sit up were the words spoken by an 
archaeologist in situ, who referred to the dog travelling with ‘its people’. Despite 
the objectifying ‘its’, it is encouraging to find the ’animal turn’ verbally expressed 
in the notion of human animals belonging to, or at least being company for an 
ancient nonhuman animal. Perhaps, borrowing again from Ingold (2013),  they 
may be considered ‘biosocial’ co-‘becomings’ of previous millennia, part of the 
evolutionary process 'carried forward in the life-histories of the organisms 
themselves, along their lines of becoming' (Ingold, 2013: 11). 
Estimates vary as to when human co-habitation with Canis familiaris 
began, but co-existence must have had valuable advantage over life in separate 
communities. Admittedly, mutual tolerance is likely to have taken considerable 
time to form and become a useful characteristic, just as smaller size must have 
become evolutionarily beneficial in domestication. It seems likely that groups of 
both humans and nonhumans may have gained from interspecies cooperation 
and companionship as well as from competition and contest in terms of hunting 
guidance and resultant share of the proceeds. But as Miklósi (2009: 130) 
intimates, it may be ‘impossible to isolate a single selective factor, a single trait, 
and a single causal chain for determining morphological and behavioural 
changes during dog domestication.’  
Over centuries, the dog’s natural wildness has been tamed and adapted 
to suit human ownership and its formerly-liberated status has altered 
dramatically, turning large numbers of this species into property, mandatory in 
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Britain, or commodity that currently can be bought and sold, used and 
discarded.  
Thurston (1996) writes of ‘our 15,000-year love affair with dogs’, 
highlighting the interspecies links that promoted healing as long ago as the time 
of the Egyptian Pharaohs when deceased respected dogs were mummified and 
placed in the tombs of their owners. Since Roman times dog breeds have been 
developed to be functional, with the chief purpose being companionship 
(Clutton-Brock, 1995). The aristocracy of Ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome 
appeared to value their dogs greatly, wrote poems to them and erected shrines 
and monuments to remember them (Thurston, 1996; Serpell, 1986 [1996]).  
Tangentially, cats, although embalmed and treated after death with 
similar dress and decoration as honoured many Ancient Egyptian humans living 
approximately 4000 years ago, were so plentiful that quantities of their 
mummified forms were disinterred in the 19th century and one shipment to the 
UK contained the packaged remains of approximately 180 000 embalmed cats.  
These became items for auction in Britain, some going on view in museums but 
the greater balance being ground into fertiliser and presumably spread across 
our ‘green and pleasant land’ (excerpt from The Daily Graphic newspaper, 
exhibited and viewed in the Manchester Museum September, 2015). 
Cemeteries in the United Kingdom, designated for companion animal 
interment, bear witness to valued deceased animal companions (Toms, 2006). 
An example is the Hyde Park cemetery created in the late 1880s which contains 
more than 300 engraved memorials to loved dogs who were interred within a 
brief 12-year span, after which time the cemetery was deemed full to capacity 
(Thurston, 1996). Online sales of grave ‘goods’ and memorial items for loved 
animal companions - urns, coffins, plaques and ornaments – signify the 
continued importance of maintaining their presence in absentia. 
A secondary result from selective dog breeding, identified by Clutton-
Brock, has been to ‘increase the personal status of the owner at home or in the 
hunt’ (1995: 18). A collection of papers edited by Cassidy and Mullin (2007) lays 
out the evolution and purpose of dog breeding and brings the concept of genetic 
engineering into modern-day reproductive practices that create the 'wanted' 
family, sporting or working dog, or the neotonised puppy-childlike 'pet' dog.  
Greenebaum's family dogs, attending 'Yappy Hour' with their 'parents', are 
'elevated to the status of children, or fur babies' and 'by treating the dogs like 
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children and following traditional gender roles and expectations, the dog 
owners' status becomes elevated to parent' (2004: 132). But Sartre's somewhat 
acidic comment may be appreciated by those who like dogs because they are 
dogs - good friends and companions from a different species: 'When you love 
children and dogs too much, you love them instead of adults' (Sartre, 1967: 
112). 
Certainly dogs may be considered multi-functional, being purchased to 
boost the owner’s social status, to provide company for children or to provide a 
sentient, live companion when family homes become ‘single’ accommodation. 
Their functioning as extensions of the human self may, in this instance, be seen 
in their embodiment of the human-needed self-awareness of approaching 
hypoglycaemic episodes. Irvine draws attention to the 'behavioral flexibility' of 
nonhuman animals, which adaptability indicates consciousness 'because it 
implies monitoring of one's own performance' (Irvine, 2007: 9) and, in Type 1 
diabetes assistance, the monitoring of another's performance as one's own.  
Participants in this project confirm that dogs assist those who have 
difficulty in performing certain tasks, as well as enabling their independence and 
more secure home life, all of which lead to the improved physical and mental 
well-being of their human companions. However, on the basis of their innate 
abilities and under human instruction, dogs have also become items of 
technology, learning to conduct a wide range of tasks whether as circus 
performers, hunting hounds, dog-fight participants, bomb detectors, guide dogs 
or guard dogs, and for these efforts, they are variously appreciated.  
4.2.2 Stray dogs and village dogs 
Those of the canine species who lack human-required capabilities, who 
are less attractive to purchasers or ‘rescuers’ than others around them, or 
whose temperaments fail to meet the required standard, also fail to be 
appreciated as well-functioning members of society. Dependent on their 
location in the human world, they may be euthanized or discarded, passed from 
home to home to street where they join the vast tribe of stray dogs surviving on 
street-pickings and foraging on rubbish dumps, scavenging on middens as their 
ancestors have done for thousands of years. More than 50 000 street dogs 
were said to inhabit the city of Bucharest in Romania (Creţan, 2015: 159) until 
the 2013 Stray Dog Euthanasia Law established an intensive cull to purge the 
city of dogs who were considered aggressive to humans. Similarly concerned 
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was the ‘mayoral committee member for safety and security J P Smith [who] 
said the city (of Cape Town, South Africa) had at least 230 000 stray dogs’ 
(Lewis, Western Cape News, 5 July 2011).  
As Coppinger and Coppinger (2016) remark, dogs are ubiquitous 
throughout the world and number approximately one billion, although the 
majority of these are ‘village dogs’ who mostly fend for themselves and cannot 
therefore be termed ‘pets’, ‘companion animals’ or ‘assistance’ dogs. 
Interesting to this project is the arrival of ‘rescued’ dogs from South 
Korea who may be considered ‘village dogs’, whether or not they were 
specifically bred for sale at dog meat markets or were captured while roaming 
for later human consumption. They have travelled across the world to take on 
the vastly different role and status of cancer detection dogs at the MDD training 
centre. While they continue to be ‘used’, their employment will be in a strikingly 
different format to that of their prior exploitation: not only are they likely to 
survive and enjoy a lengthened life, they will receive constant human attention 
to their needs, and in return, they will be requested to perform an activity that is 
natural to them when attending to the significant health requirements of another 
species: the seemingly simple act of sniffing human odour. Importantly, MDD’s 
cancer detection dogs live in homes as family members and visit the training 
centre to work on samples for short periods of time two to four times a week, so 
these well-travelled dogs will have opportunity to belong to a multispecies 
community as friends and colleagues as well as scent detection technologists.  
To promote life, biopolitics must continuously determine not only 
what it is to be a living thing, but also which lives are better able to 
be developed, which lives are worthy of enhancement, which are 
left to perish, and which are terminated in the name of sustaining 
or preserving other life (Blue and Rock, 2011: 357).  
This may convey shades of human domination and power as referred to 
in Ingold’s (2000) research on trust and control in domestication, and which 
argument is countered by Karen Armstrong Oma’s (2010) response urging 
human-animal social contracts, as first proposed by Mary Midgley (1983), 
centring instead on ‘notions of trust and reciprocity’ (2010: 177).  In the same 
context, Clare Palmer’s (1997) research deals with the problematic issues of 
inequality and lack of free consent in the creation of a domesticated animal 
contract. 
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Fijn (2011) highlights co-domestication between herders and their herds 
in Mongolia, examining reciprocal social behaviour and communication between 
humans and other animals as being important elements of animal domestication 
within today’s cross-species communities. Distant as that co-existing collective 
may be from the medical assistance dogs sharing life with their human partners 
in urban England, the concept of a multispecies social giving-and-taking 
reverberates between them. 
 John Hartigan’s thoughts on domestication, in Aesop’s Anthropology: a 
multispecies approach, flag up mutuality in terms of anthropology’s ‘new’ 
consideration of animals as active agents in the production of ‘the companion 
specieshood that has so transformed the globe’ (2014: 72). While agreeing with 
the mutuality concept, the aforesaid transformation of the globe seems still to 
have a long journey to travel. But Cassidy and Mullin (2007: 6) suggest that 
efforts are now being made to ‘replace the unidirectional, progressive history of 
increasingly exploitative relationships with the environment, with a more halting 
and incomplete vision...[in which]...emphasis has been placed on mutual 
interaction between human and nonhuman species’. And such mutuality can 
result in a companionable co-existence and a collaborative friendship (Hurn, 
2012) based on trust and reciprocated practices of care, easing a smoother 
path through what Hartigan (2014: 72) terms the ‘muddled terrain “between” the 
human and the nonhuman, that of domestication’.  
Continuing with the theme of using animals, as human animals, we make 
daily use of our own physical and mental attributes for profit, be it for the 
education, entertainment or welfare of others as well as ourselves. Indeed, 
being employed instantly places metaphorical yokes and chains around human 
individuals, regardless of the nature of the occupation. Self-interest that 
engages security and protection for the self emerges from Hobbes’ (1962 
[1651]) social contract theory, which signifies the transition from the state of 
nature to the state of so-called civil society; a transition in which the selfish 
humans' ‘acquisition of scarce resources, their own safety and their own 
reputation’ is prominent. There is no trust and threats to life are all-
encompassing so self-interest is a means to self-security (Leviathan 1(13) in 
Palmer, 1997: 414). 
However, this concept may be problematic for some, as reflected in 
Palmer’s (1997:411) ‘idea of the domesticated animal contract’, since the 
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avenues open for human choice and accord as to suitable terms of use or 
employment, may be closed to any nonhuman animal agency wishing to 
consent or agree to it. 
In Britain, dogs are considered to be possessions, the property of human 
owners, and if found straying, may be impounded for seven days while the 
owners are accessed; then if not claimed as belonging to someone, they may 
be ‘disposed of’ by finding them new homes with persons ‘who, in our opinion, 
will care properly’ for them or by ‘putting them to sleep’ (London Borough of 
Barking and Dagenham Council, 2017). A Parliamentary discussion on UK stray 
dog control, based on information sourced from a Dogs Trust Stray Dog Survey 
2016 summary report (September 2016: 6), contended that the number of stray 
dogs had dropped to 81 000 in 2016 from 102 000 the previous year, and from 
136 500 in 1997. An explanatory note to the Environmental Protection (Stray 
Dogs) Regulations 1992 No. 288, that is ‘not part of the Regulations’, mentions 
that an officer is obliged to keep ‘a register of dogs “seized” by him or her’ which 
conjures Hogarth-style images of power and pain but is presumably a doffed 
cap to the official linguistics of a previous era. These roaming dogs became the 
responsibility of local authorities instead of the police, under the Clean 
Neighbourhoods and Environment Act 2005. Compulsory microchipping of all 
dogs from the age of eight weeks was mandated in the UK in April 2016, with 
advice that every dog should wear a collar with the owner’s name and address 
on a tag attached to it. 
 The companion animal, the domesticated dog living within a human 
home, enables the human-nonhuman animal bond to strengthen and intensify. 
These are the canines who may provide reason for human exercise, improved 
health and social integration, who encourage empathy and compassion for 
other species, who may be perceived as surrogate children in ‘empty nest’ 
homes and who often maintain an active link between their bereaved human 
carer and his/her deceased partner. Their human guardians see them as family 
members, treat them as best they can and are anecdotally likely to settle their 
veterinary, animal nutrition and welfare bills before buying their own food or 
paying household accounts. 
Certainly dogs living in human households have majorly altered 
‘Western’ cultural habits for both interacting species; for example, the legal 
rights to travel on public transport and enter museums or educational 
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institutions, or the widespread availability of ‘pet’ medical insurance policies. But 
on the downside, often based on human change in socio-economic status or 
alteration in life to a more penurious, even criminal style of living, there may be 
opportunity for the denigration of the interspecies bond, to abandoning, selling, 
starving, neglecting, or abusing the creature previously welcomed and treated 
as a family member. 
Statistics in 2016 published by the Pet Food Manufacturers Association 
(PFMA) claim that more than 8.5 million dogs are currently inhabiting 24% of 
UK households, evidence which certainly appears to support the British public’s 
alleged ‘love’ of dogs. These population figures were published by the PFMA 
after survey results, averaged over two years, gave an effective sample of over 
8000 people, and estimated that 11 million (40% of) UK households have 
companion animals in their homes. Eight years earlier, Wells, Lawson and 
Siriwardene published research on canine response to hypoglycaemia in Type 
1 diabetes patients and noted that, according to PFMA statistics in 2008, this 
nation of ‘self-confessed’ animal lovers then shared their homes with six million 
dogs (2008: 1235); so the increase in UK dog numbers is substantial.  
4.2.3 Canine ergonomics: the science of the working dog 
Bearing the ‘best candidate model’ in mind, Helton (2009) introduces the 
notion of canine ergonomics, the science of working dogs, to name a new 
perspective integrating animal science and ergonomics. As a science, 
ergonomics is designed to fit and match workers to their work so that comfort 
and suitability are paramount and productivity is expected to increase.  
Suggesting that ergonomics may also be considered ‘the study of entities 
that share human capacities in working situations’ (2009: 4) - entities who in this 
instance are flexible and able to work autonomously - Helton flags up the value 
of working dogs acting as human surrogates. Incorporated into the human 
workplace in order to clear minefields, detect illegally-transported drugs, or 
discover victims buried under avalanche or destroyed buildings, ‘sniffer’ dogs 
are encouraged to perform tasks in areas where human lives may be at risk or 
in which they are unable to achieve equivalent success. 
Human and canine expertise is gained through skills training and 
continuous practice. Adapting Ericsson's (2001) set of behavioural determinants 
of deliberate practice, Helton (2009: 7) suggests that training working dogs 
involves four factors – 
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 Motivating them to perform a task 
 Providing clearly-defined tasks to be performed 
 Providing feedback 
 Ensuring practice is repeated and purposeful 
 He indicates that verbalising language to enable knowledge memory may 
not be essential for a dog who may encode declarative knowledge in images 
and consequently be able to perform tasks requiring skill. However, he notes as 
does Bradshaw (2012), that mental imagery in dogs is a 'very underdeveloped' 
research area (Helton, 2009: 8). 
 According to Irvine (2012), George Herbert Mead (1934) claimed 
influentially that animals lacked mental ability. Irvine (2012) cites Strauss's 
research which suggests that Mead considered animals to have ‘no mind, no 
thought, and hence there is no meaning [in their behaviour] in the significant or 
self-conscious sense’ (Strauss, 1964: 168). This attitude prevailed until Bryant 
(1979) critiqued sociologists for failing to ‘address the zoological component in 
human interaction and attendant social systems’ (1979: 339). Irvine develops 
Sanders’ consistent portrayal of animals as ‘minded participants in social life’ 
(Irvine, 2012: s128) and, ignoring the need for language to define the ‘self’, 
highlights how 'dog training involves encouraging the dog to shape his or her 
behavior to human expectations’ (Irvine, 2007: 8). She illustrates this with an 
example of her own dog’s behaviour modification which she attributes to the 
dog’s basic ‘understanding of causality’ (Irvine, 2007: 8) and ability to intervene 
satisfactorily in an action. 
 A similar understanding of causality, and resultant intervention, frames 
the unexpected behaviour modification of this researcher’s cat and dog, 
behaviour that has intensified belief in the animal self: 
The cat lay prostrate on the dog’s bed, stretched so expansively 
that there was no room whatsoever for the dog to lie there too.  
Instead of immediately pushing her off the mattress, which would 
have earned him the swift swipe of an unsheathed claw, he play-
bowed, whined and lowered his head submissively, looking 
downwards and not directly at the cat.  
 
He slowly opened his mouth, grasped a small corner of the 
blanketed mattress, and gave a gentle tug – the cat remained 
immobile. He grumbled and pulled harder. The cat sat up and 
yowled at him; the dog jumped backwards and barked, crept 
forward and with his teeth, slowly lifted the mattress higher and 
higher in one corner. The cat rolled off, but retaining dignity in 
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failure, stalked away swishing her tail; the dog lay down on his 
bed, mission seemingly accomplished. 
 
However, the cat then jumped up onto a kitchen cupboard close to 
the backdoor, lifted a front paw, eyed the dog, and rattled the keys 
in the door lock. Of course, the dog leapt off the bed and raced to 
the door – the cat gazed at the vacant mattress for a long 
moment. 
 Did she glory in smug triumph? She looked as if she did, but that is a 
human anthropomorphic interpretation of what might be termed trans-species 
negotiation – mutual coexistence achieved without injurious aggression – and 
this particular interactive dialogue occurred between them on more than one 
occasion. Anthropomorphism may be derided but it seems sometimes to 
facilitate the human comprehension of interspecies communication of thoughts 
and behaviours. In this instance, however, my understanding of their behaviour 
and semblance of (re)-experience could more likely be attributed to 
egomorphism (Milton, 2005), which 'implies that I understand my cat, or a 
humpback whale, or my human friends, on the basis of my perception that they 
are "like me" rather than human-like' (Milton, 2005: 261). 
 Hurn (2017: personal communication) elaborates, suggesting that 
egomorphism is 'in many respects an aspect of an inter-subjective relationship 
(i.e. one can be egomorphic in response to another being with whom one does 
not have a direct or personal relationship'. Milton's humpback whale, for 
example, or, citing Hurn's example, 'I engage egomorphically with those pigs on 
trucks bound for slaughterhouses'. With reference to the cat and dog interaction 
above in which they both engage egomorphically, their relationship might be 
considered 'a form of intersubjectivity grounded in egomorphism' (Hurn, 2017). 
Whether it was just a game or a wily method of goal achievement, both 
species appear to evince minded forethought and planned action. The dog 
seemed conscious of the cat’s likely reaction on several levels and took care in 
preparing successful retrieval of his bed, while the cat showed remarkable 
tolerance as well as knowledge/memory of canine behaviour or indeed of 
human behaviour when keys are shaken and doors are opened. It is this 
awareness that lends credibility to the idea of animal personhood and 
interspecies negotiation. In terms of the medical alert dog and the diabetic 
human, there is broad opportunity for a shared human-canine coexistence that 
has value for both when resulting from well-conceived training and a 
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comfortable closeness, and from a continuous endeavour to attain some form of 
mutual understanding. 
The strength of the human-canine bond has been frequently evaluated in 
evolutionary terms. A 20-year study of breed-specific behaviour (Coppinger and 
Schneider, 1995) focussed particularly on the ‘evolutionary mechanisms’ (1995: 
22) of dogs who were identified by the researchers as experts in their fields of 
work - sled-pulling, livestock guarding and herding.  They discovered the 
historical importance of breeding and training for temperament, and noted 
adolescence was the most beneficial age for trainability and adaptation to new 
ideas and behaviours.  
This is confirmed in the training of assistance dogs who generally spend 
their first 10-12 months in a ‘foster home’, often situated in a family with children 
and other companion animals, so as to become ‘socialised’ and accustomed to 
travel on public transport, to walk quietly past barking dogs and shouting, 
running children, for example, and to learn how to be confident in the face of 
unexpected noise hazards, such as slamming doors, fireworks, or express 
trains thundering through railway stations. Once well-accustomed to the wide 
variety of human lifestyle management methods, young medical alert 
assistance dogs remain resident in family homes but visit the MDD 
headquarters where they are trained by reward and encouragement, to sniff and 
identify odours associated with illness in exhaled human breath and to respond 
with an alerting signal. 
Only recently (1971) did Linus Pauling discover that hundreds of different 
volatile organic compounds (VOCs) are intermingled in human breath and that 
in people who are unwell, they show unique patterns based on individual 
metabolism; ‘you are what you eat’ sums up how internal bacteria behave 
towards ingestion and provides signposts flagrantly (I doubt fragrantly, though it 
may seem so to the dog’s nose!) wafted towards the nostrils of a canine 
medical detective. 
Helton suggests that dogs in work are ‘the best candidate models of 
human workers’ (2009: 3). Although they lack a spoken language that we can 
understand and cannot hold tools in their paws as we hold instruments in our 
hands, they have succeeded in living and working in close proximity to humans. 
Dogs have other competencies we value - and they appear to share them 
willingly if rewarded, or at least treated appropriately. Rewarding and enriching 
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the life of the diabetes alert dog and other assistance dogs, is a continuing 
ambition for the human partner as well as the trainer, and exploration of the 
mental and physical needs of these working dogs is undertaken in the research 
of Coppinger, Coppinger and Skillings (1998), Rooney, Gaines and Hiby (2009), 
Robinson et al. (2014) and Coppinger and Coppinger (2016). Enrichment and 
empowerment are essential qualities which can, with forethought, be 
successfully expanded to engage significant markers of canine wellbeing in a 
detection dog permanently living within the home of an unwell human. A lack of 
support to enable fulfilment of these needs, or at least the satisfactory 
achievement of them, is discussed later. 
 Narcotic detection relies to a large extent on the expertise developed 
through canine olfaction. A study was conducted by Slabbert and Rasa (1997) 
to determine whether maternal narcotic detection behaviour accelerated later 
skill development and the acquisition of expertise by puppies. Early observation 
of working role models appeared to enhance the acquisition of narcotic 
detection skills.  Whether puppies from expert medical alert assistance dogs 
would learn chemical detection skills more speedily if they observed their 
mothers at work, has yet to be tested, chiefly because the charity is still in its 
own infancy and most of the dogs in current training have been donated, 
‘rescued’ or are family pets who have shown natural aptitude to alert their 
human guardians to extreme blood sugar fluctuations. Many species have been 
observed to pass on genetic and learned traits to their offspring or group 
members to aid breed/species survival. An example are the Forest Troop 
anubis baboons (papio anubis) who, over at least two decades, have 
undergone 'multigenerational culture transmission' as young male baboons 
adopted the behaviour of the new troop into which they transferred (Sapolsky, 
2006: 645). Additionally, Irvine (2007: 16, note vii) recalls 'evidence that 
meerkats teach their young about hunting appeared in the journal Science 14 
July 2006 (Vol 313 no. 5784: 227-229)'. 
 But despite the importance of continuous practice and training to develop 
expertise, there is a need for natural talent, a perhaps anthropomorphic 
attribution of a canine yen to fulfil the trainer’s particular requirements and find 
enjoyment in achievement. The medical alert assistance dog requires a 
temperament that allows the formation of a strong human-animal bond and a 
vigilant ability to sleep polyphasically or in random snatches of time so that the 
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altered smell of changing blood glucose levels can be acted upon instantly.  
Both the alerting dog and the cancer-detecting dog need to have and maintain 
good health, mental ability and physical agility, show curiosity in training, a 
propensity to search by smell rather than sight, and display sufficient 
appreciation of the rewards offered as motivation to continue sniffing for 
detection purposes. But, as Michalko (1999:138-139) stresses, relative to the 
matching of a guide dog to a human companion: 
All discussion of a dog’s breed and breeding is put in terms of 
human descriptors – a dog is intelligent, confident, curious, and so 
on. When a dog is described as having a ‘personality’, it is no 
wonder that we often forget that it is ‘just a dog’. ... Given roughly 
matching levels of activity and physical fitness, ‘personality’ is the 
criterion trainers consider when matching dog guides with blind 
people. 
Guide Dogs for the Blind and Dogs for Good are among seven 
accredited canine-assistance charities that fall under the banner of Assistance 
Dogs UK (ADUK). The mission statement of this coalition of assistance dog 
organisations (ADUK, 2015) purports to  
encourage the exchange of ideas and best practice amongst its 
members, raise awareness amongst the general public and 
promote behavioural and legislative changes to ensure the 
freedom, independence and rights of its clients.  
Dogs are recognised by ADUK if they 
 have been trained to behave well in public 
 have safe and reliable temperaments 
 are healthy and do not constitute a hygiene risk observed over a 
considerable period of time 
 are fully toilet-trained 
 are regularly checked by experienced veterinarians 
 are accompanied by a disabled handler who has been trained how 
to work alongside their assistance dog 
 are recognisable by the harness, organisation-specific coat, 
identity tag on their collar or lead slip that they wear 
The dogs participating in this research are accredited globally by 
Assistance Dogs UK (ADUK), Europe (ADEU) and International (ADI), the latter 
providing an ADI Minimum Standards and Ethics document, and are trained by 
the UK charitable organisation, Medical Detection Dogs. They are identified as 
keen ‘sniffers’ and problem-solvers which aptitudes lend themselves to success 
in detection work achieved by olfactory ability (Gadbois and Reeve, 2014: 3-20; 
Bradshaw, 2012: 224-249). A study, examining the value of trained alerting 
  
99 
 
dogs to people subject to glycaemic episodes by Rooney, Morant and Guest 
(CEO of MDD) in 2013, used structured interview sessions in client homes, 
comparing nine client records of blood glucose levels, assistance dog 
behaviour, alerting method, and further comparisons between routine testing 
and response testing (when the dog provided an alert). Their findings showed 
that seven clients recorded a significantly higher proportion of routine tests 
within target range after obtaining a dog; and that, 'based on owner-reported 
data...trained detection dogs perform above chance level' (2013: 1) 
 Dog breeds are divided into sporting and non-sporting groups chiefly for 
the purpose of entering category classes at shows such as Crufts, ‘the world’s 
largest dog show’ held in Birmingham, UK. ‘Sporting’ dogs include hounds who 
were traditionally bred to hunt prey (for example, Deerhound or Dachshund), 
gun dogs such as the Labrador or Pointer, who indicate and retrieve prey, and 
terriers (Bull Terrier or Fox Terrier) who hunt smaller animals, particularly those 
who live in holes, for example, foxes and rabbits. They are known as sporting 
breeds because they are traditionally used by people who hunt with dogs for 
‘sport’. The Kennel Club groups non-sporting dog breeds to include utility dogs 
(Dalmatian, for example), pastoral/herding dogs (for example, Border Collie, 
Anatolian Shepherd Dog), working dogs (Bull Mastiff, Dobermann) and toy dogs 
(Pomeranian), but as Odendaal (2003: 5-6) comments: 
In a certain sense, the grouping of dogs is artificial because dogs 
are also used interchangeably for different (incorrect?) 
purposes...nowadays the sporting breeds are seldom used for 
their original purpose of hunting. Labradors, for example, are used 
as guide dogs, and terriers as watchdogs.  
Working dogs in any breed group are so-labelled when ‘working’ and 
interacting with human individuals, whether in terms of rescue from landslide, 
scenting illness conditions, finding lost individuals, drugs or money, acting as 
therapeutic aides or emptying/filling a washing-machine. 
 Medical Detection Dogs’ canine work force may have pedigreed ancestry 
or come from mixed parentage. The majority would be categorised into the 
‘sporting gundog’ group which includes Retrievers and Spaniels rather than the 
non-sporting working breeds; but as Coulter (2016) and Odendaal (2003, 
above) have suggested, a working dog is likely to be working and interacting 
with human partners in a range of fields, so the grouping of dog breeds does 
indeed seem ‘artificial’. 
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Paul considers ‘the fact that the charity works with all manner of breeds 
and sizes is a bonus’. He suggests some charities will not ‘foresee other things’ 
whereas diabetes has many other complications ‘so just having one breed of 
dog doesn’t always work’. He is thoughtful: 
Sometimes you need a little dog, sometimes you need a big dog, 
sometimes, you know... I wanted a large dog purely because of 
losing sight and all the rest of it but when another illness flared up, 
I was...like, maybe a little dog is so much easier, you can pick it up 
and carry it. 
Savalois, Lescureux and Brunois (2013: 77) draw attention to 'recent 
trends in social science advocating recognition of interactive properties in 
human-animal relationships' in their ethnographic investigation of herding dogs 
and their 'trainer-users'. ‘The dogs’ hunting skills are used to turn him/her into a 
working tool, through minimally constrained education and training’. As these 
researchers learned from their human participants, 'once trained, the dog 
should become an autonomous but controllable worker' (2013: 77) well versed 
in helping. The effects of medical assistance dog training enable independent 
decision-making by the dogs and in turn, learning is gained through observation 
of them by both clients and trainers. 
 However, there are important criteria to be fulfilled by the prospective 
human member of the interspecies partnership. Because of the high number of 
people applying for a medical alert assistance dog (MAAD), the charity’s 
website (www.medicaldetectiondogs.org.uk) defines criteria for acceptance onto 
the client waiting list: 
 Those who are detrimentally affected by their health condition, in 
particular having Type 1 or Type 2 diabetes, with little or no 
hypoglycaemic awareness. Criteria do not prevent those who use insulin 
pumps from applying. 
 Those who have made every attempt to come to terms with their 
condition and to manage it by other means, but still have frequent 
hypoglycaemic episodes. 
 Children should be at least five years old and if under the age of 18, have 
adequate parental support. 
The following list includes items considered when taking the decision to 
accept an application for a MAAD: 
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 the individual has been diagnosed with a life-threatening illness for a 
minimum of 12 months; 
 the current impact of the condition on the applicant’s daily life; how often 
emergency paramedics are called out or how frequent the need for 
hospital admission; whether the applicant has had to stop work or, if a 
child, has had repeated absence from school; 
 whether the applicant would be willing to monitor their blood sugar levels 
regularly and keep detailed records of them, and also be prepared to 
maintain records of the dog and his or her work performances; 
 whether the applicant could commit to attending the MDD training centre 
regularly to participate actively in human and canine training days and 
further, would be able to manage the dog correctly; 
 whether the applicant would be able to meet the emotional, physical and 
financial needs of the assistance dog and provide a stable home 
environment; and  
 be able to understand that the MAAD is a working dog, similar to a Guide 
or Hearing Dog, and would wear a jacket identifying the MDD charity 
whenever out and about in public. Applicants should understand that 
when they are seen in public with a working dog, they are liable to attract 
interest in both themselves and their health condition. 
More information is requested in application forms and questionnaires for 
those interested, chronically unwell individuals who are eligible to apply, 
including those who apply for their own dogs to become working diabetes alert 
assistance dogs. The need for responsible commitment to the assistance dog’s 
welfare is emphasised and applicants are asked to describe their past 
experiences of dog-handling and to name the person who would be responsible 
for the dog’s daily free-running and where this would take place. An additional 
document, to be submitted with the application form, asks the applicant’s 
diabetes healthcare professional to complete medical details that would assist 
in the charity’s ‘accurate evaluation’ of a prospective client. 
 The organisation, MDD, has charitable status and so does not charge for 
training a medical alert assistance dog - current costs to train each dog are 
approximately £13 000 - to the sometimes exacting and essential requirements 
of the diabetic individual. However, a paragraph in the application form advises 
that: 
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once a dog is placed, you are financially responsible for the care 
and welfare costs (including insurance) of the dog, except in 
exceptional circumstances. The dog’s welfare is paramount to us 
and the dog will at all times remain the property of Medical 
Detection Dogs. 
Words such as 'ownership' and 'property' in terms of companion dogs 
and their human keepers are commonly stated in the Code of Practice for Dogs 
in the Animal Welfare Act 2006 and are in general parlance. This returns us to 
dominance and control issues, and thus to the use of animals as equipment 
managed by human means and therefore the labelling of them as ‘of unequal 
status’. But being a device or property belonging to another for health benefit 
can, as in this case, ensure a high standard of care and affection.  Later 
chapters explore the concept of animate instruments in terms of ethics and 
morality, and in particular, the ethics of care. 
4.2.4 ‘Works-in-progress’ 
 Marc Higgin (2012: 74) takes human-dog partnerships working in the 
field of blindness to explore interspecies ‘works-in-progress’ who, like the 
diabetes alert dogs and their human partners, are developing and learning 
together how to be and do (mobilise) an animate assistive device. This is the 
becoming of a symbiotic progressing relationship in which smell is the 
overarching instigator of care-giving mechanisms to reduce health-risks in the 
interspecies lives. 
The ‘working’ dog of this research is an assistant, a skilled and caring 
helper to those who require expansion, extension or improvement to a particular 
ineffectual or malfunctioning corporeal ability or element in order that they may 
proceed safely and successfully with worldly existence. In the context of scent 
detection and Type 1 diabetes, these dogs assist. They are not considered to 
be ‘in service’ in the same manner and below-stairs hierarchy of butler or 
housemaid. Their human companions do not conceive them as ‘trapped’ 
(Serpell et. al., 2010: 483) in servitude, dominated and oppressed, or 
imprisoned as slaves.  
Once trained in scent detection relative to their human partner’s odour 
patterns, the dogs work of their own volition, using independent decision-
making skills and are not situated in positions of subservience to their human 
companions. They are not slinking, servile creatures of hyena-like cunning, nor 
do they resemble Lofting’s (1920 [1997]) ambivalent pushmi-pullyu. They are 
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not employed in a contract that they have ‘personally’ signed (Palmer, 1997), 
and 'they do not receive monetary pay directly, nor would they be interested in 
money specifically' (Coulter, 2016: 147) for their consistent and considerable 
assistance. They are nutritionally or physically rewarded with food, toys or play, 
however, and have accreditation from the aforementioned national and 
international organisations, ADUK, ADEU and ADI;  their human 
‘schoolteachers’ similarly attain accreditation from recognised dog training 
organisations, for example, the Association of Pet Dog Trainers (APDT). 
The medical alert assistance dog undertakes work that involves a 
previously-established task, for which he or she has been trained specifically. 
Jocelyne Porcher (2014: 7), when referring to the need for mutual recognition 
by farmers and farm animals, suggests ‘work can only reach its potential if it is 
recognized’, and contends that it is ‘with speech and petting that the farmers 
recognize their animals, and it is with trust and proximity that animals recognize 
their farmers’.  The diabetes alert dogs and their human co-workers also offer 
and accept tangible or spoken reward and recognition of their endeavours, for 
example, to nudge and have the alert signal noticed and acted upon, to be 
nudged and offer reward, to give and take responsibility for each other’s care 
practices. In this work, social identities are formed, and become appreciated 
and accepted by multiple entities.  
The work to be performed is comprehended through earlier instruction, 
by reward-based training that may take weeks or months of practice depending 
on the age and ability of each dog, leading to both an agentic way of acting and 
a habitual positive responding towards a future lifelong human companion. 
Classic conditioning or training methods stem from the days of Pavlov’s work 
with dogs, who salivated at the sound of a bell having learnt that that noise 
signalled food, but such learning can result in nonhuman animal discomfort and 
fear. Pavlov 'helped to establish the fact that animals such as dogs were quickly 
able to learn the significance of artificial cues that evolution could not have 
prepared them for...Classical conditioning is automatic; it does not involve the 
dog reflecting on what has just happened' (Bradshaw, 2012: 101). While 
positive is preferable to negative reinforcement, both of which may have 
success in animal-training methods, it is instrumental or operant conditioning, 
reward-based training – rewards taking the form of highly desired food items, 
toys, praise, active affection, or off-leash play – that seems most attractive in 
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concept and achievement for both dog and 'handler', and is the method used by 
the charity’s training staff. Bradshaw (2012: 107) emphasises that, as for 
classical conditioning, 
 the timing of the delivery of the reward is crucial. There must be 
no more than a second or two between the dog performing the 
desired action and the arrival of the reward. Longer than this, and 
not only will the learning be slower to establish, but there is also 
an increased chance that the dog will make unwanted 
associations with something else. 
Throughout the observation periods, there was no evidence of anything 
but encouragement to ensure training moved at a pace suited to the dog’s 
personality, age and temperament. 
4.2.5 Medical detection dogs in training 
During a visit to the charity’s headquarters, I watch two trainers working 
with a young dog, Ben, who has completed the first week of scent training and 
is now moving on to a client’s individual scent. While the dog is relaxed and 
ambling around the office desks, one of the trainers, Liz, puts a client’s breath 
sample pot inside the leg of her boot and says that ‘as soon as he’s on it, we 
click and reward – the main thing is to let him find the client’s scent’. They 
encourage Ben who seems a little confused and unsure of his purpose; he licks 
his lips and his eyes wander round the room. Liz says the idea is to make it a 
game as he’s still in the early stages of training. ‘We don’t want him to get 
anxious or stressed out’. 
The trainers wait patiently and gently guide him towards the general area 
of the sample without giving away the pot’s position. They will do this up to five 
times a day ‘but sometimes only twice’, depending on the dog’s degree of 
confidence. Rooney, Gaines and Hiby (2009: 133) confirm the need for dogs to 
have positive associations and gradual introductions to required actions so they 
are never afraid or concerned when asked to perform a particular behaviour. 
The sample for medical alert dog training is always placed somewhere 
on the human body as that is the source of the scent. ‘It’s never visual’, always 
olfactory detection, and the sample pot is only used once so it gives off a clear 
and uncontaminated odour. The training starts with a cloth placed somewhere 
on the trainer and the search is treated as a game, using a general odour until 
the dog is ready to be matched with a client’s sample odour: 
Once you’ve got that confidence, you let him search on his own to 
build on the confidence, and then hold off the food reward so that 
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a bit of frustration encourages him to want the reward – but it has 
to be very finely timed which is why I went straight in when he 
started to lip-lick and yawn, to show him he’s right and not push 
him too far. If you lose confidence in the early stages, then it’s 
really difficult to build it up again. 
 Ben has a food allergy so he’s on a fish and vegetable diet. His high 
reward treat is freeze-dried duck. Liz remarks that it is necessary to find the 
right high value item to motivate the alert dog, and not give something they’ve 
had during puppy training. ‘We have to be really careful with the choice of 
reward we use in training’. 
However, being an animal and therefore sentient, the ‘working’ dog is not 
a mechanical robot, not of the order of the interactive therapeutic ‘Paro’, for 
example, the robotic seal which has achieved success in care facilities since 
2003 and epitomises the advantages of neotony, having been created with 
large soulful eyes and a soft furry huggable ‘epidermis’. ‘It’ is designed to be 
‘sociable’ and to have ‘states of mind’ (Turkle, 2011: 8-9), dependent on how 
the robot animal is treated and how this affects its tactile and other built-in 
sensors.  
As with the Paro seal and the AIBO robot dog, the medical alert 
assistance dogs provide cost-savings and financial benefit to health-
management organisations as well as providing health and social advantages 
for their diabetic carers.  But neither of the former - which/who may certainly be 
beneficial to those who cannot care for their own companion animal in a 
residential or convalescent home, for example - can maintain the close, warm 
contact and agentic ability of the diabetes alert dog.  
At the charity’s training centre where trainees are matched to individuals 
with chronic illness, whether rain is sheeting down or snow whitens the 
surrounding fields, the atmosphere indoors is inviting. Human and canine 
workers intermingle with seemingly contented, collaborative intent. Gates 
across doorways act as multispecies department-dividers rather than species-
separators. There are desk-workers, eyes fixed on computer screens, who have 
dogs lying next to their chairs – these are trained dogs paired with humans who 
are themselves employed in the charity’s work but who would be unable to 
sustain employment without the alerting interventions of their canine 
companions.  
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When I arrived, a group of five large and small dogs were romping and 
racing around a field under the calm and watchful eye of an instructor. In a 
smaller paddock, a single dog was undergoing training, with enthusiasm 
apparent in student and instructor, and plentiful rewards for good work. Despite 
his free-running colleagues playing ‘tag’ close by, his concentration was 
impressive and the distraction was ignored. 
The diabetes medical assistance dogs learn a routine of alerting 
behaviour that is appropriate and acceptable to the human recipients who 
themselves must learn and adjust to someone sharing their home and lifestyle, 
someone who is likely to have habits of which they may not always approve; 
and, if they have never before shared life with a dog, who will take up more 
space and time than they could possibly have imagined. They too have to learn 
how best to maintain the wanted optimal alerts through accurate and timely 
reward, paying due attention to the canine signals, and ensuring inter-species 
training continues, whether at home, in the shopping mall or open field. 
A staff member, 'Val', (her name, as is the case for other members of the 
MDD staff, has been anonymised to maintain confidentiality) explains the 
procedures involved in placing a trained dog with a potential human match. She 
informs me that, prior to an interview, all applicants are first invited to attend an 
Applicant Awareness Day during which information, required by an applicant to 
make an informed decision as to whether a medical alert assistance dog is right 
for them, is given. Also offered are details of the requirements needed to ensure 
maintenance of a future effective partnership with a Medical Detection Dog.   
Before a placement is finalised, the applicants receive training and 
handling sessions at a one-day ‘Introduction to Assistance Dogs’ meeting. After 
this session, the instructors advise whether they feel the applicants require 
further training before being placed into a dog-human matching procedure. 
These additional training periods may take one to four more sessions and result 
in a decision to proceed with matching. If a situation arises where it is 
considered not viable for a client to handle and manage an assistance dog 
safely and confidently, the applicant would not proceed further in the matching 
process. 
Val explains that any clients with young children are invited to the MDD 
centre to attend a family handling day which ‘covers appropriateness around 
dogs and how to read the signals that dogs give to show they are happy or 
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uncomfortable'. Once applicants have carried out as much training in handling 
an assistance dog as is felt necessary, they attend a dog match day to find a 
suitable companion. Val observes that this may necessitate the applicant 
returning to the centre on a different day in order to work with other dogs, 
should the first assistance dogs they meet, not be found suitable. Once there is 
a potential match, the interspecies dyad attend a two-day advanced handling 
session at the centre, and then both spend a further three days in the client’s 
home environment.  
If this is successful, scent training commences with an instructor. The 
partnership will then receive weekly visits for a period of six weeks following the 
home placement, changing to two-weekly visits for another six weeks, 
depending on how everything is progressing. Val comments that there is always 
support available by way of telephone calls, visits, and if needed, a two-day 
refresher handling course for the client, until the human-canine partnership 
achieves accreditation which may take place three to six months after 
placement, but can take longer. Thereafter, she says, the MDD instructors 
undertake a ‘six-month’ home visit to the partnerships and then annually. They 
also arrange and run regular refresher and get-together sessions at the training 
centre and in other regions, and the latter, Val affirms, are particularly 
benefitting partnerships residing some distance from the MDD Centre. 
Medical Detection Dogs supports the concept of the ‘Five Freedoms’ for 
the good welfare of dogs in their care and in the care of their clients: 
 Freedom from hunger and thirst  
 Freedom from discomfort  
 Freedom from pain, injury and disease 
 Freedom to behave normally 
 Freedom from fear and distress 
The Code of Practice for the Welfare of Dogs (DEFRA, 2009) applies to 
all dogs and is intended to ‘provide practical guidance’ to assist in compliance 
with the provisions of Section 9 of the UK Animal Welfare Act (2006). The Act 
stipulates that all reasonable steps should be taken to ensure that dogs’ needs 
are met and elaborates as to how this should be done, based on the five 
freedoms. While breach of a provision of the Code of Practice ‘is not an offence 
in itself,’ if proceedings are brought against an offender under Section 9 of the 
Act, the Court will look at whether or not the offender has complied with the 
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Code in deciding whether an offence has been committed  (DEFRA, 2009). For 
individuals who have canine companions, whether as trained medical 
assistance dogs or solely as good friends, the Code of Practice gives a set of 
guidelines for human practices of canine care. 
4.2.6 Medical Detection Dogs in work 
In the study by Savalois, Lescureux and Brunois (2013: 82), there is a 
section entitled ‘when the focused work tool becomes an autonomous worker’ 
which may be linked without difficulty to Paul’s later comment about his 
diabetes alert dog, Nero, being an instrumental aid. A further example can be 
identified in Mel’s commendation of Gemma's independent decision-making. 
The dog wakes Mel in the middle of the night with the medical kit in her mouth 
so that Mel is immediately readied to test her child’s dropping blood sugar 
levels. 
Within the bounds of their research into interactivity, in herding dog 
training and usage where the dogs’ trainers are livestock breeders, Savelois et. 
al. (2013: 83) suggest that ‘the trainers consider that the dog’s knowledge of 
livestock functioning is much better than their own’.  In the context under 
investigation here, the intention is to facilitate life with chronic illness and 
provide means to improve the functioning of blood glucose in the body. While 
medical professionals are usually human, it is fair to say that both the charity’s 
dog-training staff and the individuals living with Type 1 diabetes accept that the 
diabetes alert dogs' knowledge, or rather their ability to detect the impact of 
diabetes on the human body, is much better than their own.  
Natasha exemplifies this thinking and identifies emerging knowledges 
and abilities of the diabetes alert dogs, confirming that: 
We all know the dogs know way more than we do, but there’s only 
so much that is currently scientifically proven that can be worked 
upon; and of course when you live with one, and certainly all the 
partnerships we’ve spoken to so far, you know, they will tell you 
that the dogs do more than what they’ve been trained to do. 
This echoes the words of Despret’s (2008: 133) cattle breeders who 
denote intentionality to their animals by commenting that the animals ‘know 
what we want better than we know what they want’, and is further elaborated in 
Haraway’s (2016: 129) study: 
Figuring out what their animals want, so that people and cows 
could together accomplish successful breeding, was the 
fundamental conjoined work of the farm [...] the animals paid 
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attention to the farmers; paying equally effective attention to the 
cows and pigs was the job of good breeders.  
Haraway (2016: 129) suggests that this is an ‘extension of subjectivities’ 
for both humans and animals, and in Despret’s (2008: 135) words, this is 
‘becoming what the other suggests to you, accepting a proposal of subjectivity, 
acting in the manner in which the other addresses you, actualizing and verifying 
this proposal, in the sense of rendering it true’. 
Intersubjectivity, elucidated by Hurn (2012: 125-138), and incorporating 
consciousness of the self and the other (Irvine, 2007), empathy (de Waal, 2010; 
Gruen, 2015 ), flexible personhood (Shir Vertesh, 2012) and a spiritual trans-
species merging (Viveiros de Castro, 1998), is reflected in the entangled 
relationships of the medical alert assistance dogs and their chronically-ill 
partners.  
Goode's 'general model of intersubjectivity' (2007: 90) in which matters 
may be 'assumed but not communicated; matters communicated but not 
spoken; and matters formulated into language' (2007: 89), can demonstrate 
how 'anthropomorphic description might be based upon shared aspects of dog-
human intersubjectivity that are in some sense anterior to linguistic naming' 
(2007:90).  For example, interspecies communication that takes place through 
the silent language expressed through the senses and in corporeal mobility. 
The assistance dogs central to this research have innate and taught skills that 
augment the capabilities of their human companions; those less well endowed 
with sensory awareness; and those who are restrained by chronic illness to 
limited movement in the home, or whose intention to integrate in society is 
prevented by fear of unprepared-for dizziness or an unexpected fall on the bus, 
in the supermarket or at school. There is reciprocal intention in their knowing 
and learning communications and in their care-workings together for comfort 
and improved health. 
In the 'donation' of abilities and skills, the dog effectively 'becomes-with' 
the human and embodies the malfunctioning aspects in order to recognise them 
(in this instance, the extreme 'fall' in blood sugar levels made obvious to the dog 
in the altered odour of human breath) and create means for positive 
restructuring (human recognition of the dog's alert by follow-up blood testing).  
4.3 Needs and complex issues in chronic illness 
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 Turning to the sociology of health and illness, content is centred here on 
researching medical and sociological issues involved in chronic illness and 
examining the concept of disability, the study of needs and complex issues in 
Type 1 diabetes and the management of long-term bodily dysfunction.  
When would someone identify themselves as disabled and why; when 
would society nominate an individual as disabled, and why? And how does a 
medical alert assistance dog make a difference to the human’s self-esteem and 
social integration? These are among questions of personal and social identity 
formation, and the sharing of an interspecies identity, to be investigated and 
debated. Discussion is enhanced by the insights and personal opinions of Tom 
Shakespeare (2014); by Molly Mullin’s (1999: 202) commentary on the crossing 
of fluctuating boundaries between species and the human use of nonhuman 
animals to construct identity, in which she cites (1999: 211) Haraway’s notion of 
‘polishing an animal mirror to look for ourselves’ (1991: 21); and further, by 
considering Rod Michalko’s illustration of his shared identity with a guide dog, 
Smokie, ‘the two in one’ (1999). The concept of transhumanism and a 
cyborgean identity highlight the extension of human wellness and ability through 
partially-mechanical means, seen against achievement in health attainment by 
guidance from sentient instruments.  
This section draws on research studies that explore long-term chronic ill-
health with particular focus on Type 1 diabetes, and that show how chronic 
illness and resultant ongoing disability may alter an individual's existence and 
identity in the world;  changing attitudes, behaviours and methods of living with 
a long-term illness in today's individualist 'Western' society.  
In addition, care practices affecting canine-human partnerships in chronic 
illness, are examined within the boundaries of Type 1 diabetes communities, 
whether these are drawn from personal health teams, medical institutions, 
communal groups comprising members of the focal partnerships, instruction 
and training group collectives or the social groups in which the human-canine 
partnerships become integrated. 
Nettleton avers that medicine has been 'taken to task for the way in 
which it treats patients as passive objects rather than 'whole' persons (2013: 5). 
‘Western’ attitudes to the generally accepted ‘medicalisation’ of illness, the 
biomedical model in which the patient may be considered a passive anatomical 
bearer of disease in the hands of the medical professional, have swung towards 
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a more active process in which disease is also seen to be socially created and 
constructed, and can also therefore be affected by the patient’s choices and 
decisions on illness treatments. As Bury (1991: 452) opines, 'interpretive 
sociology, in particular, has developed a view of people as agents, rather than 
being merely the products of the contexts in which they live'.  
The current division between illness and disease allows an individual 
versus collective interpretation. In the former, illness is seen as a personally-
owned experience whereas disease is medically identified as corporeal 
dysfunction. Impairment or dysfunction then gains medical attention and 
professional treatment whether it is a disabling condition or not. In this research, 
the condition of Type 1 diabetes can seriously hamper a desired lifestyle - 
unlike some illnesses, it is chronic and neither preventable nor curable. As a 
result those with chronic illness have to adapt in order to re-able aspects of their 
changed future, find, enact and establish new coping skills and strategies, and 
attempt to understand some of the complications and restrictions caused and 
being created by the diagnosis and ongoing treatment regimes. 
Sociologists, suggests Nettleton (2013), should observe illness behaviour 
and attempt to understand illness action; regarding the latter, she enjoins 
sociologists to perceive how the experience of illness affects people, how they 
comprehend and interpret it, and find personal significance in it. 'The sociology 
of health and illness involves the study of people's interpretations of their bodily 
experiences and concerns the social aspects of the regulation of bodies', opines 
Nettleton (2013: 9). As mentioned in the introduction, ‘when people have the 
opportunity to give voice to their experiences of illness, it becomes evident that 
their accounts are woven into their biographies’ (Nettleton, 2013: 73).  
It is this use of an illness narrative that provides identity and meaning for 
the participants in this study. Experience of chronic illness is explained in 
discourse, buoyed by the extensive research conducted by Charmaz (1983; 
1995) and Bury (1991; 2001). Bury (2001: 264) suggests that language and 
narrative are prominent features 'in the repair and restoring of meanings when 
they are threatened'. 
Shakespeare develops the narrative concept both in terms of academic 
research and autobiography in his Disability Rights and Wrongs Revisited 
(2014). He discusses the varying effects of impairment resulting from trauma or 
illness and highlights (2014: 32) Charmaz's (1995: 657) suggestion that  
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chronic illness assaults the body and threatens the integrity of self.  
Having a serious chronic illness shakes earlier taken-for-granted 
assumptions about possessing a smoothly functioning body. 
Charmaz's use of abusive verbs - assault, threaten, shake - to illustrate 
the physical and mental turmoil that may be created by chronic illness is forceful 
and unambiguous. The demise of a formerly flourishing self-belief can cause 
the unwell individual to be dragged deep into a vortex of depression, into an 
unedifying day-to-day downward spiral where merely to exist may be a lonely, 
confusing, messy and seemingly pointless process. Kenneth Doka’s (2002) 
concept of ‘disenfranchised grief’ and its challenges, lends itself to bodies 
shaken apart and lives unsettled by chronic illness so that sorrow and regret for 
what might have been, become prominent and possibly destructive emotions. 
Although resultant changes in lifestyle always occur, not all chronically ill 
individuals experience the intense psychological effects of such a diagnosis as 
those noted above. To wit, chronic illness involves the creation of an identity of 
self that incorporates the complexities of both ‘living a life’ and ‘living an illness’: 
what Whittemore and Dixon (2008: 177) term ‘uneasy bedfellows’ existing side-
by-side through necessity and challenging the self to produce a personally- and 
socially-acceptable identity.  These researchers employed a mixed-methods 
design to examine ways in which US adults with a chronic illness integrate it 
into their lives. Findings showed participants tried hard to integrate illness into a 
meaningful existence. However, the necessity to live an illness was seen as 
overwhelming because of the frequency and unpredictability of changing 
symptoms, the range of emotional challenges and the essential daily routines. 
'In mainstream medicine', according to Howes and Classen (2014) 
technology has largely usurped doctors’ sensory diagnoses, 'while in treatment 
the alleviation of pain is often considered the most that should be done for the 
patient’s sensory wellbeing' (2014: 37). Investigation into sensory perception 
was once the sole preserve of psychology but now includes what Howes and 
Classen (2014: 13) term a 'coalescence' of disciplines, for example, those of 
anthropology, geography, literature, and more recently, sociology. They 
consider a combination of approaches has encouraged the development of a 
new field of sensory studies. 
The prescription of alternative and complementary medicine has become 
more widespread as a result of the increasing Western desire to have senses 
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and emotions, 'lived experiences' (Howes and Classen, 2014: 7), recognised 
and catered for in medical treatments, for example, in music therapy (De Nora, 
2016), equine acupuncture (Koski, 2011) or animal-assisted therapy (Fine, 
2010). These are among sensory healing remedies for multiple species now 
becoming acceptable in ways that were previously unheard of or merely 
anecdotal in the West4. This change has also affected the care and welfare of 
domesticated nonhuman animals, with examples seen in Reiki’s ‘hands-on’ 
touch therapy, in citronella-based fly repellents, and in plant-based homeopathic 
remedies such as ‘rescue’ drops for calming canine anxiety during 
thunderstorm,  firework display and similar stress-inducing events. 
 Although complementary therapies and remedies are now more widely 
available for health-giving and caring purposes, it is the employment of other 
animal species to help in improving human wellbeing that is central to this study 
in which research into chronic illness investigates the new identities of humans 
integrating Type 1 diabetes management into their lives, before and after the 
arrival of a medical alert assistance dog. From this, as has already been shown 
in the partnership between Tina and Harley, emerge shared and individual 
identities – the human-nonhuman animal dyad becoming socially accepted and 
integrated as a single united ‘self’ in society, contrasted with the solitary human 
trying to escape the self-designated long-term societal outcast label, wanting to 
‘belong’ but frustrated by the self’s inability to cope unaided.  
 Problematic issues can develop if continued social interaction and 
integration into ‘normal’ society are curtailed due to anxiety and the stress of 
anticipating public embarrassment at personal human failure. The narrative 
below from Janet, explaining her life before Alfie's companionship, will exemplify 
such issues. 
Kathy Charmaz (1983: 170) details four sources of suffering resulting 
from the loss of self in chronic illness - the necessity to cope with 'living a 
restricted life, existing in social isolation, experiencing discredited definitions of 
self, and becoming a burden to others'. And nearly a half-century on, these 
issues remain prominent in diminishing both self-worth and a positive self-image 
among the lives of the chronically ill, regardless of age, ethnicity, gender, 
                                                          
4
 Herzog (2011) finds conflicting outcomes  of AAT in his examination of the 'pet effect' in relation to 
non-pet owners and pet-owners. 
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colour, creed or demographic context. ‘Experiences of being discredited, 
embarrassed, ignored and otherwise devalued' (Charmaz, 1983: 177) 
contribute to growing isolation and loss of self worth.  
In this instance, much self-esteem rides on the quantity and quality of 
support from medical personnel, family and friends, but where such validation is 
unavoidably absent, feelings of depression and inferiority may take over the 
reins of identity formation. Diminishing control of the illness and a lack of self-
efficacy can lead to feelings of failure and incapability; losses leading to a halted 
progression towards better health and lifestyle, but alternatively, people with 
chronic illness may 'gradually raise their hopes and progressively increase their 
identity goals when they meet with success' in their adaptation to a changing 
body (Charmaz, 1995: 660). 
When the human self-image is devalued and social disenfranchisement 
becomes personal to the individual with Type 1 diabetes or other chronic illness, 
the medical alert assistance dog can play a highly significant remedial role. The 
dog is not merely an autonomous medical assistant but a sentient partner able 
to provide positive, visible evidence of the human's status in the world. The 
canine provision of respect, non-judgemental support and willing 
companionship, together with an apparent desire for the other's approval, 
highlight characteristics that naturally boost human self-confidence.  
4.4 In/dependence 
 The dog becomes an aid to independence, simultaneously allowing 
dependence - a weighty burden of responsibility that appears shouldered with 
equanimity. As a guide dog safely leads an unsighted companion around 
shopping malls and onto trains, so the diabetes alert dog can arrest the 
progress of their human partner before the disorientation and confusion of a 
hypo sets in during a shopping trip or journey on public transport. In return, the 
dogs are praised and rewarded, given time out and time to play.  
Loss of an independent lifestyle complicated by an inability to function as 
expected and approved by our Western society, can lead to withdrawal from 
social activities and to a perceptible lessening of healthy cognitive thinking. A 
young participant, Janet, who relies on grizzle-muzzled Labrador, Alfie, for 
support in private and in public, exemplifies this: 
I had no confidence before Alfie. I wouldn’t talk to people because 
I’d be so worried I might just collapse on the floor in front of them; 
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it got to a point where I just didn’t want to go out and I’d only go 
out with mum or my brother – it just felt too daunting. So yeah, 
having Alfie, my confidence just sort of soared really. 
Bury (1991) suggests chronic conditions vary markedly in terms of their 
symbolic significance within segments of the cultural order, affecting individual 
adaptation as the meanings alter throughout life-stages. Changes in symptoms 
over time, he claims, can affect social responses and these may then affect 
experience (1991: 454).   
Risk and uncertainty in the behaviour of those with chronic illness can 
cause an observer to draw incorrect conclusions - dizziness or visual 
impairment may lead to a wandering, stumbling gait more often associated with 
drunkenness, and incoherent speech encourages similar branding. A fall or loss 
of consciousness in public by a diabetic individual may be seen as stereotypical 
of an epileptic seizure or of a lengthy sojourn in the local pub, but is rarely 
considered, by a public likely lacking knowledge of Type 1 diabetes, to be the 
result of extreme fluctuation in blood glucose levels. And then those who do 
recognise it as a symptom of this form of diabetes may kindly but mistakenly 
offer sugar-free drinks or food whereas the need is more often for a boost in 
glucose intake for those suffering from a hypoglycaemic episode. 
Whittemore and Dixon commend their adult participants living with 
chronic illness as ‘remarkably resourceful in developing attitudes and strategies 
to assist them in integrating the illness into their life context' (2008: 11). Bury 
(1991: 451-452) also comments on results from studies that have detailed 'the 
steps people take to manage, mitigate or adapt to it (the burden of chronic 
illness), and the meanings attached to these actions'.  Such resourcefulness 
becomes equally apparent from interview excerpts in which this study’s 
participants narrate their personal interpretations of life with Type 1 diabetes 
and with a canine medical alert assistant. 
It is, of course, not only the individual with chronic illness who is severely 
affected by the diagnosis. There is a visible ripple effect that spreads out the 
impact onto others in the household, onto work colleagues, friends and in fact, 
all who come into contact with him or her, be they members of the personal 
health care team, staff in shops or institutions, even those meeting the 
individual in a social setting or travelling on public transport:  
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The biggest challenge now is getting on the bus with the dog and 
the baby and the pram. I have to pick the time of day when I know 
the bus is going to be quiet otherwise space is so restricted for a 
dog and a pram; the dog needs to be tucked under the seat so his 
tail doesn’t get trodden on and still be within reaching distance for 
treats so I can reward him for being good.  
          (Janet and Alfie) 
 The implications of a chronic illness diagnosis are felt personally and 
socially, economically and financially, physically and mentally: the results cause 
manifold life-changes for more than the lone recipient of the diagnosis. 
Participant Paul’s partner, Natasha draws attention to some of the diverse 
consequences of this chronic illness: 
When I think about it, you know the tinnitus, you know partially-
sightedness, you know he’s now broken his nose twice, he doesn’t 
smell very good, he doesn’t taste very good (Paul interjects 
muttering that he does smell okay), he’s got diabetes and another 
chronic illness, and you know with depression and anxiety, your 
mental capacity is not as astute as it used to be, and yet to look at 
him, you wouldn’t think there was anything wrong with him; but it’s 
that whole silent illness thing. 
Chronic illness within a family context has been well explored (among 
relevant studies are papers by Rolland, 1987; Newby, 1996; Knafl and Gilliss, 
2002; and Gregory, 2005).  But research has also analysed the effects of 
chronic illness on individuals living alone. Charmaz (2006) highlights the 
measuring of individual pursuits as a way to assess personal health and illness, 
and to aid the definition of a dynamic identity. In her research, those debilitated 
by chronic illness took on more social, rather than physical, roles in activities 
they had previously enjoyed; they were able to maintain friendships and social 
contacts that 'reaffirmed that they had not become invalids' and thus gained 
significant feelings of continuity and self-worth (Charmaz, 2006: 34).  
Tina, who shares her home and life with diabetes alert dog (DAD), 
Harley, appreciates friends at work who understand the difficulties inherent in 
chronic illness, who go out of their way ‘to keep her within the work loop’ and 
who are seemingly unaffected by her repetitive questioning: 
When I’m typing, I use the 18 font whereas the others are using 
11. I’ve seen a lot of deterioration in my eyes and I think my 
memory’s going – I keep turning up at appointments at the wrong 
time; people tell me stuff and then I go and ask them again. 
Through the endeavours of office colleagues and the night-and-day 
canine alerts to possible hypos, she continues to live on her own, to use public 
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transport and to be employed, all of which would be impossible without the 
dog’s attentiveness to her changing chemical odours. 
Whether or not the participants in this study had shared their homes with 
canine companions before diagnosis, the affirmation given by a medical alert 
assistance dog upholds self-validation and helps to avoid prejudice and 
disenfranchisement. Those interviewed were able to maintain the same social 
standing as other people who kept dogs, walked with them in urban and rural 
settings, travelled distances on planes, buses and trains, attended dog-training 
classes, who freely conversed in social situations and, as often occurs naturally 
among 'dog-walkers', were fully able to discuss the merits, or otherwise, of their 
companion animals on human enjoyment of life. 
Perspectives were therefore not so altered by the diagnosis that former 
lifestyle management methods had to be completely abandoned in the face of 
changing social pressure. However, the age of the chronically ill person can 
affect the opinion of the observer, whether they are aware of such an influence 
or not. Bury (1991: 456) cites Blaxter (1990) in emphasising the 'continuing 
moral dimension of beliefs and practices surrounding different health states'. 
Type 1 diabetes is heritable rather than a result of certain lifestyle behaviours.  
Therefore children may be diagnosed with this condition at a very young age 
and receive beneficial support and likely sympathy and consideration 
appropriate to their age.  
But older recipients of this medical diagnosis may be considered less 
kindly when seen, as mentioned earlier, to stagger, or to block doorways or 
pavements with a wheelchair. Yet, when accompanied by an assistance dog 
who is seen to fetch a medical bag or to press a doorbell for the hampered 
individual of any age, public scrutiny is immediately swayed to more thoughtful 
concern. How flexible is our moral thinking! 
4.5 Self and social identity formation 
Molly Mullin (1999: 202) comments on the human use of nonhuman 
animals to construct identity and pertinently cites Haraway’s notion of ‘polishing 
an animal mirror to look for ourselves’ (1991: 21, in Mullin, 1999: 211); a phrase 
which so simply emphasises the human reliance on animal reflections to gain 
images of ourselves and our place in the world. Charmaz and Rosenfeld (2006: 
36) also investigate the mirror image when exploring Cooley’s (1902) ‘concept 
of the looking-glass self as a tool for looking at the relationships between the 
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body, self and identity’. They point out the difficulties faced by individuals with 
dis- or in-abilities who are compelled to struggle against ‘obstacles that 
undermine realizing a recognizably competent identity’ (Charmaz and 
Rosenfeld, 2006: 37). 
In public, ‘potentially discrediting visible characteristics...shape how 
actors manage their envisioned selves’ – whether they face ‘imagined 
comparisons with others and imagined normative standards’ (Charmaz and 
Rosenfeld, 2006: 38) or whether they turn away from social integration. 
When I ask if she has ever collapsed in public, Janet admits a particular 
cause of personal fear, perhaps unconsciously relating it to the stigma that can 
so easily be manifested by the reaction of others when a malfunctioning body 
determines its own behaviours: 
Not in public. I’ve always been so on the ball with blood-
testing...but when I would have them (hypos) at home during the 
night, I make a real high-pitched shrieking noise and it’s always 
that that’s made me super, super, like I don’t want that to happen 
in public because that would probably really scare people and 
make them sort of ‘ooooohhh’ (Janet laughs quietly). Obviously 
with the convulsions and everything, I just thought I don’t want to 
put anybody through it. 
 I remark her thoughtfulness for others and am reminded of Tina’s similar 
care and concern for what other people might think of their illness-related 
‘unusual’ behaviours. 
Lynda Birke and Jo Hockenhull (2012: 2) draw attention to the ease with 
which we ‘focus on the outcome of our relationships with other species, but 
much less on how relationships work, as a process, or an ongoing interaction 
between two or more sentient individuals’ (italics in text). In this study, focus 
rests on working relationships and relationships being worked on within 
healthcare boundaries; mutualistic collaborations developing performances and 
processes by which human and nonhuman may cross boundaries and embody 
mutual attunement in a shared identity. 
Richard comments on the frequency of his public identification as ‘the 
trainer’: ‘maybe the dog’s jacket should have “in training” on one side, and on 
the other, his actual job. Perhaps have “hypo-alert dog” on the jacket’. At this 
point a visitor sitting at an adjacent table in the café where we are conversing, 
questions: ‘he’s very small to be a blind guide dog, isn’t he?’ and I am surprised 
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that the speaker seems not to have noticed that Higgins’ jacket is red, in 
contrast to the Guide Dogs’ well-known yellow identification garments and 
accessories, nor that neither dog or human appear visually impaired. But again, 
many people ask if the dog is diabetic. 
Charmaz and Rosenfeld (2006), as mentioned earlier, shed light on the 
self’s internal and external image presented to the individual as both mirrored 
reflection of self and visible appearance to others. They suggest (2006: 35) that 
increased knowledge of the body is extricated ‘beyond appearance and 
information control about the body into the experiences of the body and to those 
emanating from it as they arise during illness and disability’. Charmaz and 
Rosenfeld claim that 'as our sensitivity increases to the unexpected gaze of 
others, staring into the looking-glass they hold can become increasingly painful’ 
(2006: 36) and then that pain can fracture the mirror, refracting 'contradictory 
images', they write with a jarring accuracy (Charmaz and Rosenfeld, 2006: 44). 
However, such ‘pain’ may be reduced when the mirrored image portrays the 
two-in-one, the dyad that is ‘our self’, and the strength of the symbiotic 
partnership is seen to diffuse the critical gaze of others, and magnify the visible 
interspecies bond. 
Having gained confidence, Richard admits that he now looks less at 
people’s reactions to seeing the red-jacketed Higgins and himself when they’re 
perceptible to a public eye: 
I’m more focused now on what I am doing. I’m probably more 
aloof than I was to begin with. I used to feel that everyone was 
looking at me. People ask if they can stroke him. Now I’m more 
conscious of the ratio; that one in every ten people wants to pat 
him or ask a question. On trains or buses, you can’t help but sit 
next to someone who wants to talk about what he does. I’ve got 
over the self-consciousness now and can concentrate on what the 
dog and I are doing.  
As we speak in the park-side café, another refugee from the inclement 
weather comes across from a neighbouring table where he is seated with a 
companion:  
Man: I see your little dog has ‘medical training’ on his jacket. Why 
medical training?  
Richard: I have diabetes and he alerts for high and low blood sugar 
levels. 
Man: So somebody with diabetes could have a dog like this? 
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Richard: Yes, to warn them. 
Man: That’s very interesting. 
Richard: You can look up the charity, Medical Detection Dogs. 
The man thanks him and moves back to his companion. Richard ponders 
for a moment and says ‘that was enough, I think; you can overdo the 
explanations’. The difference in Richard’s demeanour, his altered identity and 
way of being compared to observations made during my previous visit, is 
perhaps in some way related to Haraway’s ‘animal mirror’ (1991: 21) and 
Mullin’s ‘mirrors and windows’ (1999: 201). I feel his newfound confidence is 
testament to Higgins’ visible abilities and the shared benefits of ‘crossing 
boundaries’ (Birke and Hockenhull, 2012) and creating bonds. 
Erving Goffman (1959) examines the presentation of self in everyday life 
and his glimpse of humans working in lower-order service employment can 
relate also to the nonhuman animal considered to have a lower social and 
economic ranking than the human.  ‘Face-to-face interaction may be roughly 
defined as the reciprocal influence of individuals upon one another’s actions 
when in one another’s immediate physical presence’, Goffman (1959: 26) 
pronounces, and then continues: ‘a “performance” may be defined as all the 
activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence in 
any way any of the other participants’ (Goffman, 1959: 26).  The alerting dog’s 
performance is a constant activity on given occasions so that ‘when an 
individual or a performer plays the same part to the same audience on different 
occasions, a social relationship is like to arise’ (Goffman, 1959: 27), one in 
which belief and trust in each other is affirmed daily.   
Michalko (1999) continues this theme:   
From the beginning, Smokie demonstrated nothing but his desire 
to become my friend. He is my partner and the trust, respect and 
admiration we have for one another is captured even more in the 
idea of friendship than in that of a bond (1999: 187). 
Tales of the presentation and reception of the shared identity under 
public scrutiny are woven through the narratives given by the human-half of the 
participating multispecies partnerships, while the dog’s presence and abilities 
are communicated by body language and active participation in the relationship. 
In particular the human-needed canine alert is communicated as a result of the 
dog's acute sense of smell verifying changes in chemical odour detected in their 
human partner. 
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5 The canine sense of smell and olfactory acuity 
Then what a variety of smells interwoven in subtlest combination 
thrilled his nostrils; strong smells of earth, sweet smells of flowers; 
nameless smells of leaf and bramble; sour smells as they crossed 
the road; pungent smells as they entered beanfields. But suddenly 
down the wind came tearing a smell sharper, stronger, more 
lacerating than any – a smell that ripped across his brain stirring a 
thousand instincts, releasing a million memories – the smell of 
hare, the smell of fox.  
                                V. Woolf, (1933 [2016]: 7) 
 Conception of dogs as animate instruments and efficient and highly 
effective healthcare resources requires examination of the canine nasal 
structure to discover how this contributes to their exceptional accuracy in 
olfactory sensitivity.  Low (2005: 397), having explained in his ‘ruminations on 
smell’ that smell occurs everywhere in the experience of life, suggests that 
discovering the role of smell in our daily routines might better be ‘apprehended 
within the domain of a sociology of everyday life’; and in this case, its role within 
the everyday realities of symbiotic life in chronic illness. 
Looking at the dog’s sensory acuity compared to our own in terms of 
olfaction, appears to be an exercise in futility since the human nose conveys 
merely a microsmatic or weak-scenting ability, much as the nose in most 
primates, and functions far less capably than that of the pig, dog or rat. 
However, having said that, research by Zelano and Sobel ‘highlights results 
from studying humans, whom we think provide an underutilised, yet critical, 
animal model for olfaction’ (2005: 431). They comment on the canine ability to 
recognise humans through odour but ‘we don’t all appreciate that, reciprocally, 
humans can identify dogs by their odor’, as suggested by Wells and Hopper 
(2000), and seen in the practice of human scent detection ability that is learned, 
conducted and discussed by Horowitz (2016). 
Sarah Pink (2015) delves into historical sociology of the senses, 
researching studies investigating the sense of smell and social interaction. She 
highlights the suggestion by Kelvin Low that ‘the differentiation of smell stands 
as that which involves not only an identification of “us” versus “them” or “you” 
versus “me”, but also processes of judgement and ranking of social others’ 
(2005: 405).  Certainly our judgement of a dog may easily, and sometimes 
unknowingly, be affected by an unpleasantly odoriferous and unkempt coat that 
has been well-rolled in the intense scents left by fox, badger or cat, for example.  
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Howes and Classen (2014: 38) recall historical images of the senses as 
‘gateways to the body’: illness could cause sensations in the body while some 
bodily sensations could cause illness or raise good health. Low’s study of smell, 
Pink avers, ‘attempts to move ... towards individual, lived experiences where 
smell may be utilized as a social medium in the (re)construction of social 
realities’ (2005: 398).  
This research is vested in the canine sense of smell and its influential 
use in biomedical technologies, and therefore is not deemed a sensorial 
ethnography since I am not recording or interpreting personal or human naso-
sensory perceptions of the odour of volatile organic compounds. However, there 
is no doubt that both human and canine participants are affected by olfactory 
experiences within their shared homes, within their communities, practices and 
co-embodied identities. The canine olfactory sensitivity that enables acutely 
perceptive and beneficial detection of symptoms of human illness at home, or in 
the public gaze, can be considered to have use, as Low has suggested, as a 
social means to (re)construct ‘social realities’ (2005: 398). 
Irvine takes behavioural flexibility as well as multi-sensory integration to 
be indicators of consciousness (2007: 9), emphasising that the ability to 
integrate information from different sensory pathways allows beings to detect 
mis-information and respond to it. Hearing, touching, seeing, smelling and 
tasting all provide detailed information for conscious processing; the alert 
assistance dog has a highly developed sense of smell that allows detection and 
prediction of possible corporeal frailties of which the human is not consciously 
aware and therefore does not recognise as requiring urgent attention and 
action. 
Serpell (2010) is among previously-named contemporary researchers 
who consider the contribution made to human health by companion animals, a 
theme invigorating the heart of this multispecies study to investigate the impact 
of canine olfactory detection on chronic illness management. This beneficial 
sensory ability is extensively explored by Miklósi (2009) and by Bradshaw 
(2012), the latter providing an anthrozoological perspective on the canine ‘world 
of smells’, a world enabling prediction and detection beyond vision and audition 
that has profound significance for human wellbeing.  
5.1      Smelling like a dog 
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Alexandra Horowitz (2016: 3) commits to training her nose ‘to better 
conjure what it might be like to have the mind and nose of a dog’ in order to 
discover canine experiences of smell and the odours, often beyond our ability to 
recognise, which guide a dog’s perception and understanding. In her scenting 
endeavours, what Sluka and Robben (2007: 28) might term ‘sensorial 
fieldwork’, Horowitz (2016: 6) suggests ‘we may also see how to return to that 
perhaps more primal, so-called animal state of knowledge about ourselves and 
the world that we have forgotten in a culture wrought of technology and lab 
tests’.  
However, it is also in perceiving the medical alert assistance dog as a 
modern-day health technology, that we gain increased experience of our shared 
identities and ‘situated knowledges’ (Haraway, 1988: 575-599). Haraway 
suggests that feminist objectivity ‘allows us to become answerable for what we 
learn how to see’ and recalls ‘lessons that I learned in part walking with my 
dogs and wondering how the world looks without a fovea and very few retinal 
cells for color vision but with a huge neural processing and sensory area for 
smells’ (1988: 583). 
Research into the importance of the senses of vision and hearing to 
humans has been and continues to be a vast arena for exploration. But, in 
comparison, the sense of smell has been sparsely investigated; and research 
relating to the canine perception of odours remains scarce. Our sense of smell 
is not a priority for human survival, or at least not in contemporary ‘Western’ 
society. 
5.2 Consequences of scenting 
The human nose is practically non-existent. The greatest poets in 
the world have smelt nothing but roses on the one hand, and dung 
on the other. The infinite graduations that lie between are 
unrecorded. Yet it was in the world of smell that Flush mostly 
lived. Love was chiefly smell, form and colour were smell, music 
and architecture, law, politics and science were smell. To him 
religion was smell. 
                        V. Woolf (1933 [2016]: 86) 
Howes and Classen (2014: 4-5), in researching the importance of smell 
in global societies, cite Endacott’s study of the Batek peoples of peninsular 
Malaysia, who are reported to 'classify virtually everything in their environment 
by smell, and say that the sun has a bad smell “like that of raw meat”, in 
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contrast to the moon, which has a good smell, “like that of flowers”’ (Endacott, 
1979: 39). 
Subconsciously, we evoke memories and draw conclusions based on 
odour, taking pleasure in smells enticing us to enter a favourite bakery or to 
linger in a rose-laden garden. We breathe in and, with eyes closed, can identify 
bruised mint leaves, the smoke from an autumn bonfire or a steaming tarred 
road after heavy summer rain, or the less pleasant sulphurous smell of a bad 
egg or worse, the noxious odours from open sewage or a decomposing 
carcass.  
The examples above exhibit strong and distinctive scents whose 
pungency our sense of smell cannot ignore; all are consequential effects of 
where we are or what we are doing; neural messages from the nose to the brain 
affording future memories and related emotions. Mention the smell of rotten 
eggs and immediately I stand wind-blistered and sand-blasted under a leaden 
sky, on the shoreline between a darkened sea and the granite-grey desert of 
the Skeleton Coast of Namibia, watching the churning thunderous Atlantic 
rollers disinter sea-bed organisms and pump malevolent sulphurous smells 
landwards – smells that evoke memories. 
Olfactory memory training has been shown to assist in improving the 
human ability to smell odours, notably for people with Parkinson’s disease who 
may have lost this sense (Haehner et al, 2013); furthermore, the inability to 
detect odours as predictive of Alzheimer’s disease is also under investigation. 
Hummel, Landis and Huettenbrink (2011) affirm that smell and taste disorders 
strongly affect quality of life and suggest that the ability of the olfactory 
epithelium to regenerate is significant to treatment.  
However, our human survival depends more reliably on the sensory 
perceptions of keen sight and acute hearing (Ingold, 2000: 243-287) whereas 
dogs survive by employing their sense of smell as primary means of 
identification or discrimination, to detect areas of safety or danger, food and 
water, family member, friend or enemy, migratory pattern or the quickest route 
to the best mate. Evolution as human animals has reduced our scent detection 
ability, both in physiological structure and olfactory capability, so we now rely 
more on sight and hearing to perceive and achieve wanted goals.  
Ache and Young (2005: 417) suggest that ‘the ability to detect and 
respond in an adaptive manner to chemical signals serves as the primary 
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window to the sensory world for most species of animal’, but an acute sense of 
smell is no longer the prime human survival mechanism in contemporary 
society. There are exceptions of course, such as the olfactory skills of 'wine 
tasters and perfumiers' (Bradshaw, 2011: 226), whose professional ‘noses’ may 
be highly insured for their commercial value to fragrance producers and vintners 
– but survival is not incumbent upon them. 
The exceptional canine ability to perceive and identify odours with high 
accuracy, together with dogs’ sometimes surprising propensity to like the 
company of humankind, has become appreciably useful for a range of tasks, as 
noted above. Their additional value to biomedical research lies in the 
collaborative non-invasive detection of physically-limiting boundaries 
constructed by chronic illness – particularly that of Type 1 diabetes. As 
mentioned previously, people with this illness can only obtain necessary insulin 
through injection or infusion so have a continual struggle to maintain accurate 
practices of care and to conduct the stringent treatment regimes to correct and 
balance blood glucose levels that fluctuate dramatically according to intake of 
nutrition, levels of stress, barometric pressure changes and/or exercise.  
Internationally, positive results are emerging from ongoing scientific 
research and development technologies in this field – for example, work on 
types of artificial pancreas, on pump therapy and the creation of human stem 
cell-derived beta cells (Vegas et. al., 2016). Staymates et. al. (2016) 
experimented with the design of a 3D printed dog’s nose which could sniff and 
found improvement in detection which could benefit future vapour samplers for 
explosives, narcotics and illness. 
But 10%, of the 3.5 million people known to have diabetes in the United 
Kingdom, have already been diagnosed with Type 1 and this compels them to 
spend every day of their lives practicing the mechanics of care and performing 
strict treatment routines to control the effects of the illness, using whatever 
method is currently available to them. That those with Type 1 diabetes will look 
forward to new health technologies is not in doubt, as discussed in the section 
on transhumanism, but survival in the ‘here and now’ is the primary objective of 
those currently coping with the complexities of this chronic illness. 
So a human inability to recognize symptoms of an onset of 
hypoglycaemia can result at worst in death. However, the smell of changing 
scent signatures, the volatile organic compounds (VOCs) exhaled in every 
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breath, disturbs the usual odour pattern recognised by the medical alert 
assistance dog who then actively warns the human partner of an impending 
episode. These dogs may nudge, nibble, stare, paw, whine, scrabble or jump up 
to alert the human companion. They are trained to use an alert signal that is 
natural to them while being recognisable as such by their partner and not seen, 
for example, as an invitation to play or go for a walk. I ask Liz, an MDD trainer, 
how the young dog she is working with is likely to alert a future partner. She 
replies that it depends entirely on the dog. ‘Ben is quite a nudger so maybe he’ll 
do that. It’s whatever the dog offers, not what the client chooses’. 
The alert behaviour needs to be of sufficient intensity to wake up a sound 
sleeper with fast-dropping blood sugar levels and at night is likely to be 
performed with increased volume and mobility when compared with more subtle 
alert signals in daylight (participants recall the dogs shaking their heads and 
rattling collars and tags, claws tapping floorboards, jumping on the bed, whining 
and barking when doing night-time alerts). The medical alert assistance dogs 
learn to give well-practiced alarm signals to their human partners when blood 
glucose levels rise or fall to unsafe concentrations, usually above 12 or below 
4.5 millimoles per litre5, although the range will vary according to the individual 
concerned. People with Type 1 diabetes generally see 7mmol/l as a ‘normal’ 
blood glucose reading on their monitors.  
The canine assistant may fetch the medical kit for their human 
companion and not leave them until sufficient treatment has been seen to be 
performed. As mentioned earlier (page 92) with reference to causality (Irvine, 
2007: 8), the trained diabetes alert dog appears able to connect cause and 
effect: to have intention to act, to perform that intention, and then to wait and 
see the consequence of what they have done - and do more if he/she 'think' it 
necessary. As one participant confirmed, referring to her canine partner: 
In the middle of the night, obviously I’m in a deep sleep, he’ll get 
me up and get my blood kit; but he doesn’t stop there because he 
won’t relax and let me get back into bed to go to sleep until I’ve 
had my Lucozade and something to eat - and then he’ll just chill 
out. 
5.3 Canine nasal structure 
                                                          
5 Mole is the molecular weight of a biological substance in grams so that, for example, the 
molecular weight of glucose is 180 so 1mmol glucose equals 180 mg.) 
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The dog’s nasal cavity contains hundreds of millions of sensory neurons 
in the olfactory epithelium (OE), the skin which lines convoluted nasal turbinates 
– paper-thin, spiral-shaped bones at the back of the nose – providing a vast 
area for odorant transport. Helton (2009) opines the average dog to have an 
olfactory epithelium of approximately 170 square centimetres compared to the 
approximate 10 square centimetres of OE in a human. The OE of the pig is 
estimated to extend to 300 square centimetres (Roura and Tedó, 2009).  
Whether the porcine olfactory ability could be aligned to biomedical 
treatments in the same manner that dogs are trained to assist in healthcare, is 
not for this study; but future research into the scenting prowess and ‘trainability’ 
of other macrosmatic species could lead to a broader resource base of animals 
specialising in odour variation: animals who may be able to deliver increasing 
accuracy in the detection of illness at an early stage, both among human and 
nonhuman sufferers.  
As yet, no mechanical system, no technological equipment, have been 
designed to be as effective in odour detection and discrimination as the nasal 
architecture of mammals such as rats or dogs. That of the dog serves as a 
model for the E-nose, an electronic nose that will eventually provide non-
invasive diagnosis of serious illnesses affecting human and nonhuman animals. 
Gas sensor arrays, such as the LABRADOR (the light-weight analyser for 
buried remains and decomposition odour recognition) which is used to find 
clandestine graves (Vass, Thompson and Wise, 2010), are among those 
advancing inanimate scent detection technology but there is nothing currently 
manufactured and available to match the keen olfactory sensitivity of most 
nonhuman living creatures. 
News media and academic papers have commented variously on the 
exceptional scenting abilities of multiple species. It is recorded that: 
in Europe, turkey vultures (Cathartes aura) are trained to search for, but 
not eat, human corpses in hard-to-access rural areas, their sense of smell being 
more acute than that of a dog (The Local de, 2010). When comparing the visual 
systems of New World turkey vultures and black vultures (Coragyps atratus), 
Lisney, Stecyk, Kolominsky, Graves, Whylie and Iwaniuk (2013) noted that the 
turkey vulture has larger nostrils, a larger nasal fossa, a greater surface area for 
olfactory receptors, and a relatively larger olfactory bulb, and that they are able 
to detect carrion in the absence of visual cues;  
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in Africa, the Giant Pouched Rat (Cricetomys gambianus) learns swiftly 
to scent and warn of concealed landmines (Poling et al., 2010) and to detect 
pulmonary tuberculosis from sputum samples (Poling et al., 2011);  
in Southern Africa (Miller et al., 2015), the olfactory prowess of the 
African elephant (Loxodonta africana) enables them to detect traces of TNT;  
in Britain, the People’s Trust for Endangered Species supports research 
with working ‘sniffer’ dogs to trace hard-to-find harvest mice (Micromys minutus) 
(Coles, 2015).  
Locusts, of the family Acridae, are also becoming instruments in the 
olfactory search for explosives. BBC Technology 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-36702704) reported that researchers 
are currently developing technology that may allow locusts to detect explosives 
using their sense of smell. According to Baranidharan Raman of the School of 
Engineering and Applied Science at Washington University (2016), neural 
signals from a locust's brain would be processed by an attached chip that could 
send information back to those guiding the locusts into remote areas.  
Craven, Paterson and Settles (2010: 933) suggest a dog can detect 
odorant concentration levels at 1-2 parts per trillion and that, according to 
Walker et. al. (2003; 2006), canine olfactory acuity is 'roughly 10 000 – 100 000 
times that of a human'. Think of a drop of water – and two water-filled Olympic-
sized swimming pools – to picture the ratio more easily. Investigating the fluid 
dynamics of canine olfaction, Craven, Paterson and Settles (2010) draw 
attention to the fact that olfaction and respiration each have a distinct airflow 
path through the nasal cavity and these unique nasal airflow patterns can 
explain macrosmia in certain animals.  
Breathing-in enables odour-laden air to be transported to the olfactory 
recess area of the nose, while respiratory airways take the remaining airflow 
from the olfactory recess towards the nasopharynx, where it exits the nasal 
cavity. Figures a, b and c, published in the Craven et. al. (2010) study, provide 
graphic description of these nasal structures.  
Craven explains that ‘expiratory pathlines originating from the 
nasopharynx demonstrate that airflow bypasses the olfactory recess during 
expiration, leaving quiescent (inactive)  scent-laden air there, providing an 
additional residence time for enhanced odorant absorption’ (2010: 940, figure 
7c), and enabling accurate detection and discrimination. 
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A canine alert can be given up to an hour before an episode that might 
cause human loss of consciousness. An example is offered by Mel, a 
participant whose child has had Type 1 diabetes for several years but has been 
able to play football because their family dog and trained canine alert assistant, 
Gemma, alerts to Mark’s changing blood glucose levels by jumping up as she 
watches from the sidelines before his blood sugar drops too low. Mel explains: 
There is a respect barrier, a line of tape and posts between 
spectators and the players on the soccer field. Gemma will sit 
quietly beside me, then she will try to go over to him; she goes to 
the end of the lead, turns back and faces me, comes back and 
jumps up, paws at the bag I keep the meter in; then she goes 
back to the end of the lead which will be just about under the tape, 
and sort of jumps back and tosses her head as if to say ‘come on’. 
 
I ask whether she herself then goes onto the field: Mel laughs and says 
she ‘couldn’t just waltz onto the field if there’s a match’, so instead she goes 
round to the coach and whispers her request to ‘get him off’. The player can be 
called off for a blood test, perhaps be given a swift-acting carbohydrate boost, 
and may then be able to resume play.  
Similarly, adults can shop without fear of collapsing in the supermarket 
when the assistance dogs recognise and alert to scent changes prior to a 
‘hypo’. Before she shared life with Apple, Sara frequently collapsed in public 
without warning, an often-embarrassing feature of hypoglycaemia in which 
blood glucose levels can suddenly drop dangerously low.  
Tina, whose blood sugar levels are also inclined to drop very fast, 
recollected having a recent ‘funny turn’ when Harley, jumped up as she was 
paying for goods in a supermarket. ‘The lady at the till asked if I was alright. I 
said I’d get a coffee and sit down. I came round in the ambulance’. The next 
time Tina went there to shop, the staff told her how sorry they had felt for 
Harley: ‘he was so stressed doing everything, making sure everyone was doing 
everything right, we thought you were a trainer’. Such nonhuman animal 
concern for human frailty, and such human concern for an animal’s visible and 
invisible anxiety, evidence more than one way in which symbiotic relationships 
are caused and maintained. (Methods that may reduce such emotional feelings 
and behaviours in a working dog are addressed further on). Tina believes the 
shop’s members of staff like to see Harley working and, referring to her 
collapse, adds: ‘by all accounts, he did super...but what upset me more than 
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anything that day was when I realised that I’d dropped my coffee and so didn’t 
have any to drink - and it were free!’ 
During our conversation, Harley lies stretched out, snoring loudly, under 
Tina’s chair. Suddenly interrupting her discourse, he gets up, stares at her, puts 
a paw on her leg, then jumps up and licks her face. She tests her blood sugar 
levels and finds them to be 23.5 millimoles per litre, far above her acceptable 
range. Harley is rewarded swiftly with praise and a treat and Tina goes off to eat 
and rebalance. In this case the dog has alerted to hyperglycaemia, when blood 
sugar levels rise too high rather than dropping too low, but he has been trained 
to alert to both hypo- and hyperglycaemic conditions endemic to his human 
partner. 
Dogs can retain scents as can cats, rabbits, rats and the majority of other 
species. However, the olfactory recess is 'largely absent in microsmatic 
primates' (Craven, Paterson and Settles, 2010: 933), for example, humans and 
rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), and olfactory mucosa (mucous membranes) 
in these species are located in the upper part of the nasal cavity. The dog’s 
exceptional olfactory acuity appears to ‘depend on its nasal airway architecture 
and odorant transport by these unique airflow patterns generated during 
sniffing’ (2010: 939). 
John Bradshaw devotes a chapter of In Defence of Dogs to canine 
olfactory ability, comparing its advent to the diminution of human odour 
perception and the evolution of our three-colour vision (2012: 227). Excluding 
perfumiers and wine-tasters, who have specific verbal language to describe the 
odours they smell, Bradshaw draws attention to the lack of language available 
for human description of ‘the quality of odours’ surrounding us (2012: 226). 
Where we have the advantage in daylight vision terms but have weaker auditory 
powers than dogs, the latter leap and bound streets ahead of us in the scenting 
stakes. Not surprising, when reading statistical claims by Bradshaw and other 
researchers (Craven et al, 2010; Miklósi, 2009) that between 220 million and 
two billion nerves link the canine olfactory epithelium to the dog’s brain. 
So sniffing is a natural practice for a dog – air is inspired and expired 
both for olfactory purposes and for respiratory survival.  Encouraging a dog to 
use its sense of smell to identify biomarkers of human disease through positive 
reinforcement or reward-based training appears advantageous to both species.  
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However, ethical issues arising from the concept of ‘using’ other-than-human 
animals are investigated and discussed more fully in a later chapter. 
The following section, with its intense number of quoted and barely edited 
participant narrations, is strongly influenced by James Clifford’s image of a 
wished-for ‘utopia of plural authorship that accords to collaborators not merely 
the status of independent enunciators but that of writers’ (2007: 490). The 
voices of participants should be heard as speaking for themselves in their own 
choices of language, time and space. Clifford (2007) suggests it is only after 
they have been heard, that a researcher should attempt to reflect, discuss, 
interpret or analyse any verbal content narrated by the observed speakers in 
response to questions asked. 
Respondents 'speaking' in the following chapter neither evade questions 
nor try to change meanings. The vocal responses are communicated in human 
speech since the dogs achieve interspecies communication mainly through 
physical movement and sensory perception. The participants volunteer word-
pictures of their everyday routines in Type 1 diabetes, the co-embodied skills 
and behaviours they find compulsory to practice and make available to 
observation, and the mutualisms inherent in the symbiotic relationships 
developing from chronic illness. 
6 ‘Doing’ diabetes Type 1 
Josephine Donovan’s (2006: 324) call for ‘a feminist animal care 
ethic...political in its perspective and dialogical in its method’, pleads for the 
extinction of superimposed human voices over those of animals and urges 
recognition of their own subjectivity instead of considering them human-
dominated objects. Clifford and Marcus (1986: 15) introduce the concept of 
‘polyvocality’ into our cognition; the notion of a seemingly efficient and apposite 
method of hearing what discussants think and feel about themselves, their 
illnesses, the company they keep and the existences in which they live. 
However, ‘researcher mediation’ (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 1995: 13) cannot 
avoid some degree of influence on the direction and pattern of flow before, 
during and even after a particular discourse is complete. As Hurn suggests 
(2012: 212), polyvocality has become expected in ‘postmodern ethnographic 
writing’, but the multiple voices heard are principally of human creation. It is to 
be hoped that Donovan’s plea continues to be heard and acted upon so that 
multispecies dialogues are more sensitively and correctly interpreted. 
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6.1 The illness, Type 1 diabetes  
Formerly known as insulin-dependent diabetes (IDD), Type 1 diabetes is, 
as noted earlier, a medical condition in which the immune system destroys the 
body’s insulin-producing beta cells in the pancreas.  Produced successfully, 
insulin is a hormone that allows glucose to leave the blood and enter the cells of 
the body to provide energy, but once an individual is diagnosed with Type 1 
diabetes, insulin injections or infusions take over and become a constant 
requirement.  
Information from Diabetes UK (2017) suggests diabetic ketoacidosis 
(DKA) may be an indication of undiagnosed Type 1 diabetes; it is likely to occur 
when insufficient insulin prevents glucose entering cells and results in the body 
burning fatty acids, and acidic ketones being produced, for energy. High levels 
of ketone bodies in the bloodstream can lead to DKA, loss of consciousness 
and possibly death if the individual is not treated rapidly. 
Paul believes his ketone production is generally low and quite often, if he 
goes high, ketones are not registered on the monitor when testing so he is 
relieved not to suffer ketoacidosis. But then when Nero gives really strong alerts 
to his blood sugar levels, he wonders if ketones are being produced and 
decides he will start looking into this. His thoughts show him to be an ‘active’ 
rather than ‘passive’ patient (Nettleton, 2013: 5); one who will make an effort to 
discover improved methods and treatments, who will trial and experiment with 
what is new and available: 
You don’t know unless you try these things – bear in mind that like 
the blood monitors, years ago it used to be urine sticks and the 
results were 4-6 hours in arrears I think, so when you used to do 
your dipstick and you turn round and find you’re high, bear in mind 
you only had the little strips to line up, and it was this and it was 
that...four hours ago. 
He is surprised that people are unconcerned with finding new or 
improved methods of dealing with their illness; that there is passive acceptance 
instead of an active, ongoing endeavour to make life more comfortable: 
Everyone’s different so what affects one may not affect the next; 
you tend to find what works for you and stick with it. You get 
people who’ve been 10-15 years with it and they don’t understand 
– you think surely they experiment, it’s the only way of learning 
anything – that in certain conditions, this happens, or that 
happens; it doesn’t always but it’s more likely to. 
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 On a visit to the charity’s offices, I listen to clients talking to and learning 
from one another, as I am myself. They discuss symptoms of people who retain 
hypo-awareness, often noticed in pallor, shaking and sweating, but those are 
the early signals and if ignored may lead to moodiness, aggression or 
unexpected silence. One speaker, Sally, remembers teenage arguments with 
her mother over the need to test when ‘in a mood’. I ask if she is still aware of 
being ‘difficult’ and she answers ‘nowadays, no, not very often’: 
My poor husband probably gets most of it now and there are times 
when he’s woken up in bed and found me trying to smother him 
with a pillow because I can get quite aggressive. I joke about it but 
it’s because my blood sugars are so low that my brain doesn’t 
know what it’s doing and I’m in fight or flight response – so I’m 
going to kill my husband. (Laughter follows the comment and 
someone says ‘but that’s normal, isn’t it’ which maintains the 
humour – but as is so often the case, the humour is there to 
alleviate darker emotion and covers recognition of the complex 
and serious issues involved in coping with Type 1 diabetes.) 
One of the medical alert assistance dog trainers, Gill, admits she never 
realised ‘how debilitating’ the illness was until she was employed by the charity.  
I knew people tested their blood, I knew they used insulin and 
things like that, but I was very naive about hypo-unawareness and 
how it stops people going out, stops people working, you know, 
puts a lot of boundaries in there for them. 
6.2 Effects of the diagnosis 
 Richard relates that he was about 21 years old when first diagnosed with 
Type 1 diabetes. Expecting him to have been shocked and possibly depressed 
by the revelation, I was surprised when he said he had felt relief: ‘I had the 
classic symptoms of having a very dry mouth and not being able to quench my 
thirst’, so finding reason and name for his symptoms enabled access to a 
community of similarly-labelled individuals and eased some anxiety surrounding 
his unquenchable thirst when informed of available medical treatments. 
Symptoms occurring before a hypo, and of which he is no longer aware, 
are listed on the kitchen wall at home and also in his office so that his work 
colleagues can recognise out-of-the-norm behaviour and respond appropriately: 
I’ve broken the symptoms into groups. The first one is sweatiness, 
dizziness, trembling, shakiness, going pale; the second group is 
irritability, difficulty speaking and/or concentrating, confusion and 
in the third group, disorderly or irrational behaviour that may be 
mistaken for drunkenness. 
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Sometimes I think I’ve got low sugar levels when it’s the opposite, 
when it’s very high which is because...you know, not really having 
the full inkling now...it used to be sort of trembling of the lips, that 
sort of thing; tingling lips could be a sign. And just being a bit 
wobbly - I can remember when I was first diagnosed and would go 
into the canteen for a snack, and on some occasions just wasn’t 
really able to move my legs in the ways that I wanted, and people 
would speak to me and I wasn’t able to respond. 
 
Whereas now I seem to be quite able to chat to people on the 
phone or in person at 2.2mmol/l, so I’ve lost all those signs that 
other people might pick up on. 
Paul was diagnosed at a much younger age than Richard. He was six 
and avoided hospital visits for hypoglycaemia as his mother, ‘kind soul that she 
is’ [he speaks of her with warmth and appreciation throughout our 
conversations], decided she would deal with his hypos herself: 
On the odd occasion, normally at night, if I didn’t wake up, she 
would force feed me, sometimes punching me in the stomach to 
shove food down my throat – it sounds terrible but you don’t 
remember any of it and I wouldn’t fault her for the world, she did a 
brilliant job, she did what needed to be done and I never did go 
into hospital. 
 
Paul says he has never been aware of falling into a coma (although he is 
reminded by Natasha, his partner, that he was once unconscious for about four 
hours), because generally he keeps functioning and is not a ‘collapsing 
diabetic’: 
My brain shuts down and just says keep walking, get something to 
eat and that’s what I do; it’s happened at work in different places 
but I just keep going.    
Charmaz (1995) delineates the rigours and exacting demands of 
diabetes, its incessant clamour for attention to prevent loss of body, mind and 
spirit. Determination, patience and skill seem essential to performing the 
ongoing tasks inherent in this highly complex illness. Accurately weighing and 
measuring food intake, withdrawing exact amounts of insulin for injections, and 
gauging alterations in blood glucose levels resulting from stress, exercise or 
health issues, can have strong impact on day-to-day living, and ‘hypos’ can 
affect planned activities detrimentally. 
Paul explains how weather changes can affect his blood sugar levels: 
Generally I try to keep my bloods up so when I’m on a walk, 
they’re rising as I walk and so it stays level and when I get back, 
I’m not too bad. But different weather conditions have an impact 
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so today, although it’s quite blustery which means it’s harder to 
walk, I was warm on the walk and so burned off more. In summer, 
you strip off to a pair of shorts and a T-shirt so actually you’re cool 
on the walk.  
Mol’s observations of the ‘miniaturized blood sugar measurement 
machines’ as diagnostic devices (2000: 19) draw attention to how an individual 
may learn to be independent from medical professionals as he or she become 
expert in self-regulation. But, if they are hypo-unaware, they may not recognise 
when testing and the reading of numerical results should take place, and 
therefore still risk potential hypo episodes unless they test very frequently; in 
which case the device may become an unwanted but necessary intervention 
instead of a valued assistive technology.  
Mol allows that use of the diagnostic device may be ‘a practical 
nuisance’, an irritant that can ruin plans and ‘spoil the day’ (2000: 20) despite its 
significance to an autonomous lifestyle. Being diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes 
brings hard work and complex procedures; managing its effects so as to lead 
the best possible independent life incorporates obligatory management of the 
tiresome but beneficial blood glucose monitor. But if there is no recognisable 
symptom of a forthcoming hypo, many have to rely on guesswork and repetitive 
success or failure of the optional test. 
In this situation, the scenting ability of a hypo-alert assistance dog is 
influential. Where a partner or friend may insist on the frequent need to do a 
blood sugar test which can lead to ructions in relationships and refusal to oblige, 
the DAD will continue to perform an alert regardless of the individual’s mood or 
language; will provide good practices of care despite argument and tension, and 
being animate, warm and friendly, is likely to gain acceptance of the alert and 
the need to follow it with a blood test, reducing friction and the need to nag. 
6.3 Canine ‘alert’ communication 
Natasha comments on the mental and physical agility used by Nero to 
communicate an alert when Paul is sleeping too deeply to be roused by the 
dog’s usual nudging and staring: 
Nero gets up, he goes shake, shake, shake [she demonstrates his 
head swinging from side to side so his ears fly up and down], you 
hear his collar going and his ears flapping, and that’s what wakes 
me up...but it doesn’t wake Paul so Nero’ll come padding round 
the bed and I’ll just watch his behaviour while I’m pretending to be 
asleep in the hope that he’ll go round that side, but...he launches 
over him, actually on him because he can’t get to my side of the 
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bed, but Paul still doesn’t wake up; Nero clambers all over him 
and he still doesn’t wake up... 
Sara describes Apple’s similar night-time alerting method: 
Before he jumps up on the bed, he does a lot of walking about at 
night. He’ll get up, shake and you hear his tags jingling, and he 
paces around the room, sniffs the air and stands next to the bed, 
and he tends to wake you up then and you realise. If you don’t, 
he’ll jump up on the bed, but it does give you a chance to wake up 
gently – normally I think it’s my husband who’ll say to me ‘the 
dog’s up’ and I’ll look. 
6.4 Blood and pollution 
Janet Carsten (2013: 132) writes of the management of blood in 
laboratories where blood is extracted and screened, examined and analysed, 
before results are entered into information systems where data can be retrieved 
and referred to by medical practitioners. ‘The processes of extraction, analysis, 
storage, disposal, and data-recording are at the heart of what goes on in the 
labs’, she asserts; and perhaps not surprisingly, similar procedures are 
performed in every residence that is home to a Type 1 diabetic.  
Carsten shows interest in the need for social engagement to make things 
happen, for example, ‘interactions between medical lab technologists and 
patients, between working colleagues, and between the staff of the labs and the 
samples they analyse as well as with the equipment they use’ (2013: 132). This 
research is focused on social engagement and the resultant interactions 
between medical assistance dogs and their diabetic human companions, 
between the participants in this research and members of their families and 
health care teams, and between themselves, the dogs and the insentient blood 
glucose meters, insulin pumps and test strips, the contents of their treatment 
toolkits. 
Blood, pumping its circulatory route along arteries and veins, transports 
gases and nutrients, whatever is needed by internal organs to maintain and 
safeguard life. But blood has further function externally, whether in the form of 
transfusion, blood-letting or clotting, and in this instance, in providing internal 
information on blood glucose levels to the external observing eyes of its human 
‘container’, who being hypo-unaware, cannot comprehend or manage without 
measurements and statistics being presented visibly or audibly. Those who 
have lost hypo-awareness are impeded by the loss of perceptive abilities that 
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pick up warning signs of hypos and instead rely on the vital drops of blood that 
are so constantly and determinedly extracted and monitored manually. 
Considering here that our skin is the external porous and elastic casing 
of the body that contains among other essentials to life, the blood flow system, 
Carsten’s (2013: 4) alternative proposal of ‘the literal uncontainability of blood – 
its capacity to move between domains’, coincides with Mol’s concept of 
corporeal ‘leaking’ and the skin’s porosity mentioned earlier. ‘Blood can secure 
life, but also be a source of danger through its lack of boundaries’, Carsten 
suggests (2013: 5). For the most part, the body acts as an efficient receptacle 
for organs, bones, arteries and veins and is equally efficient at enabling the 
circulatory system to function optimally in pumping blood for life. 
Sally comments on the difficulty of testing blood sugar levels when away 
from home where a hygienic and private environment may be hard to find: 
Toilets aren’t the cleanest places [...] and doing the test through 
clothing isn’t ideal, so people usually go for the quick and easy 
way and that’s in your tummy or arm. 
During my observation sessions, none of the participants ever wore latex 
or any other form of material glove to prevent molecules of dirt or dust 
combining with their blood on the test strip or attaching to their pumps, 
cartridges or glucose monitors. However, they all took care to test in 
environments that were hygienic, and always at home before and after exercise, 
shopping trips, or any public venture. Having the dog close at hand generally 
ensured that an alert would give sufficient time to find a safe and clean area in 
which to test blood glucose levels. 
Mary Douglas’s well-cited observation of dirt as being ‘matter out place’ 
therefore seems not to require bold emphasis here (2002: 44). Blood is not 
dried, spilled or considered ‘dirty’ in this arena in the same way that it might 
become dirt and out of place as the result of a nosebleed or cut from broken 
glass or fall on a tarred road. However, to avoid contamination of the blood drop 
that is placed on the test strip, and any possibly incorrect blood sugar level 
readings resulting from that, advice on the Diabetes.co.uk website does suggest 
that test strips ‘that have been in contact with dirt, crumbs, food or liquids’ 
should not be used; on the test strip, those items would always be identified as 
‘matter out of place’. 
6.5 Injecting insulin 
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 As Richard exemplifies, not everyone with Type 1 diabetes is 
automatically given an insulin pump and his treatment in the early Nineties 
involved ‘one of those huge syringes’ which injected a set amount of insulin 
every day. Sally has shown me one of these and it is indeed ‘huge’ and heavy 
and shoots the insulin almost with a thump into the chosen anatomical area – I 
wonder at the strength of character and pain threshold exhibited by those 
insulin-needy ‘patients’ of former years.  
However, when he moved house, Richard’s new doctor informed him 
that the way he was injecting was ‘very old-fashioned’ and he would find it 
easier with a ‘pen’. At the kitchen table, Richard opens what looks like an 
optician’s spectacle-case, takes out a ‘pen’ and demonstrates how it works: 
You just dial up the number and there’s a plunger which moves up 
every time you release a little insulin, so you’ve got a visual of how 
much insulin is left before you need to replenish the pen.  I keep 
one in the fridge at work, one at home and one on me.  
However, the ready-mixed insulin first recommended didn’t work 
at all because I don’t have the same amount to eat at the same 
time every day. It didn’t give me any freedom and, if you’re 
working and socialising and such like, you can’t live your life to 
such a tight regime.  I was having lots and lots of hypos with it, so 
it wasn’t helping. 
 
He now has long-acting insulin in the morning and evening and can top-
up with short-acting insulin during the day, depending on the variables likely to 
extend his blood sugar levels. It is about an hour since he had breakfast when 
his levels dropped from 16 to 12 and then to 6.7mmol/l: 
It’s okay at the moment, I think [but he tests anyway]; it generally 
stays high after a meal for about an hour, but then it’s keeping it 
right between meals. Oh, it’s still quite high, it’s jumped back up to 
16.4. I can take a correcting dose – you put in the time, followed 
by the blood sugar level and it tells me I only need one unit to 
bring it down which is about 3mmol/l. 
As he works at this seemingly non-stop balancing act, this continual 
‘doing’ of diabetes care, he explains: 
In reality, I’d be inclined to take more than one unit, but it’s all 
dependent on exercise. If I was going for a long walk, then one 
unit or none might be more appropriate... 
6.6 The insulin pump 
Patients are encouraged to attend explanatory courses such as the 
DAFNE (Dose Adjustment for Normal Eating) in order to gain skills and 
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knowledge that help in understanding and maintaining the effective use of 
insulin pump therapy and that enable those attending to share tips that may 
make life management easier for one another. 
Several participants revealed significantly positive personal experiences 
from incorporating a pump to attain more accurate insulin dosage. But Janet 
sighs and relates that she used to swim a lot as a child but, although enthused 
by the pump’s improvement to her blood sugar monitoring, she has not been 
swimming for some time because ‘you can only have the maximum of an hour 
of it being off and then you have to do the extra insulin to compensate for what 
you‘ve not had’.  
Paul, recently accustomed to wearing an insulin pump which has been ‘a 
godsend; it’s so much better, not perfect, not brilliant, but so much better, I 
wouldn’t be without it’, also regrets the curtailed pleasure and comfort gained 
from relaxing for a long time in a hot bath because of the pump-free time 
limitation.  
Like other informants, Sally has no hypo-awareness so her diabetic alert 
dog, Maggie, a sturdy and inquisitive chocolate Labrador, informs her when she 
should check outside the regular testing times. Sally has an insulin pump which 
reduces the likelihood of severe hypos but does not prevent them all. Although 
she has the ‘latest’ pump which will turn off the insulin when the blood sugar 
level is too low, Sally explains the ever-present need to know that the sensor’s 
reading is accurate. She emphasises that ‘we’re relying on so many bits of 
technology to work, it can be quite scary’.  But that is where the assistance 
dog’s keen sensitivity can reassure and there seems to be comfort and relief in 
knowing that the canine alert is accurate in predicting ‘hypers’ and ‘hypos’. 
I enquire how the pump is attached to her, and while disentangling a 
flexible line from beneath her clothing, she explains that  
you’ve got a little cannula which is hollow so the insulin will go 
down that line into the part that’s just under the skin (the cannula 
is a small tube that is inserted into the body to allow fluid to enter 
or escape). It’s a bit like an injection every two or three days, 
instead of five or ten times a day. Because the insulin is short-
acting, the tube that’s now inside, has to stay open so you have to 
make sure it’s not blocked or kinking and therefore have to check 
your blood sugars to make sure it’s always open. Air getting in 
isn’t a huge worry as we only deal with very small amounts of 
insulin.  
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But even with this latest technology, there isn’t any less hassle; 
you’ve still got to be on it. So if the line came off at 3am and my 
blood sugars were going up, I’d have to change it at 3am – I can’t 
wait until morning to do it. 
I remark, as I find myself doing frequently, that I am astounded at the 
amount of work and time employed in maintaining a ‘normal’ existence. Sally 
agrees and says people suffer from ‘diabetes burn-out’.  
You go to the clinic and they say your blood sugars aren’t good 
enough, try harder, so you go back and again they’re not good 
enough...it’s difficult for teenagers. Whatever you do, will affect 
your health, and hormones can affect your blood sugar levels as 
well. With most conditions, you can have a day off without meds, 
but with diabetes, you can’t.  
Paul, who lives in a region of the country distant from the charity’s 
training centre, is seated at a table set against one wall of the sittingroom when 
diabetes alert dog, Nero announces my arrival with a low-key bark and a fast-
wagging tail. Natasha - who is partner, carer and an executive who has 
organised the administration of her business so that she can conduct it 
principally from their home - invites me in. Paul explains that he is putting in a 
new cannula: 
It goes in every three days or thereabouts, it depends on the 
person. Because I’m still quite insulin-sensitive despite everything, 
I don’t have as much difficulty as others with the sites. When 
you’re injecting a lot of insulin, it tends to get sore. You can get a 
residue, a lump under the skin. You can see the little marks when 
I pull it off (there are small red discolorations of the skin above his 
right and left hipbones). 
On another occasion, I walk with Richard and his just-above-ankle-height 
alerting dog, Higgins, through a rainy city park dotted with wet dogs and their 
umbrella’d human companions. I ask if he has received the insulin pump he was 
hoping for 18 months earlier. He says that he was found to be eligible and has 
completed the DAFNE training course which has to be undertaken to ensure 
users fully understand the pump’s requirements and practices: 
The idea is to give you a much tighter control so you can adjust 
your dose according to the number of grams of carbohydrate 
you’re eating. It’s been a real success, the course, because I keep 
control that much tighter which avoids the longer-term 
complications like sight loss. 
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Richard is aware of the ‘wild swings from highs to lows’ in his blood 
glucose levels, so he has ‘phoned again in the hoping of speeding up the 
pump’s arrival: ‘it just seems to take forever’.  
Janet hesitates before admitting the pump has made her life ‘better’ in 
that she can manipulate the settings to aid control, for example, ‘if you’re going 
to have a fatty meal which takes longer to absorb, you can set the pump to split 
the insulin so you have X amount straightaway and the rest over the next hour-
and-a-half’. 
 I note her hesitation and ask what she considers to be the pump’s 
disadvantages.  She laughs and says ‘having to wear it’, 
especially for me, I have to wear it on my arms because, where 
I’ve injected in my tummy for 20-odd years, I’ve got lots of scar 
tissue so absorption there is horrendous. The pump’s a lot better 
for people who haven’t got that because it’s completely hidden. 
But I don’t have that luxury so it’s quite obvious, but you know, I’m 
used to it and I think the benefits of it far outweigh the fact that I 
get a bit self-conscious. 
6.7 The test strips 
Paul, still seated at the table, continues to talk as he removes a narrow 
plastic test strip from a vial that, unopened, would usually contain 25 or 50 
strips.  So that I can later understand what his recorded words relate to, Paul 
lets me take photographs as he opens and closes boxes, bottles, and the 
zipped blood glucose meter pack that are required items. The table has a clean 
cloth over it and stands between the French window into the garden and the 
area where the family sit, eat, talk and relax. Sunlight beaming through the 
glass window onto the table may aid article distinction but Paul, whose vision is 
by no means accurate, appears used to changes in light strength and is 
confident in his manipulation of the correct equipment; he can read the figures 
on the meter without difficulty and identify the precise regions of his skin where 
the needle can safely be inserted.  
You take the strip out of the bottle and insert it into the monitor. It 
stays like that until you put your blood onto the strip (he pricks his 
finger and puts a drop of blood onto the narrow white test strip). 
That’s that and you wait for the result ... that’s lovely, perfect for 
me, 7.5 on the screen. Then you enter information denoting 
whether the test is pre-meal, post-meal, bedtime or other. 
Obviously if you want a snack, you put in your planned 
carbohydrates and it tells you how much insulin you need for the 
blood sugar – for the moment, I don’t need anything so we turn it 
off and that’s that. 
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The diabetes test strips, despite their insignificant appearance, provide 
an important function in monitoring blood sugar levels. According to information 
appearing on the Diabetes.co.uk website 
When blood is placed onto the test strip, it reacts with a chemical 
called glucose oxidase producing gluconic acid from the glucose 
in the blood. At the other end of the test strip, the meter transfers 
a current to the test strip. The test strip has electric terminals 
which allow the meter to measure the current between the 
terminals. The current between the terminals changes depending 
on the level of gluconic acid that has been produced. The blood 
glucose meter then uses an algorithm to work out the blood 
glucose level based upon the difference in current. 
6.8 Cannula and pump 
Paul continues his explanatory demonstration: 
Now the fun bit. Everyone does it differently, this is the infusion 
and it goes in there (tell me if you want me to slow down or stop or 
anything?) and that’s then what flies into you. (He pushes a 
gadget with a spring mechanism that has a stapler effect attaching 
a small pad to his skin). You take the safety off and throw that 
away (He drops the lancet, a short fine needle, into a yellow hard-
plastic, lidded Sharps bin6). 
 Paul shows me how he removes any air bubbles from the cannula, fills 
up the vial and the reserve and starts up the pump again. 
Now you take this one; I stop the pump and you can see there’s 
an air bubble in there so I need to get rid of that. I go onto the 
infusion set timing, it tells you three seconds (he taps to move the 
bubble using a similar action as if moving an air bubble from a 
filled syringe), if there were vials that just fitted, then there 
wouldn’t be any air. I’ve got to watch it all the way down through 
the cannula and when it’s gone out, which it has, I now hook up 
and that has just filled the reserve – there‘s a little vial there that 
needs filling up before it goes into you. You need to fill it up before 
getting insulin.  Then you re-start the pump. 
 He changes the cannula every three days and ‘the entire kit, changing 
the vial and everything, is every six days’. 
I’ve got to have all the kit ready. You have to draw one of them up 
so now I do them (the insulin vials) in blocks of five. I have four in 
the fridge and one out, because you get fewer air bubbles if 
they’re warm. The vials come in a box so you take one out, then 
get the pack of insulin and take out one of your insulins – they can 
                                                          
6
 So-named for its usage as a secure container for used needles and other sharp waste that 
might injure or carry infection – when full, the Sharps bin is usually disposed of safely at a 
surgery, pharmacy or hospital, and not put with general waste on pavements for council 
collection. 
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be out of the fridge for about a month. Everyone thinks that if 
you’re going on holiday, you must keep them in the fridge – no, 
although once they’ve been out of the fridge, you can’t put them 
back again. 
6.9 Nutrition 
The longer I spend with participants, the more I realise how much of their 
lives are entangled in the always-moving, ever-grabbing tentacles of Type 1 
diabetes. I ask Paul how he caters for the varied needs of his embodied illness 
and how he deals with the very time-consuming weighing, estimating and 
balancing of ingredients for every meal. 
It was never that accurate with the jabs. The pump is much more 
accurate so it tends to be that much harder to get it spot-on; you 
have to work a little bit more, you have to weigh food more and 
guessing has more or less gone out of the window. If you get 
chips out of the freezer, you’ve got to weigh them, so if you’re 
cooking for two, it becomes harder.  
I ask if he takes a scale when they go out for a meal. But he shakes his 
head and says:  
No, it’s just years and years of learning and guesswork....going 
out for a meal is hardest. I might order something with a bit of 
sauce on it; it doesn’t taste sweet but it might be. Then if you jab 
for that, it might not be correct so you do tend to run one way or 
the other if you go out for a meal. I run high generally because I 
go for a dessert as well and of course you’ve got no idea with 
desserts. 
Nero nearly always alerts when we go out to eat. If I’m just 
peaking and then going to start dropping, he doesn’t bother. A 
number of times I’ve checked and seen I’ve gone really high so I 
have a jab and then he suddenly alerts, so I think ‘what now?’ and 
test again, and I’ve dropped because I was just peaking when I 
first checked. 
Natasha remarks on the need to ‘know your carbs, your complex and 
your simple carbs’ and recalls that in the past week Paul’s blood sugars have 
been running high ‘for no reason’: 
He hasn’t been doing anything differently, still been injecting the 
same, no air bubbles in his feed, he’s on the insulin all the time, 
he even swapped the vials because he thought the insulin might 
be dodgy.  
Paul interjects, saying that that he develops a resistance ‘to pretty much 
anything over a period of time’: 
Lucozade will work for a few weeks and then stop; same with 
sugar in tea; dextrose will work for a while and then take longer to 
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work. Even different flavours or just changing the flavour, has an 
impact. Some days I can eat what the pump dictates, like 28 
grams of carbs, for example, so you have 28 grams of fast-acting 
carbohydrate to bring you back up to roundabout the 7 mark which 
is what my pump is set at for a good result. So I do that and 20 
minutes later when I check, I’ll still be low so then it says eat XYZ. 
So I do that, wait another 20 minutes and check again; I’ll just be 
coming over so it says eat a little bit to bring you above. Well, two 
hours later, I’ll be as high as anything because all that I’ve eaten 
has now taken effect – but at the time, it hadn’t. 
It’s a guessing game a lot of the time...an educated guess, but still 
a guess. 
His narrative paragraphs are neither edited nor shortened in order to 
allow a reader without Type 1 diabetes to comprehend the issues involved in 
what should be the simple act of eating when hungry. Natasha values frozen 
food ‘like jacket potatoes; much as I’d rather have fresh when I cook, it’s just so 
much easier ‘cos the carb count’s on the packet; someone’s already done it for 
you’. 
Paul says that ‘bread’s a nightmare’ because of the many different 
varieties available and Natasha explains that at the moment they’ve got a 
particular brand of bread that isn’t mentioned in the ‘carbs and cals’ book. 
‘There’s no label on it to tell you so you don’t know how thick to slice it – and 
that’ll have a different impact on your blood sugar levels’. 
Sara concurs with the complexities of eating to keep blood sugar levels 
within an acceptable range. When asked whether anger plays an emotional role 
in the time-consuming food preparation and digestion, she admits that she does 
get annoyed when ‘you end up having to eat when you’re not hungry’:  
You might have breakfast and an hour or so later, you’ll have a 
hypo because you need to eat something, toast or anything – and 
nobody, nobody wants to put on weight...you look at something 
and might as well apply the cake to your thighs as opposed to 
eating it! 
I’d do the housework one afternoon for an hour and a half, we’d sit 
down and eat a massive spaghetti Bolognese, then the dog would 
be going alerting mad, I’d test and my husband would say but 
you’ve just had that massive meal and then it would really start to 
plummet me down; twice during that evening I’d have a bowl of 
cereal, then a bit of toast – on top of the spaghetti for dinner – and 
you’re like I really don’t want to be eating all these calories 
because my trousers are feeling a bit tight...I’ve given up on the 
weight but I do the carb count thing because I have to work out my 
insulin... 
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Mel increases my knowledge of nutrition in balancing blood glucose. Her 
family share their home with Gemma, a spaniel of boundless enthusiasm who 
took up residence as the young children’s companion before showing altered 
behaviour patterns prior to a hypoglycaemic episode occurring in one of them. 
Gemma’s outgoing attitude and scenting ability enabled her to be trained more 
fully in hypo scent detection and accurate alerting by the charity’s instructors. 
Mel relates an example of how nutrition, or lack of, affected her son in the years 
before he was given an insulin pump: 
We went to my parents for Christmas and they decided to have a 
break between dinner and pudding. I’d given the injection for 
everything in the middle of his meal so I said ‘you can’t do that 
because he’s had all the insulin and needs to eat the pudding 
now’. It took a long time but I thought we might get away with it. 
My dad likes to go for a walk first but I said no, no. Mark was lying 
in the middle of their livingroom floor, screaming, and my mother 
wanted to tell him to stop – but he can’t.   
In the days when children were invited to share their ‘packed’ school 
lunches, there was less knowledge of allergies or illness contagion through 
germ transmission. However, Mel tells me that, to offset the chance of this 
happening in a contemporary situation, the primary school attended by her 
children does not allow any learners to offer or receive items from ‘others’’ 
lunchboxes.  
Janet is pregnant when we first meet. She was diagnosed with Type 1 
diabetes when aged four: 
I’ve never known anything different; you just find diabetes is 
always there – before you eat, you have to carb count, figure out 
what insulin you need and whether you’re going to be doing any 
activity – you just find your mind is always thinking about 
diabetes...(she sighs and then laughs) yeah, pre-empting all the 
time. 
6.10  ‘Not fit for purpose...’ 
Complications arising from Type 1 diabetes can cause renal failure, 
partial or total loss of sight, limb amputation, neuropathy (a degenerative 
disease or disorder of the nervous system), cardiovascular disease including 
heart attack or stroke, as well as possible sexual dysfunction and depression 
(Diabetes in the UK, 2010). Adult participants talk matter-of-factly about 
different illnesses, such as asthma, depression or the consequences of 
neuropathy, that are known to emerge on occasion before, after or alongside 
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the diagnosis of Type 1 diabetes. There may be a need to ask for help from 
human and nonhuman members of the family, or from visiting friends or 
healthcare professionals, if severe neuropathy prevents maintaining a secure 
grip on hot pans, or visual impairment prevents accurate reading of recipe 
ingredients or oven temperatures.  
Excerpts from participant narratives show how differently they are 
affected: 
...with diabetes, your blood goes into every cell so the smaller the 
cell, the harder it is for the blood with that much sugar, to get to 
the tips of your fingers, which is why quite often you end up with 
neuropathy in your fingers, why you have hearing problems, eye 
problems, because all of these have really fine veins so the blood 
can’t get through; so it shuts down the blood supply which causes 
more problems. 
...went to see a specialist about erectile dysfunction and he 
suggested Viagra, but you need to see a professional before 
taking it which is why we were there; he asks if I’ve tried it and I 
say ‘no, that’s why we’re here’; and he says ‘well, perhaps you 
should’. You walk away and think ‘what’s the point?’ 
...I’ve got peripheral neuropathy – zingy hands and feet 
sometimes so I couldn’t hold things for long. I was always 
dropping things out of the oven and getting very frustrated. 
...they diagnosed me with bladder neuropathy. I failed a job 
interview and got depression. We had to give up the flat and move 
back here. 
...you suffer lots of complications. One of them is hearing. 
Basically the nerve-endings to your ears and blood vessels clam 
up and don’t work so well. On top of that, I’ve got tinnitus; my eyes 
have problems so I’m having laser treatment; the tips of your 
fingers go because any bits that stick out... 
6.11 Vision difficulties 
Having been grateful that cars parked on the pavement so that it became 
possible to drive along a local road, I later walked down the same pavement 
and feelings of gratitude dissipated when, side-stepping between a car and a 
boundary wall to avoid traffic passing in the road, the stucco-ed wall grazed my 
hand and an overhanging climbing rose entangled my hair in its thorny grasp. A 
guide dog may succeed in squeezing through the reduced space on the 
pavement but has to decide whether the vision-impaired human can also 
manage this safely, when guidance around the parked car via the road is easier 
but likely to be an even more risk-filled endeavour.  
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Cars, parked on both pavement and road, become significant hazards 
when one misguided step forward by a sight-impaired individual may lead to a 
dog and/or human being seriously injured. A nationwide blanket ban on 
pavement parking has been requested by supporters of charities such as Guide 
Dogs and Living Streets. Sufficient signatures were gained for Member of 
Parliament Simon Hoare to sponsor the Pavement Parking (Protection of 
Vulnerable Pedestrians) Bill 2015-16 (Butcher, 2016: 12)....but he withdrew it at 
the end of the debate, having secured from the Minister a commitment to 
convene a round table to discuss footway parking issues and to ‘examine more 
closely the legal and financial implications of an alternative regime, and the 
likely impacts on local authorities’ (2016: 13).   
Paul comments on his own failing eyesight when we have safely 
negotiated an uneven pavement leading from home to a park where Nero can 
run unleashed: 
Most of the time, I’m so used to my eye being the way it is that I 
don’t realise how bad it is. When someone says ‘oh, you’re 
partially sighted’, I’m like, well, no, because I can see. I’m so used 
to it that I’ve adapted so that it isn’t so much of a problem. 
Obviously walking the dog with not much vision becomes more of 
a problem...(he hesitates for a few seconds)...and it takes 
concentration. 
I can see the edge of the pavement if I’m looking but I’ve got very 
little vision this side; I’ve got a bit of peripheral vision on this side 
but not enough for me to see clearly. I know I’ve got my hand 
there and I can see my hand there, because that’s what I’m 
expecting to see. If the pavement changes, it’s just grey...but if a 
colour changes or it’s moving, I can see things easier – you know 
when you look through Perspex and it’s all scratched, that’s kind 
of what’s going on in that eye. I’ve got a lot of what they call 
scarring where I’ve had laser treatment, the relics of that, and 
where I’ve had bleeds and they haven’t cleared, you’ve got this 
kind of ... spider’s web. 
It was that bad at one point that I was literally two feet in front of 
the TV just to see people and you know, I couldn’t work out what 
was going on.  
He is silent for a moment and then says, considerately: ‘Erm, most, 
you’re kind of, erm, facially I couldn’t distinguish you from somebody 
else...when something’s new, it’s a little bit harder’. I realise then that he can 
walk across a field with Nero and round the village because the routes are 
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familiar to both himself and his companion, and that he can distinguish certain 
things if they are vivid in shape and colour. And again Paul stresses that  
You see me walking around, you wouldn’t know because I tend to 
know my environment. It’s the same when I go shopping; they 
move stuff around in the shops but generally I know what’s where 
– and people are objects, you can see people, you can see cars. I 
can see enough, distinguish enough at least to get out of the way. 
But if I’ve turned my head and am looking the other way, then I’ll 
walk into people. 
I don’t see myself as partially sighted...because I’m so used to it 
now, I’ve adapted for that. People say ‘can you sign there, by the 
cross?’ and the cross is that faint, or the colour isn’t strong enough 
so that I’m looking and thinking, I can’t even see the cross. 
Natasha describes Paul’s vision impairments in relation to Nero’s 
placement when they are walking together along pavements: 
Nero walks on his right because that’s where Paul’s got his 
sight...he’s really only got this eye as a half-good eye because this 
(other) eye doesn’t really see anything at all. We asked if it was 
okay for Nero to walk that little bit ahead of him (Guide Dogs are 
encouraged to maintain a light tension in the leash as they ‘lead’ 
their partners, whereas Medical Detection Dogs are asked to walk 
on a loose leash next to their companions. This attached ‘way of 
going’ is described as having a leash with a smile, or a ‘U’, in it, 
perhaps to remove any connotation of binding together with 
forceful restriction). 
Paul volunteers that he is partially-sighted, wears glasses and is able to 
write, but he finds that ‘it’s a lot of effort for me; my spelling’s atrocious and I’m 
slightly dyslexic’.  
I question Sara about any visual difficulties she has noticed, and she 
hesitates before responding: 
I’m getting a few problems, my eyes go blurry. I’ve got a big black 
blob of a floater; you want to wipe it away. You try to look round it 
but of course you can’t because when you move your eyeball, it 
moves and then it goes blurry... 
This is something about which I can empathise – reading to the end of a 
line and expecting to start the next one immediately, but finding a need to wait 
for the floater to catch up before continuing; or trying to sweep away a fly 
dancing in front of your eyes, only to discover it’s a floater and cannot be so 
easily removed, a tiny painless irritant, but a creator of intense frustration, 
distraction and slowed reading. Sara continues:  
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A top consultant at the eye clinic said...when your blood sugars go 
up, your body dehydrates so all the water in your body that’s left 
goes to the vital organs that need it, so the first thing to dry out is 
your skin which doesn’t need to be supple and smooth and 
doesn’t need water to keep you living whereas your heart, kidneys 
etc all do need the water. Well, your eyes are made up of 70% 
water, I think, and if the water goes from your eyes, they shrink, 
the bit at the back of the retina shrinks, and that’s why you get that 
blurred vision with diabetes.  
So she said glasses wouldn’t really help; because you get 
different levels of blurriness, your prescription could be six 
different things on six days of the week so you can’t get glasses 
for when your eyes are bad because it’s not like long- or short-
sightedness. Good blood glucose control prevents this - that’s 
what they say, isn’t it? 
On a visit to talk to Richard and Higgins, I ask Richard about his visual 
acumen in relation to a hypoglycaemic episode: 
I think when I go really low to the point of collapse, that’s when my 
vision goes funny and it’s almost too late to take corrective action. 
I just see light shining very intensely. I get a different perception of 
light - but Higgins now doesn’t let me go that low - it’s very foggy 
when you come round and you’re not quite sure where you are or 
what you’re doing, but in the run-up to a hypo, I can remember 
trying to get the right sort of sugar, like jelly babies or the little jars 
of clear honey that are easy to carry and not too difficult to get the 
lids off. 
6.12 Driving and transport 
Freedom to drive whenever and wherever allows choice and 
independence. Only one of those participating in this research is now able to 
maintain a driving licence and chooses to drive for short distances because of 
fluctuating blood sugar levels, preferring to use public transport to travel further 
afield. Others are compelled to rely on buses and trains or on available family 
members or friends to transport themselves and their canine assistants.  This 
significant alteration to the habitual way of life has brought about changes in 
employment, reduction in mobility and loss of self-confidence and self-regard. 
Janet had worked independently and successfully in the field of health care 
despite her Type 1 diabetes diagnosis. However, when she could no longer 
recognise symptoms of hypoglycaemia, she was informed abruptly of her 
shrinking and insecure 'reality bubble', her personal umwelt (Von Uexküll, 1934 
[2010]): 
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My job included driving patients in my car so when I lost my hypo-
awareness, I was told I wasn’t safe ... they deemed me not fit for 
purpose and my driving licence was taken away. 
Sara was also compelled to change methods of transport and household 
management: 
I had my driving licence taken away because of my hypo-
unawareness, so I walk everywhere, to public transport, to the 
bus, I walk for everything, walk the dog – we reckon I must do 
about 15 miles of walking a week. But I think if I did anything more 
cardiovascular, for instance if I was to mop the three hard floors 
downstairs, I’d have to sit down half an hour later because I’d 
have a hypo, but then again, it can get you two hours after that... 
Tina says that during her first train journey on her own, Harley had to 
alert her three times: 
and then it used to be that I’d come down on the train and people 
would give me money for the charity because, you know, they 
were so touched on how good he was. And then you sort of forget 
about your past and look and move forward – I can’t believe how 
far I’ve come. 
Paul was diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes at the age of six but rarely 
collapses. However, other side effects have thrown powerful obstacles across 
his life-course. When he had to stop driving about 15 years ago, his world was 
shaken violently: 
Not riding the bike was the worst one because I did enjoy the 
freedom. It gave me my space, it gave me a calm, you know, used 
to go out on that, buzz around, loved it to bits...yeah, I do miss the 
bike. 
I used to have motorbikes, cars, used to drive a JCB at work and 
a dumper truck, a forklift – I was in and out of all these different 
vehicles all the time with no problem – and then suddenly I can’t, 
I’m not allowed to...the fact that I no longer have that piece of 
paper saying I can...that was hard. 
...(silence)...erm, giving up work, you suddenly feel like, well, what 
am I good for? And that for me, was a big, big issue which took 
me a long time (he drags out the syllables and his voice 
drops)...and I’m still not over it now (his speech is slow and 
hesitant as he ponders his current situation). 
6.13 School 
For children and adolescents, having Type 1 diabetes can offer 
opportunity for unwanted prominence in the classroom (although current 
improvement in health education of staff has produced a greater understanding 
of the difficulties and needs of a school-going child with Type 1 diabetes, 
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according to several parents interviewed). Difficulties and emotional outbursts 
were remembered by those already diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes when first 
attending school: 
...I was the only one (with Type 1 diabetes) at primary school and 
I’d quite often collapse in class. I did have one fit while I was at 
that school so I used to get called a diabetic spastic...so I isolated 
myself quite a bit because there just wasn’t the understanding. 
Secondary school was a lot better and the teachers let me go and 
do blood tests without questioning it. Then at college everyone 
was very understanding because there were more diabetics. 
...my friends couldn’t understand. Initially they were understanding 
but soon got quite frustrated with me because I was so nervous 
about doing things, always worrying about something happening 
and having to deal with it. This did knock my confidence way off. 
6.14 Losing hypo-awareness 
 Alfie lies on the sofa behind Janet, nose resting on his neatly-folded front 
legs and his eyes closed; the occasional twitching of a velvety ear reveals that 
he is paying attention to the nuances of our conversation but there is no sign of 
flaring nostrils suggesting his detection of steep changes in Janet’s blood sugar 
levels. 
When in hospital after a sudden collapse several years ago, Janet tested 
her blood and found she was hypo despite not feeling any symptoms. She 
spoke to a nurse who explained that as Janet had had diabetes for more than 
20 years, her body had lost the ability to give recognisable advance warning 
signs; and because she had been hypo for so long, her body now accepted a 
hypo as the ‘norm’ and any alarm signals had ‘worn out’.  Janet states bleakly 
that that explanation completely changed her life.  
 I ask if she could describe her body’s former ‘warning signs’ of an 
impending hypo; her rate of speaking increases and she clumps words together 
so that the sentences become abrupt and stilted. As she ploughs through 
explanation, fear seems to stalk her words and activates speech in both present 
and past tenses, even though her hypo-awareness disappeared several years 
before: 
...blurred vision, I get very shaky, go very pale, get quite panicky 
and jittery; erm, everyone always said I go really pale around the 
eyes; I wouldn’t be able to talk very well, probably wouldn’t be 
able to get my words out how I wanted. 
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Not having all those signals was quite disorientating, she recalls, and I 
wonder aloud if it felt strange and perhaps a bit frightening. Janet sighs: 
Yes, definitely. You become dependent on those warning signs, 
otherwise you become anxious because you don’t know what’s 
going on all the time and so I started blood-testing obsessively. 
A few weeks later, I visit Sara and over coffee in her kitchen, we talk 
about losing hypo-awareness. Her teenage children appear, listen and add 
comments, and disappear at intervals, but Apple, her diabetes alert dog, lies 
silently on his bed next to her chair throughout, ignoring us all. Sara was 
diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes at the age of 31 but maintained hypo-
awareness for the following six or seven years.  
 She then contracted shingles after which any sign heralding a hypo 
vanished and no awareness has ever returned.  She volunteers a 
comprehensive description of the incidents and lifestyle alterations that then 
took place. 
About three weeks after the shingles had gone, I’d find my blood 
sugar levels had dropped as low as 2, but I didn’t feel like I was 2. 
I’d suddenly be really low without even feeling it and that resulted 
in collapsing a couple of times. The doctor said I was still having 
hypos but my nerve-endings had been suppressed by the 
shingles, so I was to give it time and the feeling would come back 
gradually.  I waited a while and collapsed a couple of times a 
week. I’d stand and have a conversation and, boom, I’m on the 
floor, or I’d be teaching and the next minute I’m on the classroom 
floor. 
 Sara broke her arm falling down a flight of stairs at the school where she 
teaches and continued to be hypo-unaware, failing to recognise any signs that 
might give her warning of a forthcoming hypoglycaemic episode. Medical 
professionals suggested she keep an eye out for different signs such as an odd 
taste, or experience of an aura or unusual smell. 
I read somewhere that coffee stimulates part of the brain that can 
make you more sensitive to hypos, so I thought I’d drink a couple 
of extra cups of coffee a day to see if that helped – it didn’t. But 
while I was searching online for hypo-awareness information, I 
came across hypo-detection dogs and found the website for 
Medical Detection Dogs. 
We hadn’t ever had a dog because we both work and didn’t think 
it fair to leave a dog on its own all day, but I was in danger of 
losing my job because of the number of Accident and Emergency 
admissions I’d had and the frequent falls. If I lost my job, I’d be at 
home alone all day and if I collapsed, there’d be nobody here.  At 
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least if you collapse at school, there are people around to call an 
ambulance. 
Natasha is used to Paul and Nero going out for their daily walks but she 
recalls a recent incident when they planned to be gone for only 20 minutes, but 
were  out for over an hour...’he came in in a hypo state as he’d had a hypo on 
the walk’. 
Paul recalls being aware of his blood glucose levels being at about 
4.2mmol/l and having something to eat. Then he played ball on the field with 
Nero. He stood there, thinking it would give the levels a chance to drop a little: ‘I 
was walking on and he alerted again, and I tested again and found I’d dropped, 
so I had something else to eat and then on the way back...’ Natasha says he 
doesn’t remember how he got back, but Paul claims he can remember bits of it, 
although not the entire trip. 
In the end, I grabbed hold of the lead, pulled it right up tight 
against his collar and followed him home, so he actually walked 
me back. Obviously he didn’t cross the road, he waited till I’d 
come round a bit and all of a sudden this woman turned up – I 
don’t know where she’d come from...I was that fixated on getting 
home which is how my brain tends to work when I’m having a 
hypo. I‘ve got no mental capacity, I’ve just got to get to something, 
so my feet will walk, my brain is focussed on my feet walking, 
nothing else exists. All I was doing was literally holding onto the 
lead and the dog was walking and he got me home. 
6.15 The impact of mood swings... 
The complications of chronic illness can lead to other mental and 
physical issues which may directly affect individuals working or living in close 
proximity to the person with Type 1 diabetes. Paul comments that  
Diabetes is horrible because you snap at people, you know you’re 
doing it and you’re not doing it purposefully, it’s not like you want 
to lash out at people and sometimes you don’t know you’ve done 
it...well, in a hypo state, you’re not all there, you know. So 
occasionally you can be a bit snappy, sometimes you can 
completely blank things out without realising. 
I remember Sally’s ‘fight or flight’ comment earlier when she explained 
her lack of control in a hypo state and this emotional side-effect is recognised 
and related to by several participants. The impact of Sara’s diabetes took its toll 
on her family relationships.  Before Apple joined the household, Sara recalls her 
husband’s irritation at driving home from work during office hours because she 
hadn’t answered his telephone call. She says she often missed the sound of the 
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phone ringing when she was outside, or because of the noises made by the 
washing-machine or vacuum cleaner. 
He’d be cross to find me having a cup of tea, having driven across 
town for 20 minutes because he’d thought ‘she’s out cold on the 
floor; I’ve got to get there...’. It would cause arguments because 
the family would quite rightly be worried, but then I’d say I didn’t 
ask you to, and I couldn’t help not hearing the phone... 
Paul and Natasha recollect incidents resulting from ‘mood swings’. 
Natasha tells of a ‘spat’ they had had one morning just before I arrived at their 
home for a follow-up interview: 
Today I snapped back...but 95% of the time I take it with a pinch 
of salt...today he caught me unawares...it’s the things that he’s 
said to me before and I’ve gone out of my way to fix...occasionally 
I have to vent too. 
Paul explains the reasoning behind his ‘outbursts’: 
What you’ve got to remember from my point of view is that I used 
to work on buildings, I used to be very active, very mobile, I used 
to ride bikes, drive a motor and all that. That was my release. 
Well, now I’m kind of, everything’s been taken so sometimes you 
just can’t cope. 
On another occasion, I ask if walking Nero across the fields helps to 
provide some form of release and Paul responds:  
What he’s done for me is amazing, he’s got me out of me shell, 
he, I was suffering depression...I mean there are days when my 
bloods aren’t right and whatever, you know, take me out the back 
and shoot me, put me down, that kind of thing, but...(he 
hesitates)...we go out for walks and I always calm down on a walk, 
relax...If I’m wound up before I go on a walk, when I come back, 
I’m a lot better; not perfect but a lot better’. 
 However, Natasha gives an alternative picture:  
Then on the contrary, he can go out in a really good mood and the 
dog can really annoy him on the walk and he’ll come back saying 
“bloody dog” because Nero’s eaten cat faeces and Paul’s now got 
to do his teeth!  
But it is obvious how much they care for Nero; he’s washed and dried 
carefully if he’s played in stagnant water or rolled in mud or manure, his teeth 
and gums are brushed and monitored, his weight kept in check and anything 
out of the ordinary is recorded and the charity and/or veterinarian informed. 
Paul continues to explain his earlier ‘venting’: 
In my view, it’s because I’m annoyed at things I can’t do. You’re 
so annoyed you can’t do this, you can’t do that, you just end up 
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lashing out ‘look at that, can’t you do that...’; and really it’s nothing 
to do with that, it’s to do with the fact that there are things I need 
to do and I just can’t. I’m comfortable enough to know that I’ve 
upset you, but it lets me vent and then it’s okay, well, I’ve calmed 
down. 
Natasha says that she succeeds in ‘washing it off in the shower’ but then 
relates the effect of their ‘spat’ on Nero: 
The poor dog, caught up in the middle of it, is going ‘oh no, they’re 
shouting at each other’, so I go over to him and tell him it’s alright 
and ‘it’s not your fault, mummy still loves you’. Oh, he’s so 
sensitive... 
Despite the earlier human disagreement, Nero seems in high spirits 
during my visit: he squeaks his ball and throws, catches and pounces on his 
‘cuddly’ animal toy. He collects the mail from the front door and drops a packet 
decisively at Paul’s feet. However, Natasha urges Paul to check his blood sugar 
levels because Nero has re-ignited an old habit of getting all his toys out of the 
box as an alert, rather than performing in his usual manner. She has also 
noticed him go up to Paul and give him a nudge and that he’s ‘fidgety’ and not 
settling. 
That they volunteer details of the stresses and strains caused by illness 
complications is to be appreciated.  It cannot be easy to live within the 
constraints imposed by chronic illness and it takes courage to admit difficult 
issues and how they are or are not resolved to a relative stranger. However, it 
also provides depth and intensity to the picture of interspecies co-existence that 
this project wishes to convey. 
6.16 Mortality and improving control 
Tina’s fear of being found dead in bed, mentioned earlier, is not without 
medical foundation. ‘Dead in bed syndrome’(DIB) is a phrase used when a 
person with insulin-dependent diabetes, usually under 40 years old, has gone to 
bed apparently well but is then found lifeless ‘in an undisturbed bed’ 
(Diabetes.co.uk, 8 January, 2017). People with Type 1 diabetes are advised to 
avoid nocturnal hypoglycaemia by attaining blood glucose levels within a 6.5 to 
8.0 mmol/l range before they go to bed and between 5.5 and 7.5 mmol/l when 
first awake.  
It has been noted that DIB has occurred more often since the 
introduction of synthetic insulin in the 1980s. Research by Teuscher and Berger 
(1987: 382) among others, found a change from beef/porcine-derived insulin to 
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human-made insulin was observed to cause less pronounced ‘sympathoadrenal 
symptoms (tremor, sweating, &c)’ in insulin-dependent diabetic patients, 
thereby reducing possible prediction of hypos in humans compared to the years 
when nonhuman animal insulin was utilised.  
A 2008 study by Rock and Babinec highlights biomedical research into 
the historical employment of nonhuman animals as models for diabetes 
exploration, and draws attention to the fact that insulin required by humans, 
affected by diabetes between the 1920s and 1980s, was taken from bovine and 
porcine 'donors':  
All people with type 1 diabetes, who had lost the capacity to 
produce insulin and therefore required regular insulin injections for 
survival, thus became dependent on industrial slaughter facilities 
(2008: 326). 
 So cattle and pigs became involved in insulin 'donation', or were until the 
1980s, joining cats, dogs and humans in a giving-receiving multispecies 
relationship, in becoming object/subject organisms with 'flexible personhood' 
(Shir-Vertesh, 2012). Bird-David (2006: 47) talks of the 'sharing relations' in 
animist ontology which collect different types of 'persons' into  
a pluralist community as "we, the relatives," "we, the family."  A 
we-ness is stressed that absorbs the differences. Sharing and 
caring are expected, even of perspectives.  
 Shir-Vertesh (2012: 428) concurs, suggesting 'animals can be included in 
families and homes as "flexible persons", but their nonhumanness sanctions the 
possibility of exclusion at any juncture'.  
6.17 Keeping ‘high’ and life expectancy 
The following paragraph is intended to inform rather than concern or 
confuse, but is included in order to highlight the immediate need for further 
research into, and increasing development of, medical treatment technologies; 
and to indicate the significance of medical alert assistance dogs as animate 
instruments of prevention, enabling human blood sugar levels to be kept within 
safe boundaries.  
According to key statistics published by Diabetes UK, life expectancy for 
people with Type 1 diabetes is reduced, on average, by more than 20 years. A 
systematic review and meta-analysis, conducted ‘to provide reliable estimates 
of any sex differences in the effect of Type 1 diabetes on risk of all-cause 
mortality and cause-specific outcomes’, has been published online in the Lancet 
with interpretation suggesting women with Type 1 diabetes have an 
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approximate ‘40% greater excess risk of all-cause mortality, and twice the 
excess risk of fatal and nonfatal vascular events, compared to men with Type 1 
diabetes’ (Huxley et. al., 2015). 
 In commenting on this article, David Simmons (2015) mentions that 
complications deriving from Type 1 diabetes can be limited by tight glycaemic 
control, but that excess all-cause mortality at every age and in any gender 
remains. He concurs with the need for action but not that it should be based on 
sex, rather by using personalised therapy and strategy for all, from the date of 
diagnosis. 
The idea of keeping blood sugar levels consistently high to avoid ‘hypos’ 
can cause further severe medical complications such as cardiovascular disease 
or renal failure.  Terry says that high blood sugars are what you look at for 
organ or nerve damage, and Nick adds: 
With diabetes, you’ve got restriction of blood flowing to extremities 
so, like the gentleman next door, he’s had diabetes, he knows 
he’s got diabetes, he’s terrified of passing out to a low, so he’s 
always kept his blood sugars high. We can’t say specifically, but 
he’s lost part of one of his legs below the knee and his other one 
looks like it’s going that way as well. You often see people with 
diabetes where the skin on the lower leg is actually reddened, 
almost beetroot-colour; the skin’s flaking... 
Terry suggests it looks as if the neighbour sat too close to a fire for too 
long: 
If you’re losing nerve feeling at extremities, hands, on your skin, 
then there’s pressure sores as well...very quickly you know there’s 
a lot of damage that can be done from high blood sugars. Low 
blood sugars will kill quickly, but high blood sugars will kill you 
slowly. 
 There is no cure for diabetes Type 1, nor as yet is there any way to 
prevent it from developing in the first place (JDRF). So the need for children to 
have regular tests, of what the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE) identify as seven key measures, is essential to ensure diabetes can be 
controlled as far as possible by medical treatment and appropriate lifestyle 
management. The measures suggested include weight, cholesterol and blood 
pressure checks as well as diabetes risk assessments (NICE, 2004 [2014]). 
Paul remembers 
I got diagnosed when I was six and to have control and live by the 
regime is very hard to do. (He is silent for a minute and I feel I 
have dragged the following sentences out of him) It’s not until you 
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get older and you get all the problems, you want to be free, you 
want to live. 
When I first got diagnosed, it was like the chances are, you know, 
he’s not going to have much of a life, he’s not going to live beyond 
xyz, that’s pretty much how it was, sort of 40s, 50s, with problems, 
you probably won’t make it, so you’ve got that barrier...well, if I’m 
only going to live to that age, I’m going to enjoy it. 
Fortunately, mechanical/medical methods, such as the insulin pump, do 
exist to enable successful management of this chronic illness despite the likely 
initial anxiety, possible depression and frustration immediately after diagnosis.  
6.18 Type 1 diabetes and pregnancy 
Janet was relieved at no longer having to ‘set alarms throughout the 
night’ when Alfie took on ‘nightwatchman’ duties. She goes on to explain the 
dog’s newly-acquired method of alerting: ‘It’s quite funny now because he’s had 
to change his alert since I’ve been pregnant. Because I seem to be sleeping a 
lot heavier, he now growls to wake me up.’ But he doesn’t touch her and has 
not jumped on the bed in the night since her pregnancy.  
I ask Janet how Alfie normally alerts her to a possible hypo and she 
says, in the daytime, he paws at her and is very focused on her. But, when her 
blood sugar levels are high and she is tending to show early symptoms of 
hyperglycaemia, ‘he does this funny walking backwards and crying...so he does 
two sort-of different alerts.’  
Since Alfie has changed his methods of alerting during Janet’s 
pregnancy, I ask if he has altered any other of his usual behaviours. In her first 
trimester, Janet relates she had more than 80 blood sugar readings below 3.8, 
and felt she was hypo-ing so much that Alfie struggled to keep up. She was 
more tired than normal and he had to wake her up continually so ‘I got quite 
emotional because I thought if he wasn’t there, I would have gone into fits and 
nobody’d know’. 
My confidence is just transformed...anxiety levels have dropped 
because I’m not constantly having to blood test...we’ve just got an 
incredible bond. He lies outside the bathroom door and he’s even 
alerted when I’ve been in the bath; he’ll cry outside the door. 
6.19 Measuring and recording 
 The charity Medical Detection Dogs only came into being in 2008 so was 
very much an infant organisation when Richard applied for a medical alert 
assistance dog. His doctor and hospital consultant endorsed his application and 
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the charity then asked him for a continuous record of his blood sugar levels for 
a week. The hospital provided him with the results in the form of ‘a series of little 
graphs showing when my levels were dropping and rising, when I’d had insulin, 
and the carb content I was eating’. 
The MDD charity requires clients with assistance dogs to record two to 
three months of blood testing annually. Included on the computer forms to be 
completed by them, are questions relating to times when the dog has alerted, 
what the individual was doing at the particular time and the blood sugar levels 
captured.  Terry relates Jim’s accuracy in alerting as 95-100%.The recordings 
sent to MDD enable an image of the dog’s alerting success rate, whether there 
are particular times or reasons why alerting has not occurred or may be 
inaccurate, whether training has been maintained regularly, even a picture of 
exercise taken, travel and transport methods to events, to work or to holiday 
destinations.  
This information, although time-consuming to collect and enter on the 
form, has wide-reaching consequences in that clients are aware of the charity’s 
interest in both their lives and the lives of the alert dogs and therefore 
necessarily have to attend consistently to the ups-and-downs of their shared 
existence. At the same time, both client and charity gain evidence of the 
efficacy of the dogs' work and 'proof' of canine scent detection. The charity can 
offer human assistance to visit client homes to help with solving problems if test 
results appear unusually erratic and communication between the species looks 
to be blurred on occasion.  The oscillating behaviours of human client and 
assistant dog are ‘umpired’ by the charity to ensure the mutual well-being of 
both. 
Paul, Natasha and Nero are shortly to visit the MDD training centre for a 
‘refresher’. Natasha relates that she spoke to the trainer earlier and heard that  
it will be a sort of social day; there’s three or four other 
partnerships going from what I can gather, and I think, because 
we got him in May, our annual assessment will be in May, so we’ll 
get a letter saying we need to give six weeks of bloods, with the 
highs and lows, and when Nero alerts, when he doesn’t alert and 
so on.  
Paul refers to Nero’s alerting abilities: 
Some days he’s brilliant and he can go for weeks being absolutely 
brilliant and catch 95-100% of everything, and then other days, it’s 
like he’s just completely lost the plot and he either misses them or 
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keeps doing false ones – but I’m still convinced that it’s 
the...[Paul’s additional chronic illness] because the dog smells 
something’s not right, different; and I think we’ve said to you 
before, like when Natasha has a headache or a nosebleed, or 
whatever, his behaviour will change. 
Paul talks of the pump’s effect on Nero: 
All of a sudden I smell slightly different, or that’s what I put it down 
to, because I’ve got insulin running through me all the time... 
They continue talking about Nero’s personality but I am sharply reminded 
of the wayward behaviour of my son’s dog during his cancer treatment and 
wonder whether the strong chemical odours from both the cancer itself and the 
chemotherapy drugs upset and confused her so that she barked incessantly 
and occasionally nipped; behaviours that failed to accord with her natural way of 
being. Or, unlikely to my mind, was it an idiopathic7 condition to which we were 
unable to find cause or solution? Or again that stress levels in our home were 
consistently high so she reacted in the only way she could? 
7 Dogs as biomedical resources 
Our connection with another species may rest on categorisation: whether 
the member of the other species is purchased as a commodity to be eaten or 
investigated in a laboratory, whether traded to become a domesticated and  
owned 'pet', or whether trained and donated as a working animal for the 
betterment of human life. As in a spider's web, tenuous threads may bind one to 
the other in the latter category but the end result is Coulter's (2016) anticipated 
'interspecies solidarity' of an ethically-permissible kind. Participants see the 
working dogs as respected practitioners of health care and equally as good 
friends and often, particularly among those who live alone, as recognised family 
members. 
This chapter explores the issue of dogs becoming working equipment, in 
much the same way that they are employed as sentient assistants or close 
companions, and calls for broader discussion and analysis in relation to the 
canine and human interactive participants in this study. Coulter (2016: 11), 
looking through ‘the lens of animal work’, notes that ‘animal workers adapt to 
human demands and needs, and that animals shape multispecies worksites’.  
                                                          
7
 Idiopathy is the name given to a disease or disorder that has no known or apparent cause. It may 
become apparent in canine head tremor syndrome or epileptic seizures. The rare 'rage syndrome', if no 
cause can be found,  may be termed idiopathic aggression (Miller, 2004). 
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Savelois et. al. (2013: 88), referring to the human participants under their 
observation who were all male ‘trainer-users’ of herding dogs, conclude that  
a trainer-dog association leads the former to enrich his 
knowledge, improve his competencies in understanding animal 
behaviours, and find satisfaction in the resulting quality of their 
relationships...More than a work tool, the dog appears to be an 
assistant, working in the establishment and maintenance of an 
optimal interrelational distance between human, dog, and 
livestock. 
 After observing over time how the participants in this research interact 
with one another and within the situations in which they are placed, a feeling 
emerges of not merely a multispecies camaraderie but also of a human learning 
and appreciation of what ‘be(com)ing’ dog might be like (Maurstad, Davis and 
Cowles, 2013). Human participants actively, through training and experience, 
and by a seemingly subconscious picking-up of signals, appear to learn to 
anticipate the dogs’ ways of being in the shared world of chronic illness, to know 
what might happen in a given situation whether surrounded by travellers on the 
‘Underground’ or on planes and buses, to recognise the most favoured reward 
item, or where their canine companions most enjoy free-running, and even 
which locally-resident dogs or humans they prefer to avoid.  As companions in 
chronic illness, the dogs in turn evidence a 'be(com)ing human' in that there has 
to be that level of intersubjectivity for them to succeed in their situated roles. 
Earlier discussion related how these scent-detecting dogs act as 'stand ins' for 
the loss of human-embodied sensation (hypo-awareness). In this instance, as 
Hurn (2012: 125) contends, animal 'objects' standing in for humans, 'can also 
become active subjects with the capacity to impact on the relationships between 
the humans involved'. 
 When talking of the dogs as equipment or mobile devices, there is no 
suggestion of superiority; it is more an acceptance that they should be 
respected for what they ‘do’, as family members, as autonomous medical 
assistants and as mobile devices. Although I cannot record the alert dog's 
verbal opinion, both species appear content with the benefits obtained from 
mutualistic co-existences which enable successful symbiotic practices of care 
and lengthened, more secure, lives for both, notwithstanding Srinivasan’s 
below-mentioned ‘anthropogenic norms’ (2013: 114). Budiansky's (1997) 
reasoning as to why animals 'chose domestication' resonates with 
contemporary mutualistic co-existences among species. He notes à propos 
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historic and current human-dog relationships that the survival of dogs has 
'nothing to do with being rewarded for their utility to man.  It has to do rather 
with their superb adaptation to human society' (1997: 36). Examining co-
evolutionary development, Budiansky observes how 'one species' behaviour 
can influence the evolution of another's. The environment that a species 
inhabits often includes the behaviours of other species, which thus become a 
force in determining its evolution' (1997: 52). 
Physical and imagined boundaries are variously constructed: the garden 
fence and the front door contain/protect both species; the dog is expected to eat 
given food, and expects to be given food. An identifying jacket and lead 
removed from a wall-hook may induce visible excitement in the dog at the 
prospect of ‘going out’, while simultaneously bringing about an imminent human 
restriction of canine ‘freedom’ through the length and tension of the lead 
between them (whether u-shaped when relaxed or flattened when taut), as well 
as decision on the route to be taken.  
Srinivasan (2013: 114) explicates subjectification in non-human animals:  
the lives of animals are shaped by humans either by selective 
breeding and/or disciplinary techniques to such an extent that they 
are arguably unaware of alternative ways of being, and therefore 
govern themselves according to anthropogenic norms. This would 
explain a caged bird that does not fly away when released or a 
horse that does not throw off its rider. 
There is no consciously-exhibited imposition of human norms besetting 
the human-partnered assistance dog but as a participating observer, it is 
necessary to view with some caution, how human influence does affect the life 
management and activities of the working nonhuman. What is evident comes 
about from thousands of years of domestication and interspecies 
companionship; the caring and empathic mutualistic co-existences studied here, 
appear to be accepted, tolerated, even seemingly appreciated by both dog and 
human. Routines and habitual responses, to and by each, support a 
comfortable accordance with sometimes unanticipated norms that may be 
introduced from necessity by independent and cooperative decision-making and 
by the co-embodiment of complexities arising from living with chronic illness.  
Srinivasan’s (2013: 117) ‘Note 10’ has significance: 
Knowing what animals want is complicated because humans and 
animals do not share an unambiguous mode of communication. 
This inability to know with certainty makes it all the more important 
  
163 
 
to constantly query what is done in the name of animal 
wellbeing...by ‘paying attention to what the dogs [and other 
animals] are telling [me]’ (Haraway, 2003: 48) and by deploying 
‘somatic sensibilities’ (Greenhough and Roe, 2011), I use my 
embodied encounters with animals and wider reading on animal 
sentience (Dawkins, 2006) to arrive at always tentative 
understandings about animal/dog wellbeing. 
The human ‘doing’ of Type 1 diabetes has been narrated in an earlier 
chapter, so investigation now turns toward what the diabetes alert dog is seen 
to do within the symbiotic relationship that embodies this chronic illness. 
Nonhuman animal exploitation by human-created procedures is then 
considered before exploring canine usefulness in the field of biomedicine and 
human illness, and the concept of an assistance dog becoming an animate 
instrument, a sentient piece of equipment adapted to work within human health 
concerns; and empowered to make decisions autonomously but under human-
manipulated norms. 
Control of diet, exercise and lifestyle management are at the forefront of 
the diabetic individual's successful daily existence and this is echoed in the 
personal sentiments of Joseph Cevetello whose chapter in Evocative Objects 
(Turkle, 2007) suggests diabetes is all about the control of blood sugars, timing 
of meals, what food should be eaten, exercise planning, and the balancing of 
insulin intake to food. Interactions between himself and his glucometer define 
who he is, his sense of identity: 
My meter maintains my image of myself as a man able to take 
care of himself. It also defines me as a diseased person, one who 
needs the aid of objects to sustain my life. The 
meter...communicates to others that I am different, somehow 
incomplete (2007: 67).   
‘A diseased person, one who needs the aid of objects’ to survive, a claim 
by which Cevetello gives a true assessment of his situation, but the inanimate 
phrase falls heavily. How much more encouraging and revitalising would be the 
aid of sentient and significant others in helping to sustain his life? (My emphasis 
in italics.) 
Cevetello (2007: 67) continues: 
My interactions and dependency on my meter have made me 
realise that relationships between people and medical machinery 
are evolving... 
  
164 
 
Annemarie Mol (2000) examines the blood sugar measurement device 
which, like other diagnostic devices such as the diabetes alert dog, is an active 
intervention employed in specific situations. The blood glucose monitor is 
intended to maintain levels, as far as is possible, within the individual’s normal 
range. Those who ‘do their bit’ (2000:14) in treating a person with diabetes – the 
doctor, the diabetes nurse, the patient, friends and relatives, the note book, the 
food habits and so on’ – are links in the ‘great chain of beings’, among which 
the blood sugar monitor is a ‘crucial link’. Mol notes that with self-measurement, 
an individual with diabetes has greater freedom, fewer regulations restricting life 
and ‘it becomes possible to lead an irregular life’ (2000: 19). 
Cevetello considers his glucometer/self interactions may foreshadow ‘the 
nascent stages of a cyborgian relationship’ (2007: 68), which notion follows 
Haraway’s (1991: 291) cyborg or cybernetic organism, 'a creature of social 
reality as well as a creature of fiction', and the enhanced techno-human that 
Bostrom (2005) and Wolbring (2006) envisage.  
For some diabetic individuals, for whom the continuous glucose monitor 
(CGM) remains unattainable, a welcome development is the personal insulin 
pump which assists in the regulation of insulin into the bloodstream on a 
continuing basis so that high and low blood glucose levels fluctuate less 
extravagantly and an improved quality of life is obtained and maintained. On the 
one hand, advantageous, but on the other, the small pump may be considered 
an unwelcome corporeal intrusion  
The continuous glucose monitor has become a beneficial addition to self-
caring practices for some, and transhumanist concepts of cyborgean 
relationships seem irrelevant to participants in comparison to the visible 
advantages gained from the invasive inanimate piece of equipment. Paul is 
hopeful that he will soon be able to add a CGM to his medical toolkit:  
The pump is going very well but I would like to change it for a 
CGM. It connects to the insulin pump so, like when your blood 
glucose levels drop down to 4.5mmol/l, it shuts the pump off. On a 
walk I often go out quite quickly, I burn up a lot of sugar and then if 
I stop, the pump comes back on because the initial push has 
dropped me, so having something like the CGM which constantly 
monitors your blood sugar, would benefit me considerably. 
Research is under way to develop an artificial pancreas which could 
release insulin into the body according to changes in blood glucose levels and 
would unite insulin pump technology with a continuous glucose monitor 
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(Diabetes.co.uk, 2015). A closed loop insulin delivery system, developed by 
Cambridge University and consisting of an external insulin pump that 
communicates wirelessly to a continuous glucose monitor worn as a patch on 
the skin, is already being tested on human research participants, according to 
Diabetes.co.uk.  
Also reported online by Diabetes.co.uk (February, 2015) is an 
announcement that De Montfort University are in the process of creating an 
implantable insulin delivery device which makes use of a bioresponsive gel that 
enables insulin to be released faster in the body when blood sugar levels are 
high and slower when blood glucose levels are low. This small device could be 
implanted surgically and would release insulin into the peritoneum, allowing 
insulin to be delivered into the bloodstream more quickly than if delivered into 
the fat layer directly beneath the skin. 
7.1 Transhumanism 
Transhumanism, according to Bostrom (2005: 1), promotes an 
'interdisciplinary approach to understanding and evaluating the opportunities', 
such as those mentioned above, 'for enhancing the human condition and the 
human organism, opened up by the advancement of technology.  
Bostrom suggests (2005:2) that there is 'no reason to think that the 
human mode of being is any more free of limitations imposed by our biological 
nature than are those of other animals' and continues: 
In much the same way as Chimpanzees lack the cognitive 
wherewithal to understand what it is like to be human - the 
ambitions we humans have, our philosophies, the complexities of 
human society, or the subtleties of our relationships with one 
another, so we humans may lack the capacity to form a realistic 
intuitive understanding of what it would be like to be a radically 
enhanced human (a "posthuman") and of the thoughts, concerns, 
aspirations, and social relations that such humans may have. 
Remarking underdeveloped human sensory modalities, Bostrom 
highlights the contrasting keen sense of smell, magnetic orientation, and 
sharper eyesight of some animals and suggests that a range of possible 
sensory modalities may exist beyond the animal world. Macrosmia in many 
animals is a prime example of what our underdeveloped sense of smell cannot 
achieve. The keen olfactory sensitivity of creatures at home in the air, in water 
or on land, is now opening new vistas for increasing the biomedical 
armamentarium for all species and not just for human conflict advantage.  
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Supporting the basic tenets and values of transhumanism, Bostrum 
(2005) discusses the beneficial feasibility of a radical extension of the human 
healthspan, eradication of disease, elimination of unnecessary suffering, and 
augmentation of human intellectual, physical and emotional capacities. All goals 
that merit striving for achievement and in which the olfactory sensitivity of the 
dog and other macrosmatic species can play an important 'technological' role. 
Max More (More and Vita-More, 2013) similarly expresses the view that 
becoming posthuman removes the sufferings of disease, aging and inevitable 
death (notwithstanding, admittedly, the likelihood of different challenges 
emerging over time), and enhances physical ability and individually-suited 
cognitive and emotional qualities. He contends that interest in philosophy and 
neuroscience among transhumanists shows acceptance of the Cartesian 
concept of the mind as a single entity to be no longer supportable.  
More (2013: 13) suggests that  
‘transhumanists typically adopt a universal standard based not on 
membership in the human species, but on the qualities of each 
being. Creatures with similar levels of sapience, sentience, and 
personhood are accorded similar status no matter whether they 
are humans, animals, cyborgs, machine intelligences, or aliens. 
 
Anticipation of good things to come, despite risk and danger, seems to 
pervade the concept of transhumanism. Not necessarily a ‘throw caution to the 
wind’ yearning for advancement but, for some believers of its vision, a 
determinedly focused, cautious push for continual progress (refer More’s The 
Principles of Extropy (1990) in which it is stated that transhumanists appreciate 
the never-ending pursuit of knowledge and understanding). 
Perhaps the above offers a comforting prospect and an approach in 
some ways consistent with this interdisciplinary, interspecies investigation into 
improving quality of life for those with chronic illness. However, as well as 
employing nano-technology, prostheses, or artificial intelligence as progressive 
technologies, the human condition is also currently being enhanced positively 
through canine olfactory perception: an inexpensive, non-invasive but 
nonetheless effective, use of a pre-existing biological ‘tool’ that detects, 
identifies and differentiates odours through the sense of smell and therefore 
prevents the life-threatening effects of hyper- or hypo-glycaemia on people with 
Type 1 diabetes. 
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Gregor Wolbring (2006: 32) reflects on the transhumanist model of health 
and disease, which  
sees every human being as defective and in need of improvement 
(above species-typical boundaries) leading to the transhumanist 
model of disability/impairment where every un-enhanced human 
being is, by definition “disabled” in the impairment/patient sense’. 
The only way out of the impairment/patient label is to enhance 
oneself beyond the species-typical boundaries’ (2006: 34).   
 Those who cannot afford bodily enhancement will be marked impaired, 
becoming Wolbring’s ‘new techno-poor disabled’ (2006: 33), and the 'only way 
out of the impairment/patient label is to enhance oneself beyond the species-
typical boundaries’, he suggests (2006: 34).   Braidotti talks of former Olympic 
athlete Oscar Pistorius’s ‘otherwise human’ (2013: 196) medically-enhanced 
blade-running performances. With such transformations, she exhorts us to 
contemplate a posthuman social agenda in which human embodiment and 
subjectivity are currently undergoing a profound mutation.  We are in what 
Braidotti calls ‘the immanent here and now of a posthuman planet’ and not the 
‘transhumanist delirium of transcendence from the corporeal frame of the 
contemporary human’ (2013: 197).  
In the case of chronically ill humans who suffer inequality in life and lack 
social integration, the assistance of a medical alert dog seems to provide an 
economically viable, non-invasive and non-mechanical form of bodily 
enhancement that enables comfort in the community as well as in the self. Co-
embodied within the world of chronic illness, the diabetes alert dog may become 
an extension of the human self (Belk, 1988, 1996; Sanders, 2003). Belk (1996), 
describing 'pets as part of self', explains that 'the investment of time, money and 
energy on our pets' enables intense attachment to them and a perception that 
they are 'extensions of ourselves' (1996: 129). This extension of self, endorsing 
expressions of human identity, also allows the 'pets' to be 'appendages' (Belk, 
1996: 131), whose pain may be felt by the human and whose empathy may be 
reciprocated. 
While Belk's 'pet' dogs are not considered in the category of assistance 
dogs, his observations reflect similar human-canine encounters in which the 
dog, acting as part of a human extended self, represents 'a divided self that is 
both civilised and tame, well-behaved and animalistic, controlled and 
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chaotic...as a mixed metaphor, it reflects the way we view ourselves in the 
contemporary world' (1996: 140).  
In contrasting the environmental backdrops of wolf and dog, Mark 
Rowlands (2008: 30) inverts the notion of the dog as extension of the human 
self/mind: 
the dog has been forced to rely on us. More than that it has 
developed the ability to solve its various problems, cognitive and 
otherwise. For dogs, we are useful information-processing 
devices. We humans are part of the dog's extended mind. 
Often a diagnosis of diabetes conjures immediate negativity – in the 
individual, among family members, friends and work colleagues. The person 
with diabetes takes on the label of ‘poor so-and-so’, whether or not 
achievements are later gained in the contexts of sport or exercise, home, 
college or work. However, the effort to take and maintain control of food and 
other lifestyle behaviours beyond that required by healthy individuals, deserves 
to engender personal sentiments of pride and accomplishment, and a conscious 
awareness of managing life well, enabling feelings of satisfaction to reverberate 
through the individual’s umwelt (Von Uexküll, 2010).  
Cevetello asserts his need for objects to assist the sustenance of his life.  
Technoscience plays an important role but is thus far insentient, despite the 
advances in social robotics (Turkle, 2007; Miklósi and Gacsi, 2012) and 
Haraway’s 'genetically engineered mice' (1997: 53). As yet assistance objects, 
such as the insulin pump (which gives current blood glucose readings that can 
be acted upon), are not prescient and have to be manoeuvred to effect their 
benefit for the user.  
It is the ability to prevent medical emergencies through sensory warning 
that has pushed the work of the companion nonhuman animal assistant into the 
forefront of Wolbring's once ‘techno-poor’ (2006: 33), now en-abled, group of 
chronically ill humans. Unlike the inanimate insulin pump, a medical alert 
assistance dog may be considered an animate instrument 
7.2 Animate instruments 
 For many years, well-loved dogs, whose human carers were unable to 
look after them for days, weeks, even months at a time, came to share those 
periods with our family. Some dogs visited because they were known to 
become ill during car journeys and therefore disliked travelling, some because 
their human companion was hospitalised or had died, a few had caused serious 
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injury to members of their own and other species; but the majority came to stay, 
often bringing suitcases brim-full of personal items, because their families were 
travelling abroad on business or holiday; and this was South Africa from where 
dogs could not travel far without long-term quarantine regulations coming into 
play. So we endeavoured to match the meals they were given at home, to play 
with them and keep them safe, warm and clean, and as far as was humanly 
possible, to situate them in a friendly, companionable environment.  
Many returned year after year, rushing out of the family car to stand in 
front of the same kennel they had occupied previously – they recognised staff 
members and knew the daily routines; their memories proved outstandingly 
accurate, perhaps prodded effectively by their exceptional sense of smell which, 
as in human animals and mentioned in the earlier section on olfaction, 
encourages reminiscences of the previously familiar8. Occasionally a client 
request necessitated driving a dog to his or her veterinarian for euthanasia and 
this would evoke discomforting internal questioning of a daily occupation which 
was principally to care for members of another species in the absence of their 
usual companions – could such a journey ever be seen as morally acceptable, 
even compassionate? Reflexivity can induce alarming mental disquiet so that, 
fearing Coetzee’s incisive writing would scratch open scars of past and present 
ethical concerns, it has taken many years to read Disgrace (1999) and the 
unwelcome descriptions of dogs being kennelled and euthanized.  
However, it is because of Coetzee’s critical observations of human-dog 
interactions and cognitive-behavioural intersections that the following citation 
may be flagged up to illustrate his perception of this complex, often conflicting 
multispecies relationship: 
They are part of the furniture, part of the alarm system.  They do 
us the honour of treating us like gods, and we respond by treating 
them like things.  
          J.M. Coetzee, 1999: 78 
In this research, the medical alert dog is judged to be a companion, 
friend, help-mate and assistant, a facilitator of safer living and a guard against 
the perfidies of chronic illness. However, he or she may also, sometimes 
simultaneously, be considered an animate instrument - 'having life' (Oxford 
                                                          
8
 In contrast, a waning sense of smell may predict certain forms of dementia in humans (Strous 
and Schoenfeld, 2006; Velayudhan, Pritchard, Powell and Proitsi, 2013). 
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English Reference Dictionary, 1995: 52), 'a thing used in performing an action’ 
(OERD, 1995: 730). The relevant action in this instance is the olfactory sniffing 
and subsequent warning performed by the alerting dog to prevent 
hypoglycaemia affecting the human companion with Type 1 diabetes.  
Unlikely to be thought of as ‘furniture’, more likely to be appreciated as 
medical equipment (refer Paul and Terry commenting below that they view their 
dogs as equipment), and certainly considered ‘part of the alarm system’ that is 
required for day-to-day living when chronically ill, the diabetes alert dog is, 
however, much more than a ‘thing’ to the unwell human carer or to the 
observing public. As Budiansky comments in relation to farmers, hunters and 
'the few others in our modern world whose daily work brings them into contact 
with animals' (1977: 12), 'they know that animals are not people, but they are 
not things, either' (1977: 13). 
None of the human participants in this research, caring for their canine 
companions under the auspices of the provisioning charity, have evidenced 
unkind or irresponsible behaviour towards their well-respected partners (within 
my observation periods). But Coetzee’s phraseology continues to agitate 
emotions of guilt and shame at the way nonhuman animal neighbours are 
generally taken for granted without moral consideration, at the manner in which 
they are shaped mentally and physically as commodities to convenience our 
own interests while theirs may never be sufficiently accommodated and are, 
sometimes knowingly, ignored.  
Hurn (2012:104) suggests that  
in a capitalist market the value of social relations is influenced by 
the perceived value of commodities, but this value often rests on 
the symbolic qualities that 'things' are thought to possess. 
 She adds that 'pets might also be regarded as commodities when they 
generate social profit for their owners' (Hurn, 2012: 105). While the diabetes 
alert dog may be considered a working companion rather than commodity or 
pet, there is no doubt that 'social profit' is gained by a human partner, previously 
prevented from enjoying full social integration by the effects of illness.  
Igor Kopytoff (1986: 64) examining ‘commoditization as process’ in 
economic terms and the concept of commodities as material things, begins by 
approaching ‘the notion of commodity’ in terms of slavery. The slave, he avers, 
is captured and/or put up for sale, loses social identity and ‘becomes a non-
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person (1986: 65)’; but is then acquired by an individual or group, gains new 
status and identity but may continue to be a commodity, property of another. 
Whether working herd-dogs, guard dogs or hearth-loving companion 
dogs, domesticated canines in the UK are still considered to be the possessions 
of their human keepers, as set out in the Animal Welfare Act 2006. ’By contrast, 
in India, the law recognises the independent status of ownerless street dogs 
and so these animals are not confronted with the stark injunction to live well or 
die’ (Srinivasan, 2013: 106). The Code of Practice applicable to all dogs in the 
UK provides guidance to help dog-keepers comply with provisions of Section 9 
of the Animal Welfare Act 2006; it is emphasised in the introduction that ‘you 
are always responsible for your dog’s needs’ and should be aware that ‘dog 
ownership is a major responsibility’ (DEFRA, December 2009). Although 
changes in international animal welfare laws over time have led to the 
occasional/partial prohibition of cruelty and suffering to animals for the benefit of 
human entertainment or consumption - the contested lives of the orcas of 
SeaWorld and the caged dogs of South Korean meat markets come to mind 
here - there still remains an ongoing human compulsion to exploit and hurt other 
species in the name of science or entertainment.   
What is legally allowed, but appears ‘morally impermissible’ (Nobis, 
2016: 26) in ethical thinking about the use of animal others, does not always 
benefit them when they are selected for a particular human-designed function. 
The transbiopolitics concept introduced by Blue and Rock (2010: 354) has 
significance here in relation to ‘animal and human bodies [that] not only co-exist 
but are instrumental in constituting one another, at many different scales and 
across multiple spatial and temporal dimensions’. Human provisioning of ‘care’ 
for the racing dog, and canine provisioning of funds that enable that care, 
produce a cycle of interspecies complexity.  If, for example, greyhounds are well 
fed and ‘housed’, given opportunity for regular exercise, welfare checks and 
companionship, competing in the greyhound Grand National or the Oaks may 
be legally permissible. However, in terms of moral ‘rights’, caging and releasing 
greyhounds to race after a speeding mechanical lure, an artificial hare, seems 
unkind and abusive in the same way that pheasants and partridges are caged, 
fed, released and shot for so-called ‘sport’ and only occasionally end up on the 
table of ‘game’ meat-eaters. These sentient creatures are the animate 
instruments of British tradition, legally permitted to be treated as such, but the 
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moral acceptance of these traditions and adherent instruments should by now 
be seen as fast-diminishing. 
7.3 Exploitation 
Exploitation signifies a taking-advantage-of-another for benefit, whether it 
involves slavery, circus entertainment, laboratory experimentation, or the often 
inhumanely- and repetitively-produced gain from factory-farming or puppy-
milling. Exploitation reflects more than shadows of human depravity and such 
moral corruption can rarely be deemed a force for good. Yet advantage of 
sentient nonhuman beings for human financial profit continues to be taken and 
observed in the fortunes made (or lost) by breeding and betting on animals 
compelled to participate in activities such as dog-fighting or greyhound- and 
horse-racing. 
 A further exploitation of other animals is undertaken for apparent social 
advancement when they are used as human status symbols (handbag or 
teacup primates and pigs, or supposedly-fearsome dogs adorned in heavy 
metal-studded collars). Referring to consumer items designed to be thrown 
away after a brief life in order to satisfy trends of ‘new and even-better’ 
consumption, Hurn (2012: 103-104) contends that in current consumer thinking, 
companion animals may similarly be commodified and exploited as ‘potentially 
disposable material accessories in much the same way as cars, jewellery or 
clothing’ – a form of ‘planned obsolescence’. 
So, as mentioned previously, the industries of puppy-milling and dog-
fighting, factory-farming, laboratory experimentation or bear-bile extraction do 
not play important roles in this research because of the current inhumane use of 
animals as technologies solely for human gain9. However, the likelihood that 
both canine and human participants consume products manufactured from 
other animals, who did not choose martyrdom based on a utilitarian maxim, 
seems to undermine the non-speciesist ethic supporting the kindly, non-
                                                          
9
This is not to say that every human individual employed to work with animals in science and 
industry, has no heart; many of them demonstrate concern and emotion at inhumane human-
nonhuman animal practices in agriculture, for example. The writing of John Law (2004) relating 
to the anguish of farmers and veterinarians compelled by governmental authority to euthanize 
healthy animals in order to contain foot-and-mouth disease on farms in Britain, and that of Kim 
Baker (2013) which studies developing relationships between pigmen and pigs in industrial 
farming, both offer balance to my overall condemnation of human cruelty to nonhuman 
creatures. 
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exploitative use of assistance animals. Further discussion of ethics and moral 
values follows in chapter 9. 
In the meantime, the use of multispecies biomedical technology is in the 
frame to illustrate how the well-domesticated dog and the chronically unwell 
human become colleagues co-embodying good care practices and finding a 
single identity to guide them together through the uncertainties and complexities 
of chronic illness. Apart from the mutual care expressed in the symbiotic 
relationships between assistance dogs and their variously-impaired human 
companions, other positive human-canine collaborations, based on sensory 
perceptions and concomitant training methods and cooperations, exist beyond 
the boundaries of health, for example, the often exemplary care demonstrated 
by homeless people to their close animal friends (Irvine, 2013).  
Cooperative enterprise is described in the works of former Royal Marine, 
Pen Farthing (2014), founder of the Nowzad Dogs charity rescuing the often-
abused stray dogs battling to survive in Afghanistan warzones, and finding them 
safe and caring homes in other countries. Media communications and personal 
anecdotes frequently highlight the advantages of multispecies’ shared 
enterprise, for example, when members of police or defence force teams return 
home from service abroad, bringing their canine instruments of war with them.  
These may be drug-, body- or explosive-detection animals who have become 
emotionally attached to their human partners and together have co-created 
intense bonds, often deepened as the result of fear and heroism. Such close 
comradeship allows a mutualistic identity to be visible to the observing public.  
But exploitation rears up here too, since war and destruction may heap 
pain, exhaustion, neglect and abandonment on the nonhuman creatures 
enlisted to work in war zones (Allon and Barrett, 2015), who may suffer from 
mental ‘shellshock’ as well as physical injury, and who may not ‘go home’ with 
their human keepers. Do they suffer from any of the symptoms of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) that may haunt human witnesses of fatal vehicle 
accidents, murder or other violent death? Although media coverage of the 
recently-recognised diagnosis of canine PTSD is beginning to spread in the 
‘West’, there is sparse research literature available (for example, Mark Bekoff, 
2011; Coulter, 2016: 80-81) to examine the psychological effects of traumatic 
events on animals in war zones; or indeed that explores treatment interventions 
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which might assist mentally-affected nonhuman creatures who suffer from the 
conscious contribution of an animal to a dystopian world of human manufacture.   
 Ryan Hediger (2013: 55) contrasts the ‘superior sensory abilities’ of dogs 
used by the US military in the Vietnam wars, with their abandonment as ‘mere 
machinery’ when the US forces withdrew. Bearing the status of canine heroes 
when used in warfare, 'most of the 4000 or so dogs used in conflict were 
abandoned in the war zone when the United States withdrew, leaving many of 
the dogs to become meat, to be eaten by the Vietnamese' (2013: 55). 
More recently, Allon and Barrett (2015) have written of the Dobermann 
dogs co-opted into marine service in the Pacific wars, some of whom suffered 
‘shellshock’ and were destroyed; whether they suffered a canine form of PTSD 
which seems likely in that wartime environment, is not known. Dodman (2016), 
a veterinarian accustomed to treating canine cases of PTSD, and Alger and 
Alger (2013), have also noted how trauma affects dogs well after they witness 
violence or crisis. PTSD is only diagnosed in humans when ‘the full symptom 
picture is present for more than one month (Criterion E: DSM-IV-TR®) after 
exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor’ (American Psychiatric Association,  
2000: 463). 
Ignoring this scarcity of research into post-traumatic stress disorder in 
companion animals, use and exploitation of domesticated animals continue to 
be practiced at each end of the elastic commodity continuum. The domesticated 
canine may be considered a highly-valued companion but may also be shaped 
into a commodity to be fashioned and used as an instrument, one that can be 
selected from the ranks of health tools contained in the biomedical 
armamentarium.  
7.4 Use and exploitation 
Kendra Coulter (2016 (b): 146) reminds us that ‘what we condemn and 
condone’ are affected by our knowledge and understanding of those 
alternatives. Observing animals ‘as working, and even as workers, may 
increase their immediate value in particular ways’, she avers, and then 
highlights how ‘becoming “useful” can change how individuals and/or species 
are seen and treated’. She offers an example, pertinent to those with 
macrosmatic scenting ability, of the rats employed by the Belgian APOPO 
organisation (Anti-Persoonsmijnen Ontmijnende Product Ontwikkeling, which is 
translated into English as 'Anti-Personnel Landmines Removal Product 
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Development') to sniff out both concealed landmines and symptoms of 
tuberculosis. From being considered generally to be a destructive, dirty creature 
who carries disease, the African Giant Pouched Rat (Cricetomys ansorgei) has 
gained status through ‘usage’ and is now at least recognised, paternalistically 
perhaps, as a life-saving individual worthy of human gratitude. 
Moving away from animals used in war zones to those working in the 
field of health and illness, Tzachi Zamir (2006: 179-199) differentiates between 
use and exploitation in the field of animal-assisted therapy (AAT). He posits the 
liberationist stance that places value on the animal’s life and the quality of that 
life and suggests exploitation harms the exploited but is beneficial to the 
individual whereas, in AAT for example, ‘service dogs are used, though not 
exploited, since their welfare is promoted by the relationship’ (189).   
However, Serpell, Coppinger, Fine and Peralta (2010: 497) contend that 
‘the use of animals in animal-assisted activities and therapy imposes a unique 
set of stresses and strains’ and recommend a set of guidelines for their care 
and supervision during such usage, the issue being ‘how to balance the needs 
of human clients with respect for the needs of the animal’ (2010: 502). The 
provisions offer ‘basic ethics principles for the use of the therapy animal’, 
‘procedures for ethical decision-making regarding therapy animals’ and 
‘implications for ethical decision-making regarding therapy animals’.  
Medical Detection Dogs maintain responsibility for the rescued or 
donated animals who they train in bio-detection. Client do not purchase a 
diabetes alert dog and the charity covers the costs of veterinary care, canine 
insurance, medical needs, toys, equipment, training and food. Only after dogs 
have taken up residence with human partners do those clients take over the 
expenses,  The charity issues clients with guidelines, similar to those proposed 
by Serpell et. al. (2010), directing essential but ethically-based humane care 
and treatment of the diabetes alert assistance dogs, and time is taken to ensure 
both human and nonhuman are well suited and likely to form deep and long-
lasting bonds.  
Terry considers the charity’s current ‘matching process’ asks questions 
and expects answers that ‘push you to the limit’. Because working with a dog at 
the centre takes place on individual days over several months, prospective 
clients have to show commitment to wanting a diabetes alert dog and be 
prepared to travel to be and work with the dog. He adds that those who say 
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they’re coming down to the charity for a day and want to take a dog home with 
them will be unlikely to succeed, since they show no sign of moral commitment 
to ongoing consideration of the working dog's 'rights' to a harm-free and cared-
for future.  
If either dog or human present signs of discomfort or a lack of interest in 
the other, then the dog will not become that individual’s companion and further 
discussion will take place before a different dog may be introduced. Paul, for 
example, emphasising that Nero is ‘the right dog for me’, says he was offered a 
different dog by the charity before Nero, but ‘there was just no connection’. 
Similarly, Janet recalls how deflated she felt at the lack of interest in her shown 
by the first dog introduced by the charity:  
We went for a walk in the park, did a bit of 'recall'; he was very 
good, obedient in the shops and everything was perfect but you 
could just tell he wasn't interested, and the trainers felt that as 
well, so they said they had a dog who was a bit hyperactive to 
show me in the afternoon. 
Janet and her mother had two very elderly cats in their twenties at home 
and were thinking 'this might not work' when Alfie came 'bounding in, full of 
energy'.  
As soon as I spoke to him, he responded straightaway...he kept 
looking up at me and when we took him to the park and did some 
recall, he came galloping back all excited which was lovely.  My 
mum even noticed that he was mimicking my walk and so of 
course... 
Human participants affirm the need to ‘click’ with the canine working 
assistant, this ‘click’ being an emotional feeling within human cognition that is 
thought to signify mutual liking and a possible future bond of friendship. Among 
many studies into the effects of interaction between companion humans and 
dogs on their oxytocin levels, are those of Odendaal and Meintjies (2003) and 
Miller et. al. (2009). Swedish researchers, Handlin et. al. (2011), examined 
heart rate and levels of oxytocin, cortisol, and insulin in 10 male Labrador dogs 
and their female human companions, in response to an interaction during which 
the 'owner stroked, petted, and talked with her dog during the first 3 minutes' 
after which blood samples were taken from both species. The researchers 
found the dogs' oxytocin levels were 'significantly increased 3 minutes after the 
start of the interaction (p = 0.027)' while the 'owners' oxytocin levels peaked 
between 1 and 5 minutes after interaction (p = 0.026). No such effect was seen 
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in the controls' (Handlin et. al., 2011: 301). Similar experiments might provide 
instrumentation which the MDD charity could adopt as means to quantify the 
interspecies bonding 'click' necessary for successful processing of their 
partnerships. 
7.5 Anxiety: fear of failure 
There is little certainty for members of the canine or human species 
sharing life together with chronic Type 1 diabetes. The daily turmoil of 
fluctuating blood sugar levels ensures intervals for relaxation are brief for either 
partner. The dog cannot be switched off for a nap, nor are he or she always 
able to rouse the deeply-sleeping or comatose diabetic. If a timely reward is not 
given for correct alerting because the human partner is slow to react or fails to 
notice an alert, how can the dog’s uncertainties be resolved?  
Coppinger, Coppinger and Skillings (1998: 133) observed that the most 
common working dogs in the 21st century could be those who assist people 
with tasks that they are unable to manage as individuals. According to 
Assistance Dogs UK (personal communication, April 2017), 7000 dogs are now 
qualified to work within the ADUK accreditation system, so it appears Coppinger 
et. al. (1998) may have forecast the situation correctly. Their paper relates 
particularly to dogs pulling wheelchairs or opening doors for people in 
wheelchairs, indicating the possibilities of the dogs becoming injured or failing to 
achieve the expected goal. Relevant here is their conclusion that not everyone 
instructs their assistance dogs correctly so it becomes important that those 
matched with assistance dogs acquire the training and experience necessary to 
comprehend the quantity of possible complications and how they can best 
resolve them.  
Birke and Hockenhull (2015) discuss horse-human mis-communication 
and failing cooperation that appear remedied over time and proximity as each 
gain trust and knowledge of the other. The horses 'are not animals simply 
plodding around at the behest of a human, but they are mindful of how to read 
the human from moment to moment - mindful in moving and being moved' 
(2015: 97). Birke and Hockenhull continue: 
Sadly, we humans all too often misread what animals are trying to 
tell us, often with dire consequences for the animals. We may 
never know for sure how they themselves experience the 
relationships, but knowing how they behave within it does tell us 
something. A better understanding of how togetherness and 
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partnership are built, by humans and by companion animals, 
would surely benefit us all (emphasis in text, 2015: 97). 
Coppinger et. al. (1998) suggested that inability to perform a wanted task 
was less to do with the inadequacy of the dog but more relative to the difficulty 
of the required tasks, ‘the inadequacy of much of the equipment they are 
required to perform with’ (1998: 143), and the instinctive behaviour of the dogs 
themselves. 
Terry relates to the ‘difficulty of required tasks’ when attempting to 
manoeuvre himself, his wheelchair and assistance dog, Jim, safely in and out of 
lifts in multi-storeyed buildings:  
If I’m approaching a lift in the wheelchair, I’ve got to make sure my 
dog is safe going in and out because it’s incredibly dangerous 
going into a lift with a dog whereas you wouldn’t care if the chair 
hit the lift door. 
Once you’ve learned to handle the wheelchair, you have to be 
aware of ground surfaces because a pothole can throw you right 
out of it, but working with a dog keeps your mind more active 
which has to be a good thing. 
The possibility of diabetes alert assistance dogs suffering anxiety at the 
collapse into unconsciousness of their human companions is itself cause for 
concern and rigorous investigation; for example, whether the frequency of such 
episodes may cause the dog to develop learned helplessness or deepen the 
possibility of depression at failure to succeed in assisting the human partner – 
or at least from a repetitive failure to receive anticipated rewards for active 
alerting. Certainly the public observation of Harley’s anxiety and concern when 
Tina became ‘hypo’ and collapsed serves as an appropriate example here. 
However Harley’s naturally, at least outwardly, cheerful temperament appears 
to have prevented symptoms of depression overly affecting his personality, and 
his alerting ability to warn of both hyper- and hypo-glycaemia remains at a high 
level of accuracy, according to the charity staff members and his diabetic 
companion who regularly observe his emotions and behaviours. 
A lack of reaction to an alert, particularly by those who live without other 
human company, draws attention to stresses that may occur in the assistance 
dog’s life; no reaction to a given alert may signify failure, no alternative option, 
and no reward. Clara Mancini and colleagues, who work in the Animal-
Computer Interaction laboratory at the UK’s Open University and at times in 
conjunction with Medical Detection Dogs staff, clients and their diabetes alert 
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dogs, are investigating methods and developing means to lessen the types of 
anxiety likely to affect working assistance dogs in situations such as that facing 
Harley, and to find outlets for the dogs’ anxiety if their alerting efforts fail to be 
acknowledged by the unwell human. 
Researchers in the animal-computer interaction field consider nonhuman 
animals to be active participants in investigations - and not passive objects or 
instruments to be acted upon; a similar consideration to Nettleton's (2013) 
description of human patients undergoing medical treatment. They believe that 
nonhuman animals need to be involved comprehensively in the design and 
development of multispecies user-friendly, interactive technology which should 
relate beneficially to the users’ personalities and idiosyncratic traits. Such 
interactive technology should also relate to aspects of the nature of the work to 
be undertaken, the context in which the activities will be situated, and to how 
the species will be empowered by such technology (Mancini, 2016). 
Investigating the development of technologies that could empower 
diabetes alert assistance dogs, Robinson, Mancini, van der Linden, Guest and 
Harris (2014) presented a paper at the Intelligent Systems for Animal Welfare 
(ISAWEL) conference, which contended that a lack of predictability and control 
of their environment could cause stress and possible depression in dogs.  Such 
consideration, which draws on the real and imagined points of view of both 
human and dog partners living in homes affected by chronic illness, could build 
or restore certainty in what might sometimes be a difficult-to-balance mutualistic 
relationship. 
The ISAWEL’14 conference paper (Robinson et. al., 2014, np) ‘explores 
the intersection of assistance dog welfare and intelligent systems with a 
technological intervention...an emergency canine alert system’. They suggest 
the possibility of a diabetes alert dog becoming distressed when their partner 
becomes unconscious due to a hypo, perhaps due to temporary separation 
during which they cannot estimate when their human partner will regain their 
normal behaviour patterns, and they therefore cannot effect their usual methods 
of keeping control. These researchers explore the idea of a canine emergency 
alert system by which the dog could, for example, pull on a wall-mounted rope 
tug-toy, and trigger a software system that would set off an alarm request to 
external sources, perhaps from the human’s health and social network. This 
could benefit the welfare of both dog and human user, the dog empowered to 
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act positively and receive an appropriate feedback signal, and the human to 
receive medical assistance more swiftly. Just as knowledge and awareness of 
multispecies interactions are expanding, discussed above in relation to humans 
and horse co-operations (Birke and Hockenhull, 2015), so too is the technology 
increasing to aid safety and security for both assistant dogs and unwell humans. 
Tina explains Harley’s focused alerting: 
He’s sharp, he’s very sharp you know. But even if I go into me 
coma, when I come round, he’s sat there with the medical kit in his 
mouth. And you know that he’s tried everything, so, yes, he’s good 
[...] but they’re (MDD) making me a pulley at home. It will actually 
go through to home care that’ll send help out. So if I go into a 
coma - you know I’m out for anything up to five hours – well, in 
that time Harley will pull the rope and when they don’t get a voice, 
they know to come straight away. 
Before that I was given a thing for my bed because when you go 
into your comas, you actually faint, but that thing were forever 
going off, and I thought ‘I can’t live with that’, so I’d much rather 
have Harley so that if I’m out, he can pull the rope. 
Canine life enrichment is a priority if the ‘instrument’ is to maintain 
effective levels of alerting. Balanced nutrition, fresh water, outdoor exercise that 
enables interspecies social contact and improves circulation, muscle strength 
and heart rate, together with problem-solving games that invigorate brain 
activity, all contribute to the dog’s wellbeing and enjoyment of canine life in a 
human home. The economic as well as physiological status of the human with 
certain impaired abilities is likely to play a role in evaluating the degree to which 
enrichment, nourishment, security, exercise and play, interspecies and same-
species social interactions, grooming and welfare needs are sufficiently 
supplied to maintain a healthy and satisfactory personal lifestyle for the 
assistance dog sharing the home. 
Paul contends that his care of Nero is the same as he would give to any 
dog: 
The fact that he’s an alert dog makes no difference. If he was just 
a pet, he would still get the same care ... he gets a good brush, he 
gets his teeth done; normally about two or three times a week he 
gets a dental stick...I do look after him. He sleeps on the bed now 
because it’s easier for me to have him on the bed than to have 
him padding around every hour and a half to two hours.  
7.6 Parasitism: a selfish harvesting 
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The notion of the assistance dog being a useful item of sentient 
equipment may appear contra the thinking of Randy Malamud (2013) who 
suggests human inadequacies cause inferiority and produce a sense of 
entitlement to ‘harvest’ and ‘co-opt’ nonhuman animal abilities. He further posits 
that we should rather think of ourselves as ‘service animals’ and what we can 
offer to nonhuman animals in return for what we glean. Lynda Birke’s direct 
question ‘what’s in it for the animals?’ (2009: 1) resonates here, and 
emphatically invites us to take responsibility, even though we may have no 
knowledge of their ‘points of view’, when engaging with those whose abilities we 
‘harvest’ so often without regard for their consciousness, their feelings and their 
thinking. 
The concept of a kindly interspecies reciprocity is agreeable and, 
provided there is mutualism in such shared co-existences, it may be possible to 
accept an invitation to become less vehemently disapproving of the usage and 
usefulness of long-domesticated and carefully trained assistance animals. 
Trained diabetes alert dogs do receive health and welfare benefit and become 
recognised and socially-distinguished partners in symbiotic relationships; 
partnerships that enable one member to provide non-judgemental 
companionship and exceptional olfactory ability in safeguarding human health, 
and the other to give security, shelter and nutrition, and even the prospect of a 
collaborative friendship. Seemingly, these donated behaviours are considered 
forms of provision and gratitude rather than entitlement, and succeed in 
highlighting an empathic multispecies interaction that does endorse Malamud’s 
thinking. Extracts from interviews with research participants illustrate this 
instrument/companion oscillation throughout the project.  
Cassidy (2002) contends that racehorses change from subject to object 
dependent on how they are perceived and by whom, for example, by their 
jockeys, owners, grooms or the betting spectators. Shir-Vertesh (2012) 
suggests that a dynamic range of factors can influence how people perceive 
and act towards their pets, for example, the flexible status of a companion 
animal obtained and treated as a child substitute whose position is later pre-
empted on the arrival of a human baby. When Richard refers to Higgins making 
the olfactory transition over time from alerting to a scent pot to alerting to 
himself as ‘the real thing’, he may sense Higgins as equipment prior to the dog 
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becoming companion, ‘but he’s not something that you just switch on and off’, 
he remarks. 
There is increasing need to study the expanding biomedical situations 
inhabited by human and nonhuman animals. The apparently beneficial use of 
both humans and dogs for multispecies health improvement should not always 
be decried – provided, of course, that good care is the paramount concern and 
any use does not become exploitation that causes suffering to any sentient 
creature whether through mental or physical abuse or cruelty and resultant 
anguish. Responsible and sensitive research (Birke, 2009) should also not harm 
nonhuman subjects, nor reduce any forms of life enrichment they may be able 
to access, so that their good health and welfare are always to be maintained at 
the highest level. And if that is the case, making use of the cared-for biomedical 
animate resource should promote a greater wellness in the user. Rock and 
Degeling (2015), in their research into One Health and public health ethics, 
'conceptualise solidarity to encompass not only practices intended to assist 
other people, but also practices intended to assist nonhuman others including 
animals, plants or places' (2015: 61). Their conception is supported in Coulter's 
'Anifesto', in which she also calls for recognition of the role played by economic 
oppression 'in perpetuating both people's and animals' suffering' (2016: 163). 
7.7 Recognition 
These canine biomedical collaborators reciprocate the care and attention 
given by their human counterparts in the field of chronic illness, so it seems that 
a plastic symbiotic co-existence emerges in which each species depends on the 
other to an extraordinary degree for survival.  Hurn (2012) illustrates the swings 
and roundabouts of symbiosis in domestication with examples of the human-
nonhuman relationships between the Welsh breeders and exhibitors of 
‘indigenous equines' (2012: 66); human and nonhuman animals who are 
interdependent and who ‘live off’ each other, unlike promoters of factory farming 
who are sole beneficiaries of nonhuman animal products and therefore engage 
in a more parasitic relationship.  
As mentioned in the methodology chapter framing this project, Leung 
and Poulin (2008: 107) unravel the complex categories of parasitism, 
commensalism and mutualism which oscillate variously along an elastic 
continuum of symbiotic interactions. Although Coppinger and Coppinger (2016: 
133) refer to commensalism or ‘eating at the same table’ as an ecologist-
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favoured term for the human-canine symbiotic relationship that evolved from 
dogs’ need to ‘feed in the presence of humans’, it is mutualism – in which 
neither member of the relationship harms the other in a mutually beneficial 
sharing of life - that seems to identify most nearly with the symbiotic partnership 
of the co-existing unwell human and assistance dog. 
The intertwined lives of dog and human see the former become a 
construct in the creation of an animate instrument, a biomedical resource, able 
to assist in navigating through the culture of chronic illness performances and 
care practices. In this activity, some benefit for the dog comes from a work ethic 
that suggests the provision of enrichment opportunity and occupation may 
reduce the prospect of boredom or frustration in a confined space. Such 
constriction is felt by Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s young spaniel, Flush, whom 
Virginia Woolf (2016: 22) describes in her biography of the dog, as yearning ‘for 
air and exercise’ when compelled to remain secluded for seemingly endless 
days and nights in his guardian’s heavily-curtained bedroom: ‘alone together in 
a cushioned and firelit cave’.  
A lack of occupation is a common cause of inappropriate behavioural 
problems occurring in companion animals (Horowitz, 2009: 216-217; Serpell et. 
al., 2010: 481-503).  Therefore, having this useful occupation of animate, active 
biomedical resource not only situates the medical alert assistance dog as a 
valued and knowledgeable cosmopolitan, instrumental in both chronic illness 
treatment and in social environs, but also, and perhaps more importantly from 
the dog’s perspective, allows some degree of agency and opportunity for 
empowerment and enrichment. Surprisingly - or perhaps not - is the scarcity of 
literature supporting or evidencing such agency or life enrichment opportunity.  
Mental and physical stimulation are enabled in the work of an assistance 
dog, but choice of when, where and how play should be conducted, is reliant on 
human decision. Research into working dog welfare by Rooney et. al. (2009) 
provides guidelines for practitioners caring for kennelled working dogs, which 
the working DADs are not. 
Referring to the psychiatric service dog (PSD), Tedeschi, Fine and 
Helgeson (2010: 421) suggest certain 'obvious' benefits to human recipients of 
a PSD, for example 'increased social interaction [and] reduced feelings of 
avoidance and stigmatization'. But they are concerned by the new demands 
now made on service animals and cite Burrows et. al. (2008) who identified 'lack 
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of rest, recovery time, and opportunity for recreation, lack of structure in a daily 
schedule, and unintentional maltreatment as the primary concerns for the 
welfare of service dogs working with autistic children' (Tedeschi et. al., 2010: 
433). Their Table 20.2 (2010: 434) lists exclusion criteria for potential PSD 
handlers (life circumstances, individual characteristics and patient's clinical 
status).  
While the above pertains specifically to PSDs, the impact of 'service' on a 
medical alert assistance dog also requires continuous monitoring.  Tedeschi et. 
al. emphasise dogs' sensitivity to emotional and mental status changes in 
humans and suggest thorough and accurate screening of clients can determine 
'requisite stability and readiness of the handler or recipient' (2010: 436). 
Screening of MDD clients is maintained throughout their co-existences with 
diabetic alert dogs to ensure both gain maximum benefit from the partnerships.  
The medical alert assistance dog may be trained to alert to particular 
odours and rewarded when successfully performing the warning, but there is 
choice here in that failure to alert will not be punished (other than loss of 
potential reward). While some of the diabetic alert dogs give an accurate alert 
95-100% of the time, there are those of both species who may be resistant to 
alert training once situated in a client’s home. 
Paul comments on Nero’s ‘headstrong’ character which had originally 
made him difficult to work with, and as a result of which he was sent back to the 
centre for further training. He says the charity had to put in a lot of work leading 
up to Nero’s accreditation as a medical alert assistance dog: 
You have to bear in mind that I’m not a well person so what looks 
easy to a healthy person, you know, and when you’re adjusting 
the dog, and checking the dog, and doing all the things you need 
to do to get him to qualify, it's hard work for me. And they always 
say it’s not the dog, it’s the owner, you’re giving cues and this and 
that... 
There are occasions in every family when expected synchrony fails and a 
misunderstanding of voiced or silent communication causes conflict, but there is 
perhaps a greater effort to comprehend and resolve such issues immediately 
between the dog and human who work in chronic illness and need their 
interdependence for bettered existence. Time and timing may be significant in 
interspecies activity within Type 1 diabetes. It may not be possible to extend 
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argument when conflict vies with necessity for an immediate alert and medical 
treatment.  
Natasha is relieved that Paul and Nero did bond again: 'well, had we had 
another three months like that, we would have divorced each other, I think’. 
They both laugh but the situation appears to have had serious implications. She 
continues: 
You know you want to know how the dog affects the family unit? 
I’m not kidding you, we, I mean Paul and I don’t fall out, we very,  
very rarely argue, but then we really were, it was not good; it gets 
me emotional just thinking about it. He wanted Nero to go and I 
wanted him to stay. 
Paul interjects: ‘You say I wanted him to go, but I didn’t, I just couldn’t 
cope with what was happening’. 
This ‘headstrong’ behaviour by Nero draws recollection of remarks by 
Terry about Jim’s ‘playing without stopping’. Terry describes Jim’s method of 
alerting to high blood sugar levels or hyperglycaemia, as ‘frenetic’. He wonders 
how many dogs are being re-homed because of that behaviour, caused by 
people’s blood sugars rising to a high level when they have not been diagnosed 
as diabetic. 
How many people have planned to re-home their dogs because 
they think they can’t control them when in fact, the dogs are doing 
their best to alert to high blood sugars? If my sugars go high you 
cannot stop it (Jim's playing), and yet as soon as I get the test kit 
out and I've done the test, he'll go and lie down. 
This conjures an immediate image of a young West Highland terrier, 
Becky, hurtling wildly round and round my 12-year-old friend Jane as she stood 
in the garden. ‘We call them her mad-dog episodes; she’s always doing it’ – 
both Jane and her father had Type 1 diabetes, so it is likely Becky’s days were 
often interrupted if intense play is indeed a form of hyper-alerting. Whether she 
and Jim were merely trying to use up excess energy by having fun, or were 
attempting instead to draw urgent attention to their human companions' erratic 
blood sugar levels, is for further contemplation. 
7.8 An ‘alliance of friendship’? 
The lion may be anthropocentrically heralded ‘king of the beasts’, and the 
horse as ‘man’s [sic] noblest creation’ (Cassidy, 2002: 137), but those are titles 
that, while calling for admiration of aristocratic breeding, create distance from 
the iconic creatures so labelled. In terming the dog ‘man’s[sic] best friend’, the 
  
186 
 
anthropocentric intention seems to be a plaudit for the ‘other’, an appreciation of 
the goodness and a tribute to the best in companion animal-ship; and perhaps 
an attempted classless bringing-in to the human ‘fold’.  There seems to be an 
increasing and to-be-welcomed human desire, illustrated at least in 
contemporary social science literature (for example, Birke and Hockenhull, 
2015;  Braidotti, 2009; Hurn, 2012; Irvine, 2012), to eradicate ideals of our 
superiority over nonhuman animals and reduce differentiation between human 
and other-than-human beings. 
Is this kindly best-friending a genuine wish to share a common status?  
Adam Miklósi (2009) is among those who consider that the human-dog 
relationship could be an alliance of friendship, and referring to Silk (2002), he 
contends that this form of friendship could engage ‘a social dimension for 
mutual trade without the need of immediate reciprocation, having a propensity 
for sharing things and the possibility of offering social support (and thus 
enhancing mental and physical health) and engaging in cooperative actions’ 
(2009: 165). In the case of a diabetes alert dog and human ‘alliance’, sharing, 
supporting and cooperating are definite facets of the friendship, but there is, 
however, a need for immediate reciprocation in mutual trade, since as soon as 
the dog gives an alert, the human has to test blood sugar levels and reward the 
dog for an accurate assessment straightaway. As commented on by Richard, a 
few seconds of delay in offering a reward for appropriate alerting can seriously 
offset alert training since dogs benefit from association with the action and 
reward in order to bolster memory for future alerting: 
I think I was a bit disorganised in terms of alerting when he first 
arrived and didn’t recognise an alert quickly enough. The charity 
said I had to ‘treat’ him more quickly but I’m slow at checking my 
blood sugar levels. I used to drop things although I don’t have 
neuropathy. 
Certainly Hurn’s (2012) contention that friendship may be an appropriate 
way to think about the human-companion animal bond, seems viable and easy 
to accept, provided there is mutual desire for such bonding and resultant 
friendship regardless of the usefulness of each to the other. The ‘spark of 
mutual attraction, or a recognition of personhood across the species barrier’, 
(2012: 109) invite trust and co-responsibility to deepen new bonds of friendship. 
Perhaps by now we have been sufficiently encouraged to move away from 
Cartesian dualism (the separation of mind from body) and are ready to 
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recommend a contemporary mutualism to fuzz those divisive boundaries that 
separate ‘man and his dog’. 
Dogs are not the sole sentient instruments of detection and identification. 
As discussed in the section on olfaction, academic research, anecdote and 
media articles have all reported the scenting abilities of rats and elephants, 
land, avian and marine creatures. Serpell (1996: 19) contends that pigs are 'no 
less intelligent than dogs or cats; they are sociable and clean and, when tamed, 
make amiable pets', despite the general belief that they are unclean creatures. 
The pig is also an efficient and accurate olfactory sensor in the detection of 
drugs, for which employment there is reward; and, in a very different industry, 
the pig, as shown below, is proving to be a key factor in contemporary scientific 
experimentation to improve human health. 
7.9 Xenotransplantation and animal models for human treatment 
...en route, he’s stalked by escaped gen-mod animals, among 
them the vicious wolvogs and the giant pigoons, made crafty by 
their human brain tissue 
 Atwood, MaddAddam, 2013: xvi 
Here is undoubted controversy, where head and heart collide, and 
advocacy for equal status among species and a symbiotic code of ethics, vents 
vociferous protest above laboratory experimentation on nonhuman others. 
Xenotransplantation is no longer the novelist’s imaginary construct and 
Margaret Atwood’s dystopian creation, the ‘giant pigoon’' cannot be regarded as 
a ‘pigs might fly’ adynaton, an exaggeration beyond the possible, when stem 
cell technology and gene editing are fast altering definition of what it is to be pig, 
bird or human.  
Pierson et al. (2009: 263) suggest xenotransplantation, the use of 
nonhuman animals such as genetically-modified pigs, in organ 
donation/transplant surgery, may reduce or close the gap between insufficient 
human cells, tissues or organs, and the needs of numerous people with 
diabetes who may require pancreatic islet 'allotransplantation'10.  
A study in Cell Stem Cell examines ‘tolerance induction and reversal of 
diabetes in mice transplanted with human embryonic stem cell-derived 
                                                          
10
 Allotransplantation transfers cells, organs or tissues from one individual to another of the 
same species with a different genotype, whereas, in xenotransplantation, the transfer takes 
place between different species, for example, pigs and humans. 
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pancreatic endoderm’ (hESC-PE) (Szot et. al., 2015: 148).Their results  'support 
the clinical development of hESC-derived therapy, combined with tolerogenic11 
treatments, as a sustainable alternative strategy for patients with Type 1 
diabetes' (2015: 148). 
More recently, Yamaguchi et. al. (2017) injected mouse pluripotent stem 
cells (PSCs) into Pdx-1(pancreatic and duodenal homeobox [Homo sapiens 
(human)])-deficient rat blastocysts, generating rat-sized pancreata composed of 
mouse-PSC-derived cells. Islets from these pancreata were transplanted into 
mice with streptozotocin-induced diabetes where they ‘normalized and 
maintained host blood glucose levels for over 370 days...’ (Yamaguchi et. al., 25 
January, 2017).The researchers suggest their data provide proof-of-principle 
evidence for the therapeutic potential of 'PSC-derived islets generated by 
blastocyst complementation in a xenogeneic host’ (25 January, 2017).  
Complex and progressive as this experimentation would appear, use of 
the pig (and rats, mice and others) as laboratory model and ‘future xenograft 
donor’ (Hansen, Dahl and Sørensen, 2002: 45) invites concern over the 
‘transgression of species boundaries’ (Birke and Michael, 1998: 245) as 
envisioned in Atwood’s ‘gen-mod giant pigoon’. This hybridized creature plays a 
significant role in MaddAddam (2013), the concluding instalment of her post-
apocalyptic trilogy, as well as performing actively in the preceding two volumes, 
Oryx and Crake (2003) and The Year of the Flood (2009). 
Recent advances in animal biotechnology and deepening discussion of 
the field of bioethics are highlighted by Richard Twine (2015); and Donna 
Haraway’s ‘genetically engineered lab critter, patented under the name 
OncoMouse’, is creeping into a broader public knowledge (2008: 76). This 
‘transgenic animal’ was created to act as a model for breast cancer 
investigation but other transgenic mice have been used ‘to study the expression 
of AIDS in the human immune deficiency system’ (Salvi, 2001: 16) and, as 
mentioned below, continue to provide vast numbers of living models for ongoing 
global experimental studies into human health and illness. 
Gail Davies poses at the outset of her study (2013: 130), ‘what might it 
mean to become with an inbred mouse?’  Talking of ‘managing mutation in 
mouse models of human disease’, she examines the increasingly useful role of 
                                                          
11
 capable of producing immunological tolerance (Merriam-Webster Medical Dictionary, n.d.) 
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mouse models to understand human biology and disease which has resulted in 
a human-mouse biomedical entanglement and inbred mice who become 
globally commercial and in Haraway’s words (1997: 7)  scientific instruments 
‘for sale like many other laboratory devices’. 
Looking at directions for future research, authors of the JDRF Type 1 
Diabetes Research Roadmap suggest new animal models in the field of 
diabetes complications need to be created since, they opine, there are relatively 
few robust current models and, ‘although the progression to disease is 
compressed into approximately six months compared to the decades of 
progression in humans, molecules accessed from industry could be rapidly 
tested and moved into new trials where appropriate' (2013: 24). Support here 
perhaps for Cohen’s (1986) contention that animals should increasingly be used 
in biomedical research. 
Again involving mice as laboratory ‘models’, different options may evolve 
from the ongoing research into beta cell replacement, regeneration and 
transplantation (JDRF, 2013). Animal models, for example the non-obese 
diabetic (NOD) mice, are commonly used for research into Type 1 diabetes, but 
do not always display identical modelling to that evidenced in human Type 1 
diabetes. A JDRF (2013) article points out that these mice may spontaneously 
develop insulin-dependent diabetes as a result of insulitis, an inflammatory 
autoimmune reaction within the islet cells, which can cause divergence from 
human Type 1 diabetes. 
However, although this developing research conveys breakthrough 
options for the future, there is no doubt that the ability to participate safely and 
confidently in daily social activities remains the current major objective of those 
already diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes, whether living alone, or with family 
members, friends and colleagues. 
These creatures, co-opted willingly or unwillingly to extend human ability 
and desire, appear to embody technologies for peaceful purpose, to prevent 
extinction or to aid in conflict resolution, with most species wearing some form 
of harness, or a transmitter attached to a harness. The medical alert assistance 
dog may wear an identifying jacket, collar and leash when working in public, but 
within the shared home, the dog performs the wanted health behaviour without 
wearing any additional, manufactured equipment. Anticipated reward for correct 
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hypo-detection may be the motivation but the dog alone is the unadorned 
instrument for improving care practice and wellbeing.  
Morrison and Morgan (1999: 10) examine models as ‘autonomous 
agents’ and detail how they function as ‘instruments of investigation’.  Models, 
they suggest, may function as tools or instruments and are ‘independent of, but 
mediate between things; and like tools, can often be used for many different 
tasks’ (1999:11). That the authors refer to models as ‘one of the critical 
instruments of modern science’, does not preclude the concept of the medical 
alert assistance dog working autonomously as an instrument of varied function. 
The dogs provide effective alerting to fast-falling blood sugar levels but also, in 
representing and co-embodying chronic illness, bring knowledge to the 
individual companion and to a diabetes-unaware public (refer Sarah's comment 
earlier on the invisibility of diabetes).  
Tim Ingold (2000: 294) views the use of tools as ‘an instance of skilled 
practice’ in contrast with the use of them as ‘the operation of a technology’. He 
suggests ‘tools of coercion, such as the whip or spur’ (2000: 307) were and still 
are used by the ‘human master to control the skilled tool-using performance of 
his charges’ under conditions of human/animal slavery. In the training of 
medical alert assistance dogs, the whip is more likely made of cheese or other 
strong-flavoured edible item of reward and all requests are asked in positive 
terms and the wanted responses are similarly recognised. But there still 
remains the issue of the animate instrument. 
The significance of this sentient means of improvement in healthcare is 
well illustrated by Paul who portrays his canine companion Nero, in terms of 
both equipment and ‘pet’ animal:  
I see him first as an aid like a blood monitor, in other words, he’s 
just another tool that helps me.  Bearing that in mind, I obviously 
also see him as a pet, he gets me out, he gets me doing things... I 
mean I’m walking again and I’m exercising which I wasn’t doing, 
he’s keeping me fit, he gives me a better value of life – so he’s just 
another tool on top of being a companion; he’s just another tool 
that adds to the list of things that will help – in a really cut-throat 
kind of way, he’s serving a purpose. I see him in that role - and 
then I see him as a pet, but the pet is the last thing. 
Natasha takes an opposing view, observing that Nero is a member of her 
family and she considers him ‘first and foremost to be a pet who just happens to 
have a very cool, clever, life-saving ability’. 
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I note that Terry talks of his well-mannered DAD, Jim, as a companion 
but, like Paul, he also perceives the dog as an instrument.  He compares his 
reading of Jim’s signals to reading the signals of a faulty vehicle: 
You know when there’s something wrong with your car and you 
take it to a mechanic if it’s not driving right or the brakes are a bit 
sloppy – you know, you just know. And in that way, I treat the dog 
like a piece of equipment because I’m reading the signs that this 
piece of equipment gives me. 
But, as Paul has explained his varying views of the tool/pet, 
inanimate/animate dichotomy, Terry also observes that 
the dog’s not a robot, not a piece of machinery; you’ve got to allow 
the dog to be a dog and do what a dog needs to do. You’ve 
always got to think they’re animals, not like robots or a wheelchair. 
You can’t park him up in a corner, put the brake on him and say 
that’s it – I’m not using you for the next eight hours. 
Of course he can be a bit naughty; he’s a dog, not a robot, that’s 
the sort of difference. My wheelchair won’t misbehave. 
This brings a dry ‘unless it breaks down’ from Nick, and Terry mutters 
wryly ‘I don’t have to feed the wheelchair’, but it is abundantly clear that Jim 
holds high status in the family and they are aware of his needs as much as their 
own: 
With an animate tool like the assistance dog, you have to think of 
another individual. If you’re going along a busy road, how will your 
dog react to something like a 10-ton truck going past – you may 
have to change sides, putting the dog on the inside (instead of 
between Terry in the wheelchair and the traffic) for his own safety. 
Among a wide-range of complex situations they face every day, they 
recall Christmas-time ventures into town with Jim and the wheelchair:  
It’s busy and people are carrying big bags and they don’t 
think...you get clobbered, never mind the dog. They step straight 
out of a shop and because you’re below their eye-level, they don’t 
see you. 
Continuing with the theme of the living, active dog and the ‘static piece of 
equipment that just sits there’, Nick relates comment about a well-known sports 
personality who has embodied wheelchair-living for most of her life:  
To start with, she believed you’ve got to walk, you must wear leg 
callipers, you must walk because walking’s good for you; but she 
found it such hard work and was so tired. However, in a 
wheelchair, she said she’s got life, she can go off and do things, 
play with other children and ‘run away’ – things she couldn’t do in 
callipers, so to her the wheelchair was an enabler whereas to 
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others, ‘it’s the end of my life’. So you’ve got two completely 
different attitudes to the wheelchair – it’s turning more towards 
thinking of it as a life-enhancing piece of equipment – but so is an 
assistance dog. 
Referring to disability studies (for example, Bury, 1991, 2001; Charmaz, 
1995, 2006; Nettleton, 2013; Shakespeare, 2014, and Taylor, 2014), in which 
stigma and disenfranchisement are highlighted and result in a negative slant 
towards individuals lacking certain abilities, such research also envisages 
treating disability equipment as means to make an individual feel unique and to 
have a life worth living – raising personal status to an achievable and desirable 
standard. Tom Shakespeare (2014: 97) investigates people with impairments 
who are socially identified as disabled but may be reluctant to identify with what 
has become a stigmatising label. Janet, for example, feared that the co-
presence of DAD, Alfie, would draw attention to her illness and cause her 
increased social isolation. However, others such as Terry, whose capabilities 
are hampered by physical impairment and the need for particular equipment, 
identify themselves as ‘normal’ and not disabled in the first place. 
7.10 Wearing status 
In public, the dog wears a jacket identifying a link to the charity training 
and matching the diabetic alert canines to their human partners; a collar and 
lead are similarly-labelled means of identity, bringing attention to the dyad and 
an elevated status to the working dog. This scarlet, labelled jacket designating 
the dog’s prowess in biomedical achievement, echoes Rebecca Cassidy’s 
depiction of the importance and power assigned by racehorse clothing.  
’Perhaps the most significant horse clothing of all is the rug presented to the 
winners of big races; usually brightly coloured and bearing the name of the race 
and its sponsor, the horse carries its status on its back’ (Cassidy, 2002: 27). 
The alert assistance dogs may not be race winners but the jacket identifies the 
significance of their work and broadcasts the high status earned by each of 
them. 
Terry remarks their visibility in public: 
It’s not just the fact you’ve got an assistance dog; you’re an 
ambassador for the charity. People see the name of the charity 
(on the dog’s jacket) so they’re expecting a certain level of 
behaviour from you and from the dog. People will approach you 
and want to know what the charity’s about – and he can be a 
monster. (Terry and Nick both laugh and I find it hard to believe 
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that this intelligent, kind-natured person could ever demonstrate 
what contemporary society might imagine to be ‘monsterhood’.) 
Rod Michalko (1999) offers alternative reasoning for clothing designating 
prestige to the wearer.  He suggests that his guiding dog, Smokie’s harness 
presents a cue to the social observer that symbolises ‘work and blindness’ 
Similarly the DAD's jacket and leash therefore represent work and diabetes, and 
draw attention to the usually-hidden complexities of this illness. To an observing 
member of society, this is likely to indicate that a dog in an identifying jacket is a 
well-trained, working assistance dog.  
However, online columnist Helen Dolphin is among those who are 
'concerned that growing numbers of untrained and badly behaved fakes could 
compromise the credibility of the real thing' (Disability Now, 4 January, 2016). 
Terry and Nick mention they know of three 'fake assistance dogs cropping up' in 
their region. People buy or make dog jackets in order to convey the impression 
that their dog is a well-trained assistance dog so as to enter buildings or 
organisations, into which a dog would not normally be allowed access. If an 
untrained dog then misbehaves while wearing an ‘internet’-purchased 'fake' 
assistance dog jacket in public, Terry believes that accredited assistance dogs 
may 'get a bad name'. On the other hand, as seen in the many online 
responses to Dolphin's concern, there are long waiting lists for qualified 
assistance dogs and some people with mobility issues find it necessary to train 
their own dogs as best they can in order to have any sort of social contact.  
So that we can see Gemma ‘working’ in public, Mel and her family drive 
one of the charity’s instructors and myself to a shopping mall and we park on 
the roof of a multi-storey car park. Gemma wears her red DAD jacket and I am 
struck by an apparent change in her bearing compared to her un-jacketed self 
when on a ‘free run’ earlier in the day.  
On our walk in the countryside, I listen to the conversation between Mel 
and the instructor and watch Gemma and her young companion, Mark, 
zigzagging ahead. Gemma is off the leash but continually looks back at him. 
She jumps over tussocks and bushes, racing through long grass and saplings, 
ears flapping like soft wings. Every time Mark calls to her, she rushes back to 
him. However, there is a single hiatus when the smell of decomposing rabbit 
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proves too much to ignore, when she could be said to demonstrate agency12 in 
activating her inner 'dogness' so as to enjoy the fruits of her macrosmatic sense 
of smell: she triumphantly parades the corpse. Surprising to me is that she 
returns to Mel when called and allows her to retrieve the rabbit and dispose of it 
without argument. The leash is produced and she stays with us briefly before 
being released to continue exploring her chosen pathways. 
Wearing her jacket in town later in the day, she appears to hold her head 
higher, her stance is more erect and her gait is shortened, more precise, neat 
and purposeful – her identity seems to take on the persona of an authoritative 
medical assistant, yet retains that of a happy, well-loved family member.  
But then, other participants say they see no change at all in their dogs’ 
demeanours, jackets on or off. Paul and Natasha believe that Nero portrays the 
other side of the coin. Anthropomorphically, they consider him to be 'a man of 
his own mind' and put human words into his mouth so that his imagined 
emotions may be verbalised: 
It’s a bit like when we used to give a talk and get all dressed up in 
the MDD-logo clothes – you could see him sitting on the stairs 
going ‘oh god, I’m going to get patted on the head all afternoon. 
Will I get a run at the end of it or...?’ But he’s so affable, he’ll do 
anything you ask him to do...He’s not a cuddly dog and as far as 
putting the jacket on, he’s a man of his own mind and I don’t think 
it makes any difference, I don’t think he’s more proud, he doesn’t 
do a ‘ooh look I’ve got my jacket on’. 
Paul: No, he’s more of a ‘let me get my head-collar off’ – that’s his 
main goal – but then he could be the anomaly... 
I wonder if I, too, am imagining, anthropomorphising, incorporating what 
others have told me that, when their dogs wear their labelled jackets, they seem 
to be aware that they are professionals and have a sense of pride in their work. 
‘A sense of pride?’ That is inference and not knowledge so I must be attributing 
certain human personality traits to these dogs, allowing them some form of 
emotional awareness and abstract thinking, even the cognitive ability to 
possess 'theory of mind', and to attribute mental states to themselves and to 
others. This is a topic well investigated by Bekoff (2002; 2004), de Waal (2010), 
Panksepp (2005; 2011), Von Uexküll (1934 [2010]), Weil (2012) and others who 
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 A definition of 'agency' appears in Coulter (2016: 79): 'Agency (understood concisely) means 
the ability to think, act, and make choices and/or change. Agency can be individual and/or 
collective'. 
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have considered that bonobos, chimpanzees, elephants, dolphins as well as   
more domesticated species, for example, dogs and humans, are able to share 
in the perceptions, emotions and environments of other familiar beings. 
However, despite increasing neuroscientific investigation (Panksepp, 2011), 
definition of nonhuman animal consciousness shifts over time and remains 
unclear, perhaps because of the impossibility of accurately 'reading' another's 
mind or of absorbing sufficient aspects of their subjective umwelt.  
Miklósi and Topál (2013) write of developmental social competence 
(DSC), ‘an individual’s ability to generate social skills that conform to the 
expectations of others and the social rules of the group’ and this reminds again 
of Srinivasan's 'anthropogenic norms' and conjures further guidelines for my 
human imagining that dogs have degrees of 'awareness’ - although having a 
sense of pride in their occupation may not yet be recognised evidence of canine 
competence and cognition. 
Gemma’s altered presence in my imagination from that of playmate to 
professional may perhaps be compared to horses entering a show-ring or 
dressage arena. ‘She’s such a diva’ is a frequent comment but it’s not a 
censure, rather an acclaim, an admiration of the horse’s altered self-carriage 
and ‘presence’ before spectators, and a further example of attributing human-
created values to a nonhuman other. Similar attributions of 'presence', 'stamp'  
and 'type' are spoken by spectators and breeders observing prized Welsh Cobs 
entering a show-ring with their 'handlers' (Hurn, 2008a; and 2008b: 32 and 
41n13). 
However, it seems likely that the diabetic human’s status would be 
perceived as of higher import if the dog were unidentifiable (un-jacketed) 
beyond the rank of companion animal. In contrast, the rider would be ‘just a 
rider’ without the horse demonstrating his or her prowess. Hurn (2011: 109) 
contends that 'the act of clothing animals' is a means of control over their 
'animality', whereas the 'removal of clothing and material paraphernalia' (for 
example, the DAD's jacket, collar and leash) could instead signify respect and 
recognition of nonhuman animal personhood. But then again, if the alert dog 
were not wearing identification when the dyad is viewed by a public eye, their 
combined access into many institutions and organisations could be barred.  
7.11 Disabling identity 
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What has been noticed by participants is that the add-on items of our 
material culture, the labelled jacket and harness, also highlight the human 
inability to perform many of the functions achieved by more able members of 
their communities. Even though being diagnosed with diabetes does not strap 
an identifying jacket onto the human self, an imagined discriminatory label is felt 
to have been metaphorically attached to the individual walking with the jacketed 
assistance dog. This may lead to unwanted isolation and social 
disenfranchisement, the result of a public designation or at least inference of the 
possibility that the human partner has failed to live appropriately within the 
generally-accepted norms of society and its local cultural patterns. 
Clinton Sanders has examined the impact of guide dogs on their visually-
impaired human companions, noting how ‘the stereotypic expectations of the 
sighted public’ affected feelings of self-worth and accorded diminished identities 
to the unsighted or partially-sighted humans (2000: 136).  In this way, the 
assistance dogs draw negative attention to the human disability and as a result, 
are objectified by the disabled person as well as by a wider society 
Sanders affirms that others follow this way of thinking, suggesting that 
some people with visual impairments see their assistance dogs as ‘mobility 
devices’. The diabetes alert canines may equally be considered ‘diagnostic 
devices’ that can lead to social isolation.  For the chronically ill individuals 
depicted here, the medical alert assistance dog may be a sign that visibly 
highlights their in-abilities to society, a symbolism from which they may fervently 
wish to disentangle themselves. However, they may not survive without the 
ever-present early warning system that accompanies them on the bus to go 
shopping, who lies close by in the pub or restaurant, who nudges an arm at the 
cinema or disturbs their sleep at night so that extreme fluctuations in blood 
glucose levels can be quickly rectified. 
Alternatively, regarding the DADs as animate equipment, as sentient 
colleagues, can significantly change how people with chronic illness regard 
themselves and their social interactions. Self-esteem is boosted by cooperative 
endeavour and enables the previously-mentioned Michalko-merger of the two-
into-one for those with vision difficulties, into a shared identity, the 'two-in-one', 
for those with complex Type 1 diabetes.  
The dogs become complex, even contradictory symbols (semiotically-
speaking) which can impact on the way their humans perceive them. This leads 
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to the notion of 'flexible personhood' introduced by Shir-Vertesh (2012: 420) to 
'describe the Israeli cultural reasoning in the treatment of pets that encourages 
people to react adaptively and opportunistically to changing ways of life and 
social conditions' (2012: 421). Within the observed multispecies relationships, 
she discovers an oscillating momentum that alters boundaries and practices, 
activity that is similarly reflected below in Janet's changing perspective. Shir-
Vertesh proposes a theoretical approach which 'goes beyond the treatment of 
animals as commodities or symbols that are treated irresolutely in their service 
to humans' (2012: 429). This perspective, she concludes, enables investigation 
into the 'intimacy created' with companion animals as a 'flexible, yet structured, 
space with its own objectives and meanings' (2012: 429). 
Prior to Alfie’s arrival, anticipation of an always-in-attendance medical 
assistance dog provoked Janet to consider whether she might be labelled 
‘disabled’, because of the dog’s constant and close proximity. Having put 
forward this suggestion, she then kept silent for several minutes before 
admitting that 
...for a while I had a bit of a thing where I didn’t want people to 
think that because I had an assistance dog, I was disabled, and I 
had a real thing in my head that that was how I was going to be 
seen... 
But the advantages obtained by sharing life with the assistance dog 
appear to outweigh the disadvantages, and she added that her fear of the 
disabled label 
...didn’t last too long. I think once our bond properly started and he 
was alerting effectively, that just went out of the window.  It 
became – that’s what he does and it’s far more important than how 
I feel or am being perceived. 
The bond established between Alfie and Janet, and the efficacy of the 
working dog’s alerts, banished her fears of public identification as disabled, and 
therefore considered incapable, because of the dog’s presence. 
8 Animals as health technologies  
 Considering early Anthropocen(tr)ic management of/collaboration with 
nonhuman animals to be the tinder sparking forever-after domestic ‘use of other 
animals as technologies’ (Twine, 2015: 14), and recalling the previous 
domestication perspectives observed by Budiansky (1997), Clutton-Brock 
(1995) and Miklósi (2009), regarding historical canine domestication in chapter 
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4, Silverstone’s (1992) theory of domestication is now employed to expand the 
concept of using domestic animals as instruments to improve health. The four 
tenets of this perspective – appropriation, objectification, incorporation, 
conversion - enable exploration as to how the diabetes alert dog might be 
considered an everyday health technology. Haddon (2007: 26) reminds that the 
metaphor of 'domestication' evolves from 'the taming of wild animals' but was 
applied by Silverstone to describe procedures mobilised in the domestication of 
information and communication technologies.   
The difference suggested here between consideration of diabetes alert 
dogs as animate instruments and/or as health technologies may rest partially on 
degrees of activity or passivity; whether they function as domesticated, obedient 
tools available for selection among those in the human’s medical bag and/or as 
domesticated but agentic and autonomous enablers of human health 
improvement. 
Morrison and Morgan have articulated the concept of models as 
mediating instruments, an example which can be effectively reflected in the 
DAD’s performance as equipment and companion: 
Models have to be used before they will give up their secrets. In 
this sense, they have the quality of a technology – the power of 
the model only becomes apparent in the context of its use (1999: 
12). 
 It is only this century that has seen ‘the power’ of the dog’s olfactory 
sensitivity and its use in rendering an individual with Type 1 diabetes free from 
social isolation and the fear of a hypoglycaemic coma.  
Peter Soppelsa (2015: 252) examines the question of animals as 
technology, following Ann Norton Greene’s (2008) contention that horses were 
‘a crucial power source’ behind the rise of American industrialisation. Coulter 
supports this by suggesting that ‘horses do work of various kinds for people, 
and people garner material, social and/or personal gain from that work’ (2016a: 
148) and adds that this statement ‘can be extended to aptly characterize 
animals’ work more broadly’ (2016: 6).  
‘Our technologies both shape and express who we are’, claims Soppelsa 
(2015: 253) and this is evident in the co-embodied interspecies partnerships 
which become single entities in the public understanding of multispecies 
performances. Two necessarily entangled beings with one identity, similar to 
that discovered by sociologist Rod Michalko with his guide dog, Smokie (1999), 
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and the becoming of Goffman’s (1959) presentation of ‘our self’, the two in one 
in blindness, or in this instance, the two in one in chronic illness. In this research 
the alerting assistance dog and the human with Type 1 diabetes take on a 
shared persona, becoming a carefully choreographed, but also independently 
active, instrument of biotechnology performing the complex dance that is 
exacted by chronic illness. 
As living organisms trained as, guided by, and ultimately ‘doing’ medical 
technology, these human-nonhuman products of interspecies cooperation and 
collaboration accept the challenges of chronic illness, navigate its unpredictable 
oscillations, and foretell the vagaries of lives that would be lost without insulin. 
Soppelsa (2015: 255) suggests Greene’s book demonstrates how 
‘socially-desirable animals also serve to reshape the society’ in which we 
reside.  Horses defined that economy, being used as a technology to ‘drive’ 
industry, pulling fire-engines and canal barges, hauling gun-carriages and 
ploughs, extending human abilities through their actions. Ingold (2000: 308) 
hammers home the unedifying point that ‘perhaps in no other employment has 
an animal come closer to being converted into a pure machine, functioning 
simply as a prime-mover’. So what did these bred ever-larger, ever-stronger, 
horses gain from this evolutionary determinism?   
Repeating Lynda Birke's (2009) question that refers to researcher 
accountability to their nonhuman participants, what is in it for the animals? 
Certainly an avoidance of harm, but did the ‘mechanical’ horses of industry 
become more successfully empowered to improve their own welfare? As soon 
as insentient technology was developed, for example, in the form of steam 
engines and armoured tanks, the heavy horses devolved into show-pieces at 
agricultural shows or were brought out of redundancy for ceremonial occasions, 
and are now rarely considered desirable shapers of society, regardless of their 
historical industrial worth.  
Seen as ‘socially desirable’, but  possibly achieving a greater reward and 
avoidance of harm in comparison to the harnessed horses of the pre-industrial 
era, the working medical alert assistance dog has had a more recent impact on 
the reshaping of our society. Used as instruments of biomedical technology to 
rearrange and improve management of life with chronic illness, dogs' olfactory 
skills stretch and hone human capabilities, and when compared to many cold 
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inanimate diagnostic or remedial devices, their warm practices of care sculpt 
socially-acceptable multispecies niches. 
8.1 Contemporary canine domestication 
If the Latin word, ‘domus’, is translated into ‘house’ or ‘home’ (see also 
Leach, 1989), it is simple to understand ‘domicile’ as a place of settled 
residence. Yet, if the noun’s meaning changes when it is adapted to become 
‘domestic’, a servant of others in the home, it is also altered further in 
significance when the word becomes  ‘domesticate/d’ or ‘tame/d’ inviting visions 
of servitude and connotation of human domination and control over a ‘wild’ 
nonhuman being (Ingold, 2000; Malamud, 2013).  
In this instance, there is a softer side to domestication whereby the 
human offers to share a trusting co-existence (Armstrong Oma, 2010; Palmer, 
1997) and to shepherd a fear-free and curious dog into a human-made 
protective fold; an invitation that can result in an emergence of symbiotic health 
care practices within the bounds of an already-domesticated unwell individual 
and a collective social ‘domus’; an acceptable multispecies niche. 
Historical canine domestication and the engagement of an ‘other’ in care 
practices have been previously mentioned, with focus on the diabetes alert 
dog’s ability to assist an unwell human with coping skills for survival 
management; so more contemporary approaches to multispecies domestication 
are now explored. 
Donna Haraway (2008: 207) highlights the collaborative world of humans 
and dogs who work together in sports agility competition and remarks in that 
context: 
Training together puts the participants inside the complexities of 
instrumental relations and structures of power. How can dogs and 
people in this kind of relationship be means and ends for each 
other in ways that call for reshaping our ideas about, and practices 
of, domestication? 
Haraway recalls Despret’s (2004) concept of ‘anthropo-zoo-genetic 
practice’ in her redefinition of domestication where people and animals become 
more available, more interesting, more open to each other and gain new 
identities.  
In using this approach to domestication in support of a routinely-used 
health technology, motivation was encouraged and informed by the writings of 
Haraway and Despret; by research into the role of communication and 
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information technologies in the home and in society (Silverstone, Hirsch and 
Morley, 1992), by Jeannette Pols’ (2012) research into care and technology, 
and by a study (Carter, Green and Thorogood, 2013) examining the 
domestication of an everyday health technology, the electric toothbrush. 
However, instead of the inanimate electric toothbrush which requires 
manipulation via electric current and human dexterity, under focus here is the 
domestication of a sentient ‘everyday health technology’: an entirely animate 
and long-domesticated canine, the working diabetes alert assistance dog. 
Consideration is given as to whether this canine creation may be perceived as 
an everyday viable health technology mobilising improvement in the diabetic 
individual’s way of living, or, as Carter et. al. (2013: 344) have postulated, as a 
sometimes “unstable object” in the domestic setting. 
Tim Dant (2007) suggests that daily interactions with material objects 
depend on the way each individual makes sense of their significance and how 
they may be altered to fit current needs. He writes of design and consumption in 
respect of car repair and furniture construction, but here the dog comes already 
designed (macrosmatic scenting ability) and constructed (trained), and 
consumption of its scenting prowess relies on interactions between the human 
and nonhuman in order to achieve required goals.  
Miller’s concluding request in ‘Stuff’ calls for ‘a consideration of things 
commensurate with the place they evidently have in our lives’ (2010: 156) and 
as items of material culture who hold ongoing significance in and for the lives 
they share, diabetes alert dogs deserve consideration and approbation as living 
beings ’in our lives’; as creatures whose status seems often to rank of equal 
significance to that of the human with whom they co-exist. 
The electric toothbrush is an efficient health technology for oral hygiene 
similar to the well-marketed insulin pump’s usefulness as a health technology in 
Type 1 diabetes, to balance insulin intake against carbohydrate ingestion and 
exercise. However, both material items have inanimate dispositions and lack 
the ability to function without human intervention.   
At the start of this century, assistance dogs, for example, the Guide Dog, 
were recognised as material sources of health and social improvement for sight-
impaired people, but the notion of canine scenting ability being sufficiently 
accurate to change the boundaries and relationships inherent in human chronic 
illness, and in other life-altering diseases, had yet to become reality. The 
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concept of a dog’s sense of smell actively leading to the detection of cancers is 
becoming more widely accepted (Guest, 2013; Lippi and Cervellin, 2012) while 
the canine olfactory prevention of human hypoglycaemic collapse is now 
prominent in media presentations, well supported by research evidence and 
accepted as a positive health intervention by the general public. 
However, a hypoglycaemic collapse that requires emergency health 
care, often brings shame and embarrassment to the individual in social 
situations. Once consciousness is regained, the no-longer comatose person is 
likely to feel stigmatised and that any form of social inclusion is denied to them. 
This is in direct contrast to the positive effect of an attending hypo-detection dog 
who acts as a preventative technology, a constantly on-hand biomedical and 
biosocial resource that adds to positive identity rather than detracting from it, as 
shown, for example, in the significant impact on onlookers made by Harley 
when Tina collapses in public.   
8.2  A theory of domestication 
The four phases of appropriation, objectification, incorporation and 
conversion, proposed by Silverstone, Hirsch and Morley (1992: 18) as 
‘elements of the transactional system in which the moral economy of the 
household is expressed’, may themselves be ‘appropriated’ conveniently to 
allow the alert dog to be seen as a commodity in a ‘transactional system’, and 
as a functional health technology within, and beyond the household defines. 
Domestication theory in this context involves cultural, social and 
technological networks of household daily life. Haddon (2007: 26) suggests the 
metaphor of 'domestication' came from the taming of wild animals, but contends 
that Silverstone, Hirsch and Morley (1992) intended it to 'describe processes 
involved in "domesticating ICTs" when bringing them into the home'.  The 
meanings and significance of all media and information products depend on the 
participation of the user, according to Silverstone (1996), and this suggestion 
can reflect how much meaningful use is made of the autonomous working 
assistance dog by a chronically ill person. 
The first phrase, employed to describe the concept of domestication as 
envisaged by Silverstone, Hirsch and Morley (1992: 18-23), is: 
 Appropriation: when a technology leaves the world of commodity, that is 
‘at point of sale’, it is appropriated. Then it can be ‘taken possession of by an 
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individual or household and owned’. Appropriation permits artefacts to become 
'authentic (commodities become objects) and achieve significance’ (1992: 19).  
 When a medical alert assistance dog is trained as a health-improving 
technology and is ‘matched’ to a human individual with Type 1 diabetes, the 
label of sentient biomedical resource is necessarily altered.  The dog is brought 
into another species’ living space as a commodity which, in the UK, may then 
be ‘owned’ (cf Kopytoff, 1986), the joint purposes being assistance and 
companionship. The dog crosses the boundary from formally-trained commodity 
to a seemingly well cared-for sentient possession situated in the domain of 
health care and improvement.  
But does the dog remain a commodity, and not a possession, when 
adopting the clothing of a biomedical assistant? This question may be related to 
Shir-Vertesh's concept of a flexible personhood and the notion of a DAD 
becoming an emotional commodity when considering the moral appropriation of 
the assistance dog. In the public's general gaze, the dog becomes an ethically-
cared-for individual and is seen to be ethically-consumed for human health 
benefit. Participants are, however, contracted to give optimal care to the dogs 
who share their homes, under the observation and supervision of the charity’s 
staff.  Acts of appropriation, the passage of artefacts from commodity to object 
possessed, enable ‘self-creation’, a way of defining and distinguishing 
themselves from, and allying themselves to, each other. Such appropriation 
allows for new identities to appear and be clarified; and reciprocal practices of 
care and service to be engaged.  
 Objectification: this is expressed in the use and in the physical situating 
of objects in the home's 'spatial environment' and also in the 'construction of 
that environment'. Silverstone, Hirsch and Morley aver that  
all technologies have the potential to be appropriated into an 
aesthetic environment [...] Many are purchased as much for their 
appearance and their compatibility with the dominant aesthetic 
rationality of the home as for their functional significance' (1992: 
20).  
 
 As ‘objects that appear and are displayed in an already constructed (and 
always reconstructable) meaningful spatial environment’ (1992: 20), working 
alert dogs may add to the aesthetics of the human home, thereby seeming to 
boost the homeowner’s status, through coat-colour co-ordination with room 
furnishings or because of their natural grace and elegance. However, it is for 
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their functional as well as aesthetic significance that they are objectified here 
(refer Harley’s image reflecting on Tina). The pungent smell of wet dog, the 
cacophony of welcoming or defensive barks, clumps of shed hair on floor and 
furniture, or half-eaten ‘chews’ left in doorways, may not invite an aesthetic 
sensory appreciation of the environment from a human visitor to the canine 
home. But the interspecies dyads of this study bond chiefly through both need 
and ‘likeability’. The beauty of the beast might be obvious but is not considered 
of high import compared to the good practices he or she make available. 
Thinking of colour coordination in this objectification concept of a 
domestication approach brings a chance to digress and tell of the first of my 
‘rescued’ dogs – two six-month-old black Great Danes who were advertised in 
the ‘classified’ section of the local paper below ‘fridges and freezers’ but above 
‘grey school blazer’. Had they been advertised under ‘kennels and pets’, I might 
have continued reading, but such an ignominious position for such beautiful 
creatures...when collecting them, I realised the ‘clash’ potential that had brought 
them to their uncertain future. 
The dogs seemed to have been purchased to ‘match’ the black leather 
sofas and other ebony adornment in the white-walled rooms and to dispose 
themselves ornamentally, adding glamour to the well-chivvied and bountiful 
gardens overlooking the sea as they stalked along flower-bordered paths.  
But untrained young Danes play vigorously and appear unconcerned by 
the damage they cause to human-prized furniture and flowerbeds. In my 
appropriation of the dogs, there was no need for functional significance or 
particular multi-sensory aesthetic beauty or bounty; they came to play and 
bounce and bring their joy into our home. But of course they did adorn 
landscape and hearth, and they acted with 'personal' agency in ways that had 
functional significance for us as Coetzee’s ‘part of the alarm system’ (1999: 78), 
since they were a force to be reckoned with in speed and size when greeting 
strangers walking across the fields. 
Sadly, this is not a one-off misguided happening as I have since been 
regaled (although by no means in the sense of ‘gala’ or amusement) with 
stories of other dogs ‘donated’ to rescue shelters and animal welfare centres 
because they no longer ‘match’ home furnishings or fit in aesthetically with the 
lifestyles of their incongruously-termed human ‘guardians’. Joanna Swabe 
(2005: 111)) gives the ‘exasperated’ veterinarian attitude to unnecessary 
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euthanasia of animals ‘treated as throwaway items’ to be disposed of, because 
that is considered cheaper than paying kennelling fees over holiday periods.  
 Incorporation: Silverstone, Hirsch and Morley (1992) draw attention to 
the ways in which objects, especially technologies, are used, suggesting that 
'technologies are functional. They may be bought with other features in mind 
and indeed serve other cultural purposes in appropriation' (1992: 21). In order 
to become functional, the researchers contend that a technology has to 'find a 
place within the moral economy of the household, specifically in terms of its 
incorporation into the routines of daily life' (1992: 21). 
Incorporation, as they claim above, may facilitate ‘control’ of time and this 
is highly relevant to chronic illness where time plays a prominent role in 
measuring and eating, blood testing and insulin preparation, rest and exercise. 
‘Where a technology is located and when and how it is used (and of course by 
whom) become crucial elements in the moral economy of the household as a 
whole’ (1992: 22). While Silverstone, Hirsch and Morley refer to control and use 
of television remotes and computers, such ‘usage’ of a diabetes alert dog by a 
chronically ill individual in their home, can become a routine health technology. 
But, once trained, the alert dog functions autonomously - with more self 
control than evidenced by my untrained youthful Dane companions - in working 
to maintain the safe and prolonged existence of the human partner, and at the 
same time co-embodies a shared way of living life within societal and medical 
contexts. As a technology, the DAD helps maintain the choreography and 
chronology involved in the day-in and day-out dances of diabetes. 
 Conversion: Like appropriation, Silverstone, Hirsch and Morley suggest 
conversion 'defines the relationship between the household and the outside 
world' (1992: 22). It may happen that 'artefacts and meanings, texts and 
technologies' pass through boundaries, as the household 'defines and claims 
for itself and its members a status in neighbourhood, work and peer groups in 
the "wider society" (1992: 22). The behaviour of the jacketed and therefore 
purpose-identified dog, with a human partner, for example, Gemma and Mark or 
Terry and Jim, achieve conversion from two single beings to a conjoined dyad 
and gain a status that seems to earn greater levels of respect than either would 
have achieved alone.  
 An example of a technology 'passing through boundaries' might include 
the insulin travelling from the vial via the pump and cannula to the bloodstream; 
  
206 
 
but may also be seen in the medical alert dog converting council legislation to 
allow assistance dogs and their human partners to enter institutions and 
societies formerly forbidden to them as single minorities. 
 The domestication of ‘wild’ animals and the history of human-canine 
companionship are topics covered earlier, but here, the dog is already 
domesticated and has now become a household commodity – we too have 
been ‘tamed’ into domesticity (Budiansky, 1997) and want for things to 
ornament our homes, to assist in improving our existence. The animate 
technologies, bolstering health practices in the home, are trained to convert 
their best care practices and perform them equally in the streets and buildings 
of ‘wider society’. 
8.3 Tools and devices 
I write of dogs and concomitant with this species as companions to 
human animals, is the frequent endeavour by the latter to tame, train and ‘make 
behave’; so that a connecting ‘leash’ between the two species itself becomes an 
object of domestication and a device of obedience; perhaps one of Ingold’s 
‘tools of coercion’ (2000: 307) and not always the 'smiling', u-shaped link 
encouraged by MDD trainers. Training of the diabetes alert dog involves use of 
the leash but the ultimate goal is that, after consistent practice, a smile should 
develop in the material allowing the dog to walk next to his or her partner 
without tension in the device being felt by either of them. 
Domestication theory, writes Jeannette Pols (2012: 18), ‘grants humans 
more agency: animals, plants and technologies do not determine our lives but 
come to live with us, in our homes, and on our terms’, not always in the ways 
and uses for which they were 'designed'. However, Budiansky (1997) takes an 
opposing view, elaborated below, determining that other animals domesticated 
human ways of being. 
Telling of heuristic ‘activities that “unleash” and “tame” individuals and 
devices’, and that precede the ‘domestication of a species or their living 
together – or apart – happily ever after’ (2012: 18), Pols speaks of new 
technology being ‘let out of its box’ so that ‘individual devices are unleashed into 
the daily life practices to which they come to belong’ (2012: 18). Here, both the 
diabetic alert dog and the leash become individual devices working together in 
the daily practices devised by their human partners, the one being animate, the 
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other, inanimate (although the latter, if constructed from leather, may have been 
constructed from a deceased once-animate being).  
Referring to the unpredictability of the unleashed device and its 
unexpected activities contra the design formulation, Pols (2012: 18) takes the 
‘domesticated telephone’ as an example, whereby the intention was to ‘transmit 
the business conversations of American men’, but grew instead into a widely-
used instrument of social discourse for American women. ‘The history of 
technology shows again and again that devices will behave differently to what 
their designers intended’ (Pols, 2012: 18). Indeed, no-one would have predicted 
that dogs bred for herding or guarding would become adept at sniffing for 
explosives or disease. 
Pols’ second activity 'in the process of mutual adaptation involves taming 
the devices’ so that they become practical and fit for purpose, even if not all the 
available attributes are needed or used (2012: 19). Here again, the medical 
alert dog, as a technological device, is already domesticated and tamed, and 
through contemporary positive training methods is enabled to match the 
requirements of the chronically-ill individual; to nudge or 'scrabble' (Higgins) 
rather than bark or to bring the medical kit autonomously (Gemma). But the dog 
could easily be trained to switch on lights, press doorbells, pick up dropped 
laundry, collect mail posted through the letterbox, and so on. Taming here is 
‘according to requirement’, to make ‘fit for purpose’. Terry explains that it took 
five minutes to teach Jim to turn the light off. 
He’d come and cuddle at night and, because all my light switches 
are low down, I got him used to working with the laser pointer. I 
pointed it at the light switch and said ‘touch’, which was the first 
bit. He touched the light from the pointer with his nose and it 
flicked the switch, so he got lots of praise for that and now he 
knows. 
‘We taught him “fetch help” that way too,’ and Nick moves into the 
kitchen and faces away from where Terry and Jim are sitting. Terry directs the 
laser pointer so that the red dot is visible on the back of Nick’s shirt and says 
‘look, look’. Jim runs to the kitchen and jumps up, placing both paws on Nick’s 
back. ‘That’s the only time he’s allowed to jump up – good boy’ and Terry gives 
him a treat, ‘so that’s how all this training’s been done’. 
Terry’s previous canine ‘device’ only alerted to low blood sugar readings. 
As soon as the pen drawing up the blood sample ‘clicked’, the dog would lie 
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down. Dogs, accepted as beings with agency, are unpredictable in 
temperament and behaviour no matter how similar in colour, size or pedigree. 
Jim, unlike Terry's previous assistance dog, is a more attentive and perhaps a 
more conscientious individual who waits for the 'beep' to show the meter 
reading is ready. Terry describes Jim's behaviour and, like other participants, 
enables the dog to have linguistic ability, in this case to explain his conscious 
decision to 'lie down' only when his work is complete: 
So you do the click of the pen, draw the blood, put it on the strip, 
wait for the machine to diagnose the level and it goes beep when 
it’s got the result. He goes ‘you’ve got the result there, I’ll go and 
lie down, I’ve done the job’. Sometimes, if he knows your blood 
sugar has gone quite low, he’ll sit there and make sure you’ve 
eaten a biscuit or had something – then, he’ll watch you for 
another ten minutes or more, then slowly relax and lie down. 
There are seemingly different rates of metabolism and conscientiousness 
in dogs just as are exhibited by human individuals. Despite advancement in 
genetic engineering, the animal conscious has not yet been cloned and dogs 
remain similar enough to fit with specified breed appearance, but not in terms of 
motivation, temperament, personality or conscientious endeavour. They may 
assent, adapt and comply with questions asked to become adequately 'tamed' 
devices but users need to take inventive action to achieve a progressive and 
accurate 'goodness of fit'13.  
Pols' third heuristic ‘for analysing domestication processes looks at how 
devices unleash the imagination and creativity of their users who promptly 
invent new applications’ (2012: 19). The founders of the canine biomedical 
resource under focus might never have expected crossbred and pedigreed 
dogs to adapt, tolerate and collaborate with humans to the extent that they 
become highly sensitive medical detectives, regardless of birth and social 
education. The dogs' keen scenting ability to detect VOCs in cancer cells has 
been acknowledged and expanded creatively so that medical detection dogs 
now assist humans with diabetes, allergies, potentially early stage malaria and 
other illnesses, while acting as their proverbial 'good companions' in social 
contexts. 
                                                          
13
 'Goodness of fit' is an analytical test used to check that statistical data corresponds with a model 
hypothesis, but is also used as a measure of temperament, for example, in psychosocial functioning. 
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Budiansky's concept of nonhuman animals domesticating humans and 
the need for 'cooperative associations' for survival (1997: 16), in this instance 
supports Pols’ fourth heuristic which observes how devices dance a volte face, 
a turn-around intended to tame the humans, ‘by allowing for, or even forcing, 
some activities while hindering others’ (Pols, 2012: 19). Manipulation of the 
human by the diabetes alert dog is a visible and accepted construct in their 
cooperative domestication. It is essential that an individual with Type 1 diabetes 
follows a set procedure that is insisted on by the dog’s warning behaviour. The 
dogs are unable to relax and ‘chill’ until their human companions have 
performed a blood test – and acted upon it, by topping up insulin or ingesting 
fast-acting carbohydrate. Jim and Harley have illustrated this avoidance of lying 
down and sleeping until Terry and Tina have conducted the necessary 
procedures. A further example occurred when a performance of care practice 
by the dog, which was not included in the training, ‘empowered’ him to do more, 
to act autonomously, to decide how to fulfil an action deemed necessary, for 
example, by ‘blocking’ the stairs to prevent his human partner's imminent fall 
because of ‘blackout’. 
Pols’ four approaches to unleashing and taming enable a practice in 
which humans and ‘devices’ have ‘established their particular relations’:  
Their identities and functions are interdependent. Unleashing and 
taming processes may lead to a fit between individual devices and 
users and, eventually, to a form of domestication, implying more 
or less established practices of cooperation, such as those of the 
telephone (2012: 19). 
Such processes may also ‘lead to a fit’ between the diabetes alert dog as 
device, and the Type 1 diabetic as user, and to 'a form of domestication' in 
which their practices of cooperation invite mutualistic co-existence. 
The biomedical interspecies’ oscillation that swings from canine olfactory 
sensitivity to the human monitoring of blood sugar levels and a resultant usually 
chewable reward for both, contrives a pendulum of activity by which force and 
hindrance act as gravitational weights. The urgent nudging to encourage swift 
testing or the abovementioned physical ‘blocking’ of the stairs to prevent fall and 
injury are examples of how the human is appropriately tamed/manipulated by 
the dog. This perspective of mutual taming amplifies how medical alert 
assistance dogs act as biomedical resources empowering human self-care 
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practices, at the same time empowering themselves as agents (Mullin, 2002; 
Coulter, 2016). 
Mills and De Keuster (2009: 322) remark the need to 'appreciate how 
much dogs are genuinely an integral part of our society' so that we become 
'more prepared and willing to seek out solutions of mutual benefit to both 
species'. 
Engaging the ‘other’ in care practices requires investigation of ‘care’ with 
all its complex energies and intensities of meaning. If we care, we involve the 
consciousness of ourselves and others. Narcissistically, we may care ‘selfishly’ 
for ourselves and our own well-beings, but generally care incorporates the 
presence of another being, in this case principally and reciprocally, a dog who 
cares for, and is cared-for by, a human. 
9 Symbiotic practices of care 
9.1 Meanings of care 
When we see a mother whale supporting her calf to the surface to 
breathe, we see direct evidence of purpose and emotion – we see 
caring. 
                                                                      Kay Milton (2005: 265) 
Thom van Dooren (2014) is affected by the need for caring in 
conservation and the amendment of daily practices performed in captive 
breeding. He draws on Haraway’s ‘unsettling obligation of curiosity’ (2008: 36) 
and stands with Kendra Coulter (2016b: 199) in supporting Maria Puig de la 
Bellacasa’s ‘thinking care as inseparably a vital affective state, an ethical 
obligation and a practical labour' (2012: 197). Caring about and caring for 
someone or something involve both concern and that notion of the ‘unsettling 
obligation of curiosity’ (Haraway, 2008: 36), but where caring about indicates 
interest and whether or not something may be correct, moral, appropriate, it 
also permits distance and a broader concern. It is possible to care, on varying 
levels of conscious, thinking curiosity, about the –isms of discrimination, about 
today’s weather pattern, or about the partial skeleton of our very distant 
Australopithicus afarensis ancestor, Lucy, whose apparent ‘fall from a tree’ 
(Kappelman, Ketcham, Pearce, Todd, Akins, Colbert, Feseha, Maisano and 
Witzel, 2016) caused manifold fractures in her bones (was she asleep, was she 
pushed or was there an unfriendly predator sharing the branches of her 
imagined tree?), or about the future welfare of refugees and earthquake victims.  
  
211 
 
But it is also possible to care physically for the welfare of those who are 
bonded particularly closely, human kindred and nonhuman multispecies animal 
companions. Those who are well-known to the carer and who may rely on that 
care for their welfare.  Health workers, medical practitioners and veterinary staff 
care for their own relatives, colleagues and companion animals in the same 
way, but with an additional, professional focus centred on caring about the 
comfort and welfare of ‘stranger’ others in their personal responsibility agenda. 
This can develop into an empathic relationship between the carer and the 
cared-for which, in the words of Jeannette Pols (2010: 143), enables care to be 
about ‘sensitivity and concern, about being-there for those in need’. 
It cannot be said that the medical alert dogs have choice in being there 
for those in need, beyond opportunity to exhibit obvious dislike or 
acceptance/tolerance of a potential human companion. They are there, carefully 
matched and placed with a chronically unwell human partner, and they act 
autonomously to assist those in need. But, no matter the pleasurable reward 
gained for correct alerting, no dog will exert him or herself to serve ‘those in 
need’ unless they care or at least have some concern about the others, unless 
they feel the bond and are conscious of their companions’ altered states of 
being when blood sugar levels drop dangerously low – and something needs to 
be done. As Janet related, 'the dog has to want to do it for you’ and in that, 
there is choice. 
Coulter’s (2016: 200) ‘multispecies analysis of care work’ notes the 
expansion of interest in ‘engaging animals in the provisioning of care work for 
people’ while nonhuman animals’ personal ways of caring for others are 
scarcely perceived as care work of any shape or form. Coulter divides the work 
performed by nonhuman animals into the three categories of subsistence work, 
voluntary work, and work mandated by humans. Although training of dog and 
human are mandatory obligations before matching procedures can be 
performed, aspects of Coulter's 'voluntary' category relate particularly to this 
study since she considers voluntary work to be that commonly provided in 
homes where domesticated animals reside alongside humans, and may be both 
‘recipients and beneficiaries of humans’ care work...and may also perform 
different kinds of voluntary labour’ (2016b: 203). 
While emotional support and comfort given by companion animals to 
human family members is not often considered work, or even recognised 
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consciously as caring by another species, Coulter (2016b: 204) suggests this 
can provide ‘interactive care work that is especially important for seniors, 
marginalized or vulnerable people, and women who are confronting domestic 
violence, are homeless, or are precariously housed’ (see also Irvine, 2013). 
Although Coulter does not mention the significant work of diabetes alert dogs in 
detecting possible hypoglycaemic episodes, she does draw attention to the 
engagement of ‘animals’ abilities to guide, assist, comfort, calm, and detect 
physical challenges like seizures before they happen’ (Coulter, 2016b: 204).  In 
the same way that the human participants of this research perceive their canine 
companions, Coulter suggests ‘people often identify the animals and their 
contributions as life-saving, transformative and essential’ (2016: 204). 
9.2 Understanding nonhuman animal work 
Of note is Coulter's contention that such care involves skill in 
communication and may induce challenging situations for the other-than or 
more-than-human animal partners who are compelled to ignore how they might 
naturally respond and disregard all distractions outside the care work on which 
they are expected to focus. There is therefore the need to acknowledge animal 
intersubjectivity (Hurn, 2012) without which, such communication could not 
occur. Hurn suggests that by 'standing in' for humans, animals who were 
formerly considered 'objects' may become active 'subjects' with influence on the 
human relationships (2012: 125). She draws attention to Cassidy's notion of 
'intersubjectivity between the thoroughbred and its human attendants' (2002: 9), 
which depended on the status of the racehorse in the actions or eyes of the 
human beholders. 'When horses were recognized as active subjects, situated 
along a continuum which also included humans, then some form of inter-
subjective relationship could result' (Hurn: 2012: 127).  
In proposing a ‘continuum of suffering and enjoyment as a concept and 
framework for seeking to understand animals’ work from their perspectives, 
across contexts’, Coulter (2016b: 205) suggests that their work would fit on the 
continuum, dependent on ‘the occupation and labour required, the co-workers 
or employers, the species, social relations and interactions, and individual 
animals’ own personalities, moods, health, preferences, and agency, among 
other factors’.   
By incorporating broad context and becoming open-minded to offered 
nonhuman animal communication, this proposed continuum seems a positive 
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way to develop improved human comprehension of, for example, the working 
medical alert assistance dog’s perspective of life as a care worker. In this way, it 
becomes possible to achieve more ‘accurate, effective, and ethical multispecies 
standards’ (Coulter, 2016b: 209; Serpell et. al., 2010: 502-503) for the care 
programmes in which the dogs participate.  
My observations and perceptions of the diabetes alert dogs working with 
the chronically ill individuals of this study are encapsulated in Coulter’s belief 
(see also Zamir, 2006: 184) that ‘some animals can justifiably be engaged’ in 
providing care in the abovementioned ways if interspecies relationships and 
routine care practices embody "respect and reciprocity"’ (2016: 209). She then 
offers the attractive prospect of interspecies solidarity as means to involve 
ethical commitment, empathy and compassion, in multispecies care work: 
‘others should not have to be like us for us to care about their wellbeing’ (212). 
Here again, Milton's depiction of egomorphism (that we understand animals 
because we perceive them as being 'like us' rather than 'human-like' (2005: 
261), is useful in explaining how our perceptions, and therefore understanding, 
impact nonhuman others, and their influence on us: 
personal experience, rather than human-ness, is the basis for 
understanding others, and that understanding is achieved by 
perceiving characteristics in things rather than, as 
anthropomorphism implies, attributing characteristics to things 
(Milton, 2005: 260, italics in text).   
Coulter's concept of interspecies solidarity is intended to stress the 
values of empathy, dignity and reciprocity, in understanding routine work 
procedures and political relationships, and in enabling a view of care ‘as not 
only a practice or type of work, but also as the lifeblood of society and of this 
earth’ (2016: 213). The importance of mutual tolerance and trust could well be 
added to the above values. If this interspecies solidarity results from a 
refracted14 sense of responsibility, we may perceive the necessity of care and 
take actions to effect its practice through multiple reflections. 
Coulter’s conclusion reminds us emphatically that other animals ‘have 
minds, bodies, personalities, feelings, desires, and relationships that 
matter...animals deserve to receive care and provide care’ (2016: 215). In the 
field of medical alert assistance dogs, empathic recognition of the human-
                                                          
14
 if refract is taken to mean an altered appearance of something observed through a different 
medium (Encarta Dictionary: English (U.K.) 
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canine working relationship and its essential mutualism, also incorporates the 
significance of an overarching symbiotic ethics of care in guiding approaches 
and performances to make the intersections of both species and care work, 
work.  
9.3 Morally acceptable? 
The earlier references to Joel Marks’ thoughts on amoral animal ethics 
are extended by Taschi Zamir’s (2006: 179) liberationist discussion of the ‘moral 
basis of animal-assisted therapy’, mentioned earlier, in which he distinguishes 
between ‘use’ and ‘exploitation’, and asks the questions that bother me as I 
deliberate the value of canine medical assistants in helping humans with 
chronic illness: 
Can such uses of nonhuman animals [i.e. in animal-assisted 
therapy] be morally justified from a ‘liberationist’ perspective, a 
perspective that acknowledges that animals are not merely a 
resource to be exploited by humans? (2006: 180) 
 A liberationist perspective encompasses the value and quality of an 
animal’s life, including whether a lack of liberty can be morally justified. 
Speaking as a liberationist, Zamir (2006: 181-182) contends that using animals 
to treat humans may be immoral under the six particular ways elaborated 
below: 
 Limitations of freedom. Companion animals as ‘modified pets’ have 
freedom limited whether they are assistance animals or not. But a difference is 
exemplified in situations where domesticated creatures (his examples include 
rabbits, snakes and birds) fail to gain pleasure from human-nonhuman animal 
interactions in the same way that assistance animals seemingly do – ‘unlike 
alarm or service dogs’ (2006: 181), they seem unable to pass their social needs 
onto humans, thereby becoming severely hampered by the loss of freedom. 
 Life determination. Zamir suggests that making a ‘total decision’ to use 
an animal therapeutically, as a companion animal, racehorse or an occupant of 
a zoo, is more than a ‘limitation-of-freedom’, more a determination of their future 
lives (2006: 181). 
 Training. To use dogs and other species as human health assistants is 
likely to involve lengthy training that may violate their well-being, he contends, 
adding that cats and dogs are more accustomed to contact with humans than 
other species but there is still loss of kinship and therefore the possibility of 
social deprivation. 
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 Social disconnection. ‘Simians live in packs. By turning them into nursing 
entities, one disconnects them from whatever it is that they maintain through 
their social context... ...it is morally safe to make the probable assumption that 
such disconnection (or bringing up the animal without contact with the animal’s 
kin) is a form of deprivation’ (Zamir, 2006: 182) 
 Injury. Exposure to strangers and over-handling of therapy animals can 
lead to anxiety and possible injury. 
 Instrumentalisation. ‘Liberationists turn the human-nonhuman model from 
the thoughtless instrumentalization that is typical of human relations with 
objects, into forms of interaction that approximate human-human relations’ 
(2006: 182).  
Zamir opines that any of the above violations of the moral status of 
nonhuman animals could bring liberationist concern as to the moral legitimacy 
of animal-assisted therapies and therefore possible censorship of such 
assistance. 
However, he contends that the practice of keeping companion animals is 
not always objectionable, since ‘an ideal liberationist world will include pet-
owner relationships, and such relations - at their best – also show us that a 
paternalistic, yet non-exploitative, human-animal relation is both possible and 
actual’ (2006: 184). ‘Service animals’ such as guide dogs, claims Zamir, may 
belong in the pet-owner category since this can be justified ‘in principle’ but 
dogs do pay a price for this way of life: 
...they are spayed or neutered, trained for long periods...and 
isolated from their kin.  But dogs seem able to transfer their social 
needs onto humans, and some of the prolonged training can 
arguably be an advantage, providing important (and pleasurable) 
mental stimulation to these dogs. If humanity were to endorse a 
hands-off approach with regard to animals, such dogs would 
appear to lead qualitatively inferior (and probably shorter) lives in 
the wild – even in the few countries in the world in which the 
notion of ‘the wild’ still makes sense (2006: 184). 
 The anticipated brief and 'qualitatively inferior' lives in the wild of Zamir's 
assistance dogs diverge from Coppinger and Coppinger (2016: 226) who 
believe adult street and village dogs may also have a short, four-year average 
life expectancy but that they 'are fine-looking individuals with rich social lives' 
within their natural environment (2016: 227). With regard to 'village' dogs and a 
'hands-off approach' (Zamir, 2006: 184), Coppinger and Coppinger (2016: 227) 
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consider a reduction in size of their home niche to support fewer dogs - rather 
than mass sterilisation and rehabilitation as companion dogs in first world 
countries, or mass culling - might be a more acceptable solution and humane 
way of reducing populations (see also Srinivasan (2013: 106) below regarding 
the 'independent status of ownerless street dogs' in India and their individual 
needs for freedom).  
 Disentangling Cartesian and Kantian, speciesist and utilitarian 
arguments, Zamir concludes that ‘given responsible human owners’, the lives of 
cats and dogs used in AAT are 'qualitatively comfortable and safe’, and their 
social needs are catered for (2006: 195). Much rests on those 'responsible 
human owners' when working therapy and assistance dogs are separated from 
their kin and sometimes from other members of their own species in order to 
provide needed help and social encouragement in a human residence.  
 In contrast, and in a broad generalisation of species, Zamir suggests 
‘rodents, birds, monkeys, reptiles, and dolphins gain little by coercing them into 
AAT and lose a lot’ (2006: 189); although, in a notation, he relates that in some 
AAT therapy sessions, dolphins remain in their natural environment and are not 
coerced to obtain 'therapeutic objectives' (2006: 198). He indicates that his 
remarks regarding dolphins therefore 'do not apply to such programs'. However, 
in his overview of species, Zamir refers to the notion of 'bringing a particular 
member of these animals into existence for the purpose of AAT [that] benefits 
the member' (2006: 192). Allowing that, say, a rodent bred for use in AAT could 
have a 'comfortable' existence, and not necessarily be abused by the therapist, 
he contrasts this with the abuse of animal lives in factory-farming.  
 Zamir contends that coercive practices are exploitative since ‘the human 
interests that are involved can be easily met without exploiting these beings, the 
moral conclusion is that such forms of AAT should be abolished' (2006: 195). 
However, Serpell, Coppinger, Fine and Peralta (2010 [2006]), identifying 
sources of animal welfare problems in AAA/T and assistance work as 'growing 
pains' emerging in the 'new field of animal exploitation', volunteer a number of 
recommendations and 'specific guidelines...pertinent to both services provided 
in large-scale institutionally-based programs as well as small clinical practices' 
(2010: 499). Their suggested 'ethical guidelines' (2010: 502-503) for the care 
and supervision of animals used in animal-assisted therapies and activities, are 
fully detailed in Fine's Handbook of animal-assisted therapy (2010). 
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 Since the original publication of their paper (2006), many of their 
guidelines have been consciously and conscientiously followed by some animal 
therapists and assistance dog charities. Examining the training and care of 
diabetes alert dogs in the guise of assistance dogs and following the guidance 
of Serpell et. al. (2010), it seems the MDD charity espouses these 
recommendations which include principles similar to those of the Five 
Freedoms mentioned earlier. The 'implications of procedure for ethical decision-
making regarding therapy animals' (2010: 502) are further analysed relative to 
working alert dogs' 'downtime' and retirement from 'service' in the concluding 
chapter. 
 Recommendations and advice for the ethical care of other beings 
produce valuable suggestions but essentially, emotion has to play a significant 
and vital role. In this, empathy above all is the prominent conveyor of 
interspecies feeling. 
9.4 Compassion/empathy/sympathy  
Walking along a city street, I saw a grey-haired man, mouth downturned 
and forehead frowning, who might have been deep in thought or have been 
commanded ‘to take the dog out’. His demeanour was in total contrast to the 
ignored spaniel with bright eyes and lightfooted gait walking obediently at the 
end of the lead. My eyes were concealed behind dark lenses so eye contact 
was minimal but I gave the dog a small, closed-lip smile as we drew level, about 
five yards between us – and the effect changed the man’s expression as the 
dog launched into a tail-wagging frenzy towards me. 
On another occasion, driving slowly towards a red traffic-light, I grinned 
at a happy labradoodle taking a human out for an airing along the opposite 
pavement – the dog jumped into the road to reach me, again with a whole body-
wagging enthusiasm that put them both at risk of annihilation by oncoming 
traffic if the lights had changed. I now take more care of possible risk to the 
other before offering the smallest overtures of friendship; but remain intrigued 
by the seconds of instant relationship, of common understanding that can flow 
between species despite complete ignorance of the other’s existence seconds 
earlier. Is this a form of intersubjectivity as discussed by Hurn (2012)? An 
example of empathic communication as felt by de Waal (2010; 2011), Smuts 
(2001), Gruen (2015) and others? There was no attempt, nor time, to be 
consciously in the mind of the other, to interpret how that creature was feeling, 
  
218 
 
but there was an emotional interspecies bond between us for those brief 
moments. 
And not just dogs. Horses, cats, rats and pigs, sheep and cows are 
among those domesticated animals who volunteer emotions we can feel and 
reciprocate, should we make a minimal effort to recognise and appreciate them.  
This is not being ‘fey’, or necessarily practicing Serpell’s (2002: 441) 
anthropomorphic selection and attribution of admired human traits to nonhuman 
animals.  It is, or should be, natural means of relationship-shaping; an 
instinctive liking of the other and an appreciation for what they do and how they 
perform in ways we can perhaps both recognise and understand. Following 
Milton's (2005) concept of egomorphism, opportunity enables provision of 
warmth, even gladness, as more appropriate reactions to those performances; 
the 'distancing' device (Alger and Alger, 1999) of anthropomorphism serves less 
well here and is better rejected. 
Hamington (2008: 182) encourages the use of anthropomorphism - 
although egomorphism might better encompass his claim that we should care 
for nonhuman animals as 'extensions of ourselves' - as an approach to 
encompass empathy, understanding and care for the unfamiliar: 
It is praiseworthy to care for families, friends and companion 
animals but not as morally praiseworthy as caring for those for 
whom we are less familiar. That extension or reach to empathize 
with unfamiliar others requires an imaginary 
leap...anthropomorphism often represents an imaginative or 
playful attempt to understand animals. I claim that, to the extent 
that anthropomorphism facilitates caring for unknown others, 
‘humanizing’ animals can be morally beneficial. ... If we can see 
our way to care for nonhuman creatures, not as property, but as 
extensions of ourselves, perhaps we can also come to care for 
and about one another. 
These words drive a human perspective that encourages care and 
empathy with others but it holds a valuable premise that allows nonhuman 
animals to be considered ‘extensions of ourselves’ as means to ‘care for and 
about one another’. Thinking of them as extensions of ourselves is less likely to 
bring about conditions of human domination and control of nonhuman others. 
Hamington intends to bring about mutual care between species for the good of 
all, so improving care for the ‘less familiar’ members of society aids a 
multispecies moral progression that is perhaps better exemplified through 
Milton's egomorphism and not the misleadingly-labelled (2005: 256) 
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anthropomorphism. Understanding of 'others', suggests Milton, may be based 
on sensing that they are "like me" rather than the more objectifying perception 
that they are "human-like"' (2005: 261).  
Curtin (2014: 40) prefers the word ‘compassion’ to care or empathy, 
since she avers that compassion is a ‘developed moral capability whereas care 
or empathy are closer to the natural capacities that make compassion possible’. 
Compassion, she believes, is a 'cultivated aspiration to benefit other beings' 
(2014: 40), and is more resilient than empathy since it incorporates both reason 
and feeling. However, Willett (2014) disparages compassion as having similar 
significance to the way in which I see the concept of sympathy: as a generous 
bestowal of cognitive kindnesses and compassion that has a more practical, 
more selfish emphasis.  
A sympathetic mien or verbal phrase is theoretically intended to offer 
kindness and perhaps elements of sorrow that someone else has received 
injury, bereavement, unemployment or similar. But this perspective seems to 
come from above, looking down; it carries faint condescension, separateness 
and perhaps a concealed sense of relief that the other is suffering and not 
oneself. As Lori Gruen discerns, 'sympathy for another is felt from the outside, 
the third person perspective' (2015: 40), adding that 'while we're being 
sympathetic, we attempt to be disconnected from others'.  Empathy, Gruen 
(2015: 41) suggests, 'recognizes connection with and understanding of the 
circumstances of the other...the goal is to try to take in as much about another's 
situation and perspective as possible'. 
In instances of bereavement, the phrase ‘I’m so sorry for your loss’ is 
genuinely meant and every individual’s grief experiences are unique to that 
person – but sympathy in that context doesn’t build strength or assist in the 
other’s coping method. Rather, it conveys ‘poor you’, that you require 
consolation, comfort and 'sympathetic concern' (De Waal, 2010: 90); all good, 
but sympathy manages to maintain distance and infers the other's existence on 
an inferior level. Sympathy is given with kindly intent but may fail to offer more 
than knowledge of a sorrowful event and does not necessarily discern what 
feelings may be induced in the 'object' of sympathy. De Waal (2008: 283) cites 
Eisenberg's (2000: 677) definition of sympathy as 'an affective response that 
consists of feelings of sorrow or concern for a distressed or needy other (rather 
than sharing the emotion of the other). Sympathy is believed to involve an 
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other-oriented, altruistic motivation'. But De Waal believes the personal distress 
aroused in sympathy 'makes the affected party selfishly seek to alleviate its own 
distress, which mimics that of the object' (2008: 283). 
In contrast, however, empathy is an essential quality in the development 
or improvement of human-human relationships, enabling greater understanding 
of one another’s hopes, desires and despairs and the ability to reflect this 
comprehension appropriately and meaningfully by each attempting to ‘walk in 
the shoes of the other’. It is therefore a salient quality required by a member of 
the ’helping’ professions in psychological counselling practice just as it is a 
necessary quality in the health and welfare of symbiotic interspecies 
relationships. 
Hoffman (1987: 4) viewed empathy as an ‘affective response more 
appropriate to someone else’s situation than to one’s own’, proposing that 
(1987: 3) 
to me, empathy is the spark of human concern for others, the glue 
that makes social life possible. It may be fragile but it has, 
arguably, endured throughout evolutionary times and may 
continue as long as humans exist.  
Empathy is more inclusive of the speaker and the spoken-to, and 
perhaps deserves greater societal acclamation and increased attempts to put it 
into practice. More recently, eminent primatologist Frans de Waal's (2010) 
seminal work, The age of empathy: nature's lessons for a kinder society, invited 
attention to other species who are able to take and make use of the perspective 
of another, thereby giving nonhuman examples for the bettered education of 
human society. He writes of the need for an increase in fellow feeling and social 
responsibility, for coordination and caring for and by one another, and echoes 
Hoffman in taking empathy to be the glue that binds communities and societies: 
The way our bodies ... are influenced by surrounding bodies is 
one of the mysteries of human existence, but one that provides 
the glue that holds entire societies together (De Waal, 2010: 63). 
When it comes to multispecies empathy, true understanding by human 
observers may be less easy to achieve but De Waal, Smuts and other 
researchers have established its existence. Panksepp and Panksepp (2013: 
489) suggest it ‘reflects the capacity of one animal to experience the emotional 
feelings of another’. Studies relating to interspecies empathy have been 
conducted among rodents by these researchers, among chimpanzees, baboons 
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and bonobos (De Waal, 2001, 2006; Smuts 2001, 2006), and among elephants 
(Mark Rowlands, 2012). The latter work highlights how elephants care for their 
injured relatives, illustrating the ways in which these multispecies beings share 
in others’ pain.  
De Waal (2010) points to the connection between imitation, synchrony 
and mimicry, and bonding or socially connecting. Cross your legs or lean 
backwards or forwards a little when sitting and conversing with another, and it is 
likely your actions will be mirrored.  Such behaviour conveys mutual and 
empathic intention, the wish to understand, and to offer respect and trust; thus it 
is valuable in counselling sessions and in enabling confidential intimacies to be 
spoken and heard during data collection for ethnographic analysis. 
Additionally, emotional ‘feeling’ and empathy enable a deeper 
understanding, a broader knowledge of the impact of chronic illness on an 
individual’s family, friends and work colleagues, and on the assistance dog – an 
impact that inevitably and constantly changes personal and social behaviours 
and the practices of life management when compared to the impact of minor or 
short-term illness on social existence. 
 Lori Gruen (2015: 70) provides a comprehensive definition of what she 
terms ‘entangled empathy’; a ‘process of sharing experiences and 
perspectives’, an explanation that echoes through moral human-nonhuman 
experiences as much as in human-human relationships: 
A type of caring perception focused on attending to another’s 
experience of wellbeing. An experiential process involving a blend 
of emotion and cognition in which we recognize we are in 
relationships by attending to another’s needs, interests, desires, 
vulnerabilities, hopes, and sensitivities. 
Suggesting empathy is a ‘moral perception’ that requires an ability ‘to see 
what is morally relevant or important’ and then to make a decision ‘to do the 
right thing’ according to what has been perceived (2015: 38), Gruen (2015: 61) 
adds that, in wanting to empathise with ‘very different others’, we need to 
‘understand as best we can what the world senses, feels, smells, and looks like 
from their situated position’. In endeavouring to empathise with those others, we 
should attempt not to engage anthropomorphic tendencies, but rather to accept 
changes in perception that may produce unexpected understandings of other 
ways of being.  
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Relating to empathy and 'unexpected understandings', Mark Rowlands 
(2012) asks the question 'can animals be moral? and attempts to answer some 
of its complexities with examples that demonstrate how nonhuman creatures 
can act for moral reasons. In a section titled 'Animals and moral practice', he 
confirms that 'animals, trained or otherwise, are not morally responsible for their 
actions' in the way that human creatures are expected to be; 'they can be moral 
subjects, but not moral agents' (Rowlands, 2012: 209).  He introduces the family 
dog, Hugo, a German Shepherd trained to protect. Regularly knocked off his 
feet by the dog when wearing the 'bite sleeve' used in Hugo's training, 
Rowlands recalls the change in the dog's attitude and behaviour when his four-
year-old son wears the sleeve: 'Hugo will merely walk up to him and gently 
chew on it' (2012: 210).  
Rowlands suggests 'three key features of the moral profile of trained 
animals' (2012: 210-211); 'features' which are relevant to the trained assistance 
dogs of this research: 
Practical wisdom. 'Hugo is sufficiently intelligent to understand the 
differing consequences of the same behavior when it is directed at two different 
individuals'. 
Concern. 'Hugo does not wish my son to be hurt. This is a manifestation 
of his concern for my son's welfare...Having concern for his pack comes 
naturally to Hugo as part of his biological endowment'. 
Inhibition of desire. Used to working with the sleeve, Hugo has 'an 
intense desire to bite it' but has to inhibit this strong urge when the sleeve is 
'attached to the arm of a four-year-old child'. 
While the dogs and humans of this study have sincere and deep bonds 
of friendship, it is the empathic assistance offered and received by each partner 
in their mutualistic coexistences that enables life expectancy for both to 
increase. An empathic researcher observing the situation of medical alert dog 
and diabetic human, may investigate further and delve deeper into their united 
lives, without abusing shared confidences or destroying the developing triadic 
relationship. (However, this could become a risk-laden venture if an over-use of 
applied sensitivity becomes false rhetoric, a pretentious attempt to share similar 
experiences or emotions that may be seen as not genuine and therefore cause 
a ‘bringing down of the curtain’ on any future significant disclosures). 
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When ill health is the Maypole of a social gathering, the simple question 
‘how are you?’ invites and anticipates a genuine response and is not a nicety of 
speech, an introduction to conversational, possibly insincere, small-talk. It is 
noticeable among groups of bereaved people, who accept or try to find meaning 
in their grief for another’s life, and who, as a result, accommodate, tolerate and 
empathise with, if not always perfectly understand, wide swathes of physical 
and emotional unsettlement in others. Such hard-earned knowledge can be put 
to beneficial and non-judgemental use in social dialogue with individuals 
embodying Type 1 diabetes who have recently opened a symbiotic partnership 
with a medical alert assistance dog.  
Collective friendship in adversity develops more quickly and simply 
perhaps because of the compassion and empathy that infiltrate those who have 
already faced personal disasters of life and now observe lives of others at risk 
or endangered.  It seems taken for granted that members, with chronic illness 
and an assistance dog, are already seated in the same boat and therefore 
understand the situation being confronted newly and similarly by others. 
Including the value of empathy in interspecies communication and social 
integration allows the concept of ethics of care theory and practice to become 
prominent in order to examine how it affects and assists in dependency and 
interdependency; and furthermore, how respect, responsibility and trust become 
involved in interspecies care and being cared for. Sunaura Taylor's research 
(2014) and (2017) illuminates many of the conflicts facing 'disabled' and 
'nonhuman' minorities. 
9.5 Ethics of care 
Collected ecofeminist writings of intersections with animal others and the 
earth are introduced by Carol J. Adams and Lori Gruen (2014: 1) who suggest 
that  
Ecofeminist theory helps us imagine healthier relationships, 
stresses the need to attend to context over universal judgements, 
and argues for the importance of care as well as justice, emotion 
as well as rationality, in working to undo the logic of domination 
and its material and practical implications. 
 Deane Curtin’s examination of compassion and being human contends 
that an ethic of care is inclusive ‘since it values the diverse ways that women 
and men tend to organise their moral experience’ (2014: 39).  It does not 
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assume that ethics should be built on a uniquely human feature i.e. human 
reason; ‘it is less anthropocentric’.  
Further, in considering that animal advocacy discourse in principal 
acknowledges humans as ‘stewards of animal welfare’, Maurice Hamington 
(2008: 177) proposes the notion that ‘quality’ human-animal relationships might 
encourage a moral imagination enabling the care and empathy necessary for 
ethical social thinking and behaviour. He takes the concept of embodied care as 
an extension of feminist ethics-of-care and remarks (2008: 179): 
Phenomenologically, the one cared-for and the caregiver engage 
in a relationship marked by mutuality in terms of attentiveness and 
responsiveness. In this manner, care is an ethic that cannot be 
separated from epistemology – we care about that which we know 
and it is difficult to care for that which we have little or no 
knowledge of. Although knowing is not a sufficient condition of 
care, it is a prerequisite. 
And this is where Sunaura Taylor’s feminist disability ethic-of-care, 
mentioned earlier, highlights interdependency and mutual respect as significant 
factors in well-functioning interspecies co-existences. Symbiotic relationships in 
which caring for and being cared-for (despite certain ‘stifling’ kindnesses) 
enable trust, reliance and responsibility leading to ‘rights, justice and an 
accessible society that does not limit or make impossible our involvement and 
contributions’ (Taylor, 2014: 109). 
Taylor writes from a position of knowledge in that she herself is 
compelled to accept care and apply habits and routines of dependency, being 
both grateful for assistance and repressed by the need for it. Her chapter 
‘interdependent animals: a feminist disability ethic-of-care’, in the Adams and 
Gruen-edited collection (2014), draws attention to issues echoed in the daily 
activities necessarily performed by the human participants of this research. Tina 
recalls the simple act of 'putting something in the oven, then having a hypo, and 
it would be burnt'. She continues: 
So now all of a sudden I'm on ready-made meals and everything's 
from a box, but when I read the instructions at the back, if it comes 
into a different line, I can put the kitchen light on but still not see it.  
It's all muggled together so now I look at the number and hope it's 
said six minutes, but if I can't work it out, I shove it back in fridge 
and have it in daytime.    
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 Frustrated in the kitchen by her impaired sight, she is also compelled to 
ask others for help in the office but is at the same time grateful for their concern 
which enables her to maintain employment and social purpose. 
Remarking the dependency of domesticated animals on human care and 
responsibility, Taylor suggests (2014: 110) that ‘a feminist ethic-of-care offers a 
framework of justice that has the potential to complicate conceptions of 
dependency...to understand animals not as dependent beings with no agency, 
but rather as vital participants and contributors to the world’. Vitality and agency 
are key properties for the multispecies collaborating individuals involved in 
doing diabetes on a daily scale and Taylor fittingly recognises ‘that to 
understand another being who does not communicate in ways able-
bodied/able-minded humans have historically valued, we must pay attention to 
individuals - learning from them so that we can recognise their agency and 
preferences’ (2014: 111). 
Pertinently, Taylor encourages any discourse relating to the liberation of 
animals and the less able members of society - Nibert’s ‘oppressed’ minorities 
(2002: 6) - to concentrate more on ‘radical discussions about creating 
accessible, non-discriminatory space in society in which individuals and their 
communities can thrive’ and focus less on ‘suffering and dependency’ (2014: 
111). What do animals say, want and contribute, asks Taylor, and what might it 
be like for them to be cared for? 
Lumped together as incapable and therefore dependent on others, those 
human or nonhuman animals - who are in varying aspects either dis- or un-
abled physically and/or mentally - are stereotypically sometimes viewed as 
social failures, a perspective that is not only mostly incorrect but is also 
disrespectful, if not insulting. Individualism is still a prized and advocated 
‘Western’ way of life that seems insufficiently challenged by the concept of a 
collaborative community, where the extended family instead of being admired 
for its collective ways of dealing with life’s hazards, is marginalised and 
disparaged for a failure to encourage each family member to live a better life as 
an independent.  
Taylor takes the bit between her teeth and firmly, and ironically, contends 
that the ‘language of dependency is a brilliant rhetorical tool, as it is a way for 
those who use it to sound concerned, compassionate, and caring while 
continuing to exploit those who they are supposedly concerned about’ (2014: 
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114). Dependency, she writes, ‘is a reasoning that has been used to justify 
slavery, patriarchy, colonization, and disability oppression’ and of course, it 
gives apparent reason for the human need to kill and eat domesticated animals 
since, according to Callicott (1989) and others such as Budiansky (1997), if 
released into the wild, such beings would no longer be able to cope with and 
survive in a ‘natural’, unfettered state of existence. 
However, Coppinger and Coppinger (2016) provide a different stance 
when studying the ‘village dogs’ of this world and their coping mechanisms. 
Taking note of the reduction in numbers of vultures in India (see also Van 
Dooren, 2010a and 2010b) that enabled an increase in the range of dogs, they 
suggest sterilisation or culling – or ostensibly, killing for food - may not greatly 
reduce populations as other species, or more of the same, will move into the 
vacated ‘niches’. They depict an alternative approach to ‘dog control’ conducted 
by planned humane methods in which stray or street dogs are captured, 
neutered and transported to ‘rich countries to be adopted into family status, 
where they are made totally dependent and entirely restricted’, and where 
apparent benefit to the dogs, who are highly social by nature, ‘is not measured 
in terms of a better social life for them, but, rather, in terms of longer, healthier 
lives’ (Coppinger and Coppinger, 2016: 227). Srinivasan (2012) emphasises the 
individual requirement for freedom that is promulgated in India so that street 
dogs may roam safe from human culling practices.   
Coppinger and Coppinger commend ‘the village dog’ as a ‘wondrous 
animal with a self-tailored lifestyle’ and suggest that, instead of the above, the 
most humane way of reducing their populations is to lessen the size of their 
‘niche’ so that it could only cater for a smaller number of dogs (2016: 228), a 
similar contention to that put forward earlier by Zamir (2006). But such an 
evolutionary notion would take more time to effect than a speeding bullet or 
veterinarian’s knife or needle, even if the result were of greater multispecies 
benefit in the long-term. Re-ordering evolutionary direction may return us to 
economic battlegrounds rather than moving domesticated species forward to 
safely-interdependent environments and ways of being. 
Whether extinction of the domesticated species, who have become 
dependent on human whimsical, faulty, mercenary, gentle or harsh notions for 
their quality of life, is the right, moral and responsible direction to take, leaves, 
or should leave, an unpalatable sense of guilt and responsibility among the 
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human so-called guardians of nonhuman animals: whether they are the 
unnamed held in abattoirs, laboratory cages, fattening pens or zoo enclosures, 
or indeed, the named and trained autonomous care-workers in health 
assistance organisations or the loved playmates of myriad human children. 
Erasure of the domesticated creatures, tamed and harmed by human 
endeavour, is surely anathema to moral thinking. Creating extinction of those 
we developed to better our lives, whether for the purposes of survival, industry 
or care performance, must be a reversal of ethical social norms and a fast-track 
to demolition of what might be good and just in our evolutionary developments. 
9.6 Where the social contract fails... 
Taylor refers to Martha Nussbaum’s discussion of the social contract’s 
failure to ‘address [disability, species membership, and nationality] as it 
assumes that in a “state of nature” the parties to this contract really are roughly 
equal in mental and physical power’ (2009: 118). This assumption does not 
account for the likely lack of physical and intellectual balance between disabled 
and able humans, the well-off or the poverty-stricken, or between humans and 
nonhumans. Significant to this study is Nussbaum’s contention that the ‘social 
contract tradition’s reliance on the idea of mutual advantage falls short when 
addressing disability and “species membership” as disabled individuals and 
animals don’t necessarily offer mutual advantage per se’ (2014: 118) and, in 
fact, claims Taylor, may disadvantage or unbalance the other.  
She elaborates (2014: 120): 
What disability studies and a feminist ethic-of-care brings to the 
conversation is a more nuanced understanding of how to define 
mutual advantage and a much-needed analysis of what it means 
to be accountable to beings who are in many ways the most 
vulnerable. A disability studies perspective of interdependence is 
about recognizing that we are all vulnerable beings, who during 
our lives go in and out of dependency, who will be giving and 
receiving care (and more often than not, doing both), and that 
contribution cannot be understood as a simple calculation of 
mutual advantage. 
 
Animal ethics also requires a critical engagement with our 
assumptions about who is valuable and who is exploitable and a 
reimagining of what it means to contribute to the world. 
Following social contract theory’s apparent successful perspective that 
justifies the eating of meat, Pollan (2009: 120) and others, proclaim the value of 
co-evolution theory with its source seemingly based in mutual advantage to 
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human and nonhuman animal species. Taylor flags up their contention that 
humans and domesticated animals have contracted to enable the former to be 
responsible for care of the latter, while the latter offer their services and 
sometimes their bodies for consumption. How such contract can be deemed 
approved by those to be eaten or exploited, suspends (my) belief: but there is 
the more credible notion of interdependence where death by whatever means 
remains outside the frame and symbiosis does bring mutual advantages to both 
human and nonhuman domestic creatures. 
9.7 Why veganism? 
Gruen and Weil (2012: 482), in writing ‘Animal others – editors’ 
introduction’, ask: 
How can we turn shame into compassion, response into 
responsible action? To tend to an animal, to respond to her is to 
change her as it is to be changed by her in return. The ‘difficulty of 
ethical responsibility’ is that we must accept it in the face of 
uncertain changes. 
They continue: ’How might we balance conflicts between different sorts 
of oppression? Should feminist animal studies scholars be vegan?’ and my 
reading is interrupted by this latter question. I have been following Adams and 
Gruen, Donovan and Taylor and other feminist writers in their efforts to find 
‘connections between sex, gender, and the more than human world’ (Gruen and 
Weil, 2012: 485), and to encourage  
development of a praxis built on compassion, care, and empathy, 
one that includes cognition and affect in ways that cannot be 
disentangled, and that will lead to richer, more motivating 
approaches to understanding and improving our relationships with 
others (2012: 479). 
I have endeavoured to find a fitting explanation as to why I have not 
eaten meat for the last two decades. Regrettably, no moral factor swayed the 
original decision to halt meat consumption. I did not become overly-concerned 
that the meat-filled plate before me might contain part of a murdered nonhuman 
animal (Gaita: 2004: 198) and thoughts of Jeffrey Dahmer, who first cooked and 
ate nonhuman ‘road-kill’ before moving on to human edibles, did not disturb 
sleep. Much more mundane, I did not like the smell of meat cooking, I did not 
like the texture, nor did I much like the taste. I did not want the dogs I cared for 
to smell their food, the flesh of other species, being cooked long before it would 
be given to them, not because I was ashamed to be catering for their needs in 
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that way, but more because it seemed unkind to let them salivate and anticipate 
when the meat was too hot to serve them. Simple reasons that expanded and 
grew into a firm dislike of any form of meat, and subsequently fish and dairy 
products. I increased intake of fruit, nuts, salads and legumes and found that 
vegetarianism had health benefits as well as enjoyment, and engaged certain 
moral as well as nutritional fibre.  
I appropriated a ‘holier than thou’ attitude; I was on trend, it became easy 
to adopt the stance of a vegetarian. But then the unethical transport of live, 
often overheated, injured, unfed and unwatered, abattoir-bound sentient 
species crashed into my pious carrot-crunching, and action against animal 
cruelty, on individual or industrial levels, overtook the sedentary, passive non-
meat eating route.  
Veganism was the more ethical option but one harder to follow despite 
the contemporary food-counter alterations in supermarkets to accommodate 
vegan shoppers. Personal food consumption becomes less of a moral issue 
once the decision to ’become vegan’ is made; the problem is in realising what 
your shoes are made of, the dog’s collar, cosmetics, ‘the bristles of make-up 
brushes to the gelatine that encases vitamin supplements’ (Irvine, 2009: 1), 
glue, and in coping with advertisements and labels detailing the contents of 
soap and soup. This involves harder, more circumspect thinking and more 
intense, more active caring for others. Utilitarianism allows hardship, suffering 
and the sacrifice (death) of one so that many more survive; but that will not 
suffice. Using products sourced from lanolin in sheep wool, for example, vitamin 
D3 for addition to soy formula for babies, sees acceptance or ignorance of 
intense pain for the commodified sheep when folds of skin may be removed 
without anaesthetic after shearing to reduce fly infestation (Emmerman, 2014: 
163, and 170 (Note 17) with reference to 'cruelty' in wool production (Baur, 
2008: 79).  
 Tolerance of animal cruelty, or ‘unmindedness’ of its ongoing 
performances, allows the wearing of shoes and the carrying of bags created 
from crocodile and ostrich, buffalo and snake, the purchasing of coats made 
from the skins of calves and karakul lambs, and the trading of ornament and 
aphrodisiac from elephant ivory and rhinoceros horn – it is plain to see who is 
sacrificed for whom.  
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 In becoming vegan and recognising why, compassion and ethical care 
for ‘others’ increasingly occupy the uppermost rungs of a personal moral ladder, 
ignoring the jaw-snapping consumers of nonhuman animal products urging 
expansion of factory-farming, abattoirs and tanneries,  canned lion-hunting and 
puppy-milling, residing on the lowest steps. Self-righteous as that sounds, it is 
concern for the welfare, the doing well of others' lives – human and nonhuman 
– that has driven study underpinned by feminist/eco-feminist animal studies, 
ethics of care investigations and individual experiences. 
Taking a closer-to-home view of the ethics of care in relation to human 
rather than animal beings, Mol, Moser and Pols (2010: 13) suggest that ‘local 
solutions to specific problems need to be worked out’ and ‘fairness, kindness, 
compassion, generosity’ should be considered important norms. ‘Care implies a 
negotiation about how different goods might coexist in the given, specific, local 
practice’’. ‘Care seeks to lighten what is heavy, and even if it fails, it keeps on 
trying’ (2010: 14), a phrase which both dogs and humans exemplify in their daily 
managements of life shadowed by chronic illness. 
Highlighted in this text are practices of self-care and ‘other-care’, trust 
and responsibility – by the individuals to benefit their own health, by the 
individuals for the benefit of their non-human companions, by the canine 
medical alert assistance dogs for themselves, and by the MAADs for their 
chronically ill human companions.  
Parental moral views may dictate the hoped-for ethical route to be 
followed by children but in adolescence and adulthood, environmental nudges 
may shift thinking about behavioural manners directed towards ourselves and 
others. Eating meat farmed locally may not continue after viewing televised 
factory-farming, but vegans do live on cattle farms and meat-eating humans are 
fully able to protest the ill-treatment of animals destined for an abattoir. Ethical 
behaviour and moral belief are intensely individual and highly volatile features of 
human existence. Co-opting their usage into daily life may be essential for 
decision-making among the ideologies of racism, ageism or speciesism, for 
determined effort to do the ‘right’ thing and for protection of self and others 
against those of differing personal creeds. But their execution can create 
internal havoc and external upheaval that require informed practices of care for 
their safe resolution. 
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Taylor (2017: 217) explains the inherent difficulties of dependency based 
on leaving domesticated animals to fend for themselves without our moral or 
immoral interference.  
We are all affecting one another and our environments all the time 
- all of us depending on one another - sometimes in terrifyingly 
intimate ways. Perhaps dependency is so uncomfortable precisely 
because it demands intimacy. With domesticated animals and with 
many disabled humans, there has to be involvement and 
interaction; there can be no illusions of independence. 
 Admitting that such vulnerability could provide 'opportunities for 
coercion', Taylor (2017: 217) suggests it may also provide 'new ways of being, 
supporting and communicating - new ways of creating meaning across 
differences in ability and species'.   
 Only recently have vegan or vegetarian 'dog food' items been produced 
for general purchase and the charity and its clients currently feed meat-based 
kibbles to their canine collaborators. Although dietary requirements vary, and 
each dog is considered individually, some form of meat product is generally the 
main ingredient in the DADs' daily nutrition. Whether this will change when 
vegan dog food becomes more widely advertised and available, is an ethical 
question for the charity and clients to debate, bearing in mind their reliance on 
donation for many products aimed at the dogs' health and welfare. Certainly the 
dogs' collars and leads are not made from tanned animal hide and instead are 
crafted from a lightweight synthetic material.  
9.8 Morality and symbiotic ethics 
David Goode (2007: 111) highlights differentiation between the 
companion ‘pet’ animal and the companion ‘working’ animal, recalling the words 
of Rod Michalko (1999: 74) who cites Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics (Book 
Two, 15-25) to explain his guide dog’s ‘virtuous’ work ethic: 
...moral virtue comes about as a result of habit...from this it is also 
plain that none of the moral virtues arise in us by nature; for 
nothing exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its 
nature...nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way 
be trained to behave in another. 
Michalko considers that his close companionship with working guide dog, 
Smokie, may be seen as an outcome of ‘virtuous occupation’ (1999: 74) since it 
is customary today to view work with blind persons as moral employment – and 
indeed Smokie can well be considered to be similarly engaged in ‘virtuous 
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occupation’ as he guides the visually-impaired sociologist according to the 
repetition and reward training he receives. By nature, states Michalko, dogs 
would not take on the role of virtuous guide work – ‘this virtue is the result of 
habituation through training’ (1999: 74) and is therefore not contrary to their 
nature. But an alternative view comes from Frans de Waal (2008: 292) who 
considers that empathy, being the basis of human altruism which enables the 
ability to take the perspective of another, may also see such altruism inherent in 
the nature of other animals. 
When reward is the result of requested goal achievement and tasks 
become habitual and are seen as near natural, autonomous behaviours, all 
trained and qualified assistance dogs may then be considered to perform what 
Goode and Michalko refer to as ‘virtuous occupations’ when working with their 
human companions. 
Perhaps this too is ‘virtuous occupation’ for this human-canine minority 
group. Yet I am mentally diverted from the interspecies health behaviours to an 
image of cornetted heads bowed over pews, downcast eyes and folded hands, 
fingered-rosaries and the whiteness of purity and cambric: connotations of 
goodness and spirituality also contained in ‘virtuous occupation’.  
But then the image changes again and the dictionary is called for to 
search for the roots leading away from virtue and virginal to virago, virility and 
virulent – this appears to be a tactic of procrastination, a moving away from the 
roles of virtuous occupation played by the assistance dogs and their diabetic 
companions in their communal activities, and by my thinly-veiled preoccupation 
with writing about them. The mind is hauled back to contemplate ‘virtuous’ – 
‘possessing or showing moral rectitude’ – and ‘virtue’ – ‘moral excellence, 
uprightness, goodness’ (The Oxford English Reference Dictionary, 1995: 1614). 
So virtuous occupation seems praiseworthy, potentially humble, but with a firm 
backbone of goodness ribbed by goal-directed endeavours. 
Where Goode adds value is in his incisive perception of his own 
relationship with his pet dog, Katie, as being an emotional and affective bonding 
but one that is in contrast to the relationship between Michalko and Smokie, one 
that lacks the functional, purposeful and determined effort to achieve a 
‘practical’ goal and therefore fails to achieve the mutualistic co-embodied 
identity of the two-in-one.  Frans de Waal’s (2006: 162) suggestion that ‘morality 
helps people get along and accomplish joint endeavours’, permits the 
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comfortable ‘do as you would be done by’ ethic, and within such concept 
enables the decision to help, or not to help, an ‘other’. There is moral behaviour 
in the companionship between animal companions and their caring guardians, 
but as Goode remarks, it is not the morality gained from ‘sharing some form of 
virtuous work together’ (2007: 111). 
The mutualism that binds together an assistance dog and a human 
weakened by ill health incorporates ‘discovery and practice’ (Goode, 2007: 
111), as well as Coulter’s ‘respect and reciprocity’ (2016: 209), that lead to 
better management of the intricacies and complexities of chronic illness. 
If virtuous shared work produces admirable morality, then the less 
practical function of play between dog and human still succeeds in achieving 
routines of ethical reciprocity and interspecies interdependence. However, 
elements of trust that are expected in virtuous occupation may be exchanged 
for elements of deception in play, for example when a toy is hidden completely 
or is brought into view and swiftly concealed several times. In this case, teasing 
can become overdone and result in a dog understandably snapping from 
frustration. Alternatively, positive lessons can be learned from a deceptive 
concealment: items of food can be placed out of sight, under upturned 
flowerpots for example, the smell attracting the dog to the correct container and 
an instant reward. 
Care is convoluted in meaning and in activation.  Mol, Pols and Moser 
(2010: 14) talk of the twentieth century definition of care as warm and emotional 
‘nourishing’, in contrast to instrumental ‘cold and rational’ technology. There is 
always a motivation to care, to do better for the self or others, to perform 
‘maintenance and repair’ work (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2012: 198) that keeps 
individual and global existences spinning. Recalling Haraway’s (2003: 5) ‘dogs 
are here to live with’, Puig de la Bellacasa emphasises how ‘laborious’ living-
with can be, contending that ‘relations of "significant otherness" are more than 
about accommodating “difference”, co-existing or tolerating’ (2017: 83). She 
suggests (2017: 83) that 
thinking-with nonhumans should always be a living-with, aware of 
troubling relations and seeking a significant otherness that 
transforms those involved in the relation and the worlds we live in. 
Natasha recalls Paul’s complete lack of interest in leaving the house, 
unless she ‘put him in the car and took him somewhere’, which infers that he 
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never enjoyed exercise or the appeal of scenic rural views and changing 
seasons observed while walking outdoors. She remembers: 
No, no, because obviously living where we are, he wouldn’t go for 
a walk and I’d say ‘just go for a walk, there’s loads of walks round 
here’, but he’d say ‘no, I can’t’. But now, with the dog, there’s a 
reason to go for a walk again; from a care perspective, that’s one 
of the things they say with your health – anything that you can do, 
keep it going – whereas a lot of people won’t, they’ll sit there and 
just say I’m sorry for myself.  
Free-running, being able to explore unleashed, is important for all dogs 
and Paul says he probably lets Nero run free for longer than he should, but ‘you 
know it’s got to be unkind for a dog if he’s on a lead all the time; and anyway, it 
takes too much out of me so I let him off’. He seems to care not only for the dog 
as someone with personhood, but also shows concern for Nero’s welfare and 
contentment.  
Following Serpell et. al. (2010) and MDD ethical guidelines for canine 
care, participants in this research maintain an unspoken but active adherence to 
ethics of care, particularly in regard to their companions' freedom to run, to play, 
to do what it might be expected that a 'pet' or non-working companion dog 
would have opportunity to do.  However, I have observed these assistant 
companion dogs interact unleashed with other members of canine society in city 
parks; seen them race across commonage and through wood and forest; chase 
dogs they know and don't know, and gambol muddily in puddles and ploughed 
fields. If anything, DADs have working occupations that can enrich their daily 
lives, have opportunity for 'time-out', are fully respected by those with whom 
they live and work, and are treated considerately by the charity which shares 
responsibility for their good welfare. 
Separation anxiety is endured by many dogs every day when human 
families leave for school or work. But DADs are never left alone; like Apple, they 
may spend the working day among schoolchildren, or, like Harley and Higgins, 
they share office space with their working companions. 
Paul then remarks on the difficulties that occasionally arise from the very 
close relationship he has with Nero: 
I might say I’m going to send him back but I’d struggle not having 
him. There are times when I think I can’t deal with him now and a 
couple of times when I’ve left him with my dad when I’ve gone 
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shopping with my mother because I haven’t had the strength – but 
dad walks the dog and he loves it.  
Unsurprisingly, Paul lacks strength as well as poor vision and it requires 
intense concentration for him to focus on both dog and environment when 
walking with Nero. 
Listening to Paul and Natasha describing the complexities and 
discomforts inherent in Paul’s illness, I am struck by the invisibility of the 
majority of symptoms and observe aloud ‘yet you look so well’. Paul laughs and 
says he’s had a really good walk earlier in the day, but while agreeing that he 
does look well ‘at the moment’, Natasha wishes she could show me a picture of 
him before he went out.  
Human care for a diabetes alert dog accepts and accommodates myriad 
differences between the two species, allows and tolerates unaccustomed 
behaviours until they become customary and reasonable, so that their relations, 
their ways of being are transformed to comfortable and progressing co-
existences. However, Natasha worries what might happen if she’s not at home 
and Paul has a bad day: 
How would he get on caring for the dog? There will be a time at 
some point potentially where there isn’t somebody around; like 
when Nero kept licking and licking his paw and of course Paul 
couldn’t see, in fact even his mum and dad looked and couldn’t 
see anything wrong, but I did a proper thorough inspection; and 
it’s things like that – yes, he cares for Nero very, very well but 
because he doesn’t see very well...I don’t know how blind people 
work with Guide Dogs... 
 But Paul says he would rely on the veterinarian if something seemed 
wrong with Nero. ‘You’d notice and get the vet. If something occurs and re-
occurs over three days, then it’s the vet – for example, if he keeps licking his 
paw, you’re aware of it and you’ve washed his paws but he’s still doing it’. 
9.9 Object and subject of care - collective identities 
The highly perceptive canine sense of smell and prowess in olfactory 
detection enable a human-animal collaboration that advances medical 
exploration of Type 1 diabetes and improves lifestyle management and security 
for the members of this group, provided that the human collective are able to 
commit fully to the dog’s health and welfare as well as to their own. Each 
person in a collective of humans and nonhumans is ‘simultaneously an object 
and a subject of care’, writes Myriam Winance (2010: 95), discussing disability 
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and care, wheelchairs, and those hoping for rehabilitation: there is opportunity 
and need for ‘care in shared work’ dispersed among the multispecies group.  
Chatjouli (2013: 88) encapsulates - through research in Greece with 
thalassaemics, people who inherit a particular form of anaemia - the way in 
which ‘a biosocial approach to studying emerging biologies, normalities and 
socialities in diverse contexts enables us to better understand the ways in which 
new biotechnologies interact with socio-cultural forces...’. In Type 1 diabetes, as 
in thalassaemic disease, research participants form and share a collective 
identity and their participation in local and national community congregations 
‘facilitates the exchange of knowledge and experience’ which may lead to 
improved treatments and more considered research and support.  
Exchanging ‘insider’ information - about pumps and pens, multispecies 
travel abroad, canine behaviour with young children and blood-testing, or how 
best to inform a knowledge-thirsty public keen to understand what the canine 
companion is doing for the human, and occasionally vice versa - enables the 
continuous melding of the very different human and nonhuman individuals 
congregating under the banner of Type 1 diabetes, into a cooperative, 
collaborative and caring progressive community – a group of multispecies 
members whose collective identity enables a welcomed sense of belonging.  
The group members become an amoebic shape-changing phenomenon, 
continually developing and reforming through trial and test of shared 
information, or increase or decrease in attendance numbers, in order to cope 
more easily with the intricacies of life with chronic illness. Newly-advertised 
glucose tablets, most easily absorbed and quick-acting carbohydrates, blood 
glucose monitors, instructive courses and the like provide foundation for 
dialogue and communication among both the recently-joined and more 
permanent members of the group.  
Items and moments of irritation and frustration with health professionals 
are recalled: 
...you don’t want to tell these people anything because as far as 
they’re concerned, you don’t count. I get better reception when I 
talk to nurses than when seeing a doctor because the nurse is 
more understanding and inclined to steer you in the right direction, 
and then you go and see the doctor. 
But nurses are allowed to have a 15-20 minute appointment slot 
for you, and the GPs have a 5-minute slot and you can only go in 
with one issue – how can anybody know the emotional, 
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psychological, you know...the doctors just look at the 
symptoms...(fingers drum on the table)...however, we can’t 
complain about the treatment we have now... 
As with many who care for, or are cared-for by others, there is 
willingness to welcome new entrants to the ‘fold’ and I am frequently asked if I 
will be attending one or other gathering, if I would like to travel with others to a 
particular destination and what topic I would like to discuss with them.  
There is a generosity of spirit that becomes visual, almost tactile, in this 
multispecies community; the dogs are amicable towards one another and 
towards the human complement, while the human contingent make obvious the 
pride and respect they hold for their canine companions – the prowess 
observed in rapid detection of rising or falling blood glucose levels, the condition 
and conformation of their other-than-human home-sharers, the attention paid so 
consistently to preventing hypoglycaemic episodes. There appears to be 
enjoyment in taking responsibility for the welfare of a multi-talented partner, in 
displaying the beneficial and benevolent behaviours created and received, and 
perhaps in sharing status. 
Paul responds to a question asking whether participants feel their dogs 
enhance life or assist in managing it: 
Enhance irrespective, because the dogs give you freedom to do 
stuff. As assistance dogs, they’re there all the time and they keep 
a check on you; any problems they’re there telling you, so it gives 
you more freedom, you’re more relaxed, so it’s got to be 
enhancement. The dog gives you freedom to, you know, be more 
adventurous, to actually go out into the world, rather than being 
shut in, basically, I was shut in. 
He laughs: ‘Oh god, I sound so sad’.  
But inhabiting chronic illness allows for, even expects, the playing of a 
xylophone of emotions, notes struck that are sometimes tuneful, sometimes 
discordant. That Paul is able to appreciate the difference in his life pre- and 
post-Nero’s arrival so graphically, illustrates for me a little of what it must be like 
to be liberated from the squidish tentacles of Type 1 diabetes. 
9.10 Systems of cooperation and mutuality 
Agustin Fuentes (2013: 57) draws attention to the ‘widespread and 
complex patterns of cooperation (that) lie at the heart of human evolutionary 
success’, and follows Nowak and Highfield’s (2011) concept of humans as 
‘SuperCooperators’ whose ‘ability to cooperate goes hand in hand with 
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succeeding in the struggle to survive’ (2011: xviii), by suggesting that human 
societies are all based on extensive and exceedingly complex systems of 
cooperation and mutuality, rendering any consistently selfish behavioural 
strategy unsustainable. 
‘Humans are the selfish apes...the creatures who shun the needs of 
others...we are motivated by self-interest alone’ (Nowak and Highfield, 2011: 
xiii)... yet, claim the authors, creatures of every persuasion and level of 
complexity cooperate to live, including the meerkats ‘who risk their lives to 
guard a communal nest’. As Nowak and Highfield suggest, these complex 
systems appear to work equally for nonhuman animal societies and for the 
collaborative and unselfish interspecies communities of which the group under 
discussion is but one.  
Cooperation and mutuality underlie the co-existences of the medical 
assistance dog and the health-impaired human. Compassion, even altruism, 
could not survive in their midst, were the practices of unselfish care not actively 
performed. Practices that include care for self, care for the assistant alert dog, 
mutual care based on an interspecies symbiotic co-existence, and the care 
practices occurring in social and institutional organisations, among health teams 
and hospital staff. 
9.11 Communication and understanding 
 Dogs may not offer many vocal contributions to the researcher’s learning 
but an ethnographer’s field observation of the personalities of any canine 
character generally allows time and space at least to attempt to view and hear - 
occasionally smell and touch - and to interpret canine efforts to hold 
interspecies conversation. Similarly, Hurn (2012: 213) considers that there will 
always be 'a need for someone to "speak for" animal persons on a political or 
legal stage'. Donovan contends that ‘we use much the same mental and 
emotional activities in reading an animal as we do in reading a human. Body 
language, eye movement, facial expression, tone of voice ... helps us to know 
about the species’ habits and culture’ (Donovan, 2006: 321).  
 In the world of dogs, the gaze, the interval-barks of the lonely, the 
repetitive monotone barks of the deaf, the pointing of direction, the wag of a tail 
or curl of a lip, and the posturing play-bow are among familiar communication 
signals to which we easily react, often physically as well as verbally. Vivid 
examples of canine communication appear in the writings of David Goode 
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(2007: 30), who describes himself as ‘an available playmate’ in his dog, Katie’s 
‘reckoning’, but who also confesses to embarrassment at his ‘babyish’ verbal 
responses to her communications. 
 Coulter (2016a: 34) suggests that ‘effective understanding and exchange 
is not automatic, but rather requires continuous reflection, control, 
augmentation, and adjustments to promote understanding’.  Taking ‘the dog’ for 
a walk is mind-numbingly dull for both species if there is no communication, no 
recognition of previous enjoyable experience, no sharing of play strategies, no 
effort to instigate social interaction and conversation. Such lack of 
communication could also lead to the perpetuation of a sense of otherness, a 
perception of distance or indeed a concept of distancing. 
 Highly-attuned communication methods are essential between trainer 
and potential assistance dog. Because the former has learned over time to 
recognise varying signs and signals given and received by dogs in 
conversation, the knowledge gained from such experiences can be employed to 
augment training methods and practices, and produce significant dialogue that 
may be understood and responded to by both species. 
Human actors in this chronically ill grouping recognise what some of 
them term ‘the sulk’, the refusal to alert because it seems that a voice has been 
raised too loudly or signals performed in the previous alert have been ignored; 
they witness the enthusiastic nose-to-tail body language exhibited when all 
members of the multispecies family are shepherded together, or the firm nudge 
that means ‘you need to check your blood sugar levels now’; the anxiety 
denoted by the angle of the ears or seen in the tightly-clamped tail curved under 
a lowered body, and the joy displayed out of doors when cavorting freely in the 
company of human or nonhuman others. In their recognition of the meaning 
embedded in their partners’ attitude and behaviour, the human companions, as 
best they can, comprehend canine communication and become openly 
empathic and caring about the other’s offered dialogue and way of well-being.  
In Czerny’s words, ‘the flow of dog knowledge ... informs the practices of 
humans’ as exemplified between ‘police dogs and their handlers, service dogs 
and their owners, and sniffer dogs and doctors’ (2012: 13).  
Travelling with an MDD instructor and her in-training companion, Jessie, 
to visit a client, I learn the background that brought Gill to the charity. Her career 
started with Guide Dogs and the-then Dogs for the Disabled, first as a kennel 
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staff member and then dog-trainer. After 11 years, she continued working with 
dogs but this time in a prison with drug-scenting dogs.  
You have an active and a passive dog; the passive one searches 
people so that anybody coming into the prison including staff are 
searched; the pro-active dog searches cells, vehicles, workshops, 
everywhere else, and the one I had was trained on mobile phones 
as well so he could find mobile phones, SIM cards, chargers, any 
part of a mobile phone (cf. Horowitz, 2016: 20). 
She worked with the drug-detecting dogs for several years but then her 
working environment became ‘very violent’ and demoralising. ‘You’re taught not 
to trust anyone but I was lucky that I had my dogs and could trust them day-in, 
day-out – they were my pals.’ Czerny’s earlier examples as to how the ‘flow of 
dog knowledge ...informs the practices of humans’ (2012: 13) is exemplified in 
this instructor’s close social and working relationships with the dogs of her 
different vocations. 
It is the image of ‘flow’ that is significant - the ongoing movement of 
information, the fluid circulation of intent and meaning, a stream of unspoken 
but graphic language pouring into the consciousness of an accepting other 
species. 
Sara recalls Apple wanting to get on her as yet unmade bed, but 
‘knowing’ he could not until a throw was laid over the bedding: 
He’s standing there and keeps looking as if to say ‘are you going 
to make this then? You know I’m waiting here’; he stands (she 
demonstrates Apple’s head tilted upwards and to one side at the 
bed’s edge) as if to say ‘you know where I want to go’. It’s almost 
like I can read him. 
On another occasion, Mel actively describes the sports in which her child 
is now able to participate: we are sitting at the dining table on which lie the 
‘carbs and cals’ book, our coffee mugs, and my recording equipment and 
notebooks. She explains how she tried to manage swimming lessons with all 
the necessities that normally accompany a traveller with diabetes – the monitor, 
pen and test strips, the jelly babies and extra food and drink – and the additional 
food, water, rewards, bowls, jacket and lead that accompany Gemma; and then 
the swimming towels and extra clothing for the children.  
I enquire rather tentatively how the swimming lessons progressed and 
Mel starts to speak: 
I just...er Gemma, no, stop...(Gemma has climbed onto the table 
and is sitting on the voice recorder)...off, madam, go on the floor, 
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you’re a dog... (Mel then pretends to speak for Gemma) 'I’m not, 
I’m one of the family...’, (Mel to Gemma) I know you’re beautiful, 
yes... (Mel to me) so she’s erm very clever, (then to Gemma) 
‘aren’t you’? 
Fittingly relevant to Gemma’s position in the family, Franklin suggests 
that ‘animals are just as good as people for the expression of love and 
attachment and they are equally good at asserting their agency in human 
households’, whether as medical assistants or as ‘one of the family’ (2006: 
148). 
Listening to Mel’s 'dialogue' with Gemma, I realise that all the human 
participants addressed their canine companions as if they were capable of 
understanding their words and in turn, endeavoured to translate canine 
communication into English. They frequently attempted to take what they 
anthropomorphically considered to be the dog’s perspective which helped them 
to understand why certain behaviours occur in their homes and in public. In 
addition to an emotional contiguity, they seem to take a commonsense 
approach often egomorphically (Milton, 2005) sharing a single identity to explain 
social occurrences, for example, using the plural ‘we’ as do mothers to their 
babies and nurses to their patients, exhibiting deep signs of attachment and 
attunement.  
However, Cynthia Willett (2014: 38) maintains, as do many who live and 
work with animals, ‘animals are not like our children; they are like us’, a 
reflection of Milton's (2005: 261) inclusive egomorphism. Willett suggests 
animals ‘are not vulnerable sites of protection and recipients of human 
sympathy, but kindred political agents in their own right with interlocking 
histories, cultures, and technologies’ (2014: 38).  
 Leslie Irvine (2004: s129) draws attention to our assignation of individual 
traits, preferences and personalities to dogs we know so that they become, in 
Sanders’ words (2003: 410), ‘much more than a breed or species 
representative’. Often the identity of the person walking with a dog in public 
takes on the identity of the dog in the eyes of the observer so that the man 
accompanying his medical alert dog gains a shared status. Together they may 
attract a united nomenclature reminiscent of Michalko’s ‘two in one in 
blindness’, or become, for example, the ‘sniffer-dog man we saw on the bus’; or 
of course Coetzee’s Lurie who becomes a ‘dog-man’ in Disgrace (1999) and ‘a 
guardian of animal souls’ (Willett, 2014: 156). 
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Just as the dog is the likely topic of conversation with strangers or friends 
in the park, so he or she becomes the prominent and symbolic representative of 
both the chronic illness and of the human companion – and of the charity: 
weighty responsibilities for a creature caring for another, without verbal 
communication skills. 
 The medical alert assistance dogs learn through continuing education, 
through a sharing of emotion and experience, through their acute sensory 
perception, to know their human partners' bodies better than they do 
themselves.  Through the close relationships, narrated and described here, the 
dogs are perceived as becoming part of the human body and may therefore be 
considered to have reached a peak, if not the pinnacle, of Ingold and Palsson's 
(2013) 'biosocial becomings'.  The trans-species partnership becomes greater 
than the sum of their parts as individual selves. Mol's porosity of the body 
(2004) and Vaisman's (2013) embodied identities and differing perspectives 
share an image both of momentum and change.  
 Vaisman (2013) cites Viveiros de Castro's observations of Amazonian 
societies who perceive the world as inhabited by 'different sorts of subjects or 
persons, human and nonhuman, that apprehend reality from distinct points of 
view' (2012: 45). Following Viveiros de Castro, Vaisman (2013: 107) writes that 
'animals see themselves as humans, they see their food as human food, they 
see their social system as organized in the same way as human culture, and 
they see humans as animals or prey'. By this means, 'animals see the same 
way we do different things because their bodies are different from ours' 
(Viveiros de Castro, 1998: 478 in Vaisman, 2013: 115). This notion of bodies 
refers to the 'affects, dispositions and capacities' (2013: 115), the skills and 
situations of life that make up Bourdieu's (1977) habitus; they are not just 
physical objects but 'assemblages' of experiences and emotions. 
 The assistance dog self and the human self have a single shared identity 
and two separate identities. Borrowing Vaisman's 'Magic Eye' illustration, for 
example, the question of seeing either a horse's head or a frog in a drawing, 
depends on your perspective, but once both individuals are sighted, neither will 
become a fixed, static image. Perception is altered and it becomes impossible 
not to see one without the other. As Vaisman (2013: 122) suggests, alternative 
ways of perceiving are becoming more meaningful and require increased 
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development for a better-enabled existence in our fast-changing technological 
and scientific world. 
9.12 Welfare concerns 
 When I remarked on the welcoming attitudes shown me by all the human 
and nonhuman participants, Terry said they were all proud of their dogs and the 
charity puts great care into the ‘matching’ process beginning with a human-only 
interview before human training takes place over several days at varying 
intervals in the training centre. This is to ensure the client's commitment to 
continue training and take full responsibility for the dog’s welfare is accepted 
and understood. 
The charity is fast expanding, say the participants, but it hasn’t lost the 
‘family feel’, something the staff members appear keen to encourage and 
maintain. ‘Everybody knows everybody and they’re nice – it’s not growing so 
fast that they lose touch’ (with the interspecies partners the charity has brought 
together). There are meetings at the training centre where administrative staff (I 
am informed that ‘people love coming to work here’), human and canine clients, 
trainers and volunteers, get together to discuss improved ways of living with 
chronic illness, gain news of the charity’s diverse health investigations sourced 
from canine olfactory capabilities, and to learn from one another what works 
well or doesn’t, ways to keep the dog actively wanting to alert accurately, and 
things to avoid in nutrition, when travelling or when surrounded by interested 
strangers in the supermarket. 
The following excerpts from narratives show human care and concern for 
nonhuman partner welfare. Janet takes on the work of monitoring her blood 
sugar levels when Alfie has ‘free’ time: 
Alfie’s the first (of the multispecies family) to be fed because I 
always like to feed him two hours before we go out for a walk to 
make sure he’s digested his meal properly. He does alert when 
we’re out but I think this is his time – he’s free then and because 
he sniffs everything, there are deer, pheasants, rabbits, he gets 
very caught up in the scents so I monitor myself then. 
Janet explains how Alfie was enabled to cater for her lack of hypo-
awareness and to continue his alerting practices when she spent time in 
hospital for the birth of her child: 
What was amazing was that they let Alfie stay with me. The 
nursing staff offered to find me a side room so that he could stay. 
He did find it incredibly boring and looked as if he was questioning 
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‘why are we here?’ but my mum took him out for walks and things, 
because the nursing staff obviously couldn’t take responsibility for 
his care. 
 I ask Janet how Alfie has coped with the change in his position in the 
household hierarchy and she says that they have had to try and do things to 
boost him: ‘Three times a week he and I go out together so that it’s just our 
time’. We watch her baby’s determined efforts to crawl; face on the carpet, 
bottom in the air, a lot of pushing and stretching but it doesn’t come together 
and he rolls onto his back. ‘Alfie’s hair gets everywhere...we’re teaching the 
baby not to grab hair so much – Alfie would move away before, but I think he 
knows now that it’s not being nasty; we keep all their interactions as being very 
positive...I praise Alfie for being good around the baby’.  
Paul keeps Nero in close proximity during hospital consultations. Only 
when x-rays are being taken, does he have to wait for Paul on the other side of 
the door because of radiation risk. Natasha recalls Nero not wanting to settle 
with her: 
Paul was out 10 minutes, maybe 15, and Nero’s nose was going, 
his ears were going, he’d lay down but he was alert, you know, the 
whole time, licking, and once for about two seconds, he put his 
head on his paws and I thought, okay he’s going to settle down 
now, but somebody made a noise and that was it. 
 ‘He comes in when I have my eyes checked; wherever I go, he goes’. 
They walk together into medical consultations in the same way that they walk 
into shops but, Paul considers, ‘probably more people stop you in the hospital 
than they do in the shops’. 
Talking of pain or injury affecting dogs, Paul remarks their tolerance of 
human behaviours, whether or not these are actions demonstrating care for 
canine welfare: 
That’s the trouble with dogs; you never really know how bad they 
are because they cover it up with so much.  He just, you know, the 
times I’ve had my hand halfway down his throat pulling bits of 
bread out or when he’s stuffed down something he’s found in the 
field, and he just stands there, not trying to shut his mouth, just 
looking at me as if to say ‘please let me have it’ ... I could get into 
his dinner-bowl, take a bone off him, he’s just brilliant. 
The concern shown for Nero’s welfare seems constant. Paul and 
Natasha worry that Nero may pick up and eat something with pesticide on, or 
drink from a puddle that might have ‘antifreeze or some chemical in it’ when 
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he’s free-running in the fields, and they empty his mouth by hand if they can’t 
tell whether or not he has ingested something toxic. Nero’s teeth are brushed 
regularly, his coat groomed frequently, his pads checked for thorns or splinters, 
and his weight watched to maintain good health.  
His human family feed him in three bowls at every meal, each amount 
weighed and set down only after he has eaten the first, sat and waited for the 
second bowl, and repeated the performance for the third quantity. They hope 
this will help him to slow down his eating behaviour as he gulps the food at 
speed, and risks gastric torsion, a serious condition in which the stomach 
revolves closing the entrance and constricting blood circulation, thereby causing 
a gas build-up and extreme bloating – death can follow torsion, so the human 
carers are wise in their preventative endeavours on Nero’s behalf. He is given 
carrot, interspersed with more special rewards for good alerting performances, 
and the weight - which he ‘put on’ over three months when the kitchen scales, 
thought to be accurately weighing his kibbles, proved erroneous and allowed 
him a third extra pellets at every meal! – is slowing disappearing. 
When we got him he was 37.2 kilograms which is a lovely weight 
for him to be, and since then we’ve managed to keep him pretty 
much where he was...but he was losing a little bit of his waist so 
he went on the scales at the vet and it was 42.4kg [because of the 
additional kibbles]. He’s now down to 41.2. 
Nero’s between-meals snacks involve carrot and cucumber: 
If you give him a chunk of cucumber, he just looks at it, but if you 
slice it, he chews it. But it’s the opposite with carrot, if you give 
him a slice of carrot, he goes ‘what’s that, there’s nothing there’ – 
he likes the whole thing and crunches it. He likes apple too, but 
we’ve stopped giving it because it’s so sugary. 
Tina’s humour combines a sort of gallows-glee and a genuine willingness 
to share moments of hilarity and warmth. Recalling a previous hypoglycaemic 
collapse, she assumes Harley alerted her as she remembers going into a 
supermarket to buy chocolate after a day at work and sitting on a bench at the 
bus-stop. ‘I didn’t know how to do my blood or even eat the chocolate but one 
lady saw Harley was barking and licking my face and she stopped’.  
Tina woke up on the hospital resuscitation table and the medical staff 
immediately asked ‘what time do you feed your dog?’ Tina replied: 
Only at 6’clock, we’ll be home by then; it’s only 5pm now so we’ve 
got plenty of time. They said ‘it’s 8 o’clock’ and I went ‘ooh, don’t 
worry, he’ll be alright’ but they ordered him two meat 
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sandwiches...but they didn’t feed me! I’m diabetic in coma but they 
didn’t give me owt! (she laughs at the memory). But they were 
really taken with him and the ambulance man says ‘I know you 
Harley, you’re a good lad’ and I said ‘where do you know him 
from?’ and he says he picked me up earlier on and repeats ‘what 
a good dog, there were no way he were going to go with anyone 
else, just with you’. 
 No matter the degree of collaboration and friendship developed over 
time, the partnership will eventually draw to some form of conclusion, 
occasionally because the human's blood sugar levels become more balanced 
due to evolving mechanistic technology, or because secondary illnesses take 
up prime medical positioning. However, most often the interspecies 
collaboration will end because signs emerge in the dog that exhibit diminishing 
good health and an increasing inability to recognise extreme blood sugar levels 
through the sense of smell. 
10 Endings and 'ethical decision-making' 
10.1  No longer useful? 
 Natasha responds to this question: 
...if Paul’s blood ends up being really, really stable and Nero 
doesn’t have a job to do, it leads to the question of what happens 
to him because technically he then probably shouldn’t be a fully-
trained medical alert assistance dog out in public – but of course, 
he’s never been left alone at home, he’s always had someone 
with him 24/7. 
 Paul joins in: 
Obviously I am still diabetic and there are going to be times when, 
providing he gets a bit stronger on the alert signals, I don’t think 
there will be a problem. It’s one of those things; every time there’s 
a change, it knocks the dogs. So before, when I had all the 
problems with the other illness, it knocked him so he reacted 
differently, which meant he had to go back and be retrained... 
 Natasha: 
And that had another, different effect:  Nero came back and the 
bonding was much better because he was like ‘you’re back, you 
really belong to me, and I really belong to you’. The connection 
between them has really strengthened since I was away and he’s 
got very little respect for me now.  
He’s not disrespectful in that he’s naughty or anything but I really 
have to get his attention or tell him something three times before 
he takes any notice of me. Before I went away last year, I’d only 
got to look at him and lift a finger or say just one word – in fact he 
was much more obedient to me than he ever was to Paul – but 
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because they had no choice but to be together all the time while I 
was away, the bond had completely shifted when I got back. 
 Paul is not a ‘collapsing’ diabetic so finds his ‘biggest problem is that I 
think I can cope with this, I can manage, and I look around and see other 
people and think they’re so much worse off than I am...’ He is concerned that he 
could be taking Nero away from a partnership that really needs him, when ‘in 
actual fact, I really need him’.  Natasha confirms this, adding that without Nero, 
Paul would have ‘no reason to get up in the morning because he gets up to feed 
him and take him for a walk round the village which he would not do on his 
own’.  
 Leslie Irvine (2013: 140) records a similar reasoning in her research on 
homeless people and their animal companions when Tommy speaks of his dog, 
Monty, helping him ‘with’ depression: 
He makes me come out and walk with other people. He gets me 
socializing with other people. ... He gives me energy because he 
can make me get out and walk. 
 Nero and Monty may be identified as life-changers, as good companions, 
as social facilitators but, particularly, they are motivators who help channel 
idling thoughts or feelings into beneficial actions. Whether suffering from 
depression or from Type 1 diabetes, and the latter illness is likely to incorporate 
depression as a fluctuating symptom, the dogs provide animated 
encouragement to ‘do’ something positive, to move onwards to better things. 
10.2 Recycling 
Jan Shillum (2016: 23), writing in the charity’s magazine, The Sniff, tells 
of a ‘new’ matching between a diabetes alert dog, who became ‘redundant’ 
when his MDD partner’s circumstances changed, and an individual whose first 
canine partnership ‘didn’t work out’. A charity instructor worked with the 
‘redundant’ dog to ‘retrain’ him to his new partner’s ‘hyper and hypo odour and 
range, which is below 5mmol and above 15mmol – slightly different to his 
previous partner.’ This newly-evolved partnership is developing successfully in 
terms of attachment and alerting, giving both more opportunity for a healthy 
symbiotic relationship and providing an ‘example of recycling a ... four-legged 
resource’. 
 The concept of recycling the dog was cause for deeper thought: recycling 
instantly produced mental images of waste disposal centres and artefacts 
  
248 
 
contrived from melded others, leading on to further contemplation of a DAD as 
potentially faulty, disposable equipment. However, the ‘proof of the pudding’ 
was demonstrated in the renewed purpose provided for a trained and willing 
medical alert assistant whose new employment, albeit in accordance with 
Srinivasan’s ‘anthropogenic norms’ (2013: 114), has reinvigorated the health 
and social life of his formerly reclusive, mobility-impaired partner. The latter has 
gained a personal companion whose attention is consistently directed towards 
him and who provides him with the best practices of care available to her. In this 
instance, ‘recycling’ has less of a cold and metallic feel, more of warm and re-
entangled ‘knotting’ of lives (Haraway, 2008: vii).  
 The DAD may be a device, but not in the manner that glucometers or 
dialysis machines, for example, are cold, impersonal and yet vitally assistive. 
The alerting dog is warm-blooded, a very personal partner and vital in both 
senses of the word – vital in being regarded as essential and of high 
importance, but also vital in feeling alive and warm, physically and emotionally 
sentient.  
Jeannette Pols and Ingunn Moser (2009: 159), in an analysis comparing 
robotic companion animals, viewed in a documentary, with ‘ethnographic 
material about a particular care technology’ the Health Buddy, have drawn 
alternative meaning from ‘cold technologies versus warm care’ suggesting there 
is no opposition between them,. The robot AIBO dog, who is able to supply 
entertainment for the inhabitants of a residential home, can refuse to do a 
requested action and instead is programmed to offer a different behaviour. It is 
said to offer ‘affective appeal’ (2009: 169) that cannot be matched by the 
speaking robot cat who provides certain services but is unable to interact 
successfully, nor as warmly. However, the Health Buddy technology does 
provide an important communication system between a patient at home and a 
nurse in a hospital and, according to Pols and Moser, ensures a feeling of 
safety and being well looked-after despite the distance between the 
independent patient and the offered care. They conclude that ‘warm and cold, 
rational and affective, medical and social, technological and social, are not 
opposites’ (2009: 176), but differently aligned in different practices. 
However accurate their findings, which demonstrate the ability of cold or 
warm devices to suit a variety of contexts, the option of having a consistently 
warm and proximate companion, who can act and react in multiple situations 
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and locations, may have more appeal to the chronically ill than a ‘novelty item’ 
that may be discarded under a chair once its repertoire becomes prosaic and its 
activities, limited. 
10.3 Replacing 
No-one wants to think about replacing an affectionate, sentient 
companion who has shared a home and a lifetime, with a new, ‘other’ dog, with 
a necessarily alien usurper, but it happens. Whether through curtains of tears or 
a stoic determination, this event takes place in homes countrywide and is of 
prime importance to the human participants with whom I have conversed in this 
research.  Daniel Miller’s (2008: 105) chapter, ‘Talk to the dog’, articulates one 
of the street's residents' regret that his dog Jeff would not ‘be with him much 
longer’ because of his advancing years. He records Jeff's annoyance at a 
visiting fortune teller’s ‘presumption’ in predicting his future meeting with ‘a 
brown Labrador’; Miller gets the ‘feeling that Harry no more wants to talk in 
terms of Jeff’s replacement than one would of replacing a wife or a child whose 
demise looks imminent’ (2008: 105).  
It is this emotional ‘replacement’ concern that makes me hesitant to 
broach questions about DAD futures. However, Terry brings up the topic of 
Jim’s working life: 
He’s almost five so we’re halfway through his working life and now 
I’ve got to start thinking along the lines of a replacement. I’m 
getting on and when he retires, I won’t want a big dog, and not 
one that’s too young either, as I will have to exercise a new dog 
myself. It will depend on whether the charity has anything 
physically available, possibly one of the smaller spaniel breeds. 
The diabetes alert dogs’ sense of smell is so good that they 
probably can go on working for longer but if they get arthritis or 
limp a bit, the charity would have to say they’re sorry but you can’t 
use the dog any more. The thing is that you can’t put a jacket 
advertising the charity onto a dog and then go out shopping or 
whatever when the dog is obviously unwell, limping or seems to 
be in pain. 
 Serpell et. al. (2010: 502) suggest the following in their recommendations 
for ethical decision-making regarding therapy animals: 
Animals that, due to age or other reasons, become unduly 
stressed, should have their service scaled back or eliminated 
entirely. Attention should also be given to transition the animal as 
s/he begins to retire. This will help with the animal's sense of 
wellness. 
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Val explains the MDD policy regarding dogs who are no longer able to 
work as alerting dogs and I learn that 
in the case of placing a successor dog with an existing client, if 
they are not in a position to home two dogs, we would discuss 
with the individual whether it is better to wait until the elderly dog 
has passed over, or if this is not viable, in the case of an MDD-
owned dog, we would support the client by finding a foster home 
for the dog until the dog passes away. 
In response to my question about change of owner, Val says that a 
fostered, no longer working dog, would remain in the ownership of Medical 
Detection Dogs for the rest of his or her life. 
Terry continues talking about the possibilities for Jim's future: 
This is where your animate or inanimate become the same. When 
my wheelchair is starting to wear out, I will get rid of it; when our 
dog stops working or becomes unreliable with the blood sugars, I 
will have to replace him; and living here, I couldn’t cope with two 
dogs, that would be my problem. So in that way he is then being 
treated as a piece of equipment, even though he’s a warm-
blooded live creature. 
 I very tentatively pose the next question: ‘in that case, if you couldn’t 
cope with two dogs here, what would you do?’  There is a moment of silence 
and Terry, looking forlorn already, hesitates before speaking:  
I don’t know – that’s why it was such a shock this morning to think 
that he’s five – the average age for a dog of this size is 10-12, not 
like the smaller ones who go on to live for 15 or 16 years 
and I realise that despite his earlier remarks about ‘robots’, he is thinking 
of Jim as his long-term sentient companion and not of the length of time that he 
would continue to work as an animated piece of equipment.  
They holiday together - ‘the chair allows me to go out and he (Jim) 
makes me comfortable’ - and to increase his fitness, Terry has been extending 
the length of time he is able to push himself in the wheelchair: 
I wouldn’t have had the confidence to push myself for 49 miles 
without having him to check my sugar levels.  I could have 
stopped and used the machine, but what draws people’s 
attention? Me getting out the kit and stabbing myself, or stopping 
for a dog and putting my hand close to his nose? Nobody ever 
noticed it being done and I didn’t bother testing because he was 
convinced.  
There is pride in his voice as he states ‘I wouldn’t have done it without 
him’.  
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After my old dog, I said I’m never having another dog because it 
hurts and no dog will ever take his place. But he does (he points 
to Jim); he’s just kicked the hole into a different shape, made it his 
shape instead of the previous dog’s. 
Some, like Mel, chose their assistance dogs as puppies for family 
companionship and only later discovered their sensitivity to odours of illness 
and their aptitude for medical alert assistance dog training; other participants 
selected their alert dogs from those who were fostered and socialised by 
volunteers before training by the charity.  
In all cases, bonds of friendship developed throughout the entangled 
lives so that when it seemed likely that these could be broken in the not-too-
distant future, anticipatory grief began to swirl and spiral like smoke from a 
November bonfire. Anticipatory grief can become a doom-laden cloud, evasive 
but ever-present. Susan Dawson (2010: 73) examines this form of grief which 
‘may begin when there is a threat of loss or of disruption of the bond’ between 
the human and nonhuman companions. Emotion weighs heavy over the 
prospective death of a close relationship. Human voices whisper so dogs 
cannot hear what might be treacherous conversations and human eyes avoid 
contact with those of the dogs for fear of emotional reflection or possible 
contagion.  
Like Jim, Alfie is also more than five years old and on my second visit, I 
ask Janet if the charity has spoken to her about what might happen when his 
scenting ability slows and he has to stop working. 
Mmm, yeah...MDD say they would retire a dog who is achieving 
less than 50% of the alerts, so erm, yes, he would retire and be a 
pet, and then I would be given a choice either to have another dog 
to train alongside Alfie or to just wait and start afresh. (She frowns 
and takes a deep breath.) Erm, I’d probably wait and start 
afresh...mmn, I don’t know.  
10.4 What next for human-canine biomedical collaboration?  
 What do the dogs gain from my interest in their work as medical 
assistants and in their lives as one-half of an interspecies coexistence, a close 
companion in a shared identity? So often multispecies ethnography portrays, 
understandably, the human view of the nonhuman animal subject but there is 
need for the canine perspective in order to bring balance to the research. Karen 
Emmerman (2014: 161) records her ecofeminist approach to ‘inter-animal 
conflicts which is non-hierarchical, pluralist about moral significance and 
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contextualized’ in order to ‘obtain as full a picture as possible of what is at stake 
for all parties’. Participant observation allows an experiencing of other lives 
instead of distant perception; it enables the physical reality of ‘I wouldn’t have 
believed it if I hadn’t been there and seen it for myself’. But that is still a human 
experiencing of those lives. By examining what the dogs do in their everyday 
roles as medical assistants, by watching their communications with their own 
and other species, and by listening to polyvocal dialogues deciphering canine 
behaviours and human responses to those activities, I have attempted to ‘bring 
in’ diabetes alert dog perspectives and make more lucid their impact on 
multispecies families and on the possibilities of biotherapeutic and biomedical 
research.   
 Lynda Birke (2009: 2) questions whether or not we better the world for 
animals: she pleads for scholars to ‘pause, to ask more overtly what the animals 
might think about what we do, about whether who they are, really informs our 
work?’ It would be possible to reject research projects for ethical reasons if they 
were to risk the welfare of the animals in focus, she suggests, but to do 
research studies that result in animals becoming ‘empowered’ is less simple. It 
is to be hoped that, at least in some respects, the diabetes alert dogs have 
gained more tangible and visible credibility through exposure of their work in 
these pages.  
Hurn (2012: 211), like Birke, asks what animals gain from human 
research into their lives.  What choice might an assistance dog make if given 
the opportunity to voice words in language understandable by humans? 
Whatever the answer and however phrased, the result is still derived from an 
anthropocentric imagining. A dog’s rose-tinted image might endorse the release 
of their species’ members from any form of cage, whether bars of a crate, walls 
of a house or fences round farmland or prison; and the forbidding of any future 
milling or manufacturing of puppies for sale, so that castration and spaying, and 
culling to reduce numbers, become historical applications and the hundreds of 
thousands of unwanted dogs are lessened in number and become persons who 
are cherished. Like humans who care and are cared for, dogs could be given 
opportunity to demonstrate more widely their capabilities, the possibilities they 
offer that enable them to be recognised and trusted presences in the world. 
Alternatively, the human-admired and respected medical alert assistance 
dog might well feel that the mutual healthful gain of both species provides 
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sufficient means of a comfortable and caring survival in which the loss of total 
freedom in terms of space, reproduction or hunting, may be balanced by the 
provision of food, shelter, friendship, entertainment and daily off-leash 
exploration of field and forest, with and without multispecies companionships. 
Franklin reminds that the companion animal, no longer an inferior ‘pet’ animal, 
‘ushers in the potential for greater mutual becomings’ as both dogs and humans 
in this instance, ‘explore even more possibilities of co-presence’ (2006: 137). 
Tolerance and trust seem prominent features of mutual co-existences, where 
care for each other’s wellbeing includes empathy and ‘touching comfort’ 
(Haraway, 2008: 202-204). 
 What this shared identity, this mutualistic coexistence, brings to the fore 
is the concept of caring, the carer and the cared-for in a reciprocal relationship 
that neither might have ever known or conceived of without the constant 
presence of chronic illness and its particular odours, and the embodied care 
essential to its ongoing presence. The interspecies partners are not locked into 
nor entrapped by an illness such as Type 1 diabetes in the sense of an 
overpowering need to escape, but rather they make up an entanglement of 
bodies and minds that challenges and encourages, that evokes new learnings 
and new ‘situated knowledges’ so that life can go on with meaning, with 
purpose significant to the relatings but also recognisable and acceptable to 
society. 
 Referring to the human exploitation or extinction of animals, Taylor 
(2017: 218) suggests that it is time to take responsibility for those with whom 
'we have co-evolved': 
We could take seriously the ways domesticated animals contribute 
to our lives and world, in ways that don't involve slaughter. We 
could recognize our mutual dependence, our mutual vulnerability, 
and our mutual drive for life.  
Although referencing multiple research studies to clarify and explain 
anthrozoological thinking and current sociological theories relating to health and 
illness, an objective throughout has been to evidence contemporary application 
of mutual care practices and to put forward examples of ‘doing Type 1 
diabetes’. The intention being that others may learn of the highly complex 
routines and disturbances that affect the shared daily lives of those 
collaborating in, limited by, and embodying chronic illness: and additionally, how 
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unsettled lives are smoothed and shaped within an acceptable, albeit somewhat 
speciesist, symbiotic ethics of care.  
The collaboration between the dogs of olfactory biomedical detection 
ability and the humans, who train them in practices that advantage individuals 
with corporeal inabilities, combines to produce a mutualistic ethics of care and 
care practice that provides a living sensory resource of future use to the 
chronically ill of all populations. The interspecies cooperation performed 
between dog and human offers alternative means to benefit the multispecies 
unwell, without the contested need for invasive, often public, diagnostic 
procedures being conducted at medical and veterinary hospitals. 
 Imagining a diagnostic electronic nose and creating one that functions as 
effectively as that of a dog in multipurpose scent detection, is the aim of 
biotechnologists and engineers who have researched canine nasal airflow 
patterns and produced printed examples (Craven, Paterson and Settles, 2010); 
but while these are valuable models and markers of progress in this field, as yet 
the dogs remain leaders, particularly so in the rapid and sensitive detection of 
illness symptoms.  
 In the introductory paragraphs, I stated that I would principally be 
discussing assistance dogs and their human partners as, apart from the staff 
members, they are the current 'components' of the Medical Detection Dogs 
charity. However, recalling Singer’s definition (1990: 6) that: 
Speciesism ... is a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the 
interests of members of one’s own species and against those of 
members of other species,   
and also bearing in mind that dogs are the particular species incorporated in the 
charity's name, future research might encourage charities similar to MDD to 
consider the inherent speciesism of what they do and promote, and to examine 
the 'use' of other species, not only dogs but perhaps the equally macrosmatic 
pigs, in the diagnosis of illness. As there is now widespread approval of 
APOPO's working rats, such species-collaborative charities might encourage 
change in public perception of other widely stigmatised and abused animals.  
While some breeds of rat become firm friends to their human guardians, 
and Giant African Pouched Rats are optimal sensors of Tb symptoms in sputum 
samples, the latter have personhood that has yet to sit comfortably in a 
domestic mutualistic relationship with a tuberculosis-infected human companion 
  
255 
 
The rats are sensitive and accurate in their diagnostic endeavours, but lack the 
millennia of domestication procedures and interspecies familiarities that 
structure dog and human relating. Only now are they taking up a role in the 
compatible interspecies companionship that is currently enjoyed by dogs and 
humans across much of the world.  
As discussed earlier, pigs are efficient olfactory sensors and expert 
truffle-detectives and they could become accurate sensors of VOCs for 
oncological purpose or for other medical diagnoses. They might take time in 
health assistance training to reach accreditation levels that qualify dogs, but 
companion pigs already share human homes, learn acceptable hygiene 
behaviours and offer good friendship. However, in the UK, the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) currently considers pigs to be 
livestock so their employment, as home-based medical scent-detectives with 
family privileges, remains an ambitious objective. There seems sparse research 
into their ability to scent drugs or explosives, although a Google search 
revealed media stories of accolades to the pig's prowess in that regard. 
 The warm-hearted multispecies companions who have given time and 
space, histories and anecdotes, to this research more than merit the impact of 
their narrations resonating beyond the ink of this text. It is hoped that coffee-
shop conversation may now incorporate the responsive question: ‘what type of 
diabetes does she have?’ and perhaps lead to enquiry as to whether ‘Jenny’ 
may still be hypo-aware, or not. In particular, that the conversation might 
discuss the possibilities for mutual care practices if one partner in the dyad 
embodying chronic illness, is a nonhuman animal and the other, a human one. 
Neither the working assistance dogs nor their unwell partners should be 
marginalised, set aside as being different and ‘other’. Their cooperative 
practices may be complicated and not always fulfilling, but their collaboration in 
olfactory biomedical research to improve the lifestyles and better balance the 
bodies of those unsettled by chronic illness, is innovative and gaining rapid 
acceptance in the fields of health and society.  
I: I’ve attended courses but unless you’re close to someone 
who has diabetes, or you have it yourself, you can’t really 
imagine... 
Terry: To see it (canine medical alert assistance) work gives you 
100 times more than any lecture can give you. My specialist at the 
hospital would rather rely on him than the blood meter, to the point 
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where he says ‘don’t test unless the dog tells you to’. So instead 
of 20 or 30 tests a day, it’s now two or three. 
The diabetes alert dog becomes an ally, an affectionate and loyal friend 
and associate, in addition to acting as a highly efficient diagnostic device which 
may save minutes, hours, days and months, of human life-time. In embodying 
the complexities of chronic illness, the assistance dog is able to restructure the 
performance of that human life.  
Adrian Franklin lists ‘companionship, friendship, love and even 
community’ as words that have been ‘rescued for many through new 
relationships with companion animals’ (2006: 138). Those four words of 
communal involvement may enlist, or be enlisted by, mutual concern and 
empathy, to demonstrate the warmth derived from close multispecies 
cooperation between trans-species partners, whether they work as independent 
dyads or among the collaborative ‘relatings’ (Haraway, 2003: 6-10, for example, 
and Franklin, 2006: 145) or groupings within the charity that has enabled these 
combinations. 
Braidotti’s intense ‘rich new alliances’ (2009: 529) are forged from 
disparate, but willingly congruent, ‘living beings’ (Hurn 2012: 219) co-supporting 
attainment of bettered life within chronic illness’s elastic boundaries, and 
demonstrating what they do in their bonded fellowship and shared identity to 
shape and achieve multispecies ‘mattering’. 
Tina: The dogs go out of their way to help. That’s why when I 
meet people, I say to them tell the charity what you’re having 
difficulties with, because it’s amazing what the dogs can do – and 
they just love it. They just love to be there to care for you, you 
know.  
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